Tag Archives: Merrill Lynch

Seniors Selling Their Homes

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AARP Magazine quoted me in Selling Your Home. It reads, in part,

Judy and Joe Powell recently faced a decision most of us will eventually have to make: Should we sell our home and downsize to save money and effort, or hang on to the homestead because it’s familiar and full of fond memories?

After mulling the choice for a couple of years, the Texas couple decided to sell their 20-acre cattle ranch to move to a nearby college town.

“We are the sole caretakers of this property. It’s 24/7,” says Judy, 69, who mows the pastures with a John Deere tractor while her husband, 71, tends the cattle. “Basically, we don’t want to have to work this hard. We want time to play.”

The Powells now have their sights set on a single-story house in nearby College Station, where, for a monthly fee, someone else will maintain the yard. What’s more, they will be 30 minutes to an hour closer to their friends and doctors. The savings on gas alone will be more than a thousand dollars a year, Judy says.

Most of us aren’t dealing with the rigors of running a ranch. But, like the Powells, many of us will discover at some point that our homes, though we love them, no longer suit our lifestyles, or that they are becoming labor-intensive money pits.

A recent Merrill Lynch survey of people’s home choices in retirement found that a little more than half downsized and, like the Powells, were motivated by the reduction in monthly living costs and by shedding the burden of maintaining a larger home and property. Still, moving is not a decision easily made.

“The tie to one’s home is the hardest thing to understand from the outside. It’s a very personal decision,” says Rodney Harrell, a housing expert with the AARP Public Policy Institute.

Some people may be reluctant to move from a house where they raised children and created decades of memories, he says. On the other hand, the cul-de-sac that provided a safe place for kids may be isolating if driving becomes a challenge.

A good way to begin the process of figuring out what’s best for you is to “recognize the trade-offs,” Harrell says. First, consider the house itself. Is it suitable for your needs, and will it allow you to age in place? Most homes can be easily modified to address safety and access issues, but location is also critical.

“How close are health facilities?” asks Geoff Sanzenbacher, a research economist with the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. “Are things nearby, or do you have to drive?”

Even if your current home meets these age-friendly criteria, you need to consider whether it is eating up money that could be spent in better ways to meet your changing needs.

For example, the financial cushion provided by not having a mortgage can be quickly erased by rising utility costs, property taxes and homeowner’s insurance. There is also the looming uncertainty of major repairs, which can cost thousands of dollars, such as a new roof and gutters, furnace or central air conditioner. A useful budgeting guide is to avoid spending more than 30 percent of your gross income on housing costs, says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School who specializes in real estate finance.

“This isn’t a hard-and-fast rule, but it does give a sense of how much money you need for other necessities of life, such as food, clothing and medical care, as well as for the aspects of life that give it pleasure and meaning — entertainment, travel and hobbies,” Reiss says.

So if your housing expenses are higher than a third of your income or you’re pouring your retirement income into your house with little money left to enjoy life, consider selling and moving to a smaller, less costly place.

Just as important, once you’ve made the decision, don’t dawdle, Sanzenbacher says. The quicker you move, the faster you can invest the proceeds of the sale and start saving money on maintenance, insurance and taxes.

Take this example from BC’s Center for Retirement Research: A homeowner sells her $250,000 house and buys a smaller one for $150,000. Annual expenses, such as utilities, taxes and insurance, typically amount to 3.25 percent of a home’s value, so the move to the smaller home saves $3,250 a year right off the bat.

Moving and other associated costs would eat up an estimated $25,000 of profit from the sale, leaving $75,000 to be invested and tapped for income each year.

If all of this sounds good, your next decision is where to move. Your new location depends on any number of personal factors: climate; proximity to family and friends; preference for an urban, suburban or rural setting; tax rates; and access to medical care, among other considerations.

“You want to take an inventory of your desires and start to think, ‘Do I have the resources to make that happen?’ ” Reiss says.

Bank Settlements and the Arc of Justice

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Ron Cogswell

MLK Memorial in DC

Martin Luther King, Jr. said that the “arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.” A recent report by SNL Financial (available here, but requires a lot of sign-up info) offers us a chance to evaluate that claim in the context of the financial crisis.

SNL reports that the six largest bank holding companies have paid over $132 billion to settle credit crisis and mortgage-related lawsuits brought by governments, investors and other financial institutions.

