Reiss on Snuffing out FIRREA

Law360 quoting me in BofA Fight Won’t Blunt DOJ’s Favorite Bank Fraud Weapon (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

A federal magistrate judge on Thursday put a Justice Department case against Bank of America Corp. using a fraud statute from the 1980s in peril, but the case’s limited scope means the government is not likely to abandon its favorite financial fraud fighting tool, attorneys say.

Federal prosecutors have increasingly leaned on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, a relic of the 1980s savings and loan crisis, as a vehicle for taking on banks and other financial institutions over alleged violations perpetrated during the housing bubble years.

*     *     *

Some banking analysts hailed the ruling as potentially the beginning of the end of the government’s pursuit of housing bubble-era violations.

“If the judge’s recommendation is accepted by the federal district court judge, then this development will represent a significant setback for the government’s legal efforts and likely mark the beginning of the end for crisis-era litigation,” Isaac Boltansky, a policy analyst at Compass Point Research & Trading LLC, said in a client note.

However, others say the government’s case was brought under relatively narrow claims that Bank of America did not properly value the securities to induce regulated banks to purchase securities they otherwise might not have.

That is a tougher case to bring than the broad wire fraud and mail fraud claims that were available to the government under FIRREA. The government has employed those tools with great success against Bank of America and Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC in other cases in far-flung jurisdictions, said Peter Vinella, a director at Berkeley Research Group.

“There was no issue about whether BofA did anything wrong or not. It’s just that the case was filed incorrectly. It was very narrowly defined,” he said.

It is not entirely clear that Bank of America is in the clear in this case, either.

U.S. district judges tend to give great deference to reports from magistrate judges, according to David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

But even if U.S. District Judge Max O. Cogburn Jr. accepts the recommendation, the Justice Department has already lodged a notice of appeal related to the report. And in the worst-case scenario, the government could amend its complaint.

A victory for Bank of America in the North Carolina case is unlikely to have a widespread impact, given the claims that are at stake. The government will still be able to bring its broader, and more powerful claims, under a law with a 10-year statute of limitations.

“It is one opinion that is going against a number of FIRREA precedents that have been decided in others parts of the country,” Reiss said. “It also appears that this case was brought and decided on much narrower grounds than those other cases, so I don’t think that it will halt the government’s use of the law.”

No Justice for Mortgage Fraud

The Audit Division of the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General has issued an Audit of the Department of Justice’s Efforts to Address Mortgage Fraud.  One word for it — DEPRESSING:

The Department’s inability to accurately collect data about its mortgage fraud efforts was starkly demonstrated when we sought to review the Distressed Homeowner Initiative. On October 9, 2012, the FFETF [Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force] held a press conference to publicize the results of the initiative. During this press conference, the Attorney General announced that the initiative resulted in 530 criminal defendants being charged, including 172 executives, in 285 criminal indictments or informations filed in federal courts throughout the United States during the previous 12 months. The Attorney General also announced that 110 federal civil cases were filed against over 150 defendants for losses totaling at least $37 million, and involving more than 15,000 victims. According to statements made at the press conference, these cases involved more than 73,000 homeowner victims and total losses estimated at more than $1 billion.

Shortly after this press conference, we requested documentation that supported the statistics presented. In November 2012, in response to our request, DOJ officials informed us that shortly after the press conference concluded they became concerned with the accuracy of the statistics. Based on a review of the case list that was the basis for the figures, the then-Executive Director of the FFETF told us that numerous significant errors and inaccuracies existed with the information. For example, multiple cases were included in the reported statistics that were not distressed homeowner-related fraud. Also, a significant number of the included cases were brought prior to the FY 2012 timeframe. (ii, footnote omitted)

According to the report, this was not a one time problem with the DoJ’s reporting about mortgage fraud.

The audit “makes 7 recommendations to help DoJ improve its understanding, coordination, and reporting of its efforts to address mortgage fraud.” (iii) The last two seem to be the most important:

6. Develop a method to capture additional data that will allow DOJ to better understand the results of its efforts in investigating and prosecuting mortgage fraud and to identify the position of mortgage fraud defendants within an organization.

7. Develop a method to readily identify mortgage fraud criminal and civil enforcement efforts for reporting purposes. (30)

I (along with Brad Borden) have previously argued that law enforcement agencies have not been tough enough on high-level perpetrators of mortgage fraud, although our position appears to be the minority view among lawyers (see here for a more common view). I think this audit supports our view that, for one reason or another, prosecutors have dropped the ball on this in a big way. It’s probably too late to do anything about the last financial crisis, but it sure would be swell to have a system of accountability put in place for the next one!

