Tag Archives: Federal Housing Finance Agency

Reiss on The FHFA’s Common Securitization Platform

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I have submitted my response to the FHFA’s Request for Input on the Proposed Single Security Structure.  The abstract for my response, The FHFA’s Proposed Single Security Structure, reads,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has posted a Request for Input on “the proposed structure for a Single Security that would be issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.”  The FHFA states it is most concerned with achieving “maximum secondary market liquidity” (Request for Input, at 8)

I am skeptical about the reasons for this move to a Single Security and whether it will achieve maximum liquidity. Moreover, it is unclear to me that this move reflects an urgent need for the FHFA, the two companies, originating lenders or borrowers. While I have no doubt that it could slightly increase liquidity and slightly decrease the cost of credit, I do not see this move as having a meaningful effect on either.

This move is consistent, however, with a move toward a new model of government-supported housing finance, one that could contemplate an end to Fannie and Freddie as we know them and the beginning of a more utility-like securitizer.  If, indeed, the FHFA is taking this step, it should be more explicit as to its reasons for doing so.

A Framework For Housing Finance

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The Government Accountability Office has released Housing Finance System: A Framework for Assessing Potential Changes. The GAO writes,

To help policymakers assess various proposals for changing the single-family housing finance system and consider ways in which the system could be made more effective and efficient, we prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General. Specifically, this report (1) describes market developments since 2000 that have led to changes in the federal government’s role in single-family housing finance; (2) analyzes whether and how these market developments have challenged the housing finance system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework for assessing potential changes to the housing finance system. (2)
It is useful to have a framework to figure out what kind of housing finance system we want for the 21st century. The GAO’s has 9 elements:
  1. Clearly defined and prioritized housing finance system goals
  2. Policies and mechanisms that are aligned with goals and other economic policies
  3. Adherence to an appropriate financial regulatory framework
  4. Government entities that have capacity to manage risks
  5. Mortgage borrowers are protected and barriers to mortgage market access are addressed
  6. Protection for mortgage securities investors
  7. Consideration of cyclical nature of housing finance and impact of housing finance on financial stability
  8. Recognition and control of fiscal exposure and mitigation of moral hazard
  9. Emphasis on implications of the transition (54-55)
This all sounds very Yoda-like, but the report itself goes into great detail as to what each of these 9 elements means. Given that Congress has left the housing finance system to its own devices, it is helpful that other branches of government like the GAO, Treasury and the FHFA are trying to move us beyond our current state of limbo. We need a housing finance system that is designed to last longer than the Band Aids and duct tape that were applied to it during the financial crisis.

Big Decision in GSE Litigation

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Regular readers of this blog know that I have written a lot about the shareholder suits arising from the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie. One of the main cases is being presided over by Judge Lamberth in the District Court for the District of Columbia. This case raises a range of challenges to the government’s action: violations of the Administrative Procedures Act, violations of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 and more. Judge Lamberth has issued an opinion that dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims, dealing a severe (but not fatal) blow to their cause. His conclusion captures the tenor of the whole opinion:

It is understandable for the Third Amendment, which sweeps nearly all GSE profits to Treasury, to raise eyebrows, or even engender a feeling of discomfort. But any sense of unease over the defendants’ conduct is not enough to overcome the plain meaning of HERA’s text. Here, the plaintiffs’ true gripe is with the language of a statute that enabled FHFA and, consequently, Treasury, to take unprecedented steps to salvage the largest players in the mortgage finance industry before their looming collapse triggered a systemic panic. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ grievance is really with Congress itself. It was Congress, after all, that parted the legal seas so that FHFA and Treasury could effectively do whatever they thought was needed to stabilize and, if necessary, liquidate, the GSEs. Recognizing its role in the constitutional system, this Court does not seek to evaluate the merits of whether the Third Amendment is sound financial — or even moral — policy. The Court does, however, find that HERA’s unambiguous statutory provisions, coupled with the unequivocal language of the plaintiffs’ original GSE stock certificates, compels the dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims. (52)
Not one to typically say “I told you so” (or at least not on the blog), I will say that I had predicted that deference to the Executive during a time of national crisis was going to be hard for the plaintiffs to overcome. That being said, this is an extraordinarily complex cases both legally and factually so we can expect appeals up to the Supreme Court (and perhaps a return to the District Court), so it is premature to say that the plaintiffs’ claims are DOA just yet.

