Loan Mods Amidst Rising Interest Rates

photo by Chris Butterworth

The Urban Institute’s Laurie Goodman et al. have posted Government Loan Modifications: What Happens When Interest Rates Rise?. This brief is another product of the newly formed Mortgage Servicing Collaborative. This brief

examines the current loan modification product suite for government loans insured or guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), or the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). When a delinquent borrower with a government loan obtains a modification, the mortgage rate is typically reset to the prevailing market rate, which can be higher or lower than the original note rate. When the market rate is below the original rate, providing payment reduction becomes inherently easier and less expensive for the investor. Conversely, when market rates are above the note rate, providing payment reduction becomes more expensive and challenging, making it more difficult to cure the delinquency. This can result in more redefaults and foreclosures, larger losses for government insurers, and greater distress for borrowers, communities, and neighborhoods. In addition, most government mortgage borrowers are first-time homebuyers and minorities, who tend to have limited incomes and savings, making loan modifications all the more important. (1)

Given the recent upward trend in interest rates, this is more than a theoretical exercise. And indeed, the brief “explains why FHA, VA, and USDA borrowers who fall behind on their payments are unlikely to receive adequate payment relief when the market interest rate is higher than the original note rate. ” (3)

The brief outlines some options that could increase payment relief for those borrowers, including deploying a 40-year extended term and principal forbearance to reduce the monthly mortgage payment. The brief acknowledges that there are barriers to implementing the options it has identified but it also proposes ways to overcome those barriers.

As I had stated previously, the Mortgage Servicing Collaborative is providing sorely needed guidance through some of the darker corners of the mortgage market. This brief sheds some welcome light on an obscured problem that may cause trouble in the years to come.

Rethinking FHA Insurance

The Congressional Budget Office issued a report on Options to Manage FHA’s Exposure to Risk from Guaranteeing Single-Family Mortgages. FHA insurance stands out from other forms of mortgage insurance because it guarantees all of a lender’s loss, rather than just a portion of it. It is certainly a useful exercise to determine whether the FHA could reduce its exposure to those potential credit losses while also making home loans available to people who would otherwise have difficulty accessing them. This report evaluates the options available to the FHA:

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures the mortgages of people who might otherwise have trouble getting a loan, particularly first-time homebuyers and low-income borrowers seeking to purchase or refinance a home. During and just after the 2007–2009 recession, the share of mortgages insured by FHA grew rapidly as private lenders became more reluctant to provide home loans without an FHA guarantee of repayment. FHA’s expanded role in the mortgage insurance market ensured that borrowers could continue to have access to credit. However, like most other mortgage insurers, FHA experienced a spike in delinquencies and defaults by borrowers.

Recently, mortgage borrowers with good credit scores, large down payments, or low ratios of debt to income have started to see more options in the private market. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the share of FHA-insured mortgages going to such borrowers is likely to keep shrinking as credit standards in the private market continue to ease. That change would leave FHA with a riskier pool of borrowers, creating risk-management challenges similar to the ones that contributed to the agency’s high levels of insurance claims and losses during the recession.

This report analyzes policy options to reduce FHA’s exposure to risk from its program to guarantee single-family mortgages, including creating a larger role for private lenders and restricting the availability of FHA’s guarantees. The options are designed to let FHA continue to fulfill its primary mission of ensuring access to credit for first-time homebuyers and low-income borrowers.

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What Policy Options Did CBO Analyze?

Many changes have been proposed to reduce the cost of risk to the federal government from FHA’s single-family mortgage guarantees. CBO analyzed illustrative versions of seven policy options, which generally represent the range of approaches that policymakers and others have proposed:

■ Guaranteeing some rather than all of the lender’s losses on a defaulted mortgage;

■ Increasing FHA’s use of risk-based pricing to tailor up-front fees to the riskiness of specific borrowers;

■ Adding a residual-income test to the requirements for an FHA-insured mortgage to better measure borrowers’ ability to repay the loan (as the Department of Veterans Affairs does in its mortgage guarantee program);

■ Reducing the limit on the size of a mortgage that FHA can guarantee;

■ Restricting eligibility for FHA-insured mortgages only to first-time homebuyers and low- to moderate-income borrowers;

■ Requiring some borrowers to receive mortgage counseling to help them better understand their financial obligations; and

■ Providing a grant to help borrowers with their down payment, in exchange for which FHA would receive part of the increase in their home’s value when it was sold.

