Tag Archives: mortgage-backed securities

Consumer Protection in RMBS 3.0

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The Structured Finance Industry Group has issued RMBS 3.0:  A Comprehensive Set of Proposed Industry Standards to Promote Growth in the Private Label Securities Market.  This “green paper,” frequently referred to as a First Edition, states that RMBS 3.0 is an initiative

established with the primary goal of re-invigorating the “private label” residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) market.

Initiated by members of SFIG, the project seeks to reduce substantive differences within current market practices through an open discussion among a broad cross-section of market participants. Where possible, participants seek to identify and agree upon best practices. RMBS 3.0 focuses on the following areas related to RMBS:

  • Representations and warranties, repurchase governance and other enforcement mechanisms;
  • Due diligence, disclosure and data issues; and
  • Roles and responsibilities of transaction parties and their communications with investors. (1 footnotes omitted)

RMBS 3.0 is expected to

1. Create standardization where possible, in a manner that reflects widely agreed upon best practices and procedures.
2. Clarify differences in alternative standards in a centralized and easily comprehendible manner to improve transparency across RMBS transactions.
3. Develop new solutions to the challenges that impede the emergence of a sustainable, scalable and fluid post-crisis RMBS market.
4. Draft or endorse model contractual provisions, or alternative “benchmark” structural approaches, where appropriate to reflect the foregoing.(2)

There is much of interest in this attempt at self-regulation by the now quiescent but formerly roaring private-label market. But I think that readers of this blog would be interested in its approach to consumer protection regulation. First, the green paper refers to it as “consumer compliance.” (See, e.g., 23) Unsurprisingly, the paper is only concerned with protecting industry participants from liability for violations of consumer protection/consumer compliance laws. It pays no lip service to the spirit of consumer protection — promoting sustainable credit on transparent terms. That’s fine given the constituents of the SFIG, but it only confirms the importance of active consumer protection regulators and enforcement agencies who will look beyond rote compliance with regulations. The private-label industry is capable of rapid change once it gets going, change that can outpace regulations. Someone has to keep an eye on it with an eye toward to the principles that should guide a fair market for consumer credit.

S&P on Risky Reps and Warranties

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Standard & Poor’s posted New Players In The RMBS Market Could Present Unique Representations And Warranties Risks. It opens, S&P

believes that new entrants into the residential mortgage-backed securitization (RMBS) market that make loan-level representations and warranties (R&Ws) may present additional risks not present with more established market players. Many of these new entrants not only lack historical loan performance data, but have not yet established track records for remedying any R&W breaches. This can call into question their ability or willingness to repurchase under R&W provisions. In light of this, mitigating factors may exist that could alleviate the risk of a potential R&W breach. (1)

This all sounds pretty serious, but I am not so sure that it is.

S&P explains its concerns further:

We believe it is important for investors and other market participants to evaluate the quality and depth of various factors that mitigate the risk of R&W breaches occurring in U.S. RMBS transactions, including those that would be remedied by new entities with limited histories and the risk that comes with their willingness or ability to do so. Specifically, we believe the quality and scale of third-party due diligence, the depth of operational reviews, and a transaction’s overall expected losses, are critical for assessing the risk of a breach and if a new entity would be remedying it. We consider all of these aspects in our assessment of the credit characteristics of loans that are securitized in U.S. RMBS deals. (1)

One assumes that every party to every transaction would consider the counterparty risk — the risk that the other side of a deal won’t or can’t make good on its obligations. Regular readers of this blog also know that many well-known companies have attempted to avoid their responsibilities pursuant to reps and warranties clauses. So, when S&P states that “the quality and scale of third-party due diligence, the depth of operational reviews, and a transaction’s overall expected losses, are critical for assessing the risk of a breach and if a new entity would be remedying it,” one wonders why this is more true for new players than it is for existing ones.