Is Freddie the “Government” When It’s In Conservatorship?

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Professor Dale Whitman posted a commentary on Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Kelley, 2014 WL 4232687, Michigan Court of Appeals (No. 315082, rev. op., Aug. 26, 2014)  on the Dirt listserv:

This is a residential mortgage foreclosure case. The original foreclosure by CMI (CitiMortgage, apparently Freddie Mac’s servicer) was by “advertisement” – i.e., pursuant to the Michigan nonjudicial foreclosure statute. Freddie was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale. In a subsequent action to evict the borrowers, they raised two defenses.

Their first defense was based on the argument that, even though Freddie Mac was concededly a nongovernmental entity prior to it’s being placed into conservatorship in 2008 (see American Bankers Mortgage Corp v. Fed Home Loan Mortgage Corp, 75 F3d 1401, 1406–1409 (9th Cir. 1996)), it had become a federal agency by virtue of the conservatorship with FHFA as conservator. As such, it was required to comply with Due Process in foreclosing, and the borrowers argued that the Michigan nonjudicial foreclosure procedure did not afford due process.

The court rejected this argument, as has every court that has considered it. The test for federal agency status is found in Lebron v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp, 513 U.S. 374, 377; 115 S Ct 961; 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995), which involved Amtrak. Amtrak was found to be a governmental body, in part because the control of the government was permanent. The court noted, however, that FHFA’s control of Freddie, while open-ended and continuing, was not intended to be permanent. Hence, Freddie was not a governmental entity and was not required to conform to Due Process standards in foreclosing mortgages. This may seem overly simplistic, but that’s the way the court analyzed it.

There’s no surprise here. For other cases reaching the same result, see U.S. ex rel. Adams v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat. Ass’n, 2013 WL 6506732 (D. Nev. 2013) (in light of the GSEs’ lack of federal instrumentality status while in conservatorship, homeowners who failed to pay association dues to the GSEs could not be charged with violating the federal False Claims Act); Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2012) (Fannie Mae, while in conservatorship, is not a federal agency for purposes of a wrongful discharge claim); In re Kapla, 485 B.R. 136 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012), aff’d, 2014 WL 346019 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (Fannie Mae, while in conservatorship, is not a “governmental actor” subject to Due Process Clause for purposes of foreclosure); May v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 3207511 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (same); In re Hermiz, 2013 WL 3353928 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (same, Freddie Mac).

There’s a potential issue that the court didn’t ever reach. Assume that a purely federal agency holds a mortgage, and transfers it to its servicer (a private entity) to foreclose. Does Due Process apply? The agency is still calling the shots, but the private servicer is the party whose name is on the foreclosure. Don’t you think that’s an interesting question?

The borrowers’ second defense was that Michigan statutes require a recorded chain of mortgage assignments in order to foreclose nonjudicially. See Mich. Comp. L. 600.3204(3). In this case the mortgage had been held by ABN-AMRO, which had been merged with CMI (CitiMortgage), the foreclosing entity. No assignment of the mortgage had been recorded in connection with the merger. However, the court was not impressed with this argument either. It noted that the Michigan Supreme Court in Kim v JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 493 Mich 98, 115-116; 825 NW2d 329 (2012), had stated

to set aside the foreclosure sale, plaintiffs must show that they were prejudiced by defendant’s failure to comply with MCL 600.3204. To demonstrate such prejudice, they must show they would have been in a better position to preserve their interest in the property absent defendant’s noncompliance with the statute.

The court found that the borrowers were not prejudiced by the failure to record an assignment in connection with the corporate merger, and hence could not set the sale aside.

