- S&P agrees to settlement of $58 million for fraudulent ratings on commercial mortgage-backed securities.
- SEC order regarding violations of Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, Section 15E(c)(3) of the Exchange Act, and Exchange Act Rules 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) and 17g-2(a)(6). $6.2 million disgorgement, plus $800,000 prejudgment interest, and $35 million civil money penalty for affirmatively claiming to use one method of rating when it was actually using another method.
- SEC order regarding violations of Section 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act and Exchange Act Rule 17g-2(a)(6). $15 million penalty for publishing “false and misleading article purporting to show that its new credit enhancement levels could withstand Great Depression-era levels of economic stress.”
- SEC order regarding violations of Section 15E(c)(3)(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 17g-2(a)(2)(iii) and 17g-2(a)(6). $1 million civil money penalty for failure in oversight of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) ratings.
- SEC order regarding a public hearing.
- Following the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau filing a complaint in the District Court for the District of Maryland, JP Morgan and Wells Fargo agreed to pay $37.5 million in penalties for a mortgage-kickback scheme with a title company.
- The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for disparate impact case on January 21st. (Whether disparate impact is a cognizable claim under the Fair Housing Act).
Tag Archives: settlement
Reiss on Ocwen Settlement
Law360 quoted me in New York’s Ocwen Deal Sets Tough Precedent For Regulators (behind a paywall). It reads in part,
New York regulators ordered Ocwen Financial Corp. to pay $150 million in hard cash and barred the company from claiming a tax deduction on the restitution payments in a mortgage servicing settlement that could set a new standard for regulators accused of being soft on the companies they penalize.
The New York Department of Financial Services’ penalty against Ocwen, which also saw the company’s executive chairman lose his job, comes amid criticism that major penalties against Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and other banks have been too lax. In a move aimed at addressing concerns over companies’ abilities to game the penalties, New York’s settlement specifically says Ocwen will not be able to use some of the techniques banks have used to lessen the blow of earlier settlements.
“They’ve tried to make a very tight settlement that demonstrates that Ocwen is suffering measurable costs for their behavior,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
The New York Department of Financial Services announced Monday that Ocwen, the country’s fourth-largest mortgage servicer, with some $430 billion in unpaid servicing balances, would pay out $150 million in “hard money” to New York homeowners who were victim to the company’s problematic servicing operations. A third of that $150 million would go directly to people who were foreclosed upon, and the remaining $100 million would go to housing-related projects chosen by the state.
But, unlike in previous mortgage-related settlements, Ocwen will not be able to count what are known as “soft dollar” modifications of mortgages they do not own and other techniques toward its settlement total, the DFS said. Banks and other servicers have been able to count such modifications in their total settlement amounts in previous deals, including the $25 billion national mortgage settlement from 2012.
Critics say such soft-dollar remediation has allowed law enforcement agencies, regulators and banks to inflate the amount of money banks and servicers are said to be paying out while limiting the amount of money they actually pay.
“It seems like a transparent settlement,” Reiss said.
* * *
“A lot of the problems that people have had with these financial settlements are specifically identified,” Reiss said.
Reiss on $17 Billion BoA Settlement
Law360 quoted me in BofA Deal Shows Pragmatism At Work On Both Sides (behind a paywall). It reads in part,
Bank of America Corp.’s $16.65 billion global settlement over its alleged faulty lending practices in the run-up to the financial crisis may have made bigger waves than recent payouts by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., but attorneys say the deal still represents the best possible outcome for the bank and for federal prosecutors, who can now put their resources elsewhere.
The settlement, inked with the U.S. Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the Federal Housing Administration and the states of California, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and New York, released most of the significant claims related to subprime mortgage practices at Countrywide Financial Corp. and investment bank Merrill Lynch, both of which Bank of America picked up during the crisis.
Although the hefty price tag, which includes $7 billion in consumer relief payments and a record $5 billion in civil penalties, is nothing to balk at, the settlement will help Bank of America avoid a series of piecemeal deals that could stretch out over a much longer period without the prospect of closure, according to Ben Diehl of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.
“They want to start being looked at and considered by the market, their customers and regulators based on what they are doing today, in 2014, and not have everything continue to be looked at through the perspective of alleged accountability for conduct related to the financial crisis,” said Diehl, who formerly oversaw civil prosecutions brought by the California attorney general’s mortgage fraud strike force.
