Reforming the Fed

Peter Conti-Brown and Simon Johnson posted their policy brief, Governing the Federal Reserve System after the Dodd-Frank Act, on SSRN (also on the Peterson Institute for International Economics website). I have said before that the Fed is a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” and I stand by that characterization. This policy brief is very helpful, however, in identifying the legal structure of the Federal Reserve System as well as the practical constraints and political forces that affect the workings of that legal structure.

The authors write that by statute, the chair of the Fed

decides almost nothing herself: The Federal Reserve System is supervised by a Board of seven presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed governors, of whom the chair is but one. In practice, the chair has frequently had a disproportionate influence on the monetary policy agenda and also the potential to predominate on regulatory matters—working closely with the Fed Board’s senior staff. Even so, for the most significant decisions, the Board must vote, and the chair must rely on the votes of the other six governors (for Board matters) and in addition, on a rotating basis, the votes of five of the twelve Reserve Bank presidents (for monetary policy). On regulation and supervision issues, the chair can do little of consequence without the support of at least three other governors. (1)

The brief goes on to document other aspects of the Fed’s organizational structure and the practical politics of Fed decisionmaking. For those of us who have a hard time parsing how the Fed acts, this is a useful document.

The brief also argues for a new approach to Fed governance:

The Fed chair is arguably the most important economic appointment any president makes. After the crises, new statute, and bold decisions of recent years, this job has become even more important.

During its first 100 years of existence, the position of Fed chair has risen to exercise great potential power. By statute, an appointee can remain in office 20 years or more. A perceived “maestro” effect in which insiders and outsiders are discouraged from challenging the chair is no longer a model with broad appeal, if it ever was.

The Board of Governors could provide an effective counterweight to the chair. Indeed, such a counterweight is what Congress intended by requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of the entire Board. In order to break the tradition of a chair-dominated board, governors need sufficient expertise and experience to engage with and in some instances counteract the chair and Fed staff.

A president’s choice for Fed chair matters enormously, but the choice for members of the Board also matters a great deal. Monetary policy remains a crucial criterion but not at the exclusion of regulatory policy. The Board is second to none—in the nation and indeed arguably in the world—in its responsibility for regulatory oversight over the financial system. The president, members of the Senate, and the general public ignore these considerations at significant peril to the financial system and the economy. (9)

The brief presents a powerful alternative to business as usual at the Fed.  Hopefully, it will gain some traction.

New and Improved Rating Agencies!

The SEC issued its 2013 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization. I had noted that the 2012 report was not an impressive document. Much the same can be said for the 2013 version of this statutorily required document (it is required to be produced pursuant the 1934 Securities Exchange Act). It seems, to my mind, to focus on the trees at the expense of the forest.

The report is overall positive, with the staff noting “five general areas of improvement among the NRSROs [rating agencies]” from the previous reporting period:

(i) Enhanced documentation, disclosure, and Board oversight of criteria and methodologies. The Staff has observed that many NRSROs have developed and publicly disclosed ratings criteria and methodologies that better describe ratings inputs and processes. Some NRSROs have also increased Board oversight of rating processes and methodologies.

(ii) Investment in software or computer systems. The Staff found that some NRSROs have made investments in software and information technology infrastructure by, for example, implementing systems for electronic recordkeeping and for monitoring employee securities trading. One NRSRO has implemented systems that enable it to operate in a nearly paperless environment, so as to minimize the inadvertent dissemination of confidential information and to ensure preservation of all records required by Rule 17g-2.

(iii) Increased prominence of the role of the DCO within NRSROs. The Staff has found that the role of the DCO [designated compliance officer] has taken on more prominence within many NRSROs. The Staff has noticed that certain DCOs have increased reporting obligations to, and more interaction with, the NRSRO’s Board. At these NRSROs, the DCO meets with the Board to discuss compliance matters, quarterly or more frequently.