S&P’s Fightin’ Words

S&P filed a memorandum in support of its motion to compel discovery in the FIRREA case that the United States brought against S&P last year. S&P comes out fighting in this memorandum, arguing that the “lawsuit is retaliation for S&P’s decision to downgrade the credit rating of the United states in August 2011.” (1)

S&P argues that the “most obvious explanation” for the United States’ “decision to pursue a FIRREA action against S&P alone” among the major rating agencies “is apparent:”   “S&P alone among the major rating agencies downgraded the securities issued by the United States.” (17) This is not obvious to me, particularly given the various explanations for this disparate treatment that have appeared in outlets like the WSJ over the last couple of years. But it may be true nonetheless.

In any case, I do not find the “chronology of events relating to the downgrade and the commencement of this lawsuit” to provide “powerful evidence linking the two.” (17) The chronology ends with the following entries:

  • S&P’s downgrade of the United States occurred on Friday, August 5, 2011. That Sunday, August 7, Harold McGraw III, the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of McGraw Hill (of which S&P was a unit), received a telephone message from a high-ranking official of the New York Federal Reserve Bank; when the call was returned, the official conveyed the personal displeasure of the Secretary of the Treasury with S&P’s rating action.
  • This was followed on Monday by a call to Mr. McGraw from the Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, in which Secretary Geithner stated that S&P had made a “huge error” for which it was “accountable.” He said that S&P had done “an enormous disservice to yourselves and your country,” that S&P’s conduct would be “looked at very carefully,” and that such behavior could not occur without a response.
  • The McClatchy Newspapers subsequently reported in a piece authored by Kevin G. Hall and Greg Gordon that while the United States’ original investigation included S&P and Moody’s, “[i]nvestigator interest in Moody’s apparently dropped off around the summer of 2011, about the same time S&P issued the historic downgrade of the United States’ creditworthiness because of mounting debt and deficits.” A source familiar with the investigations was quoted as stating: “After the U.S. downgrade, Moody’s is no longer part of this.”
  • In the year preceding S&P’s downgrade of the United States, two states, Mississippi and Connecticut, had initiated proceedings alleging deceptive practices based specifically on an alleged lack of independence. Each of those states named both Moody’s and S&P as defendants. After the downgrade, additional state lawsuits were commenced, with allegations nearly identical to those of the Connecticut and Mississippi complaints. Drafted after coordination and consultation with the U.S. Department of Justice, none of those lawsuits named Moody’s. (19, footnotes omitted)

This is surely no smoking gun and lots of dots remain to be connected.  How did DoJ get involved? Are the state Attorneys General in on the conspiracy? Why would DoJ stop an investigation of Moody’s to punish S&P? Sounds a bit like cutting off your nose to spite your face?

That being said, S&P might be right about the motivation for this suit and their allegations may be enough to win this motion to compel discovery. But whoever wins this round, this should be a fight worth watching.

Doing Justice with the $13B JPMorgan Settlement

I have posted a couple of items on this massive settlement (here and here).  This should be my last one. Perhaps I am ungrateful, but the Statement of Facts agreed upon by the Department of Justice and JPMorgan Chase left me with an empty feeling. Recovering $13 billion for homeowners, investors and the government is certainly a key aspect of the justice done in this case. But the law can and should have an expressive function — it should make a statement about the difference between right and wrong behavior. Unfortunately, the Statement of Facts almost completely fails as an expressive document.

It only makes it clear at one point that JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual did something very wrong:

employees of JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu received information that, in certain instances, loans that did not comply with underwriting guidelines were included in the RMBS sold and marketed to investors; however, JPMorgan, Bear Stearns, and WaMu did not disclose this to securitization investors. (1)

The Statement of Facts provided a couple of facts that made clear what JPMorgan did wrong (see page 2), but I could not even parse the sections of Bear Stearns and WaMu to tell you what they did wrong. This is about as strong as it gets:

in 2008, internal WaMu reviews indicated specific instances of weaknesses in WaMu’s loan origination and underwriting practices, including, at times, non-compliance with underwriting standards; the reviews also revealed instances of borrower fraud and misrepresentations by others involved in the loan origination process with respect to the information provided for loan qualification purposes. (10)