Further undercutting itself, this report notes that “post-2008 issuers have been addressing many of these potential R&W risks, including newer players. The level of third-party due diligence in recently issued U.S. RMBS for example has been more comprehensive from a historical (pre-2008) perspective in terms of the number of loans reviewed and the scope of the reviews.” (1)

So I am left wondering what S&P is trying to achieve with this report. Are they really worried about new entrants to the market? Are they signalling that they will take a tough stance on lowering due diligence standards as the market heats up? Are they favoring the big players in the market over the upstarts? I don’t think that this analysis stands up on its own legs, so I am guessing that there is something else going on.  If anyone has a inkling as to what it is, please share it with the rest of us.

Subprime Scriveners

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Milan Markovic has posted Subprime Scriveners to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Although mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and other financial products that nearly caused the collapse of the global financial system could not have been issued without attorneys, the legal profession’s role in the financial crisis has received relatively little scrutiny.

This Article focuses on lawyers’ preparation of MBS offering documents that misrepresented the lending practices of mortgage loan originators. While attorneys may not have known that many MBS would become toxic, they lacked incentives to inquire into the shoddy lending practices of prominent originators such as Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) when they and their clients were reaping considerable profits from MBS offerings.

The subprime era illustrates that attorneys are unreliable gatekeepers of the financial markets because they will not necessarily acquire sufficient information to assess the legality of the transactions they are facilitating. The Article concludes by proposing that the Securities and Exchange Commission impose heightened investigative duties on attorneys who work on public offerings of securities.

The article addresses an important aspect of an important subject – which professionals could and should be held responsible for the rampant misrepresentation found throughout the MBS industry in the early 2000s. The prevailing wisdom is that no one can be held responsible, because no one did anything that made him or her personally culpable.  Markovic argues that lawyers can and should be held responsible for the misrepresentations found in MBS offering documents.  While I buy his argument that lawyers have been unreliable gatekeepers, I am not sure that I fully agree with diagnosis of the problem.

Markovic writes,

The large financial institutions that issued MBS presumably understood the implications of incorporating questionable representations from loan originators into MBS offering documents. They also would have been able to consult with their in-house counsel about the risks of securitizing poor quality mortgages. It is not self-evident that ethical rules should compel attorneys to investigate what sophisticated clients advised by in-house counsel do not believe needs investigating. (45)

In fact, sophisticated parties often use reps and warranties to allocate risk. For instance, a provision could require that an originating lender buy back mortgages that failed to comply with reps and warranties. This is not a situation where any of the parties would expect anyone to investigate the “representations from the loan originators.”  Rather, the parties assumed (rightly or wrongly) that the originator would stand behind the representation if and when it was proved to be false. And, indeed, solvent originators have had to do so.

As I do not fully agree with Markovic’s diagnosis of the problem, that leads me to have concerns with his proposed solution as well. But the article raises important questions that we have not yet answered even though the events leading to the financial crisis are nearly a decade behind us.

G-Fee Entreaty

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The FHFA has issued a Request for Input about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Guarantee Fees. The Request both provides a good explanation of g-fees and poses important questions about their appropriate role in the functioning of the housing finance system. The Request opens,

On December 9, 2013, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced proposed increases to guarantee fees (g-fees) that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises) charge lenders. The Enterprises receive these fees in return for providing a credit guarantee to ensure the timely payment of principal and interest to investors in Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) if the borrower fails to pay. The MBS, in turn, are backed by mortgages that lenders sell to the Enterprises.

 The proposed changes included an across-the-board 10 basis point increase, an adjustment of up-front fees charged to borrowers in different risk categories and elimination of the 25 basis point Adverse Market Charge for all but four states. On January 8, 2014, Director Melvin L. Watt suspended implementation of these changes pending further review. (1)

The Request asks for responses to 12 questions. The most important, as far as I am concerned, is the first: “Are there factors other than those described in section III – expected losses, unexpected losses, and general and administrative expenses that FHFA and the Enterprises should consider in setting g-fees? What goals should FHFA further in setting g-fees?” (7)

Setting the g-fee has far-reaching consequences not just for the financial health of the two companies, but also for the health of the overall housing market and the mortgage industry. It will also have predictable effects on the litigation over the conservatorships of the two companies. For instance, a high g-fee will make the two companies appear to be more valuable than a low one. The size of the g-fee may also impact the scope of federal affordable housing initiatives.

