Tag Archives: financial crisis

Life Post-Fannie, Post-Freddie

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The Congressional Budget Office has released a report, Transitioning to Alternative Structures for Housing Finance. This report

examines various mechanisms that policymakers could use to attract more private capital to the secondary mortgage market. The report also addresses how those mechanisms could be combined in different ways to help the market make the transition to a new structure during the coming decade. CBO analyzed transition paths to four alternative structures that involve choices about whether the government would continue to guarantee payment on mortgages and MBSs and, if so, what form and prices those guarantees would have. Under those different structures, the government’s activities would range from providing full or partial guarantees for a large share of the mortgage market to playing a minimal role in a largely private market (except perhaps during a financial crisis). Any transition to a new type of secondary market would also require decisions about what to do with the existing operations, guarantee obligations, and investment holdings of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (1, footnotes omitted)

The report has three key findings:

1.  A transition to a new structure for housing finance that emphasized private capital could reduce costs and risks to taxpayers. One drawback to such a transition is that mortgages could become somewhat less available and more expensive to borrowers. Thus, over the longer term, it could also result in a modest shift of the economy’s resources away from housing toward other activities.
2.  Although the transition to a new structure could significantly decrease the number of borrowers who received mortgages backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, additional private capital would replace most of the lost funding. Borrowers would probably not face significant increases in interest rates because the two GSEs’ current pricing is not too far below market pricing. Consequently, a gradual transition would probably exert only modest downward pressure on house prices.
3.  Because policymakers have already raised the guarantee fees charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac close to those that CBO estimates would be charged by private insurers, the budgetary costs of the two GSEs’ activities over the next 10 years are expected to be small. As a result, the budgetary savings would also be small under any of the transition paths to a more private system that CBO considered. Thus, the choice between the different market structures probably rests primarily on considerations other than budgetary costs. (2)
I have been a long-time advocate for attracting more private capital to the secondary mortgage market, so I welcome this report. Given the public statements of the Obama Administration and the composition of the new Congress, there appears to be an opportunity to move in that direction. A bipartisan reform plan for the housing finance system will need to provide for a lender of last resort; appropriate consumer protection; and assistance for households that are underserved by the private market. There seems to be bipartisan will to reform this system, so we just need to chart a way to achieve it. This report leads us down the right path.

Strip-Downs Are Good

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The Philadelphia Fed has posted a Working Paper, Using Bankruptcy to Reduce Foreclosures: Does Strip-Down Of Mortgages Affect The Supply of Mortgage Credit? The paper’s abstract reads,

We assess the credit market impact of mortgage “strip-down” — reducing the principal of underwater residential mortgages to the current market value of the property for homeowners in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Strip-down of mortgages in bankruptcy was proposed as a means of reducing foreclosures during the recent mortgage crisis but was blocked by lenders. Our goal is to determine whether allowing bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages would have a large adverse impact on new mortgage applicants. Our identification is provided by a series of U.S. Court of Appeals decisions during the late 1980s and early 1990s that introduced mortgage strip-down under both bankruptcy chapters in parts of the U.S., followed by two Supreme Court rulings that abolished it throughout the U.S. We find that the Supreme Court decision to abolish mortgage strip-down under Chapter 13 led to a reduction of 3% in mortgage interest rates and an increase of 1% in mortgage approval rates, while the Supreme Court decision to abolish strip-down under Chapter 7 led to a reduction of 2% in approval rates and no change in interest rates. We also find that markets react less to circuit court decisions than to Supreme Court decisions. Overall, our results suggest that lenders respond to forced renegotiation of contracts in bankruptcy, but their responses are small and not always in the predicted direction. The lack of systematic patterns evident in our results suggests that introducing mortgage strip-down under either bankruptcy chapter would not have strong adverse effects on mortgage loan terms and could be a useful new policy tool to reduce foreclosures when future housing bubbles burst.
This paper seems to cut through some of the hyperbole that surrounds this topic. Its concluding paragraphs indicate how a modest introduction of strip-downs would have only a modest impact on the availability of mortgage credit. It contrasts such a modest step with more far-reaching proposals, such as using eminent domain to take underwater mortgages throughout an entire jurisdiction. The paper seems to argue that the more modest proposal could be acceptable to the lending industry. I am not so sure that that is true, particularly in the current political environment. But it is certainly true that strip-downs could be a useful tool to have when “future housing bubbles burst,” as they most certainly will.

Reiss on Shakespearean GSE Litigation

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Fundweb quoted me in Stateside: My Kingdom for a House. It reads in part,

History repeats itself. In 1483, Richard III seized the British crown from his 13-year-old nephew on a trumped up legal sophistry.  One justification was to prevent a return to the chaos of the War of the Roses, considered likely to resume under a child king. (Many historians believe he subsequently murdered those princes in the tower to dispense with future claims.)

Five centuries later, the issue of confiscation returns in the form of US government actions taken to stabilise the financial system during the 2008 credit crisis.  The usurpation argument repeats that the end justifies the means and the rule of law may be subverted in perceived emergencies for the common good. Recent legal cases are challenging that principle, with momentous long- term consequences for the nation.

