Author Archives: David Reiss

Long-Term Homeownership Affordability

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Amnon Lehavi has posted Can the Resale Housing Market Be Split to Facilitate Long-Term Affordability? to SSRN.  The paper argues that

a comprehensive affordable housing policy requires the formal splitting of the homeownership market into (at least) two distinct segments: one designated for the general public and following a conventional pricing mechanism through free market supply and demand, and the other designated for eligible households and controlling both initial supply and subsequent resale of housing units through regulated affordability-oriented pricing mechanisms.

While regulation of the pricing of affordable housing units during their initial allocation is a standard feature of housing policy–whether such affordable units are produced by a public authority or a private developer–regulation of pricing upon resale to subsequent buyers has received less attention as a matter of both theory and practice, thus leaving a substantial gap in

design mechanisms aimed at promoting a sustainable affordable housing policy.(1)

This is not really a new argument, but the paper takes the position that existing efforts to regulate resales of affordable housing in the homeownership market can be scaled up significantly. The paper does not take on some of the bigger questions that this position implicates — for instance, should scarce homeownership dollars be spent on rental housing instead — but it does develop a concrete proposal:

This paper seeks to enrich policy design options by introducing two alternative cap-on-resale mechanisms for the affordable housing segment: “Mixed Indexed Cap” (MIC) and “Pure Indexed Cap” (PIC). It explains how such models could be utilized to attain a policy goal of promoting long-term social mobility, allowing multiple low- and modest-income households to engage in capital building by sequentially enjoying increments of appreciation of properties in the affordable housing segment.

In so doing, the paper addresses a series of challenges posed by the design of a cap-on-resale mechanism: Could such a mechanism ensure that the homeowner is granted a fair return upon resale, providing the owner with proper incentives to invest efficiently in the property during the tenure, while setting up a resale rate that would make the unit truly affordable for future homebuyers? (1)

New York Ciy has experimented with affordable homeownership and has not come up with an ideal solution to the problem of affordability upon resale. Given the renewed focus on affordable housing policy in NYC, this attention to affordable homeownership policy is most welcome.

Reiss on Single Family Rental-Backed Bonds

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Law360 Quoted me in Newest Property-Secured Bonds Invite Scrutiny (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

The Blackstone Group LP’s recent groundbreaking move to sell bonds secured by single-family rental homes may have created the next securitization blockbuster, but attorneys say the product could attract the same type of litigation that has plagued the commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities markets.

Blackstone is among a growing group of entities that amassed large numbers of foreclosed homes after the crisis and are turning them into profitable rentals. Now some are hoping to take that profitability one step further, extending loans secured by these single-family homes and securitizing them.

This process offers benefits both to players like Blackstone and to smaller landlords that own groups of single-family rentals and can’t get traditional lenders to lend against their assets. Blackstone’s debut product — sold to a syndicate led by Deutsche Bank AG — has been very well-received, but attorneys caution that many questions remain unanswered, and REO-to-rental-backed bonds could pose litigation risks.

*    *    *

Blackstone’s $480 million deal, in which it pooled 3,200 homes owned by its portfolio company Invitation Homes and used them to secured a single loan that it then securitized, made waves as the first of its kind.

Several other opportunistic real estate investment companies, including American Homes 4 Rent and Colony Capital LLC, are expected to follow suit, but they are treading lightly as the new product is assessed by the market and investors.

*    *    *

The homes themselves may also be subject to condemnation or landlord-tenant litigation that could encumber the overall loan indirectly by affecting the value of the collateral, according to David Reiss, a real estate finance professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Before the recession, single-family homes were considered too expensive to be managed by a large institution like Blackstone or American Homes 4 Rent because of their geographic diversity and because it was hard to control property management on so many different homes, according to Reiss.

The financial crisis made distressed single-family homes cheaper and more attractive to opportunistic investors, and the low price may compensate for the other issues, he said.

“This is a new asset class, and it is not yet clear whether Blackstone has properly evaluated its risks,” Reiss said.  “Time will tell whether these bonds will become a significant new category of asset-backed securities or whether the financial crisis presented a one-time financial opportunity for some firms.”

Reiss on Mortgage Availability

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The Consumer Eagle quoted me in Will Mortgages be Harder to Get in 2014? It reads in part,

David Reiss, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, also sees some benefit in more conservative guidelines. “The QM rules and ability-to-repay rules legislate commonsense things like making sure people can repay loans that they take out, which was something that was given up not only in the last boom but in the boom that preceded it. So from the consumer perspective, you now know that when you get a mortgage you’re probably going to be able to pay it back,” Reiss says. “Some consumers and some people in the industry would say let people make their own decisions with minimal consumer protection regulation, but we had a phase of that and it ended poorly for all of us.”

Borrowers who are self-employed or have irregular income may have a harder time qualifying for a loan under the new rules. Reiss notes that those who are ineligible for a QM may still be able to get a non-qualified mortgage. “What we haven’t seen is what this non-QM market is going to look like in 2014 and beyond,” Reiss says. “It’s a new market.”