While this Request for Input is pretty technical (particularly the parts of it that I didn’t blog about), it touches on some of the most fundamental aspects of our system of housing finance. As such, it invites responses from more than just industry insiders. Input is due by August 4th.

“Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics”

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Judge Chesler issued an Opinion in The Prudential Insurance Company of America et al. v. Bank of America, National Association et al., No. 13-1586 (Apr. 17, 2014), deciding the motion to dismiss the Complaint. Claims relating to fraud, a theory of underwriting abandonment and the 1933 Securities Act survived the motion to dismiss. The Court summarized the case as follows:

In a nutshell, this case arises from a dispute over the sale of certain residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) by Defendants [various Bank of America parties , including Merrill Lynch parties] to Plaintiffs [various Prudential parties]. The Complaint alleges that Defendants obtained the underlying mortgages, created the securitizations based on them, issued “offering Materials” for their sale, and sold them to Plaintiffs.

*     *     *

The Complaint alleges a variety of statistics in support of its claims. It is often not clear, however, what the basis for a particular statistic is. (1-2)

The Court’s description of the Complaint is pretty damning. But the Court does not find that the poor use of statistics in the Complaint is fatal to all of its claims.

Here are some highlights of the Court’s assessment of the Complaint:

  • “this Court does not find that the Analysis, as described in the Complaint, is such obvious junk research that it fails to constitute relevant factual allegations which, considered along with the other factual allegations in the Complaint, make plausible certain of the assertions of misrepresentation.” (8)
  • “The Complaint alleges that Defendants knowingly misrepresented that they would properly transfer title to the underlying mortgage loans to the particular trusts. The sole factual allegation made in support is: ‘Prudential’s forensic loan-level analysis revealed that across the Offerings Prudential tested, 43% of the Mortgage Loans were not properly assigned to the Trusts.’ Yes, if true, that is an astonishing fact– but there is not even a suggestion in the Complaint of a theory of how this gives rise to the inference of a knowing misrepresentation.” (13)
  • “The Complaint has so little explanation of the AVM [automated valuation model] methodology that this Court has no idea of how the computer used what information to generate property appraisals.” (15)

Notwithstanding the Court’s critique, it ends up finding the Complaint persuasive in the main:

The claim that Defendants’ representations about the underwriting practices and standards used in the issuance of the underlying mortgage loans were fraudulent because of a systemic abandonment of such underwriting standards is perhaps the central claim in this case. in brief, this Court has carefully examined the Complaint and finds that it states an abundance of factual allegations supporting this claim. (21)

The drafters of the complaint might reckon, ‘no harm no foul’ from the Court’s conclusion. But the rest of us might better see this as their having dodged a bullet, a bullet that the Plaintiffs’ attorneys shot at themselves. Mark Twain had said that “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” Not sure what he would have said about those in this Complaint — damned statistics?

Open Season on Homeowners

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A case coming out of California, Peng v. Chase Home Finance LLC et al., No. B245436 (California Courts of Appeal Second App. Dist., Div. 8, April 8th, 2014, has attracted a lot of attention in the blogosphere. This is particularly notable because this case is not to be published in the official reports and thus has no precedential value. Judge Rubin’s dissent has attracted much of the attention. It opens,

The promissory note signed by appellants Jeffry and Grace Peng obligated them to repay their home loan. In August 2007, Freddie Mac acquired the promissory note from Chase. Based on Freddie Mac owning the note, appellants seek to amend their complaint to allege Chase did not have authority to enforce the promissory note or to foreclose on their home, but the majority rejects appellants’ proposed amendment. Relying on case law rebuffing a homeowner’s challenge to a creditor-beneficiary’s authority to foreclose, the majority notes that courts have traditionally reasoned that the homeowner’s challenge is futile because, even if successful, the homeowner “merely substitute[s] one creditor for another, without changing [the homeowner’s] obligations under the note.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 271.) The only party prejudiced by an illegitimate creditor-beneficiary’s enforcement of the homeowner’s debt, courts have reasoned, is the bona fide creditor-beneficiary, not the homeowner.

