Author Archives: David Reiss

This Note and Mortgage Are Unenforceable

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The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit issued a thoughtful opinion in In re: Dorsey, File No. 14b0002n.06 (March 7, 2014) but it leaves me dissatisfied. As Elizabeth Renuart and Dale Whitman have each demonstrated, courts have had a hard time parsing how UCC Article 3 relates to the enforceability of mortgage notes. That is not the problem with this opinion — the Court carefully applies UCC Article 3, but still concludes that the possessor of the note could not establish that it was a Person Entitled To Enforce it. As a result, the Court concludes that the possessor of the note cannot enforce the note and as a result, the mortgage is “no longer enforceable under Kentucky law.” (12)

Because of the complexity of the analysis, I refer interested readers directly to the opinion itself, which is as clear as can be expected for such a technical subject. But I will note that the Court’s result means that a party that holds the note itself and has much circumstantial evidence that the note was transferred to it by the original lender under the note can forfeit the entire value of the note and mortgage. I generally believe that lenders should be held to strict standards when seeking to enforce the terms of a mortgage loan. But in this bankruptcy proceeding, the possessor of the note is left with nothing and the borrower is granted a windfall — the entire mortgage debt has been extinguished. This does not seem to be consistent with the principles of equity.

I am curious to know what others think, particularly bankruptcy experts. Perhaps I am missing something.

 

[HT April Charney]

Reiss on NYC Development

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Law360 quoted me in Domino Deal Shows De Blasio Can Play Nice With RE Cos. (behind a paywall). The story reads in part,

New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s affordable housing deal with the developer of the Domino Sugar factory, despite being for a unique project, may be a harbinger of how the mayor will implement his affordable housing goals without hampering the market, experts say.

When De Blasio first took office, many in the real estate community, and their attorneys,were concerned that the new mayor’s “tale of two cities” approach to governing might elevate the development of affordable housing to the detriment of other types of projects.

While his administration is still young and the Domino Sugar project is a unique one that had previously been approved in a different form under former Mayor Michael Bloomberg, experts say the way De Blasio handled negotiations that led to the project’s City Planning Commission approval on Wednesday may be a positive sign for the future.

*     *     *

But the mayor’s willingness to reach out directly to a developer and negotiate for terms that fit his goals — De Blasio wants to add or retain 200,000 affordable units over the next 10 years — without harming the deal will be noted by developers.

“One data point does not make a trend, but as a symbol at the beginning of the administration, I think it’s a pretty powerful one,” said David Reiss, a real estate professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Community Preservation Corp. and Kattan Group LLC had originally planned to build a $2.2 billion, 2,200-unit residential project in place of the Domino Sugar factory, but the plan stalled in 2012, and the partners began looking for a new buyer.

When Two Trees Management Co. was chosen in June 2012, the developer purchased the property for $185 million after a long court battle with Katan. The approvals process then began anew, and Two Trees’ revised plan — for 2.3 million square feet of residential space, plus office and retail components — was certified for review in November.

This week, as the City Planning Commission was poised to cast its vote on Two Trees’ plan, De Blasio stepped in to ask for a larger affordable housing component. The project called for about 660 units, but the mayor wanted about 60 more in exchange for zoning changes Two Trees would need to construct the development.

Two Trees Principal Jed Walentas told the New York Times that the mayor’s request was “not workable,” and onlookers worried that the mayor’s relationship with the real estate industry, which had thawed after a Real Estate Board of New York speech in which he assured developers that he wanted them to “build aggressively,” might again be chilling.

But the fears were premature; the mayor and developer reached a deal late Monday that would yield an additional 110,000 square feet of affordable housing at the development.

In connection with the deal, Two Trees agreed to construct 700 permanently affordable units ranging in size to accommodate small and large families that will be integrated throughout the complex.

“This agreement is a win for all sides, and it shows that we can ensure the public’s needs are met, while also being responsive to the private sector’s objectives,” Deputy Mayor of Housing and Economic Development Alicia Glen said in a statement.

That balance will not be lost in the city’s development community, even if another project of this size and complexity doesn’t come around any time soon, experts say. There are many developers looking to do deals in the city, and many of them may now feel at least a bit more comfortable that their needs will be understood by a mayor with an ambitious affordable housing plan.

“He took a line and stuck to it and got what he wanted, without killing the deal,” Reiss said. “That’s a good thing from the development perspective.”

Whitman on Servicer Lies

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Professor Dale Whitman posted a commentary on Quintana v. Bank of America, No. CV 11–2301–PHX, 2014 WL 690906 (D.Ariz. Feb. 24, 2014) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) on the Dirt listserv:

Synopsis: A borrowers who is “jerked around” by a mortgage servicer may have claims in fraud or on other theories.

Karoly Quintana’s home mortgage loan was serviced by Bank of America, When she began having difficulty making her payments in 2009, she was told by B of A that she would have to miss three payments to be considered for a loan modification, and that the servicer would forbear foreclosure while it did so. She missed the payments and applied for a modification, but (she alleged) B of A did not consider it, and instead accelerated her loan and commenced foreclosure.

