Tag Archives: Freddie Mac

Reiss and Lederman on Affordable Housing Goals

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Jeff Lederman and I have posted our comment to the FHFA’s proposed housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for 2015 through 2017.  We argue,

As the FHFA sets the housing goals for 2015-2017, it should focus on maximizing the creation and preservation of affordable housing. Less efficient proposed subgoals should be rejected unless the FHFA has explicitly identified a compelling rationale to adopt them. The FHFA has not identified one in the case of the proposed small multifamily subgoal. Thus, it should be withdrawn.

Reiss on The FHFA’s Common Securitization Platform

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I have submitted my response to the FHFA’s Request for Input on the Proposed Single Security Structure.  The abstract for my response, The FHFA’s Proposed Single Security Structure, reads,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has posted a Request for Input on “the proposed structure for a Single Security that would be issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.”  The FHFA states it is most concerned with achieving “maximum secondary market liquidity” (Request for Input, at 8)

I am skeptical about the reasons for this move to a Single Security and whether it will achieve maximum liquidity. Moreover, it is unclear to me that this move reflects an urgent need for the FHFA, the two companies, originating lenders or borrowers. While I have no doubt that it could slightly increase liquidity and slightly decrease the cost of credit, I do not see this move as having a meaningful effect on either.

This move is consistent, however, with a move toward a new model of government-supported housing finance, one that could contemplate an end to Fannie and Freddie as we know them and the beginning of a more utility-like securitizer.  If, indeed, the FHFA is taking this step, it should be more explicit as to its reasons for doing so.

Reiss on FIRREA Penalties

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Bloomberg quoted me in S&P Faces Squeeze After $1.3 Billion Countrywide Fine. It opens,

Standard & Poor’s (MHFI)’ chances of settling the government’s lawsuit over mortgage-bond ratings for less than $1 billion may have slipped away after Bank of America Corp.’s Countrywide unit was socked with a $1.3 billion fine.

The Countrywide ruling was the first to lay out what penalties financial institutions could face under a 1989 bank-fraud law the Obama administration is using against alleged culprits of the subprime mortgage crisis. It has boosted the government’s hand against McGraw Hill Financial Inc.’s S&P, said Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne State University.

“If the starting negotiation point for the Justice Department to settle was $1 billion before, that number has just gone up,” Henning said in a phone interview.

The U.S. sued S&P and Countrywide under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, a law passed by Congress in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. The administration, which seeks as much as $5 billion from S&P, is using the law to punish alleged misconduct in the creation and sale of residential mortgage-backed securities blamed for the financial crisis two decades later.

For the Justice Department, the case against S&P goes to the heart of the financial crisis, attacking the company’s claims that its ratings — relied on by investors worldwide — were honest and neutral. S&P has countered that the case is really retribution for it downgrading the U.S. government’s own debt and it has subpoenaed officials including former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner in an effort to prove that.

Hearing Today

A hearing on the company’s request to force Geithner and the government to turn over records is scheduled for today in federal court in Santa Ana, California.

Countrywide was found liable by a federal jury in Manhattan for lying about the quality of the almost $3 billion in mortgages it sold to Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FMCC) in 2007 and 2008. U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff in Manhattan agreed with the Justice Department that the penalty should be based on how much money the mortgage lender fraudulently induced the companies to pay for the loans.

“The civil penalty provisions of FIRREA are designed to serve punitive and deterrent purposes and should be construed in accordance with those purposes,” the judge said in his July 30 ruling.

S&P is accused of defrauding institutions that relied on its credit ratings for residential mortgage-based securities and collateralized debt obligations that included those securities. The government claims S&P lied to investors about its ratings on trillions of dollars in securities being objective and free of conflicts of interest.

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Appeal Probable

The judge’s analysis, using the nominal value of the transactions as a starting point to determine the penalty, was “out of whack” and will probably be appealed by Bank of America to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York, said David Reiss, a professor at the Brooklyn Law School.

“The Second Circuit has no problem reversing Rakoff,” Reiss said in in a phone interview. “The ruling pushes the balance of power in favor of the government by expanding the definition of a civil penalty.”

While other judges aren’t obliged to follow Rakoff’s reasoning, they will pay close attention to the decision because the federal court in Manhattan is the leading business law jurisdiction in the country and the ruling was clearly explained, Reiss said.