(iv) Implementation or enhancement of internal controls. The Staff has recognized that all NRSROs have added or improved internal controls over the rating process. More NRSROs are using audits and other testing to verify compliance with federal securities law, and NRSROs have generally improved employee training on compliance matters.

(v) Adherence to internal policies and procedures. The Staff has noticed a general improvement in NRSROs’ adherence to internal rating policies and procedures, which improvement appears to be attributable, in part, to improvements in the internal control structure at NRSROs. (8)

Hard to complain about any of these findings, but I have a sinking feeling that improvements such as these won’t add up to enough of a change to the culture that put profits ahead of objective ratings. Hopefully I am wrong about that

Preserving Low-Income Housing

NYC Mayor De Blasio announced an aggressive goal of producing and preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing over the next ten years. New York City will need to be as creative as possible to achieve this goal and will need to look to all of the resources that it has at its disposal to achieve it. Enterprise Community Partners released Preserving Housing Credit Investment: The State of Housing Credit Properties and Lessons Learned for the Extended Use Period. This report looks at important component of a preservation agenda: Low-Income Housing Tax Credit buildings that “reach the end of their initial 15-year compliance period.” (4) The report presents data about LIHTC buildings during the 15-year “extended use period” that follow the compliance period

and shares how some state and local housing agencies around the country are addressing the post-Year 15 Housing Credit properties. While the condition of the Housing Credit portfolio at Year 15 is strong, as properties age into a second 15-year period of rent restrictions and beyond, the ability for some of those properties to be able to afford to make improvements while maintaining affordability is clearly a challenge. Some of these local best practices point to solutions demonstrating programmatic and regulatory flexibility, new resources as well as resyndication where appropriate. (4)

Across the nation, roughly 100,000 units of housing age out of the initial compliance period each year, so we are talking about a lot of housing.  New York has a significant portion of that housing stock. While these properties are in pretty good condition overall, the report found that

very limited financing choices exist throughout the extended use period for properties with modest recapitalization or capital improvement needs. Currently, the best choice seems to be a resyndication with a new Housing Credit allocation. However, the use of Housing Credits to preserve and extend the affordability of existing affordable housing competes with other Housing Credit properties, including public housing revitalization and new projects (both as adaptive reuse of existing buildings and new construction). The Housing Credit was created to address affordable housing needs that the private market could not effectively serve. It incentivized a public-private partnership that includes affordability for 30 years. In order to preserve this inventory, more investment will be required. Ensuring the physical and economic stability of these assets through their extended use periods will require innovative uses of limited public subsidy by states and municipalities. (5)

New York City will certainly want to plan for the modest recapitalization of its LIHTC properties as part of its affordable housing strategy. And it will be better to plan for it now than pay too much for deferred maintenance down the line.

U.S. Dismissive of Frannie Suits

The Federal Housing Finance Agency filed its motion to dismiss all the claims in Perry Capital v. Lew, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01025, 1/17/14. I blogged about this case (and similar cases) when they were filed last summer. It is quite interesting to read the government’s side of the story now. Today’s post focuses on the federal government’s alternative narrative. Where the private investors describe an opportunistic and abusive government in their complaints, the FHFA’s brief describes the government as a white knight who rode in to save the day at the depth of the financial crisis:

The national crisis having eased, Plaintiffs now ask the Court to re-write the agreements that FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, and Treasury executed to stabilize the Enterprises and the national economy, pursuant to express congressional authority. Plaintiffs want to cherry-pick those aspects of the agreements that they like—namely, the unprecedented financial support from Treasury at a time when the Enterprises required billions of dollars in capital—and discard the parts they do not like—namely, the Third Amended PSPAs—now that over one hundred billion dollars of federal taxpayer capital infusions and commitments have allowed the Enterprises to remain in business and produce positive earnings, rather than being placed into mandatory receivership and then liquidation. Plaintiffs’ attempt to reward themselves, at the expense of federal taxpayers who risked and continue to risk billions of dollars to save the Enterprises from receivership and liquidation, directly contravenes the relevant statutory authorities as implemented by the unambiguous language of the PSPAs.

