What Do People Do When Mortgage Payments Drop?

I went to an interesting presentation today on a technical paper, Monetary Policy Pass-Through: Household Consumption and Voluntary Deleveraging. While the paper (by Marco Di Maggio, Amir Kermani & Rodney Ramcharan) itself is tough for the non-expert, it has some important implications that I discuss below. The abstract reads,

Do households benefit from expansionary monetary policy? We investigate how indebted households’ consumption and saving decisions are affected by anticipated changes in monthly interest payments. We focus on borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages originated between 2005 and 2007 featuring an automatic reset of the interest rate after five years. The monthly payment due from the average borrower falls by 52 percent ($900) upon reset, resulting in an increase in disposable income totaling tens of thousands of dollars over the remaining life of the mortgage. We uncover three patterns. First, the average household increases monthly car purchases by 40 percent ($150) upon reset. Second, this expansionary effect is attenuated by the borrowers’ voluntary deleveraging, as a significant fraction of the increased income is deployed to accelerate debt repayment. Third, the marginal propensity to consume is significantly higher for low income and underwater borrowers. To complement these household-level findings, we employ county-level data to provide evidence that consumption responded more to a reduction in short-term interest rates in counties with a larger fraction of adjustable rate mortgage debt. Our results shed light on the income channel of monetary policy as well as the role of debt rigidity in reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy. (1)

The paper cleverly exploits

the anticipated changes in monthly payments of borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) originated between 2005 and 2007, with a fixed interest rate for the first 5 years, which is automatically adjusted at the end of this initial period. These cohorts experience a sudden and substantial drop in the interest rates they pay upon reset, regardless of their financial position or credit worthiness and without refinancing. These cohorts are of particular interest because the interest rate reduction they experienced is sizeable: the ARMs originated in 2005 benefited from an average reduction of 3 percentage points in the reference interest rate in 2010. (3)

I will leave it to individual readers to work through how they designed this research project and move on to its implications:

The magnitude of the positive income shock for these households is large indeed: the monthly payment falls on average by $900 at the moment of the interest rate adjustment. Potentially, this could free up important resources for these indebted and mainly underwater households. We show that households increase their car purchase spending by more than $150 per month, equivalent to a 40 percent increase compared to the period immediately before the adjustment. Their monthly credit card balances also increase substantially, by almost $200 a month within the first year after the adjustment. Moreover, there is not any sign of intertemporal substitution or reversal within two years of the adjustment. . . . However, we also show that households use 15% of their increase in income to repay their debts faster, almost doubling the extent of this effort. (38-39)

There are all sorts of interesting implications that follow from this study, but I am particularly intrigued by its implications for “debt rigidity — the responsiveness of loan contracts to interest rate changes.” (6) While the authors are interested in how debt rigidity can impact monetary policy, I am interested in how it can impact households. There is much in the American housing finance system that keeps households from refinancing — high title insurance charges and other fees, for instance — but we do not often focus on the impact that rigid mortgage contracts have on the broader economy. This paper demonstrates that the effects are not borne by consumers alone. This paper quantifies the effects on the consumer economy to some extent and reveals that they are quite significant. Policy makers should take note of just how significant they can be.

Reiss on Refis Redux

Refinancing must be in the air because I was interviewed twice in the last week about them. The first story appeared here. The second story, This Could Be Your Last Shot to Refinance a Mortgage, is in the Fiscal Times. It reads, in part,

After the Fed’s announcement Wednesday that it would end its historic $3 trillion bond-buying program, mortgage rates predictably began to rise.

The good news is that they were rising from the lowest rates of the year, after tumbling through most of October. At just over 4 percent, today’s mortgages rates still remain extremely low by historical standards. In 2008, before the housing busts, rates were around 6.5 percent.

*     *     *

Banks are stilled scarred from the housing bust and are dealing with significant changes to the regulatory environment, so lending standards are much tighter than they were in the past. Even former Fed chair Ben Bernanke recently admitted to having had his mortgage refinance application rejected.

To get the best rate, you’ll need excellent credit and lots of documentation of your income and assets. The average credit score for closed loans in September was 726, according to Ellie Mae.

Finally, shop around. “Talk to a big bank, talk to a little bank, talk to a mortgage broker,” says David Reiss, a professor of real estate finance at Brooklyn Law School. The gap between the best and the worst mortgage deals can be as much as a full percentage point.

Reiss on Refinancing

MainStreet quoted me in Fed’s End to Quantitative Easing Will Affect How You Invest and Buy a House. It reads in part,

The Federal Reserve’s decision to end its bond buying program after six years to help boost the economy is a sign that more recovery and growth will occur. So what does the typical American on Main Street need to know?