Regulating Fannie and Freddie With The Deal

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Steven Davidoff Solomon and David T. Zaring have posted After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie and the Financial Crisis Aftermath to SSRN. The abstract reads,

The dramatic events of the financial crisis led the government to respond with a new form of regulation. Regulation by deal bent the rule of law to rescue financial institutions through transactions and forced investments; it may have helped to save the economy, but it failed to observe a laundry list of basic principles of corporate and administrative law. We examine the aftermath of this kind of regulation through the lens of the current litigation between shareholders and the government over the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We conclude that while regulation by deal has a place in the government’s financial crisis toolkit, there must come a time when the law again takes firm hold. The shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who have sought damages from the government because its decision to eliminate dividends paid by the institutions, should be entitled to review of their claims for entire fairness under the Administrative Procedure Act – a solution that blends corporate law and administrative law. Our approach will discipline the government’s use of regulation by deal in future economic crises, and provide some ground rules for its exercise at the end of this one – without providing activist investors, whom we contend are becoming increasingly important players in regulation, with an unwarranted windfall.

Reading the briefs in the various GSE lawsuits, one feels lost in the details of the legal arguments and one thinks that the judges hearing these matters might feel the same way.  This article is an attempt to see the big picture, encompassing the administrative, corporate and takings law aspects of the dispute. However the judges decide these cases, one would assume that they will need to do something similar to come up with a result that they find just.

I also found plenty to argue with in this article.  For instance, it characterizes the Federal Housing Finance Administration as the lapdog of Treasury. (26) But there is a lot of evidence that the FHFA charted its own course away from the Executive Branch on many occasions, for instance when it rejected calls by various government officials for principal reductions for homeowners with Fannie and Freddie mortgages. Notwithstanding these disagreements, I think the article makes a real contribution in its attempt to make sense of an extraordinarily muddled situation.

State of the Nation’s Housing Finance

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The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University has released the 2014 edition of The State of the Nation’s Housing. As to the nation’s housing finance system, the report finds that

The government still had an outsized footprint in the mortgage market in 2013, purchasing or guaranteeing 80.3 percent of all mortgages originated. The FHA/VA share of first liens, at 19.7 percent, was well above the average 6.1 percent share in 2002–03, let alone the 3.2 percent share at the market peak in 2005–06. Origination shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also higher than before the mortgage market crisis, but less so than that of FHA. According to the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center, the GSEs purchased or guaranteed 61 percent of originations in 2012 and 2013, up from 49 percent in 2002 and 2003.

Portfolio lending, however, has begun to bounce back, rising 8 percentage points from post-crisis lows and accounting for 19 percent of originations last year. While improving, this share is far from the nearly 30 percent a decade earlier. In contrast, private-label securitizations have been stuck below 1 percent of originations since 2008. Continued healing in the housing market and further clarity in the regulatory environment should set the stage for further increases in private market activity. (11)

As usual, this report is chock full of good information about the single-family and multi-family sectors. I did find that some of its characterizations of the housing market were lacking. For instance, the report states

Many factors have played a role in the sluggish recovery of the home purchase loan market in recent years, including falling household incomes and uncertainty about the direction of the economy and home prices. But the limited availability of mortgage credit for borrowers with less than stellar credit has also contributed. According to information from CoreLogic, home purchase lending to borrowers with credit scores below 620 all but ended after 2009. Since then, access to credit among borrowers with scores in the 620–659 range has become increasingly constrained, with their share of loans falling by 6 percentage points. At the same time, the share of home purchase loans to borrowers with scores above 740 rose by 8 percentage points.

Meanwhile, the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have also concentrated both their purchase and refinancing activity on applicants with higher credit scores. At Fannie Mae, only 15 percent of loans acquired in 2013 were to borrowers with credit scores below 700—a dramatic drop from the 35 percent share averaged in 2001–04. Moreover, just 2 percent of originations were to borrowers with credit scores below 620. The percentage of Freddie Mac lending to this group has remained negligible.