Specifically, in 2008, Congress enacted the Housing Economic and Recovery Act, which authorised loans to mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac known as government-sponsored entities. The HERA law placed the GSEs in a conservatorship, giving the US government senior preferred shares in the companies, which paid the government a 10 per cent dividend.

Eventually, the GSEs became immensely profitable again, having now repaid $30bn more to the government than the original loan. In 2012, the conservator passed a third amendment, which transformed the 10 per cent preferred dividend to a sweep of all profits, forever.

Richard Bove, vice-president equity research at Rafferty Capital Markets, responds: ”If the government has the right to override any contract and can appropriate private property for itself, then contracts mean nothing in the US and the government is like Richard III.”

Politics of populism
Ultimately, the government may determine whether the GSEs survive or in what guise or how their profits are distributed.

“Politicians are carrying out what people want them to do.  The public and the media maintain that if the bankers are harming society and the economy, there is no limitation on what the government can do,” says Bove. But beware. Investor confidence further erodes each time the government steps in to act unilaterally in the name of crisis control. The determinant is whether or not the country needs the GSEs to continue to underwrite mortgages and the answer is probably yes. Without them, there will be no one to under-write 30-year mortgages, “the monthly cost of owning a home will go up, prices will go down and it will kill housing in the US,” Bove insists.

Mel Watts, who was appointed this year as a new conservator, may represent a new direction for reshaping the GSEs. His recent speeches suggest he may be planning to merge the two agencies and liberate them from conservatorship status.

David Reiss, professor at Brooklyn Law School, points out another drawback to leaving the GSEs in limbo for six years. Executives, employees and others are now running for the exits, with turnover at the top. The agencies back 60 per cent of residential US mortgages but no longer know who they are. “It’s not healthy for homeowners or taxpayers,” says Reiss.

Investment War of the Roses
A number of hedge fund investors have rebelled, challenging the conservator’s behaviour. Marquee names include Perry Capital, Fairholme Funds and Pershing Square Capital Management. Their claims generally derive from assertions that the conservator illegally expropriated shareholder profits. The plaintiff hedge funds represent a motley crew, some of whom bought the stock after 2009, knowing they were picking up lottery tickets, and others well predating the conservatorship. From the sidelines, smaller investors watched keenly and joined the big boys’ ranks.

“People bought the stock only knowing that Icahn, Berkowitz and Ackmann had positions, so they followed like lemmings,” says Bove. To compound the confusion, most conventional wisdom from commentators lined up on one side. Many were openly remunerated by the shareholders, like New York University’s Richard Epstein.

Reiss adds that, “with no public speakers of equivalent prestige on the other side, it seemed inconceivable the investors might lose, which was a perfect set up for falling hard”.

Indeed they fell, with the recent ruling by Judge Royce Lamberth in the Perry hedge fund case.  The court dismissed the suit with complex arguments but one theme undergirded the judge’s ruling: the government had acted forcefully in a financial emergency, authorised by Congress, which he hesitated to unwind.

Romano’s Iron Law of Financial Regulation

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Roberta Romano has posted an essay, Further Assessment of the the Iron Law of Financial Regulation:  A Postscript to Regulating in the Dark, to SSRN. The abstract reads,

In an earlier companion essay, Regulating in the Dark, I contended that there is a systemic pattern in major U.S. financial regulation: (i) enactment is invariably crisis driven, adopted at a time when there is a paucity of information regarding what has transpired, (ii) resulting in off-the-rack solutions often poorly fashioned to the problem at hand, (iii) with inevitable flaws given the dynamic uncertainty of financial markets, (iv) but arduous to revise or repeal because of the stickiness of the status quo in the U.S. political framework of checks and balances. This pattern constitutes an “Iron Law” of U.S. financial regulation. The ensuing one-way regulatory ratchet generated by repeated financial crises has produced not only costly policy mistakes accompanied by unintended consequences but also a regulatory state whose cumulative regulatory impact produces over time an increasingly ineffective regulatory apparatus.

This Postscript analyzes the experience with regulators’ implementation of Dodd-Frank since the publication of the earlier essay. After a discussion of broad issues related to the statute and its implementation, the analysis focuses on two provisions by which Dodd-Frank exemplifies the difficulties that are created by legislative strategies conventionally adopted in crisis-driven legislation, off-the-rack solutions along with open-ended delegation to regulatory agencies as legislators, who perceive a political necessity to act quickly, adopt ready-to-go proposals offered by the policy entrepreneurs to whom they afford access: the Volcker rule, which prohibits banks’ proprietary trading, and the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The analysis bolsters the original essay’s contention regarding the inherent flaws in major financial legislation and the corresponding benefit for improving decision-making that would be obtained from employing, as best practice, the legislative tools of sunsetting and experimentation to financial regulation. The use of those techniques, properly implemented, advances means-ends rationality, by better coupling the two, and improves the quality of decision-making by providing a means for measuring and remedying regulatory errors.