Quintana filed a suit in federal court to stop the foreclosure. In March 2012 the suit was dismissed voluntarily on the assurance that B of A would again consider a loan modification, but again it did not do so. (Oddly, B of A’s counsel conceded these facts.)

The court held that the allegations of both the 2009 and 2012 conduct of B of A stated claims of fraud, sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The statements that she would be considered for a modification were false, she relied upon them, and was damaged. Her damages were the expenditure of additional attorney’s fees, and the court found this sufficient, even though in general attorneys’ fees are not recoverable in a fraud action.

The court also held that the plaintiff’s count for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing survived a motion to dismiss. While the loan documents did not require the servicer to consider the mortgage modification or to forbear foreclosure, when it promised to do so and then did not, it breached the implied covenant. The promise was only oral, and B of A asserted it was inadmissible under the Statute of Frauds, but the court found that Quintana’s detrimental reliance (in missing the payments) provided a basis for promissory estoppel, overcoming the Statute of Frauds defense.

However, the court dismissed Quintana’s claim under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (on the ground that it was barred by the 1-year statute of limitations). There’s a convoluted argument about whether B of A can be liable under the FDCPA, but the court ultimately refused to dismiss that claim.

Comment: Borrowers have often tried to claim that they should have received loan modifications, but have not in fact received them. In general, of course, there’s no legal right to a modification. But this court holds that a false promise to consider a modification is enough to make out a claim of fraud.

Reiss on Fannie/Freddie Suits

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Bloomberg BNA quoted me in No Basis for Discovery by GSE Investors, Treasury Department, FHFA Memos Say. It reads

[Reproduced with permission from BNA’s Banking Report, 102 BBR 417, 3/11/14. Copyright  2014 by The Bureau
of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033) https://www.bna.com]

The Treasury Department and the Federal Housing Finance Agency March 4 said a federal judge should deny a motion for discovery in lawsuits by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac investors, citing an agreed-upon schedule and saying the motion would do nothing to address legal questions at the core of the case (Fairholme Funds v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01053, 3/4/14).

In its memo filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Treasury said Fairholme’s Feb. 12 motion for discovery (31 DER EE-6, 2/14/14) would be “improper” under a November scheduling order, and urged the court to dismiss the Fairholme suit and related cases.

“These cases should proceed on the agreed briefing schedule, which already provided ample time to the plaintiffs to file their substantive briefs, and the Court, upon review of a completed set of briefing with respect to the defendants’ dispositive motions, should dismiss these cases,” Treasury said March 4.

In its March 4 filing, the FHFA memo said “no discovery is necessary to assess the purely legal arguments” before the court, adding the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) bars second-guessing of the FHFA’s actions as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Litigation Ongoing

The suit is one of several in at least two district courts and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims that challenge Treasury and FHFA action in August 2012 that restructured contracts governing preferred stock issued by the two government-sponsored enterprises.

Fairholme and other investors say the August 2012 amendment amounted to an expropriation of their assets and have variously sought damages and compensation in response.

The government has sought to dismiss the Fairholme case and others, but in its Feb. 12 motion, Fairholme said the government’s motion to dismiss was too expansive and raised questions that require access to government documents, e-mails and other materials.

Arrowood Indemnity Co., the plaintiff in a related case in the district court and a separate case in the Claims Court, Feb. 20 sought to link its own bid for discovery to Fairholme’s (36 DER EE-8, 2/24/14).

Fairholme has already prevailed on its discovery motion in the Claims Court. In a Feb. 26 order, Judge Margaret M. Sweeney granted Fairholme’s motion for a continuance to pursue discovery in that case.

March Reply Scheduled

In the district court, Fairholme is scheduled to respond to the government’s March 4 memos by mid-March.

“We are reviewing the opposition briefs filed by the defendants just yesterday, and we will respond to them in our reply brief, due on March 14,” a spokesman for Fairholme told Bloomberg BNA March 5.

High Stakes Seen

Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School in New York March 5 said discovery usually occurs after motions to dismiss have been decided.

In this case, he said, “the stakes are so high and the quality of lawyering so high that there is litigation over the scheduling order itself.”

“This is a hard-fought battle and the issues are incredibly complex,” Reiss told Bloomberg BNA. “Each side characterizes their arguments as relatively straightforward, but I think the judge will have a hard time parsing out the issues, because there are different statutory regimes, policy issues and the like that must be rationalized with each other. I think this is just the beginning of a long slog,” he said.

What $4 Billion Does for Homeowners

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Enterprise released a Policy Focus on What the JPMorgan Chase Settlement Means for Consumers: An Analysis of the $4 Billion in Consumer Relief Obligations. It opens,

On November 19, 2013, JPMorgan Chase reached a record-setting settlement deal with the federal government’s Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working Group for $13 billion, which included $4 billion in consumer relief for struggling homeowners and hard-hit communities.