In the context of the litigation over the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships, I had considered whether it is efficient to respond to financial crises by allowing the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis and then “use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has stabilized.” (121)

Given that the biggest bank settlements are now in the rear view window, we can now say that the accounting for the financial crisis comes in at around $132 billion give or take. Does that number do justice for the wrongs of the boom times?  I don’t think I have my own answer to that question yet, but it is certainly worth considering.

On the one hand, we should acknowledge that it is a humongous number, a number so big that that no one would have considered it a likely one at the beginning of the financial crisis. This crisis made nine and ten digit settlement numbers a routine event.

On the other hand, wrongdoing (along with good old-fashioned boom mentality) during the financial crisis almost sent the global economy into a depression.  It also wreaked havoc on so many individuals, directly and indirectly.

I look forward to seeing metrics that can make sense of this (ratio of settlement amounts to annual profits of Wall Street firms; ratio to bonus pools; ratio to home equity lost), but I will say that I am struck by the lack of individual accountability that has come out of all of this litigation.

Individuals who made six, seven and eight figure paychecks from this wrongdoing were able to move on relatively unscathed.  We should think about how to avoid that result the next time around. Otherwise the arc of justice will bend in the wrong direction.

 

“Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics”

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Judge Chesler issued an Opinion in The Prudential Insurance Company of America et al. v. Bank of America, National Association et al., No. 13-1586 (Apr. 17, 2014), deciding the motion to dismiss the Complaint. Claims relating to fraud, a theory of underwriting abandonment and the 1933 Securities Act survived the motion to dismiss. The Court summarized the case as follows:

In a nutshell, this case arises from a dispute over the sale of certain residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) by Defendants [various Bank of America parties , including Merrill Lynch parties] to Plaintiffs [various Prudential parties]. The Complaint alleges that Defendants obtained the underlying mortgages, created the securitizations based on them, issued “offering Materials” for their sale, and sold them to Plaintiffs.

*     *     *

The Complaint alleges a variety of statistics in support of its claims. It is often not clear, however, what the basis for a particular statistic is. (1-2)

The Court’s description of the Complaint is pretty damning. But the Court does not find that the poor use of statistics in the Complaint is fatal to all of its claims.

Here are some highlights of the Court’s assessment of the Complaint:

  • “this Court does not find that the Analysis, as described in the Complaint, is such obvious junk research that it fails to constitute relevant factual allegations which, considered along with the other factual allegations in the Complaint, make plausible certain of the assertions of misrepresentation.” (8)
  • “The Complaint alleges that Defendants knowingly misrepresented that they would properly transfer title to the underlying mortgage loans to the particular trusts. The sole factual allegation made in support is: ‘Prudential’s forensic loan-level analysis revealed that across the Offerings Prudential tested, 43% of the Mortgage Loans were not properly assigned to the Trusts.’ Yes, if true, that is an astonishing fact– but there is not even a suggestion in the Complaint of a theory of how this gives rise to the inference of a knowing misrepresentation.” (13)
  • “The Complaint has so little explanation of the AVM [automated valuation model] methodology that this Court has no idea of how the computer used what information to generate property appraisals.” (15)

Notwithstanding the Court’s critique, it ends up finding the Complaint persuasive in the main:

The claim that Defendants’ representations about the underwriting practices and standards used in the issuance of the underlying mortgage loans were fraudulent because of a systemic abandonment of such underwriting standards is perhaps the central claim in this case. in brief, this Court has carefully examined the Complaint and finds that it states an abundance of factual allegations supporting this claim. (21)

The drafters of the complaint might reckon, ‘no harm no foul’ from the Court’s conclusion. But the rest of us might better see this as their having dodged a bullet, a bullet that the Plaintiffs’ attorneys shot at themselves. Mark Twain had said that “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” Not sure what he would have said about those in this Complaint — damned statistics?

Reiss on BoA-FHFA Settlement

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Inside The GSEs quoted me in BofA MBS Lawsuit Settlement Shrinks List of FHFA Defendants (behind a paywall). It reads,

It’s only a matter of time before the remaining big bank defendants settle lawsuits filed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency over billions in non-agency mortgage-backed securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the years leading up to the housing crisis, predicts a legal expert.

Last week, Bank of America agreed to a $9.3 billion settlement that covers its own dealings as well as those of Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch, which it acquired in 2008. The agreement covers some $57 billion of MBS issued or underwritten by these firms.