You can’t tell from such language whether WaMu was acting intentionally, recklessly or negligently.  You can’t really tell whether this behavior was endemic, frequent, occasional or rare. You can’t tell whether it was the fault of some low-level employees or of upper management. Just about the only thing you can tell from the WaMu section (and the Bear Stearns section, for that matter) is that it was not JPMorgan’s fault:

The actions and omissions described above with respect to WaMu occurred prior to OTS’s closure of WaMu and JPMorgan’s acquisition of the identified WaMu assets and liabilities. (11)

No doubt, JPMorgan tried to control the PR and legal liability to third parties that this Statement of Facts could engender. But Justice could have held the line on the expressive aspect of the settlement just as it did with the monetary aspect. In the long run, that could turn out to be just as important.

And How About the Just?

Some believe that there are 36 righteous people whose existence justifies the whole of humanity.  Each bears the world’s pain and the world would come to an end without these Just ones. Oddly enough, I was thinking about this story when reading about the the JPMorgan Chase settlement with the Department of Justice.

I was glad to see that the company was being held accountable for its behavior (the Statement of Facts outlines the basis for the settlement).  I was also glad to see that Justice is not giving a free pass to the individuals who may be individually guilty of wrongdoing. The settlement does not bar future prosecutions and Justice seems energized to hold individuals accountable for their intentional and wrongful acts that contributed to the financial crisis. These actions by Justice will hopefully deter some potential wrongdoers going forward.

But what is missing from all of this allocating of responsibility is an acknowledgment that some people in these financial institutions tried to do the right thing. They tried to underwrite mortgages properly; they tried to rate securities properly; they tried to follow established due diligence procedures. These people were overrun by their superiors who were chasing short term profits for their employers and bigger annual bonuses for themselves. Some of these Financial Industry Just were fired, some retired, some moved on.

How might the FI Just view their actions so many years later? Their supervisors likely received large bonuses and promotions and very few of them will be held responsible for their bad acts. The FI Just, on other other hand, got harsh words, poor treatment and relatively poor compensation for their troubles.

Just as we want to disincentivize bad behavior, we should also seek to incentivize good behavior. This does not necessarily require financial compensation. For many people, an acknowledgement of their good judgment might be enough. Is there a role for government in such an initiative? Can their be a medal for financial rectitude; an honor roll for underwriting: a listing of the Just by Justice?

 

Reiss on $13B JPMorgan Settlement in CSM

The Christian Science Monitor quoted me in JPMorgan Chase settles. Is $13 billion for role in mortgage crisis fair? The story reads in part,

The settlement does not, however, release any individuals within JPMorgan from further criminal or civil charges. The bank has agreed to cooperate fully in any investigations related to the fraud covered in the agreement.

“I think that the Department of Justice has heard the public in terms of saying, if people were criminally responsible, they should be held liable,” says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, who has written extensively on the mortgage crisis. “Just a handful of people have faced any serious personal liability as a result of the events of the financial crisis of the 2000s.”

But some feel that the unprecedented scope and size of the penalty is unfair for the bank behemoth, which was seen as something of a financial savior when it took on the imploding assets of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual after the financial collapse. Some estimate that employees at these banks conducted up to 80 percent of the fraud found by the Justice Department. JPMorgan assumed these firms’ legal jeopardy when it took on their troubled assets.

“There’s a moral narrative about this, that it’s unfair to go after JPMorgan because they stepped in to help,” says Mr. Reiss.

Reiss on Countrywide Verdict

Law360 interviewed me in DOJ’s Countrywide Win Could Force More Bank Settlements (behind a paywall).  The story opens

The U.S. Department of Justice’s victory in a case against Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide subsidiary over a housing-bubble-era mortgage program shows the power of a 1980s fraud statute, and could further encourage banks to settle future financial crisis cases, attorneys say.

A federal jury in New York on Wednesday unanimously found that Countrywide Financial Corp. and one of its former executives defrauded Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through a program designed to speed up mortgage issuing in 2007 and 2008.

The court victory was significant in part because of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara’s use of the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, a law that grew out of the 1980’s savings-and-loan crisis, to bring a case over the 2007-09 financial crisis. With a fairly low standard of proof and a 10-year statute of limitations, a jury’s verdict based on FIRREA bodes well for future government cases, said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“This successful use of FIRREA makes it much more likely that financial institutions are going to settle with the government,” he said.