But this holding raises an interesting issue: When is failure to record a mortgage assignment ever prejudicial to the borrower? One can conceive of such a case, but it’s pretty improbable. Suppose the borrowers want to seek a loan modification, and to do so, check the public records in Michigan to find out to whom their loan has been assigned. However, no assignment is recorded, and when they check with the originating lender, they are stonewalled. Are they prejudiced?

Well, not if it’s a MERS loan, since they can quickly find out who holds the loan by querying the MERS web site. (True, the MERS records might possibly be wrong, but they’re correct in the vast majority of cases.) And then there’s the fact that federal law requires written, mailed notification to the borrowers of both any change in servicing and any sale of the loan itself. If they received these notices (which are mandatory), there’s no prejudice to them in not being able to find the same information in the county real estate records.

So one can postulate a case in which failure to record an assignment is prejudicial to the borrowers, but it’s extremely improbable. The truth is that checking the public records is a terrible way to find out who holds your loan. Moreover, Michigan requires recording of assignments only for a nonjudicial foreclosure; a person with the right to enforce the promissory note can foreclose the mortgage judicially whether there’s a chain of assignments or not.

All in all, the statutory requirement to record a chain of assignments is pretty meaningless to everybody involved – a fact that the Michigan courts recognize implicitly by their requirement that the borrower show prejudice in order to set a foreclosure sale aside on this ground.

Frannie Reps and Warranties Crisis Brewing

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The Inspector General of the Federal Housing Finance Agency released an audit, FHFA’s Representation and Warranty Framework. Reps and warranties are a risk-shifting device that sophisticated commercial parties use in transactions. If a party makes a representation or warranty that turns out to be false, they other party may have some remedy — maybe the ability to return something or to get some kind of payment to make up for the failure to live up to the promise.

For instance, a lender may sell a bunch of mortgages to a securitizer and represent that all of the borrowers have FICO (credit) scores of 620 or higher. If it turns out that some of the borrowers had scores of less than 620, the securitizer may be able to make the lender buy back those mortgages pursuant to a rep and warranty clause. The IG undertook this audit because of recent changes to the reps and warranties framework for Fannie and Freddie. Before these changes were implemented,

the Enterprises’ risk management model primarily relied on reviewing loans for underwriting deficiencies after they defaulted as the representations and warranties were effective for the life of the loans. In contrast, the new framework transfers responsibility to the Enterprises to review loans upfront for eligible representation and warranty deficiencies that may trigger repurchase requests. If the Enterprises fail to do so within the applicable period, their ability to pursue a repurchase request expires if it is based upon a representation and warranty that qualifies for repurchase relief. (2)

The IG’s findings are disturbing. It “found that FHFA mandated a new framework despite significant unresolved operational risks to the Enterprises.” (3) It also found that

FHFA mandated a 36-month sunset period for representation and warranty relief without validating the Enterprises’ analysis or performing sufficient additional analysis to determine whether financial risks were appropriately balanced between the Enterprises and sellers. Freddie Mac, in contrast to Fannie Mae which provided analysis limited to a 36-month period, provided FHFA with the results of an internal analysis of loans that indicated loans with a 48-month clean payment history were significantly less likely to exhibit repurchaseable defects than loans with a 36-month clean payment history. Thus, losses to the Enterprise could be less with a longer sunset period. Therefore, FHFA cannot support that the sunset period selected does not unduly benefit sellers at the Enterprises’ expense. (3)

This is all very technical stuff, obviously. But it is of great significance. Basically, the IG is warning that the FHFA has not properly evaluated the credit risk posed by changes to the agreements that Fannie and Freddie enter into with the lenders who convey mortgages to them. It also implies that this new framework “unduly” benefits the lenders.

The FHFA’s response is unsettling — it effectively rejects the IG’s concern without providing a reasoned basis for doing so. Its express rationale for doing so is to avoid “adverse market effects” and because addressing the IG’s concern “may not align with the FHFA objective of increased lending to consumes . . ..” (32)

Whenever federal regulators place increased lending as a priority over safety and soundness, warning bells should start ringing. Crises at Fannie and Freddie (and the FHA, for that matter) begin with this kind of thinking. Increased lending may be important today, but it should not be done at the expense of safety and soundness tomorrow. We are too close to our last housing finance crisis to forget that lesson.