Members of the banking industry have expressed concerns about the changes. In recent testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, William Emerson, CEO of Quicken Loans and vice chair of the Mortgage Bankers Association, said the rules “are likely to unduly tighten mortgage credit for a significant number of creditworthy families who seek to buy or refinance a home” and “may impair credit access for many of the very consumers they are designed to protect.”

Reiss notes that consumer protections are always a compromise. “Regulators want to be conservative to protect consumers, but they also don’t want to keep people who would pay back their loans from getting credit,” he says. “There’s always a dance.”

Calling All RE Law Profs!

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I have been asked to post this announcement by Rutgers Professor Jay Soled.  He indicated that they were very interested in hearing from law professors who do research in this area.

Paul V. Profeta Chair in Real Estate

The Finance and Economics Department of the Rutgers Business School at Newark and New Brunswick, Rutgers University invites nominations and applications for the inaugural holder of the Paul V. Profeta Chair in Real Estate. The School and University are strongly committed to recruiting an accomplished scholar necessary to lead the school’s ambition to be a leader in research and teaching in Real Estate. The successful candidate will become the Founding Executive Director of the Rutgers Center for Real Estate Studies.  The center is envisioned to facilitate scholarship activities and promote the education of real-estate issues in its various degree granting and continuing education programs.  The Finance and Economics Department has 35 full-time faculty members.  The Rutgers Business School offers BS, MBA, Masters of Quantitative Finance, and Ph.D. programs that include finance and applied economics concentrations.  Please submit your application (cover letter, three names of your letter writers, research paper[s], and CV) electronically at https://www.business.rutgers.edu/faculty-research/teaching-opportunities. The search will continue until the position is filled.

Reiss in Bloomberg on CS Lawsuit

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Bloomberg quoted me in Credit Suisse Waits for $11 Billion Answer in N.Y. Fraud Suit.  It reads in part,

As Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) sees it, time has run out on New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s pursuit of Wall Street banks for mortgage fraud that helped trigger the financial crisis.

Schneiderman sued Credit Suisse in 2012 as part of a wide-ranging probe into mortgage bonds. He claimed Switzerland’s second-largest bank misrepresented the risks associated with $93.8 billion in mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006 and 2007.

Credit Suisse asked a Manhattan judge in December to dismiss Schneiderman’s case, as well as his demand for as much as $11.2 billion in damages. The bank argued that New York, by waiting so long to file the lawsuit, missed a three-year legal deadline for suing. The state countered that it had six years to file its complaint.

If the bank wins, Schneiderman will face a new roadblock as he considers similar multibillion-dollar claims against a dozen other Wall Street firms. The judge in New York State Supreme Court could rule at any time.

“It would obviously tilt everything in the favor of Credit Suisse and similarly situated financial institutions,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, hindering New York’s remaining efforts to hold banks accountable for mistakes that spurred a recession.

*     *     *

Since the latest bonds cited in Schneiderman’s suit originated in 2006 and 2007, if the judge chooses the bank’s argument, the lawsuit may be dismissed. If the judge takes Schneiderman’s more expansive view, most or all of the suspect bonds may still be covered by the litigation.

“The entire case is time-barred,” Richard Clary, a lawyer for the bank, told Friedman at the December hearing. Lawyers for the state argued that such limits weren’t intended to apply to the attorney general.

“We’ve successfully resolved cases filed within six years,” Deputy Attorney General Virginia Chavez Romano said, citing last year’s JPMorgan accord. “It has been our decades-long practice.”

So far, New York’s courts have broadly interpreted the statute in finding a six-year period, Brooklyn Law School’s Reiss said. That may be changing as legal scholars and financial industry lawyers question its propriety.

“Having these incredibly long and ambiguous statutes of limitations is not particularly fair,” he said.

*     *     *

Friedman’s ruling in the Credit Suisse case may be crucial to Schneiderman’s probe of close to a dozen other banks, and whether he can sue them successfully.

New York agreed with the firms in October 2012 that any legal deadline for bringing fraud claims against them would be suspended while he continues his investigation, a person familiar with the matter said.

Such tolling agreements stopped the clock on any statute of limitations and ensured Schneiderman can bring fraud claims against banks for conduct going as far back as 2006, said the person.

Brooklyn Law School’s Reiss said the banks may have agreed to the delay to avoid forcing Schneiderman to file a “kitchen sink complaint with every possible allegation in it” just to beat the clock. Doing so also builds good will with regulators and may also facilitate a favorable settlement.

The agreements don’t necessarily mean that suits will be filed, the person said. If Schneiderman sues any of the banks, they may then assert the statute of limitations is three years, and not six, just as Credit Suisse has done.

*     *     *

This may be a more potent argument if Friedman rules for the Swiss bank in the pending case.

A three-year statute-of-limitations would mean they can’t be held responsible for transactions before 2009, while a six-year deadline would allow Schneiderman to reach back to 2006.

There’s “great uncertainty” about whether Schneiderman can move forward with the Credit Suisse case in light of the statute of limitations arguments, said James Cox, a corporate law professor at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina.