This is a foray into the dark heart of financial regulation. Romano finds much to be unhappy with. I disagree, however, with some of her main points. For instance, I think that her assessment of the role of the CFPB in the broader context of financial regulation misses the mark. She argues that the “absence of a designated consumer-product regulator” did “not contribute to the financial crisis.” (28) In fact, regulating exotic loan terms like Option ARMs and teaser rates would have slowed the expansion of the subprime market. Those exotic terms allowed lenders to keep the party going longer than it would have otherwise. And that would have limited the exposure of financial institutions to subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Notwithstanding my disagreements with this essay, I think that Romano’s “Iron Law” of financial regulation remains, unfortunately, quite strong.

 

Reiss on GSE Privatization

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GlobeSt.com quoted me in Waiting to Say Goodbye to the GSEs. It reads in part,

US HUD Secretary Julian Castro added another “to do” item to the lame duck Congress’ list of things they should get done before they adjourn on Dec. 11: pass the bipartisan Johnson-Crapo Senate bill introduced earlier this year that would wind down the GSEs.

“This could be, I believe, a good victory in the lame duck session or next term of Congress for housing finance reform,” he said in an interview with Bloomberg Television earlier this week. The crux of the plan – doing away with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, creating a backstop for these loans and removing tax payer risk – are all supported by the Obama Administration, he said.

“Housing finance reform will continue to be a priority for the Obama Administration,” Castro said.

The multifamily finance industry has been expecting GSE reform for years now; certainly there have been calls for their dismantlement when they were placed in conservatorship in 2008 during the depth of the financial crisis. Many in the industry, in fact, would welcome their sunset, in the expectation that the private sector could fully and more efficiently and more cheaply provide the same level of funding.

That is not the unanimous sentiment though. In fact, opinions about the subject in commercial real estate range, widely, across the board from “it is about time” to “the politics are too strident for it to happen” to “maybe it will happen but it is difficult to believe the GSEs could entirely be replaced by the private sector.”

*     *     *

David Reiss, a professor of Law and Research Director, Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship (CUBE) at Brooklyn Law School, has been calling for the privatization of Fannie and Freddie for some time and is dismissive of the “Chicken Little claims” that the sector will collapse if the government reduces its footprint in multifamily and single-family housing finance.

“With a carefully planned transition, it is eminently reasonable to believe that we can put private capital in a first loss position for multifamily housing so long as the government retains a role in subsidizing affordable housing and acting as a lender of last resort when necessary,” he tells GlobeSt.com.

GSE Nationalization and Necessity

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Nestor Davidson has posted Nationalization and Necessity: Takings and a Doctrine of Economic Emergency to SSRN. This essay will be of interest to those following the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation. The abstract reads,

Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently, shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the obligation to pay just compensation should be recognized as a natural extension of the doctrine of emergency in takings. Public officials must be able to respond quickly to serious economic threats, no less than when facing the kinds of imminent physical or public health crises — such as wildfires and contagion — that have been a staple of traditional takings jurisprudence. Far from an affront to the rule of law, this reflection of necessity through an extension of emergency doctrine would reaffirm the flexibility inherent in property law in times of crisis.

Davidson looks at the various companies that were nationalized during the financial crisis, including Fannie and Freddie, and concludes,

It does no violence to norms of ownership—or the rule of law—to acknowledge that overriding necessity in times of crisis can be as relevant to economic emergency as it has always been to more prosaic threats. The doctrine of economic emergency that this Essay has proposed accords with the deepest traditions of our system of property, and rightly should be so recognized. (215)

 

Davidson reaches a very different conclusion than does Richard Epstein, who argues that just compensation is warranted for shareholders in the two companies. I have no doubt that the judges deciding these cases will have to struggle with very same issues that Davidson sets forth in this article, so it is worth a read for those who are closely following these cases.

Tall Mortgage Tales

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Todd Zywicki has posted The Behavioral Law and Economics of Fixed-Rate Mortgages (and Other Just-So Stories) to SSRN. The article contains

SPOILER ALERT!

a spoof, in order to make a larger point.

The abstract reads,

A major cause of the recent financial crisis was the traditional American mortgage, which is distinctive for the following features: it is a thirty-year, self-amortizing loan with an unlimited right to prepay. The United States is unique in the world for standardizing on a mortgage product with these features. Yet not only have a majority of the foreclosures that occurred during the financial crisis been fixed-rate mortgages, the fixed-interest-rate characteristics have undermined efforts by the Federal Reserve and government to assist recovery of the housing market. Moreover, the long fixed-rate term and ability to refinance are highly expensive and suboptimal features for many consumers. Nevertheless, many consumers persist in purchasing this mortgage. Drawing on the methodology of behavioral law and economics, this article provides rationalizations for how behavioral law and economics can explain the persistence of a product that is so harmful to many consumers and to the economy at large. The article then draws conclusions about what this analysis means for the behavioral law and economics research program generally and for the use of behavioral law and economics in government policymaking.

 I have a lot to say about this article but I don’t want to ruin it for you!  Suffice it to say, the article is a provocative critique of behavioral law and economics. Those of us who hope to see a healthy mortgage market develop would do well to take this critique seriously — even if you end up rejecting its broader implications.