Tag Archives: Geithner

The Rescue of Fannie and Freddie

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Federal Reserve researchers, W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery, have posted a staff report, The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The abstract reads,

We describe and evaluate the measures taken by the U.S. government to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. We begin by outlining the business model of these two firms and their role in the U.S. housing finance system. Our focus then turns to the sources of financial distress that the firms experienced and the events that ultimately led the government to take action in an effort to stabilize housing and financial markets. We describe the various resolution options available to policymakers at the time and evaluate the success of the choice of conservatorship, and other actions taken, in terms of five objectives that we argue an optimal intervention would have fulfilled. We conclude that the decision to take the firms into conservatorship and invest public funds achieved its short-run goals of stabilizing mortgage markets and promoting financial stability during a period of extreme stress. However, conservatorship led to tensions between maximizing the firms’ value and achieving broader macroeconomic objectives, and, most importantly, it has so far failed to produce reform of the U.S. housing finance system.

 This staff report provides a nice overview of the two companies since the financial crisis. I was particularly interested by a couple of sections. First, I found the discussion of receivership versus conservatorship helpful. Second, I liked how it outlined the five objectives for an optimal intervention:

(i) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be enabled to continue their core securitization and guarantee functions as going concerns, thereby maintaining conforming mortgage credit supply.

(ii) The two firms would continue to honor their agency debt and mortgage-backed securities obligations, given the amount and widely held nature of these securities, especially in leveraged financial institutions, and the potential for financial instability in case of default on these obligations.

(iii) The value of the common and preferred equity in the two firms would be extinguished, reflecting their insolvent financial position.

(iv) The two firms would be managed in a way that would provide flexibility to take into account macroeconomic objectives, rather than just maximizing the private value of their assets.

(v) The structure of the rescue would prompt long-term reform and set in motion the transition to a better system within a reasonable period of time. (14-15)

You’ll have to read the paper to see how they evaluate the five objectives in greater detail.

Carney, Epstein, Macey & Reiss on GSE Litigation

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I was on an interesting panel today on the state of the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation. Judge Lamberth’s ruling in Perry Capital LLC v. Lew et al. was bad news for the plaintiffs in all of the shareholder suits. The panel was hosted by Michael Kim, CRT Capital Managing Director & Senior Research Analyst, and featured

  • John Carney – Wall Street Journal
  • Richard Epstein – NYU Law School
  • Jonathan Macey – Yale Law School
  • David Reiss – Brooklyn Law School

The agenda for the panel included

  • an overview of the litigation timeline for the cases in Iowa District Court, the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
  • a detailed analysis of Judge Lamberth’s Ruling and
  • a review of legal strategies and the outlook going forward

The more of these panels I am on, the more I am struck by the passionate intensity of those representing the shareholders. They are convinced that they are not only right, but also that the judiciary will see it their way. I lack this conviction.

It is not that I am so sure that the shareholders will ultimately lose (although that is a good possibility). Rather, it is that the facts and the law are extraordinarily complex in these cases. Because of this complexity, I find it hard to predict how the judges assigned to hear these cases will choose to frame them.

Judge Lamberth and other judges deciding cases arising from government action during the financial crisis often frame their decisions with a narrative of extraordinary government intervention during a period of great uncertainty. As a result, those judges have granted the government as much deference as they can.

Many of the shareholder advocates analogize from precedents drawn from more pedestrian situations and believe that courts will hew closely to them. I am quite skeptical of that approach. Judges lived through the crisis too and are all too aware of the precipice we were on. I think they will think twice before second guessing those who had to call the shots with such severely limited information, and did so while under unrelenting pressure to get it right when the stakes were so high.

Reiss on FIRREA Penalties

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Bloomberg quoted me in S&P Faces Squeeze After $1.3 Billion Countrywide Fine. It opens,

Standard & Poor’s (MHFI)’ chances of settling the government’s lawsuit over mortgage-bond ratings for less than $1 billion may have slipped away after Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide unit was socked with a $1.3 billion fine.

The Countrywide ruling was the first to lay out what penalties financial institutions could face under a 1989 bank-fraud law the Obama administration is using against alleged culprits of the subprime mortgage crisis. It has boosted the government’s hand against McGraw Hill Financial Inc.’s S&P, said Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne State University.

“If the starting negotiation point for the Justice Department to settle was $1 billion before, that number has just gone up,” Henning said in a phone interview.

The U.S. sued S&P and Countrywide under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, a law passed by Congress in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. The administration, which seeks as much as $5 billion from S&P, is using the law to punish alleged misconduct in the creation and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities blamed for the financial crisis two decades later.