While the Fed did not indicate a timeline for when interest rates will rise, consumers should be prepared and “see the writing on the wall” since variable rates such as credit cards, adjustable rate mortgages and home equity loans will start to rise slowly and gradually, said Bankrate.com chief financial analyst Greg McBride, CFA.

“The low interest rates will come to an end,” he said. “Consumers should pay down debt while the rates are low rather than contend with it once rates move up.”

Mortgage rates will remain low but will fluctuate according to global risks, not because of any actions taken by the Fed, said Ernie Goss, a professor of economics at Creighton University in Omaha. Consumers should expect rates for short term rates such as auto loans to rise “ever so slightly” between now and July 2015, he said.

The good news about rising interest rates is that savers will begin earning more on their nest eggs, but the increase could be offset by a higher cost of borrowing and could discourage people from getting loans and spending, said Gail Cunningham, a spokesperson for the National Foundation for Credit Counseling, a Washington, D.C. non-profit organization.

“If mortgage rates rise, consumers with variable rate mortgages will see their monthly payments go up, putting a dent in the amount they have available for disposable spending,” she said.

Even if mortgage rates do increase, consumers need to consider the costs of refinancing before they embark on the process, said David Reiss, a law professor at the Brooklyn Law School in New York. Homeowners need to determine how long they plan to live in their home and if the cost of refinancing outweighs the lower monthly payments.

“If you are not sure that you will be there for a few years at least, the cost of refinancing may be more than the amount you save in decreased interest payments,” he said. “How many years will it take you to recoup that cost in reduced interest rate payments?”

Gimme More Mortgage Data!

People are always talking about the value of data about web browsing habits. They don’t talk nearly enough about the value of data about mortgage shopping habits. Regulators and researchers do not know nearly enough about how borrowers and lenders interact in the mortgage business — and the stakes are high, given that a home is often the biggest investment that a household ever makes. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is seeking to make some modest improvements to the federal government’s existing data collection pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) through a proposed rule.

Under this proposed rule,

financial institutions generally would be required to report all closed-end loans, open-end lines of credit, and reverse mortgages secured by dwellings. Unsecured home improvement loans would no longer be reported. Thus, financial institutions would no longer be required to ascertain an applicant’s intended purpose for a dwelling-secured loan to determine if the loan is required to be reported under Regulation C, though they would still itemize dwelling-secured loans by different purpose when reporting. Certain types of loans would continue to be excluded from Regulation C requirements, including loans on unimproved land and temporary financing. Reverse mortgages and open-end lines of credit would be identified as such to allow for differentiation from other loan types. Further, many of the data points would be modified to take account of the characteristics of, and to clarify reporting requirements for,different types of loans. The Bureau believes these proposals will yield more consistent and useful data and better align Regulation C with the current housing finance market. (79 F.R. 51733)
This seems like a reasonable proposal. It increases the amount of information that is to be collected about important consumer products such as reverse mortgages.  At the same time, it releases lenders from having to determine borrowers’ intentions about how they will use their loan proceeds, something that can be hard to do and to document well.
There is more to the proposed rule than this, so take a look at it and consider commenting on it. Comments are due by October 29, 2014.

State of the Nation’s Housing Finance

The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University has released the 2014 edition of The State of the Nation’s Housing. As to the nation’s housing finance system, the report finds that

The government still had an outsized footprint in the mortgage market in 2013, purchasing or guaranteeing 80.3 percent of all mortgages originated. The FHA/VA share of first liens, at 19.7 percent, was well above the average 6.1 percent share in 2002–03, let alone the 3.2 percent share at the market peak in 2005–06. Origination shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also higher than before the mortgage market crisis, but less so than that of FHA. According to the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center, the GSEs purchased or guaranteed 61 percent of originations in 2012 and 2013, up from 49 percent in 2002 and 2003.

Portfolio lending, however, has begun to bounce back, rising 8 percentage points from post-crisis lows and accounting for 19 percent of originations last year. While improving, this share is far from the nearly 30 percent a decade earlier. In contrast, private-label securitizations have been stuck below 1 percent of originations since 2008. Continued healing in the housing market and further clarity in the regulatory environment should set the stage for further increases in private market activity. (11)

As usual, this report is chock full of good information about the single-family and multi-family sectors. I did find that some of its characterizations of the housing market were lacking. For instance, the report states

Many factors have played a role in the sluggish recovery of the home purchase loan market in recent years, including falling household incomes and uncertainty about the direction of the economy and home prices. But the limited availability of mortgage credit for borrowers with less than stellar credit has also contributed. According to information from CoreLogic, home purchase lending to borrowers with credit scores below 620 all but ended after 2009. Since then, access to credit among borrowers with scores in the 620–659 range has become increasingly constrained, with their share of loans falling by 6 percentage points. At the same time, the share of home purchase loans to borrowers with scores above 740 rose by 8 percentage points.