Although some of those approaches would require action by lawmakers, several of the options could be implemented by FHA without legislation. In addition, certain options could be combined to change the nature of FHA’s risk exposure or the composition of its guarantees. CBO did not examine the results of combining options.

What Effects Would the Policy Options Have?

Making one or more of those policy changes would affect FHA’s financial position, its role in the broader mortgage market, and the federal budget. All of the options would improve the agency’s financial position by reducing its exposure to the risk of losses on the mortgages it insures (see Table 1). The main reason for that reduction would be a decrease in the amount of mortgages guaranteed by FHA. CBO projects that under current law, FHA would insure $220 billion in new single-family mortgages in 2018. The options would lower that amount by anywhere from $15 billion to $77 billion (see Figure 1). Some options would also reduce FHA’s risk exposure by decreasing insurance losses as a percentage of the value of the guaranteed mortgages. (1-2)

National Survey of Mortgage Originations

survey

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has issued a request for comments on the National Survey of Mortgage Originations. The NSMO is

a recurring quarterly survey of individuals who have recently obtained a loan secured by a first mortgage on single-family residential property. The survey questionnaire is sent to a representative sample of approximately 6,000 recent mortgage borrowers each calendar quarter and typically consists of between 90 and 95 multiple choice and short answer questions designed to obtain information about borrowers’ experiences in choosing and in taking out a mortgage.

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The NSMO is one component of a larger project, known as the “National Mortgage Database” (NMDB) Project, which is a multi-year joint effort of FHFA and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (although the NSMO is sponsored only by FHFA). The NMDB Project was created, in part, to satisfy the Congressionally-mandated requirements of section 1324(c) of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, as amended by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (Safety and Soundness Act). Section 1324(c) requires that FHFA conduct a monthly survey to collect data on the characteristics of individual prime and subprime mortgages, and on the borrowers and properties associated with those mortgages, in order to enable it to prepare a detailed annual report on the mortgage market activities of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for review by the appropriate Congressional oversight committees. Section 1324(c) also authorizes and requires FHFA to compile a database of timely and otherwise unavailable residential mortgage market information to be made available to the public. (81 F.R. 62889)

Obviously, this is another post on a technical subject that is not for the faint of heart, but it is very important for the health of the mortgage market. During the Subprime Boom of the early 2000s, mortgage characteristics changed so quickly that information became outdated within months.  Policymakers and academics did not have good access to newest data and thus were operating, to a large extent, in the dark.

The information in the NSMO will not only help regulators, but will also outside researchers to “more effectively monitor emerging trends in the mortgage origination process . . ..” (81 F.R. 62890) The FHFA requests comments on whether “the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of FHFA functions, including whether the information has practical utility.” (Id.) The FHFA is also looking for comments on ways “to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected.” (Id.) Those with an interest in securing a safe future for our mortgage markets should take a look at the survey instrument (attached to the Comment Request) and respond to the FHFA’s request. Comments are due on or before November 14, 2016.

Mortgages for Borderline Borrowers

photo by Olli Henze

BiggerPockets.com quoted me in 7 Mortgage Qualification Tips for Borderline Borrowers. It opens,

It’s super easy to qualify for a mortgage when you have an 800 credit score, a six-figure salary, no debt, and 20% to put down. But that isn’t everyone’s story.

It’s far more difficult to be approved with a 620 credit score, a low five-figure salary, some outstanding debt, a car loan, and 3% for the down payment. You can still qualify, but it’s a LOT more difficult. And you’re not going to be getting the lowest rate around.

I asked some experts for their mortgage qualifying tips for borrowers who run the highest risk of being turned down. Here’s what they had to say:

7 Mortgage Qualification Tips for Borderline Borrowers

Go FHA

“Applicants with a low credit scores should be sure to look for lenders who offer FHA-insured mortgages. The FHA will insure mortgages with lower credit scores than most others will accept. Borrowers with small savings should look for lenders with low-down-payment requirements. Again, an FHA-insured lender may be the right match, but Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also have programs with low down payment requirements, so applicants should ask their lenders about those as well,” says David Reiss, a Law Professor at Brooklyn Law School who also writes at REFinBlog.com.