Plaintiffs’ charges of common law and APA violations have it exactly backwards: FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, has acted at all times consistent with the Enterprises’ contractual obligations and FHFA’s powers as Conservator and statutory successor to all rights of the Enterprises and their stockholders. The shareholder-Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are attempting through these cases to convince this Court, during the conservatorships, to give shareholders financial value that they are not owed under the terms of their stock certificates or statutes, and to ignore the rights of the Enterprises’ senior preferred stockholder, the U.S. Treasury. By doing so, Plaintiffs seek not only to undermine the purposes of conservatorship, but also the very statutory mission of the Enterprises in which they chose to invest. (4-5)

While I think that the investors raise some serious legal issues for the court to decide, the federal government’s narrative of the financial crisis jibes a whole lot more with my own than does the investors’. I argued last summer that the side that wins control of the narrative will have an advantage in the battle over the legal issues. I would say that the federal government has won this first round.

S&P’s Fightin’ Words

S&P filed a memorandum in support of its motion to compel discovery in the FIRREA case that the United States brought against S&P last year. S&P comes out fighting in this memorandum, arguing that the “lawsuit is retaliation for S&P’s decision to downgrade the credit rating of the United states in August 2011.” (1)

S&P argues that the “most obvious explanation” for the United States’ “decision to pursue a FIRREA action against S&P alone” among the major rating agencies “is apparent:”   “S&P alone among the major rating agencies downgraded the securities issued by the United States.” (17) This is not obvious to me, particularly given the various explanations for this disparate treatment that have appeared in outlets like the WSJ over the last couple of years. But it may be true nonetheless.

In any case, I do not find the “chronology of events relating to the downgrade and the commencement of this lawsuit” to provide “powerful evidence linking the two.” (17) The chronology ends with the following entries:

  • S&P’s downgrade of the United States occurred on Friday, August 5, 2011. That Sunday, August 7, Harold McGraw III, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of McGraw Hill (of which S&P was a unit), received a telephone message from a high-ranking official of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; when the call was returned, the official conveyed the personal displeasure of the Secretary of the Treasury with S&P’s rating action.
  • This was followed on Monday by a call to Mr. McGraw from the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, in which Secretary Geithner stated that S&P had made a “huge error” for which it was “accountable.” He said that S&P had done “an enormous disservice to yourselves and your country,” that S&P’s conduct would be “looked at very carefully,” and that such behavior could not occur without a response.
  • The McClatchy Newspapers subsequently reported in a piece authored by Kevin G. Hall and Greg Gordon that while the United States’ original investigation included S&P and Moody’s, “[i]nvestigator interest in Moody’s apparently dropped off around the summer of 2011, about the same time S&P issued the historic downgrade of the United States’ creditworthiness because of mounting debt and deficits.” A source familiar with the investigations was quoted as stating: “After the U.S. downgrade, Moody’s is no longer part of this.”
  • In the year preceding S&P’s downgrade of the United States, two states, Mississippi and Connecticut, had initiated proceedings alleging deceptive practices based specifically on an alleged lack of independence. Each of those states named both Moody’s and S&P as defendants. After the downgrade, additional state lawsuits were commenced, with allegations nearly identical to those of the Connecticut and Mississippi complaints. Drafted after coordination and consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice, none of those lawsuits named Moody’s. (19, footnotes omitted)

This is surely no smoking gun and lots of dots remain to be connected.  How did DoJ get involved? Are the state Attorneys General in on the conspiracy? Why would DoJ stop an investigation of Moody’s to punish S&P? Sounds a bit like cutting off your nose to spite your face?

That being said, S&P might be right about the motivation for this suit and their allegations may be enough to win this motion to compel discovery. But whoever wins this round, this should be a fight worth watching.