And the bank isn’t the only one looking for closure, according to Diehl.
“It’s in a regulator’s interest as well to be able to look at what is currently being offered to consumers and have a dialogue with companies about that, as opposed to talking about practices that allegedly happened six or more years prior,” he said.
The government also saw great value in getting a big dollar number out to a public that has expressed frustration over a perceived lack of accountability of financial institutions for their role in the financial crisis.
“The executive branch get a big news story, particularly with the eye-poppingly large settlements that have been agreed to recently,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, who added that the federal government also has an interest in global settlements that keep the markets running more predictably.
More on GSE Litigation
Inside Mortgage Finance did a longer story on the GSE litigation that profiled my take on it, Expert: GSE Shareholder Suits at ‘Early Stage’ of a Long Process; Litigation No Barrier to Dissolution, Says Group.
Look for the various lawsuits filed by private owners of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock against the federal government to take a “very long time to be decided,” as the courts may take up to a year to resolve just the introductory motions, according to a legal expert. Beyond that, the litigation over shares in the two government-sponsored enterprises could stretch out to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss, speaking during a Bloomberg Industries webinar last week, noted that lawsuits stemming from the savings and loan debacle of 20 years ago give a sense of the possible timeframe, but litigation brought by disenfranchised Fannie and Freddie investors against the government offers an entirely different and deeper set of legal complexities.
“These are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks this is a slam dunk for any one of the parties,” said Reiss. He added that neither the government nor shareholders of the two government-sponsored enterprises can cut a deal and settle for anything short of total victory.
“I think we have plaintiffs that are going to go all the way on this because they have a lot at stake and they have a lot of resources to pursue their claims. You have a government that doesn’t have an incentive to settle like a normal private party does. They’re not worried about litigation costs or time, so I foresee this going on for a very, very long time,” said Reiss.
More than a dozen lawsuits filed against the government – led by hedge funds Perry Capital and Fairholme Capital Management – are pending in federal district court in Washington, DC, and in the Court of Federal Claims. The shareholder plaintiffs allege that the Treasury’s 2012 change in the dividend structure of its preferred stock leaves no funds to pay dividends to junior shareholders.
The government in its pending motion to dismiss gives some clear indication as to the tactics it will take to derail the various shareholder suits, Reiss explained. The government’s brief states that not a single plaintiff is entitled to recover anything – either on their individual or derivative claims – in light of the extensive powers that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act vests in the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as conservator to the GSEs.
“Until we have some motions to dismiss decided, we’re not really going to know how wide a scope these cases will have,” he said. “Only when we having a ruling on a summary judgment motion, will we have a sense of the real issues in contention. I will say that we are at an absolutely early stage.”
With the “entire range of private, administrative and constitutional principles” due to be called into question through the litigation, Reiss said there’s a great deal of uncertainty how the courts will decide the issue, including whether the Supreme Court will hear the inevitable appeal by plaintiffs or the defendant.
Although the pending shareholder litigation and investors’ claims of a government taking “must be taken seriously,” there’s no barrier – either from a legal or safety and soundness standpoint – preventing Fannie and Freddie from being dissolved, the Heritage Foundation argued in an issue brief.
“Protecting property rights, however, does not mean that taxpayers and consumers must continue to be put at risk by these government-sponsored housing giants,” said Heritage. “The ongoing lawsuits need not impede and should not distract Congress from the critical task of dissolving these economically dangerous institutions.”
Each of the GSE charters explicitly grants Congress the power to dissolve the corporations free of any conditions. After dissolution, Heritage notes that creditors would be paid off, with any remaining assets divided among shareholders, taking into account the priorities of different classes of shares.
“Because the United States is a defendant in the lawsuits, the litigation can proceed independently of the GSEs’ dissolution,” said Heritage. “If shareholders prevail on their takings claim, or any other monetary claim, they would still be able to receive full restitution for any legitimate claims.”
Reiss on GSE Litigation
Inside Mortgage Finance profiled me in Legal Expert: GSE Shareholder Plaintiffs, U.S. Want ‘Total’ Victory (behind a paywall). It reads,
Look for the various GSE shareholder lawsuits against the federal government to take a “very long time to be decided” with the courts taking up to a year to resolve just the introductory motions and an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
That’s the view of one legal expert speaking during a recent Bloomberg Industries webinar on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac litigation. Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss noted there are some parallels to the savings and loan lawsuits brought by owners against the federal government 20 years ago. But the attorney stressed that the litigation from the Fannie and Freddie investors against the government offers an entirely different and deeper set of legal complexities.