Such reasoning troubles me. I wonder whether the law would apply the same reasoning if we were dealing with debtors other than homeowners. I wonder how most of us would react if, for example, a third-party purporting to act for one’s credit card company knocked on one’s door, demanding we pay our credit card’s monthly statement to the third party. Could we insist that the third party prove it owned our credit card debt? By the reasoning of Fontenot and similar cases, we could not because, after all, we owe the debt to someone, and the only truly aggrieved party if we paid the wrong party would, according to those cases, be our credit card company. I doubt anyone would stand for such a thing. (Dissent, 1)

The dissent’s concern is justified. As Professor Whitman has recently noted on the Dirt Listserv and elsewhere, it is a “bizarre notion that anyone can foreclose a mortgage without showing that they have the right to enforce the note.” He also notes that the majority (and even the dissent) in Peng confuse ownership of the note with the right to enforce it. Until courts fully understand how the UCC governs the enforcement of notes, one should worry that some state court judges might declare an open season on homeowners as the majority does here in Peng.

Reiss on BoA-FHFA Settlement

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Inside The GSEs quoted me in BofA MBS Lawsuit Settlement Shrinks List of FHFA Defendants (behind a paywall). It reads,

It’s only a matter of time before the remaining big bank defendants settle lawsuits filed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency over billions in non-agency mortgage-backed securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the years leading up to the housing crisis, predicts a legal expert.

Last week, Bank of America agreed to a $9.3 billion settlement that covers its own dealings as well as those of Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch, which it acquired in 2008. The agreement covers some $57 billion of MBS issued or underwritten by these firms.

BofA did not admit liability or wrongdoing but it will pay $5.8 billion in cash to Fannie and Freddie and repurchase about $3.5 billion in residential MBS at market value. In return, FHFA’s lawsuits against the bank will be dismissed with prejudice.

The FHFA said it is working to resolve the remaining lawsuits regarding non-agency MBS purchased by the GSEs between 2005 and 2007. The suits involve alleged violations of federal and state securities laws and allegations of common law fraud. One week earlier, the Finance Agency announced that Credit Suisse Group had agreed to pay $885 million to settle a similar lawsuit.

Under the terms of that agreement, Credit Suisse will pay approximately $234 million to Fannie and approximately $651 million to Freddie. In exchange, certain claims against Credit Suisse related to the securities involved will be released.

So far, the FHFA’s lawsuits have recovered $19.5 billion in total payments. Expect more where that came from, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“Every case is different and each institution has a different risk profile in terms of litigation strategy,” said Reiss. “The BofA settlement is so high profile because it’s Countrywide. It gives a lodestar when trying to figure out how low [defendants] can go in a settlement offer.”

Prior to the BofA deal, the FHFA had collected $8.9 billion in prior settlements. The Morgan Stanley settlement is the fourth largest of those settlements, behind Deutsche Bank, which agreed to pay $1.93 billion in December, and JPMorgan Chase, which reached a $4 billion settlement in October.

The bank defendants have repeatedly tried and failed to dismiss the FHFA suits on procedural grounds, including a claim that the cases were no longer timely.

In October, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the banks, prompting the expectation in legal circles that few, if any, of the remaining cases will ever go to trial.

“I don’t think that if you are a [big bank] defendant, that you see a particularly favorable judiciary,” said Reiss. “You see that the government is able to reach deals with companies in front of you and I think you’re thinking about settling.”

Entities that have yet to settle non-agency MBS claims with the FHFA include Barclays Bank, First Horizon National Corp., Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Nomura Holding America and the Royal Bank of Scotland.