Shiller on Primitive Housing Finance

Robert Shiller has posted Why Is Housing Finance Still Stuck in Such a Primitive Stage? The abstract for this brief discussion paper reads:

The institutions for financing owner-occupied housing have not progressed as they should, and the financial innovation that has followed the financial crisis of 2007-9 has not been focused on improving the risk management of individual homeowners. This paper lists a number of barriers to housing finance innovation, and in light of these barriers, the problems of some major innovations of the past and future: self-amortizing mortgages, price-level adjusted mortgages (PLAMs), shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), housing partnerships, and continuous workout mortgages (CWMs). (1)

The paper is more of an outline than a fleshed out argument, but it has some interesting points (and not just because the author recently won a Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics).  They include

  • Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), which offered some risk management of home price appreciation, were offered by the Bank of Scotland and Bear Stearns in the 1990s, but acquired a damaged reputation with the boom in home prices. U.K. homeowners who took such mortgages, and lost out on the speculative gains, were so angered that they filed a class-action lawsuit against the issuers. The suit was dropped, but the reputation loss was permanent. (5)

  • There has been some questioning of the assumption that insuring homeowners against a decline in home value is a good thing. Sinai and Soulelis (2014) have written that the existing  mortgage institutions may be close to optimal given that people want to live in their house forever, or move to a similar house whose price is correlated with the present house, and so are perfectly hedged. But their paper cannot be exactly right, given the sense of distress that homeowners are experiencing who are underwater. They are more certainly not right about all homeowners, many of whom actually plan to sell their home when they retire. (5-6)

  • The difficulties in making improvements in mortgage institutions have to do with the complexity of the risk management problem, coupled with mistrust of institutional players. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank Act and having authority over mortgages, among other things, seems oriented towards addressing complaints from the public, and has focused its attention so far on such things as unfair collection practices, bias against minorities, and excessive complexity of financial products being used to confuse customers. These are laudable concerns, but complaints that economists might register about the fundamental success of mortgage products to serve risk management well have not yet taken center stage. (6)

  • New Development economics, Karlan and Appel (2011), Bannerjee and Duflo (2012) has shown how carefully controlled experiments can reveal solid steps to take regarding new financial institutions for poverty reduction. The same methods could be used to improve mortgage institutions, as well as rental, leasing, partnership and cooperative institutions, in advanced countries. (7)

These are just brief thoughts. It will be interesting to see how Shiller develops them further.

Reiss on Death and Mortgages

Credit.com quoted me in What Happens to Your Mortgage After Death? It reads in part,

Death isn’t on the minds of most homeowners on closing day, naturally, unless it’s a fear of drowning in paperwork. But it’s really never too early to consider what happens to your mortgage should you pass away.

The financial obligation of a home loan does linger after death. There’s a host of scenarios regarding the mortgage’s ultimate disposition, all colored by a homeowner’s estate planning (or lack thereof) and other legal issues.

It isn’t a particularly pleasant topic, but a little bit of planning and paperwork can save your loved ones from considerable headache and hassle during an already difficult time.

“If you’re really thinking about your family’s long-term interests, purchase insurance so they can stay in your home upon your death, and have a will to make everything administratively easy,” said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School in New York.

Keeping the House

Nearly seven in 10 recent homebuyers are married couples, according to the National Association of Realtors, so we’ll focus on them. The co-borrowing spouse will typically be financially liable for the mortgage moving forward.

A spouse who plans to continue living in the home will need to keep current on payments. If you have a life insurance policy in play, your spouse may be able to use the payoff to keep up with or completely wipe out the mortgage balance.

Reiss recommends homeowners consider term life plans rather than actual mortgage term insurance, which can be more expensive.

*     *     *

Older Homeowners

About a third of people 65 and older have a mortgage, according to the U.S. Census. For older homeowners, it’s important to talk with family members about the property’s long-term future.

Children and grandchildren may not share the same desire to keep a house in the family.

“Do you see it as something your family wants to keep?” Reiss said. “You want to make that as financially easy for them as possible.”