For the Justice Department, the case against S&P goes to the heart of the financial crisis, attacking the company’s claims that its ratings — relied on by investors worldwide — were honest and neutral. S&P has countered that the case is really retribution for it downgrading the U.S. government’s own debt and it has subpoenaed officials including former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in an effort to prove that.

Hearing Today

A hearing on the company’s request to force Geithner and the government to turn over records is scheduled for today in federal court in Santa Ana, California.

Countrywide was found liable by a federal jury in Manhattan for lying about the quality of the almost $3 billion in mortgages it sold to Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FMCC) in 2007 and 2008. U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in Manhattan agreed with the Justice Department that the penalty should be based on how much money the mortgage lender fraudulently induced the companies to pay for the loans.

“The civil penalty provisions of FIRREA are designed to serve punitive and deterrent purposes and should be construed in accordance with those purposes,” the judge said in his July 30 ruling.

S&P is accused of defrauding institutions that relied on its credit ratings for residential mortgage-based securities and collateralized debt obligations that included those securities. The government claims S&P lied to investors about its ratings on trillions of dollars in securities being objective and free of conflicts of interest.

*     *     *

Appeal Probable

The judge’s analysis, using the nominal value of the transactions as a starting point to determine the penalty, was “out of whack” and will probably be appealed by Bank of America to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York, said David Reiss, a professor at the Brooklyn Law School.

“The Second Circuit has no problem reversing Rakoff,” Reiss said in in a phone interview. “The ruling pushes the balance of power in favor of the government by expanding the definition of a civil penalty.”

While other judges aren’t obliged to follow Rakoff’s reasoning, they will pay close attention to the decision because the federal court in Manhattan is the leading business law jurisdiction in the country and the ruling was clearly explained, Reiss said.

S&P’s Fightin’ Words

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S&P filed a memorandum in support of its motion to compel discovery in the FIRREA case that the United States brought against S&P last year. S&P comes out fighting in this memorandum, arguing that the “lawsuit is retaliation for S&P’s decision to downgrade the credit rating of the United states in August 2011.” (1)

S&P argues that the “most obvious explanation” for the United States’ “decision to pursue a FIRREA action against S&P alone” among the major rating agencies “is apparent:”   “S&P alone among the major rating agencies downgraded the securities issued by the United States.” (17) This is not obvious to me, particularly given the various explanations for this disparate treatment that have appeared in outlets like the WSJ over the last couple of years. But it may be true nonetheless.

In any case, I do not find the “chronology of events relating to the downgrade and the commencement of this lawsuit” to provide “powerful evidence linking the two.” (17) The chronology ends with the following entries:

  • S&P’s downgrade of the United States occurred on Friday, August 5, 2011. That Sunday, August 7, Harold McGraw III, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of McGraw Hill (of which S&P was a unit), received a telephone message from a high-ranking official of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; when the call was returned, the official conveyed the personal displeasure of the Secretary of the Treasury with S&P’s rating action.
  • This was followed on Monday by a call to Mr. McGraw from the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, in which Secretary Geithner stated that S&P had made a “huge error” for which it was “accountable.” He said that S&P had done “an enormous disservice to yourselves and your country,” that S&P’s conduct would be “looked at very carefully,” and that such behavior could not occur without a response.
  • The McClatchy Newspapers subsequently reported in a piece authored by Kevin G. Hall and Greg Gordon that while the United States’ original investigation included S&P and Moody’s, “[i]nvestigator interest in Moody’s apparently dropped off around the summer of 2011, about the same time S&P issued the historic downgrade of the United States’ creditworthiness because of mounting debt and deficits.” A source familiar with the investigations was quoted as stating: “After the U.S. downgrade, Moody’s is no longer part of this.”
  • In the year preceding S&P’s downgrade of the United States, two states, Mississippi and Connecticut, had initiated proceedings alleging deceptive practices based specifically on an alleged lack of independence. Each of those states named both Moody’s and S&P as defendants. After the downgrade, additional state lawsuits were commenced, with allegations nearly identical to those of the Connecticut and Mississippi complaints. Drafted after coordination and consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice, none of those lawsuits named Moody’s. (19, footnotes omitted)

This is surely no smoking gun and lots of dots remain to be connected.  How did DoJ get involved? Are the state Attorneys General in on the conspiracy? Why would DoJ stop an investigation of Moody’s to punish S&P? Sounds a bit like cutting off your nose to spite your face?

That being said, S&P might be right about the motivation for this suit and their allegations may be enough to win this motion to compel discovery. But whoever wins this round, this should be a fight worth watching.