“These are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone that thinks this is a slam dunk for any one of the parties,” predicted Reiss. He added that neither the government nor GSE shareholders can cut a deal and settle for anything short of total victory.
In its motion to dismiss, the government argues that the plaintiffs – hedge funds that have speculated in the junior preferred – are not entitled to recover anything, either on their individual or derivative claims, in light of the extensive powers that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act granted to the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as conservator.
With the “entire range of private, administrative and constitutional principles” due to be called into question in this litigation, Reiss said there’s a great deal of uncertainty over how the courts will decide the issue, including whether the Supreme Court will hear the inevitable appeal by plaintiffs or defendant.
Premature End to Foreclosure Review
Congressman Cummings (D), the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, has sent a letter to Congressman Issa, the Chairman of the Committee, regarding the Independent Foreclosure Review. It opens,
I am writing to request that the Committee hold a hearing on widespread foreclosure abuses and illegal activities engaged in by mortgage servicing companies. I request that the hearing also examine why the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) appear to have prematurely ended the Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR) and entered into a major settlement agreement with most of the servicers just as the full extent of their harm was beginning to be revealed. (1)
It goes on to assert that “some mortgage servicing companies engaged in widespread and systemic foreclosure abuses, including charging improper and excessive fees, failing to process loan modifications in accordance with federal guidelines, and violating automatic stays after borrowers filed for bankruptcy.” (2) It concludes that it “remains unclear why the regulators terminated the IFR prematurely, how regulators determined the compensation amounts servicers were required to pay under the settlement, and how regulators could claim that borrowers who were harmed by these servicers would benefit more from the settlement . . . than by allowing the IFR to be completed.” (2)
The letter raises a number of important concerns, but I will focus on just one — “how did the regulators arrive at the compensation amounts in the settlement?” (9) This particular settlement was for billions of dollars from BoA, PNC, JPMorgan and Citibank. This is an extraordinarily large sum, but the public is left with no sense of whether this sum is proportional to the harm done. I have raised this concern with other billion dollar settlements. As the federal government moves forward with these large settlements, it should carefully consider their expressive function — does the penalty fit the wrongdoing? And if so, how was that calculated? People want to know.
What $4 Billion Does for Homeowners
Enterprise released a Policy Focus on What the JPMorgan Chase Settlement Means for Consumers: An Analysis of the $4 Billion in Consumer Relief Obligations. It opens,
On November 19, 2013, JPMorgan Chase reached a record-setting settlement deal with the federal government’s Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working Group for $13 billion, which included $4 billion in consumer relief for struggling homeowners and hard-hit communities.
This brief examines how the $4 billion obligation will likely flow to consumers over the next four years. According to the settlement terms, eligible activities for which JPMorgan Chase will receive credit broadly include: loan modifications; rate reduction and refinancing; low- to moderate-income/disaster area lending; and anti-blight work. (1)
Enterprise projects that JPMorgan’s $4 Billion obligation will
translate into $4.65 billion in relief for existing homeowners, with an additional $15 million going to homebuyers, and as much as $380 million in cash and REO properties allocated to reducing foreclosure-related blight. Our analysis projects that over 26,500 borrowers will receive a total of $2.6 billion in principal forgiveness, which translates into $1.5 billion in credit toward the bank’s obligation. Forbearance will be extended on 17,000 loans, and slightly more than 7,000 second liens will be fully or partially forgiven. In addition to forgiveness or forbearance, we anticipate the interest rates on approximately 26,500 loans will be reduced, resulting in a real borrower savings of $1.4 billion. (1)
We’re talking about some pretty big numbers here, so it might be useful to break them down on a per borrower basis.
- 26,500 loans will receive interest rate reductions resulting in $1.4 billion in consumer benefit, or $52,830 per loan.
- 26,500 borrowers will receive $2.6 billion in principal forgiveness, or $98,113 per homeowner.
The report, unfortunately, does not parse these big numbers out so well. For instance, do they reflect savings over the expected life of the loans or over the remaining term? We also do not know whether these changes, large as they are, will leave sustainable loans in their place. So, this is a report provides a useful starting point, but some very big questions about the settlement still remain to be answered.
