What Are Mortgage Borrowers Thinking?

photo by Robert Huffstutter

Freud’s Sofa

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) have released A Profile of 2013 Mortgage Borrowers: Statistics from the National Survey of Mortgage Originations. While sounding dull and perhaps a bit dated, this document is actually an extraordinary overview of the much discussed but rarely seen mortgage borrower. And while the information is from 2013, it provides a good baseline for the post-financial crisis and post-Dodd Frank world we live in.

Historically, it has been difficult for government and academic researchers to get comprehensive data about mortgage borrowers. The impetus for this report was the Housing and Economic Recover Act of 2008 which requires the FHFA to conduct a monthly mortgage market survey. In the long term, this survey will help policymakers respond to the rapid changes that are so common in our dynamic mortgage market.

The National Survey of Mortgage Originations (NMSO) focuses on

mortgage shopping behavior, mortgage closing experiences, and other information that cannot be obtained from any other source, such as expectations regarding house price appreciation, critical household financial events, and life events such as unemployment, large medical expenses, or divorce. In general, borrowers are not asked to provide information about mortgage terms in the questionnaire since these fields are available [from other sources]. (1)

Here are some of the findings that I found interesting, albeit not always surprising:

  • Mortgage shopping behavior differed significantly by borrower characteristics and by whether the consumer was also shopping for a home at the same time as the mortgage. (14)
  • First-time home buyers differed significantly from repeat home buyers in their mortgage search behavior and repeat borrowers differed significantly in their mortgage search behavior depending on whether they were refinancing or purchasing a home. (14)
  • Slightly more than 40 percent of all respondents reported having a difficult time explaining the difference between a prime and a subprime loan. (16)
  • Overall about one- quarter of borrowers reported that they could not explain amortization or the difference between the interest rate and APR on a loan.(18)
  • Roughly one in five borrowers had to delay their closing date. (26)
  • In general, respondents believe that mortgage lenders treat borrowers well. (35)
  • Fifteen percent of respondents expected to have difficulties in making their mortgage payments in the next couple of years. (44)

There are a lot more interesting nuggets about the subjective views of borrowers in the report. I hope that later reports offer more analysis that ties this information into other objective sources of data about borrowers and their mortgages. How well do they know themselves and how good are they at predicting their ability to maintain their mortgages over the long-term?

Is NYC Rent Too Damn High?!?

Husock and Armlovich of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research have posted an Issue Brief, New York’s Rent Burdened Households: Recalculating the Total, Finding a Better Solution. The brief makes some important points, but they are almost lost because of its histrionic tone.

First, the good points. The authors write this brief in reaction to the de Blasio administration’s plan to build or preserve 200,000 units of affordable housing. They believe, however, that the administration has exaggerated the need. They write: “the housing needs of low-income New Yorkers must be acknowledged and addressed. Still, they should not be exaggerated by numbers that fail to reflect the income and in-kind assistance that benefit poor households.” (6)

They argue that the administration’s claim that more than 600,000 households are “severely rent-burdened” is flawed, resulting in an overestimate of the need for affordable housing. While I am not in a position to evaluate the underlying work, they make a reasonable case that the administration did not properly account for the impact of Section 8 housing subsidies and a variety of other programs that offer financial assistance to low-income households in arriving at their number.

They also argue that the administration’s proposed solution, permanent affordability, is flawed because some households that may be income-eligible at the commencement of their tenure in an affordable unit may end up with a significantly higher income down the line. Indeed, this has been a long-time issue with the Mitchell-Lama program.

These are some serious issues for the de Blasio administration to chew over. Clearly, we should be working from the best data we can about the extent to which households are severely burdened by housing costs. (Indeed, another recent study also indicates that the administration is working from too high of an number.) And just as clearly, the solution chosen by the administration should work as effectively as possible to reduce the rent burden for low- and moderate-income households.

But the brief’s tone, unfortunately, masks these insights. First, the brief opens by questioning the basis for the mayor’s affordable housing plan — that many New Yorker’s are severely rent burdened. But the authors acknowledge that at least 300,000 households are severely burdened, even after they make their adjustments to the administration’s numbers. That hardly undercuts the policy rationale for the Mayor’s affordable housing initiative.

Moreover, some of the adjustments made by the authors are themselves suspect. For instance, the authors exclude households “that report severe rent burdens while paying more than the 90th percentile citywide of per-capita” out-of-pocket rent. (5) They state that “Logic dictates that such households have significant existing savings or assets themselves, or they receive assistance from family or other sources.” (5) That seems like an extraordinary “logical” leap to me. While it may describe some households at the 90th percentile, I would think that it is also logical that it includes some people who barely have enough money to buy food.

As to the solution of permanent affordability, the authors write,

a household member could win the lottery, or sign a multimillion-dollar major league baseball contract, and an affordable unit’s rent would remain unchanged. Affordable units would be “permanently” affordable, creating what economists term a “lock-in effect,” limiting the likelihood that such units will be vacated. This is problematic for a city housing policy that seeks to decrease the overall number of severely rent-burdened households. (6)

This is just silly. Very few people have such windfalls. And very few of those who do have such windfalls live in small apartments afterwards. The more common problem is that young, educated people get affordable units when their earnings are low and then become middle-class or upper-middle class over the years. This is a serious program design issue and it means that the administration should think through what permanent affordability should mean over the lifetime of a typical household.

As I noted, this brief raises some serious issues amongst all of its heated rhetoric. One hopes that the administration can get through the hot air to the parts that are informed by cool reason.