This brief examines how the $4 billion obligation will likely flow to consumers over the next four years. According to the settlement terms, eligible activities for which JPMorgan Chase will receive credit broadly include: loan modifications; rate reduction and refinancing; low- to moderate-income/disaster area lending; and anti-blight work. (1)

Enterprise projects that JPMorgan’s $4 Billion obligation will

translate into $4.65 billion in relief for existing homeowners, with an additional $15 million going to homebuyers, and as much as $380 million in cash and REO properties allocated to reducing foreclosure-related blight. Our analysis projects that over 26,500 borrowers will receive a total of $2.6 billion in principal forgiveness, which translates into $1.5 billion in credit toward the bank’s obligation. Forbearance will be extended on 17,000 loans, and slightly more than 7,000 second liens will be fully or partially forgiven. In addition to forgiveness or forbearance, we anticipate the interest rates on approximately 26,500 loans will be reduced, resulting in a real borrower savings of $1.4 billion. (1)

We’re talking about some pretty big numbers here, so it might be useful to break them down on a per borrower basis.

  • 26,500 loans will receive interest rate reductions resulting in $1.4 billion in consumer benefit, or $52,830 per loan.
  • 26,500 borrowers will receive $2.6 billion in principal forgiveness, or $98,113 per homeowner.

The report, unfortunately, does not parse these big numbers out so well. For instance, do they reflect savings over the expected life of the loans or over the remaining term? We also do not know whether these changes, large as they are, will leave sustainable loans in their place. So, this is a report provides a useful starting point, but some very big questions about the settlement still remain to be answered.

Housing Affordability Challenges

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The Center for Housing Policy has issued a report, The Housing Affordability Challenges of America’s Working Households. It finds that

Overall, 15.6 percent of all U.S. households (18.1 million households) were severely housing cost burdened in 2012. Severely cost burdened households are those that spend more than half of their income on housing costs. Renter households are more than twice as likely to be housing cost burdened than owner households. In 2012, 24.7 percent of all renter households were severely burdened compared to 10.5 percent of all owner households. (1)

Unsurprisingly, “the nation’s lowest income households face the most severe challenges” as nearly “eight in ten extremely low-income working households, and over a third of very low-income working households, are severely housing cost burdened.” (3) The paper concludes that “unless housing production increases substantially — particularly in the highest cost markets — rents are going to continue to rise . . ..” (4)

This simple point — that there is not enough supply to meet demand is made time and again by scholars and policy analysts. But that simple truth bangs up against the arguments of those who oppose development for a variety of reasons:  because it can be an agent of localized gentrification, because it changes the fabric of communities, because it can benefit business interests.

There is some truth to all of these arguments and many people can make them in good faith. But one cannot be a proponent of affordable housing without supporting a meaningful increase in housing production. Here in NYC, the de Blasio Administration has appeared to embrace this fundamental truth. In many parts of the country, however, people claim to support affordable housing and strict limits on housing construction. Affordable housing advocates have to call them out on that contradiction as the two policies are in direct conflict with each other.

All the demand side subsidies in the world (like Section 8 vouchers) won’t get people into housing if the supply isn’t there in the first place.  Build it and working households will be sustainably housed. Don’t build it and they won’t be.

Fannie and Freddie Boards: Caveat Fairholme

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Fairholme Capital Management has sent stern letters to the the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the letters are essentially the same). Fairholme’s funds have millions of common and preferred shares in the two companies and Fairholme has taken a multi-pronged to trying to wring some value out of those shares. It has sued the federal government. It has offered to buy the two companies’ mortgage guaranty operations. Now, it is threatening the board of the two enterprises with personal liability for their actions and inaction.

In regard to the cash dividends that the two companies have paid to the Treasury as a result of their Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (as amended), Fairholme writes,

It is common sense that no Board should approve cash distributions without independent financial advice as to the effect of such payments on the Company’s safety, soundness, and  liquidity. Moreover, corporate laws generally prohibit the payment of dividends in many circumstances, imposing personal liability on Directors for illegal dividends – a liability that, pursuant to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, is not assumed by the Conservator. (Fannie Letter, 3) (emphasis added)

This is a straightforward threat that will likely get the attention of the directors of the two companies and get them to check in with their D&O insurer before taking any further actions. But it is genuinely unclear what they should be doing at this point.

As I note in a forthcoming article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation (NYU J. Law & Bus.), the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation raises all sorts of complex and novel legal issues, and I am not willing to predict their outcomes. But I will go as far to say that Fairholme presents the way out of this mess as far clearer than it is — “Various solutions are simple, equitable, and need not be contentious.” (5) The ones that Fairholme has in mind likely involve large payouts for shareholders, one way or the other.

At the same time that Fairholme presents the solution as simple, it does acknowledge (as it really must) that the problem itself is not:  “we are aware of no circumstance in which the controlling shareholder and its affiliates simultaneously act as director, regulator, conservator, supervisor, contingent capital provider, and preferred stock investor.” (3-4) Yup, this is one big mess with no real precedent. I am confident, however, that the federal government has no interest in reaching a settlement with shareholders that shareholders would find acceptable. So, no end in sight to this aspect of the Fannie/Freddie situation, a far as I can tell.