Tag Archives: Jun Zhu

2-4 Unit Properties: Housing’s Middle Child

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photo by Kgbo

The Urban Institute’s Laurie Goodman and Jun Zhu have posted Do Two- to Four-Unit Properties Have Higher Credit Risk? An Analysis of Default and Loss Experience to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Two- to four-family properties make up 19% of all rental housing but receive almost no attention. Using a unique dataset from Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, we show that, for any given set of loan characteristics and compared with one-unit properties, two- to four-unit properties are more likely to default, its owner-occupied (investment) properties are less (more) likely to liquidate, and all two- to four-unit properties are more likely to have a higher loss severity upon liquidation. Historically, these patterns have led to higher losses on two- to four-unit loans. Current tighten credit results in loss rates much closer to those on one-unit owner-occupied properties, indicating that policymakers can relax the credit requirements of two-to-four properties to better serve affordable rental housing.

It is great that the authors are looking at the neglected, middle child of the rental housing market. Providing 19% of the rental housing stock is nothing to sneeze at, even if other segments of the housing stock provide more.

It is particularly interesting to me that owner-occupied 2-4s do better than investor-owned 2-4s in terms of liquidation, even while overall 2-4s are roughly on par with 1-unit owner occupied properties in that regard. There are a lot of other interesting tidbits about this housing stock in the paper, such as the fact that these properties are more likely to be owned by lower-income households and that 2-units have the highest default rates of 1-4 unit properties.

The authors make the case that

though predicted losses on two- to four-unit production are now on par with one-unit owner-occupied properties, the low volume suggests that many borrowers (who are disproportionately likely to be low and moderate income and minority) are getting squeezed out. In the interest of expanding credit to these underserved populations and expanding, or at least preserving, the supply of affordable rental housing, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) could relax the current loan-to-value requirements. If this relaxing were coupled with counseling for landlords, we believe it would make financing more available for this critical part of the market, with little additional risk to the GSEs. (3)

This all sounds good, although I am somewhat skeptical of the claim that reduced financing costs for owners will be passed onto tenants in the form of lower rents or rent increases. There are a lot of factors that go into rent levels, and costs are just one of them. The local demand for housing as well as the competing supply cannot be ignored. Owners may be able to keep all of those reduced financing costs as additional profits, depending on those local conditions.

The main question I am left with after reading the paper is — why haven’t Fannie and Freddie, whose data the paper is based upon, already reached the same conclusion about loosening credit for this type of housing? Do they know something about it that the author’s don’t?

Principal-ed Reduction

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Torn Dollar

 

The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has issued a report, Principal Reduction and the GSEs: The Moment for a Big Impact Has Passed. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) prohibits Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) from unilaterally reducing the principal balance of loans that they guarantee, known as principal reduction. When director Ed DeMarco established the prohibition, he was concerned that reducing principal would cost the GSEs too much, not only in setting up the systems required to implement it, but also— and to him more important — in encouraging borrowers to default in order to receive the benefit. DeMarco’s position generated significant controversy, as advocates viewed principal reduction as a critical tool for reducing borrower distress and pointed out that the program the Obama administration had put forward to provide the relief had largely eliminated the cost to the GSEs, including the moral hazard. We believe that at the time the advocates had the better side of the argument.

The FHFA is now revisiting that prohibition, though in a very different economic environment than the one faced by Director DeMarco. Home prices are up 35.4 percent since the trough in 2011, adding $5 trillion in home equity and reducing the number of underwater homeowners from a peak of 25 percent to 10 percent. This means that far fewer borrowers would likely benefit under a GSE principal reduction program today. (1, footnote omitted)

Principal reduction was highly disfavored at the start of the financial crisis as it was perceived as a sort of giveaway to irresponsible borrowers. Some academics have disputed this characterization, but it probably remains a political reality.

In any event, I think this report has the analysis of the current situation right — the time for principal reduction has passed. But it is worth considering the conditions under which it might be appropriate in the future (for that next crisis, or the one after that). The authors make four  assumptions for a politically feasible principal reduction program:

  1. borrowers must be delinquent at the time the program is announced, in order to avoid the moral hazard of encouraging borrowers to default;
  2. borrowers must be underwater;
  3. the house must be owner-occupied; and
  4. the principal reduction is in the economic interest of Fannie and Freddie.

It is worth noting that during the Great Depression, the federal government figured out ways to reduce the burden of rapidly dropping house prices on lenders and borrowers alike without resorting to principal reduction much. Borrowers benefited from longer repayment terms and lower interest rates. Below-market interest rates are similar to principal reduction because they also reduce monthly costs for borrowers. They are also politically more feasible. It would be great to have a Plan B stored away at the FHFA, the FHA and the VA that outlines a systematic response to a nation-wide drop in housing prices. It could involve principal reduction but it does not need to.

Homeowners Heading to Pottersville?

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Lionel_Barrymore_as_Mr._Potter

Mr. Potter from It’s A Wonderful Life

The Urban Institute has issued a report, Headship and Homeownership: What Does The Future Hold? The report opens,

Homeownership rates averaged around 64 percent until about 1990, when they began to climb dramatically, reaching 67.3 percent in 2006. The housing crisis that began in 2007 and the ensuing recession, from which the US economy is recovering slowly, resulted in a fall in the homeownership rate to 63.6 percent, according to the latest ACS numbers. Such a trajectory has generated important questions about the future of homeownership at all ages. The issues with young adults seem particularly acute. Will young adults want to own houses? Even if they do, will they be able to afford homeownership? The answers to these questions are still unclear, especially because millennials are not just slower to start their own households and purchase homes: they also are more likely to live in their parents’ homes than any generation in recent history. The rapidly changing racial and ethnic composition of the population also has profound implications for household formation and homeownership.

In this report, we dive deeply into the pace of household formation and homeownership attainment—nationally and by age groups and race/ethnicity over the past quarter-century—and project future trends. Considering the great uncertainty about household formation and homeownership, single-point forecasts of homeownership rates and housing demand could seriously mislead policymakers and obscure the potential implications of their decisions. Instead, we offer plausible competing scenarios for household formation and homeownership that generate a range of future national housing demand projections. (1)

I am not in a position to evaluate how well the report projects future trends, but some of its conclusions are worth considering together:

  • the homeownership rate will decline from 65.1 percent in 2010 to 61.3 percent in 2030; (46)
  • the rapid growth of the renter population will create significant demand for new rental housing construction and encourage shifting of owner-occupied dwellings to rentals; (47)
  • very tight credit availability standards will retard homeownership attainment and may exacerbate the growing shortage in rental housing; (48) and
  • the erosion of black homeownership needs to be addressed by more than mortgage policy. (48)

Taken together, these conclusions all point to a backsliding in the housing market: the American Dream disappearing for millions of Americans, particularly African Americans, who will end up living in overcrowded Pottersvilles straight out of It’s A Wonderful Life. Just like George Bailey, we have choices to make before that nightmare becomes a reality. But before we decide anything too hastily, we should consider the fundamental goals of housing policy.

I have argued that a “fundamental goal of housing policy is to assist Americans to live in a safe, well-maintained and affordable housing unit.” I am less convinced than most housing scholars that homeownership, given the state of today’s economy, is such a sure road to stable housing and financial well-being. So, instead of blindly focusing on increasing the homeownership rate, I would focus on increasing opportunities for sustainable homeownership. I believe the report’s authors would agree with this, but I think that housing scholars in general need to focus on policies that keep households in their housing, given how much income instability they now face.