Meanwhile, the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have also concentrated both their purchase and refinancing activity on applicants with higher credit scores. At Fannie Mae, only 15 percent of loans acquired in 2013 were to borrowers with credit scores below 700—a dramatic drop from the 35 percent share averaged in 2001–04. Moreover, just 2 percent of originations were to borrowers with credit scores below 620. The percentage of Freddie Mac lending to this group has remained negligible.

Yet another drag on the mortgage market recovery is the high cost of credit. For borrowers who are able to access credit, loan costs have increased steadily. To start, interest rates climbed from 3.35 percent at the end of 2012 to 4.46 percent at the end of 2013. This increase was tempered somewhat by a slight retreat in early 2014. In addition, the GSEs and FHA raised the fees required to insure their loans after the mortgage market meltdown, and many of these charges remain in place or have risen. The average guarantee fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac jumped from 22 basis points in 2009 to 38 basis points in 2012. In 2008, the GSEs also introduced loan level price adjustments (LLPAs) or additional upfront fees paid by lenders based on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, credit scores, and other risk factors. LLPAs total up to 3.25 percent of the loan value for riskier borrowers and are paid for through higher interest rates on their loans. (20)

Implicit in this analysis is the view that lending should return in some way to its pre-bust levels. But, in fact, much of the boom lending was unsustainable for many borrowers. The analysis fails to identify the importance of promoting sustainable homeownership and instead relies on one dimensional metrics like credit denials for those with low credit scores. Until we are confident that borrowers with those scores can sustain homeownership in large numbers, we should not be so quick to bemoan credit constraints for people with a history of losing their homes to foreclosure.

The Center’s analysis also takes a simplistic view about guarantee fees.  The relevant metric is not the absolute size of the g-fee. Rather, the issue should be whether the g-fee level achieves its goals. At a minimum, those goals include appropriately measuring the risk of having to make good on the guarantee.

Finally, the Center demonstrates symptoms of historical amnesia when it characterizes an interest rate of 4.46% as “high.” This is an incredibly low rate of interest and one would expect that rates would rise as we exit from the bust years.

I have made the point before that the Center’s work seems to reflect the views of its funders. The funders of this report (not identified in the report by the way) include the National Association of Home Builders; National Association of Realtors; National Housing Conference; National Multifamily Housing Council; and a whole host of lenders, builders and companies in related fields that make up the Center’s Policy Advisory Board. These organizations benefit from a growing housing sector. This report seems to reflect an unthinking pro-growth perspective. It would have benefited from a parallel focus on sustainable homeownership.

Reiss on Supreme Court Mortgage Case

Law360 quoted me in Supreme Court Takes Up Mortgage Rescission Timing Case (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to weigh in on whether federal law requires borrowers to notify creditors in writing of their intention to rescind their mortgages or file a lawsuit making a similar claim within three years.

The petitioners in the case, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski of Eagan, Minn., are seeking to overturn a September ruling in the Eighth Circuit that they were required to sue Countrywide Home Loans Inc. to have their mortgage financing rescinded within three years of the transaction closing. The Jesinoskis argue that the Truth In Lending Act only requires that they provide notice of rescission in writing within those three years.

But the case goes beyond a ruling in the Eighth Circuit. A Supreme Court ruling would resolve a circuit split that has seen the Third, Fourth and Eleventh circuits rule that borrowers have three years from closing to notify lenders in writing within three years of their intention to cancel their mortgages, while the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth circuits have found that a lawsuit must be filed within that three-year period, according to the Jesinoskis’ December petition for certiorari.

“The resulting rule does violence to the statutory text, manufactures legal obstacle for homeowners seeking to vindicate their rights under a law that was enacted to protect them, and risks flooding the federal courts with thousands of needless lawsuits to accomplish rescissions that Congress intended to be completed privately and without litigation,” the petition said.

TILA provides two different rescission rights to borrowers who apply for and receive a mortgage refinancing. The more common process allows such borrowers to rescind their mortgage within three days of closing and before any money is disbursed.

The law also provides a more expanded rescission right in situations where borrowers do not receive mandated disclosures. There, the law provides three years from the closing date to provide such notice, but with proof that the documents were not provided.

Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, such expanded rescission claims were rare, said Reed Smith LLP partner Robert Jaworski.

“A lot more people were in trouble on their mortgages and couldn’t make payments and were subject to foreclosure. That caused a lot of these claims to be made, much more than previously,” he said.

And that has made the need for resolving the circuit split that much more important.

“It’s kind of ambiguous. It’s not stated as a statute of limitations,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.