Reiss said that any ruling would probably be challenged all the way to the Court of Appeals in Albany, the state’s highest court.

The State of the Foreclosure Crisis

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Rob Pitingolo of the Urban Institute issued State of the Foreclosure Crisis: Past the Peak but Not Recovered. It opens,

Much attention has been given to statistics that show new foreclosure activity nationally has slowed over the past few years. When it comes to metropolitan area markets, however, some have gotten worse, while others have stagnated. It is not simple enough to declare an end to the foreclosure and delinquency crisis when there are as many as a quarter (25%) of metro areas that have not yet begun their recovery. (1)

It continues,

the rate of 90 day or more delinquency steadily fell in 2010 and 2011, ending at 3.1% in September 2013. In contrast, the foreclosure inventory only turned the corner in mid -2012, and is still higher than the March 2009 level at 4.5%, around seven times the pre-crisis level. Historically, a foreclosure inventory under 1% is what we would expect in “normal” market conditions.” (1, footnote omitted)

It concludes, “attention must be paid to individual metropolitan housing markets. Some are in much better shape than others; and some have made great strides since the peak of serious delinquency in December 2009. However, it may be premature to declare the problem is “ending” until all metro area markets show signs of recovery.” (2) The report identifies the starkest differences in metro areas:

Three geographic regions were hard hit at the beginning of the foreclosure crisis: California metros, Florida metros, and “Rust Belt” metros (those in Midwest states like Ohio, Michigan and Indiana). All three of those regions have seen solid improvements since December 2009.

On the other hand, the Northeast has generally performed poorly in the past several years. Serious delinquency rates in major metropolitan markets like New York City, Philadelphia and Baltimore have all worsened since December 2009. Other metro areas in New York like Buffalo, Rochester and Syracuse have similarly struggled, as have metro areas surrounding New York like New Jersey and Connecticut. (5)

The report concludes with a call for a nuanced response to the current state of the foreclosure crisis:  “communities need strong examples to build upon, rigorous data and analysis, and a commitment to evidence-based policymaking that strives toward the best fit between policy solutions and policy problems.” (6) This seems like the right call and the appropriate response to headlines that report the national trend without mentioning the variations among metro areas.

Federalizing Monoline Mortgage Insurance

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The Federal Insurance Office of the Department of Treasury issued a report required pursuant to Dodd-Frank, How To Modernize And Improve The System Of Insurance Regulation In The United States, which addresses among other things the state of the monoline mortgage insurance industry:

Recommendation: Federal standards and oversight for mortgage insurers should be developed and implemented.

Like financial guarantors, private mortgage insurers are monoline companies that experienced devastating losses during the financial crisis. A business predominantly focused on providing credit enhancement to mortgages guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, mortgage insurers migrated from the core business of insuring conventional, well-underwritten mortgage loans to providing insurance on pools of Alt-A and subprime mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis. The dramatic decline in housing prices and the impact of the change in underwriting practices required mortgage insurers to draw down capital and reserves to pay claims resulting in the failure of three out of the eight mortgage insurers in the United States. Historically high levels of claim denials, including policy rescissions, helped put taxpayers at risk.

Regulatory oversight of mortgage insurance varies state by state. Though mortgage insurance coverage is provided nationally, only 16 states impose specific requirements on private mortgage insurers. Of these requirements, two govern the solvency regime and, therefore, are of particular significance: (1) a limit on total liability, net of reinsurance, for all policies of 25 times the sum of capital, surplus, and contingency reserves, (known as a 25:1 risk-to-capital ratio); and (2) a requirement of annual contributions to a contingency reserve equal to 50 percent of the mortgage insurer’s earned premium. In addition to the states, the GSEs (and through conservatorship, the Federal Housing Finance Agency) establish uniform standards and eligibility requirements that in some cases are more stringent than those required by state regulators. As the financial crisis unfolded, mortgage insurers no longer met state or contractual capital requirements. State regulators granted waivers in order to allow mortgage insurers to continue to write new business while the GSEs loosened other standards that were applicable to mortgage insurers.

The private mortgage insurance sector is interconnected with other aspects of the federal housing finance system and, therefore, is an issue of significant national interest. As the United States continues to recover from the financial crisis and works to reform aspects of the housing finance system, private mortgage insurance may be an important component of any reform package as an alternative way to place private capital in front of any government or taxpayer risk. Robust national solvency and business practice standards, with uniform implementation, for mortgage insurers would help foster greater confidence in the solvency and performance of housing finance. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to establish federal oversight of federally developed standards applicable to mortgage insurance. (31-32)

This critique of the monoline insurance industry seems accurate to me. The industry has a tendency to fail when it is needed most — during major financial crises. Having multiple states regulate monoline insurers allows this nationally (and globally) significant industry to engage in regulatory arbitrage — that is, finding the most pliable regulatory environment in which to operate. National regulation would solve that problem. As always, a single federal regulator is more prone to capture by the industry it regulates than a bunch of state regulators. We have, however, tried the alternative and it has not worked so well. I think a federal approach is worth a try.