BofA did not admit liability or wrongdoing but it will pay $5.8 billion in cash to Fannie and Freddie and repurchase about $3.5 billion in residential MBS at market value. In return, FHFA’s lawsuits against the bank will be dismissed with prejudice.

The FHFA said it is working to resolve the remaining lawsuits regarding non-agency MBS purchased by the GSEs between 2005 and 2007. The suits involve alleged violations of federal and state securities laws and allegations of common law fraud. One week earlier, the Finance Agency announced that Credit Suisse Group had agreed to pay $885 million to settle a similar lawsuit.

Under the terms of that agreement, Credit Suisse will pay approximately $234 million to Fannie and approximately $651 million to Freddie. In exchange, certain claims against Credit Suisse related to the securities involved will be released.

So far, the FHFA’s lawsuits have recovered $19.5 billion in total payments. Expect more where that came from, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“Every case is different and each institution has a different risk profile in terms of litigation strategy,” said Reiss. “The BofA settlement is so high profile because it’s Countrywide. It gives a lodestar when trying to figure out how low [defendants] can go in a settlement offer.”

Prior to the BofA deal, the FHFA had collected $8.9 billion in prior settlements. The Morgan Stanley settlement is the fourth largest of those settlements, behind Deutsche Bank, which agreed to pay $1.93 billion in December, and JPMorgan Chase, which reached a $4 billion settlement in October.

The bank defendants have repeatedly tried and failed to dismiss the FHFA suits on procedural grounds, including a claim that the cases were no longer timely.

In October, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the banks, prompting the expectation in legal circles that few, if any, of the remaining cases will ever go to trial.

“I don’t think that if you are a [big bank] defendant, that you see a particularly favorable judiciary,” said Reiss. “You see that the government is able to reach deals with companies in front of you and I think you’re thinking about settling.”

Entities that have yet to settle non-agency MBS claims with the FHFA include Barclays Bank, First Horizon National Corp., Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Nomura Holding America and the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Bransten Trio: Part Deux

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As I work through the Bransten Trio of cases on misrepresentation in the securitization process, I am struck by the arguments of the defendants, arguments that do not seem to carry much weight with judges who hear them.  In the Merrill Lynch case, the defendants (all Merrill-affiliated entities) “argue that it was not reasonable for plaintiffs, as sophisticated investors in the mortgage-backed security market, to rely on ‘unverified information.'” from the mortgage originators that was repeated by the defendants with the defendants making “no representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of that information.”. (22)

This court, like others, does not treat “boilerplate disclaimers and disclosures” as Get Out of Jail Free Cards” for underwriters. (22) The court reviews a number of cases in which courts similarly refuse to treat such disclaimers as such, including

  • Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 773 (1st Cir. 2011)
  • In re Morgan Stanley Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 650, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
  • New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC, 720 F. Supp. 254, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
  • Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Mississippi v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 475, 483 (S.D.N.Y 2010)
  • In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 2d 495, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

It will be interesting to see how disclaimers will be modified to offer increased protection to underwriters in the future.  Could an underwriter protect itself by saying that “there is a high likelihood that the representations and warranties contained in offering materials are false and intended solely to convince potential purchasers of the securities to purchase them?”

A Bransten Trio Join Judicial Chorus on Misrepresentation

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Justice Bransten, a judge in the Commercial Division of the N.Y. S. Supreme (trial) Court, issued three similar decisions last week denying motions to dismiss lawsuits by Allstate over its purchase of hundreds of millions of dollars of MBS. The net result is that various Deutsche Bank, BoA’s Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley entities must continue to face allegations of fraud relating to those purchases.

In the Deutsche Bank case, the court rejected “the notion that defendants are immunized from liability because the Offering Materials generally disclosed that the representations were based on information provided by the originators.”  (22)

The court also found that “defendants can be held liable for promoting the securities based upon the high ratings from the credit rating agencies, if, as alleged, thy knew the ratings were based on false information provided to the agencies.” (22)  Finally, the court found that “Defendants’ occasional disclaimers cannot be invoked to excuse the wholesale abandonment of underwriting standards and practices.”  (24-25)

Justice Bransten joins a growing chorus of judges who reject the notion that vague disclosures can protect parties who engage in rampant misrepresentation.  One wonders how this body of law will impact the behavior of Wall Street firms during the next boom.