J.D. Crowe, President of Southeast Mortgage of Georgia agrees. “Those with less-than-ideal credit scores sometimes have home loan options through the Federal Housing Administration. The FHA works with approved lenders to help applicants who have lower credit scores and small down payments, and can offer as much as 96.5% financing.”

You can find the other six tips here.

 

What Are Mortgage Borrowers Thinking?

photo by Robert Huffstutter

Freud’s Sofa

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) have released A Profile of 2013 Mortgage Borrowers: Statistics from the National Survey of Mortgage Originations. While sounding dull and perhaps a bit dated, this document is actually an extraordinary overview of the much discussed but rarely seen mortgage borrower. And while the information is from 2013, it provides a good baseline for the post-financial crisis and post-Dodd Frank world we live in.

Historically, it has been difficult for government and academic researchers to get comprehensive data about mortgage borrowers. The impetus for this report was the Housing and Economic Recover Act of 2008 which requires the FHFA to conduct a monthly mortgage market survey. In the long term, this survey will help policymakers respond to the rapid changes that are so common in our dynamic mortgage market.

The National Survey of Mortgage Originations (NMSO) focuses on

mortgage shopping behavior, mortgage closing experiences, and other information that cannot be obtained from any other source, such as expectations regarding house price appreciation, critical household financial events, and life events such as unemployment, large medical expenses, or divorce. In general, borrowers are not asked to provide information about mortgage terms in the questionnaire since these fields are available [from other sources]. (1)

Here are some of the findings that I found interesting, albeit not always surprising:

  • Mortgage shopping behavior differed significantly by borrower characteristics and by whether the consumer was also shopping for a home at the same time as the mortgage. (14)
  • First-time home buyers differed significantly from repeat home buyers in their mortgage search behavior and repeat borrowers differed significantly in their mortgage search behavior depending on whether they were refinancing or purchasing a home. (14)
  • Slightly more than 40 percent of all respondents reported having a difficult time explaining the difference between a prime and a subprime loan. (16)
  • Overall about one- quarter of borrowers reported that they could not explain amortization or the difference between the interest rate and APR on a loan.(18)
  • Roughly one in five borrowers had to delay their closing date. (26)
  • In general, respondents believe that mortgage lenders treat borrowers well. (35)
  • Fifteen percent of respondents expected to have difficulties in making their mortgage payments in the next couple of years. (44)

There are a lot more interesting nuggets about the subjective views of borrowers in the report. I hope that later reports offer more analysis that ties this information into other objective sources of data about borrowers and their mortgages. How well do they know themselves and how good are they at predicting their ability to maintain their mortgages over the long-term?

Couples Leave Money on Closing Table

photo by Dustin Moore

Geng Li, Weifeng Wu and Vincent Yao, three Fed economists, have posted a research note, Do People Leave Money on the Table? Evidence from Joint Mortgage Applications and the Minimum FICO Rule. The authors state that there “is mounting evidence that households make suboptimal savings and investment decisions” and find that

many mortgage borrowers appear to have failed to apply for mortgages that give the lowest interest rates. Specifically, we find that nearly 10 percent of prime borrowers who applied for their loans jointly could have lowered their mortgage interest rate at least one eighth of 1 percentage point if the mortgage was applied for by the applicant with a higher credit score and an income high enough to qualify for the mortgage. Furthermore, among the joint applicants with a lower credit score below 740, for whom mortgage interest rates are most sensitive to credit scores, more than 25 percent could have significantly reduced their borrowing cost by having the individual with a higher credit score apply. This is due to the fact that when lenders price mortgages with joint applications, the interest rates are determined by the lower score of the two–often known as the minimum FICO rule. We estimate that such borrowers could reduce their annual interest payment by between $220 and $1,400. Consistent with the existing literature, we find that couples who appeared to have left money on the table tend to have lower credit scores and be much younger and less financially sophisticated. (1, emphasis added)

This note provides an example of just how complicated the mortgage underwriting process is, particularly for less financially sophisticated borrowers.

One wonders if the CFPB should take a look at this. Should lenders be required to evaluate if joint mortgage applicants would get a better rate if only one of them ended up taking out the mortgage? And when the answer is yes, should lenders be required to share that information with the applicants? I can think of a variety of reasons why that should not be the case (not the least of which is that it could leave just one member of the family holding the bag if things go south), but it might be worth exploring this question more systematically.