Reiss on Housing Finance Reform

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Inside MBS and ABS, the trade journal, quoted me in DeMarco Cites ‘Structural Improvements’ in Housing Six Years After GSE Conservatorship, More Needed (behind a paywall). It reads,

Six years after the government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the former regulator of the government-sponsored enterprises noted that the housing finance system has made “significant progress.” But even as critical structural changes are underway, comprehensive improvement is still several years out.

In a policy paper issued last week, Edward DeMarco–new senior fellow-in-residence for the Milken Institute’s Center for Financial Markets–said that house prices, as measured by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, have recovered more than 50 percent since their decline in 2007.

“While the damage from the housing crisis has been substantial, we are finally seeing a sustained market recovery,” said the former FHFA chief. “The crisis showed that numerous structural improvements were needed in housing–and such improvements have been underway for several years.”

Poor data, misuse of specialty mortgage products, lagging technologies, weak servicing standards and an inadequate securitization infrastructure became evident during the crisis.

“New data standards have emerged…with more on the way,” wrote DeMarco. “These standards should improve risk management while lowering origination costs and barriers to entry.” Development of the new securitization structure, begun more than two years ago, “should be a cornerstone for the future secondary mortgage market,” he added.

DeMarco said the major housing finance reform bills in the House and Senate share key similarities: “winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, building a common securitization infrastructure and drawing private capital back into the marketplace while reducing taxpayer involvement.”

DeMarco added, “We should build on these similarities, making them the cornerstone features of final legislation.” Prolonging the GSEs’ conservatorship, he warned, “will continue to distort the market and place taxpayers at risk.”

David Reiss, research director of the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at the Brooklyn Law School, lauded the common securitization project. But Reiss worried the former FHFA head is too optimistic about the state of Fannie and Freddie.

“The GSEs have been in a state of limbo for far too long,” said Reiss. “All sorts of operational risks may be cropping up in the entities as employees sit around or walk out the door waiting for Congress to act.”

Hope for Housing Finance Reform?

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The former Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Edward Demarco, has issued a short policy brief from his new perch at the Milken Institute’s Center for Financial Markets.While there is nothing that is really new in this policy brief, Twelve Things You Need to Know About the Housing Market, it does set forth a lot of commonsensical views about the housing markets. I do take issue, however, with his optimism about the structural improvements in the housing finance sector. He writes,

The crisis showed that numerous structural improvements were needed in housing—and such improvements have been under way for several years. Poor data, misuse of specialty mortgage products, lagging technologies, weak servicing standards, and an inadequate securitization infrastructure became evident during the financial crisis. A multi-year effort to fix and rebuild this infrastructure has been quietly under way, with notable improvements already in place.The mortgage industry has been working since 2010 to overhaul mortgage data standards and the supporting technology. New data standards have emerged and are in use, with more on the way. These standards should improve risk management while lowering origination costs and barriers to entry.

*     *     *

Structural improvements will take several more years. A new securitization infrastructure has been in development for more than two years. This ongoing work should be a cornerstone for the future secondary mortgage market. Other structural improvements will include updated quality assurance (rep and warrant) systems for the Federal Housing Administration, Fannie and Freddie, revamped private mortgage insurance eligibility standards, and completion and implementation of remaining Dodd-Frank rulemakings. (2)

DeMarco himself had led the charge to develop a common securitization platform while at the FHFA, so I take care in critiquing his views about structural change. Nonetheless, I am worried that he is striking too optimistic of a note about the state of Fannie and Freddie. They have been in a state of limbo for far too long (which DeMarco acknowledges). All sorts of operational risks may be cropping up in the entities as employees sit around (or walk out the door) waiting for Congress to act. I think commentators should be striking a far more ominous tone about our housing finance system — something this big should not be treated as an afterthought by our elected officials.