Yet another drag on the mortgage market recovery is the high cost of credit. For borrowers who are able to access credit, loan costs have increased steadily. To start, interest rates climbed from 3.35 percent at the end of 2012 to 4.46 percent at the end of 2013. This increase was tempered somewhat by a slight retreat in early 2014. In addition, the GSEs and FHA raised the fees required to insure their loans after the mortgage market meltdown, and many of these charges remain in place or have risen. The average guarantee fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac jumped from 22 basis points in 2009 to 38 basis points in 2012. In 2008, the GSEs also introduced loan level price adjustments (LLPAs) or additional upfront fees paid by lenders based on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, credit scores, and other risk factors. LLPAs total up to 3.25 percent of the loan value for riskier borrowers and are paid for through higher interest rates on their loans. (20)

Implicit in this analysis is the view that lending should return in some way to its pre-bust levels. But, in fact, much of the boom lending was unsustainable for many borrowers. The analysis fails to identify the importance of promoting sustainable homeownership and instead relies on one dimensional metrics like credit denials for those with low credit scores. Until we are confident that borrowers with those scores can sustain homeownership in large numbers, we should not be so quick to bemoan credit constraints for people with a history of losing their homes to foreclosure.

The Center’s analysis also takes a simplistic view about guarantee fees.  The relevant metric is not the absolute size of the g-fee. Rather, the issue should be whether the g-fee level achieves its goals. At a minimum, those goals include appropriately measuring the risk of having to make good on the guarantee.

Finally, the Center demonstrates symptoms of historical amnesia when it characterizes an interest rate of 4.46% as “high.” This is an incredibly low rate of interest and one would expect that rates would rise as we exit from the bust years.

I have made the point before that the Center’s work seems to reflect the views of its funders. The funders of this report (not identified in the report by the way) include the National Association of Home Builders; National Association of Realtors; National Housing Conference; National Multifamily Housing Council; and a whole host of lenders, builders and companies in related fields that make up the Center’s Policy Advisory Board. These organizations benefit from a growing housing sector. This report seems to reflect an unthinking pro-growth perspective. It would have benefited from a parallel focus on sustainable homeownership.

Reiss on Rising Interest Rates

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ABC News quoted me in Small Interest Rate Changes Mean Big Money for Home Buyers.  The story reads in part,

As the economy continues to recover from the worst recession since the 1930s, mortgage interest rates remain at historically low levels.

The Primary Mortgage Market Survey, produced by Freddie Mac, reported in mid-March the average rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages was 4.32 percent; 15-year fixed-rate mortgages averaged 3.32 percent and interest rates 5-year Treasury-indexed hybrid adjustable rate mortgages averaged 3.02 percent. Nonetheless, Frank Nothaft, chief economist for Freddie Mac, speculated the Fed’s gradual tapering of its stimulus efforts may prompt a rise in mortgage interest rates.

If mortgage interest rates do rise significantly in the future, what, if any effect will there be on the home buying market? According to Steve Calk, chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Federal Savings Bank, interest rates have never been the deciding factor for whether potential home buyers actually purchase a home.

“Whether interest rates are 5.5 percent or 7.5 percent, when people are ready to buy, they’ll buy a home,” Calk said.

Price, location, size, appreciation value – these are factors many would-be homeowners consider long before mortgage interest rates enter into the picture. However, once they begin actively searching for a home, interest rates often play a role in their ultimate buying decision.

This is especially the case when interest rates are high, according to David Reiss, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School.

“When people think about buying houses, they think about the price of the house. But what they really should be thinking of are the monthly costs. The average 25-year-old might not think about housing rates until they go to a mortgage broker.
“Then they discover that 8 percent interest may mean that instead of a $200,000 home they can only afford a $160,000 home,” Reiss said.

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Tight credit and persistent high unemployment have almost certainly played a role in depressing home buying figures during the recovery, as has the large numbers of home owners who perhaps bought homes at the height of the bubble who now find themselves underwater on their mortgages. However, many underwater homeowners could be missing out on a unique opportunity presented by the present financial climate. In a housing market where prices are depressed and borrowing is cheap, home buyers with solid incomes and good credit can find lenders willing to extend credit on favorable terms, ultimately putting them ahead financially, even if they sell their present homes at a loss, according to Reiss.

“Many people feel stuck in place because they are underwater or the market is bad. But although it may be counterintuitive, it could actually be a smart move to sell in a bad market. It’s a bit more sophisticated strategy, but you could move out of a cheap home into a better home for not that much money,” Reiss said.

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Education and due diligence in maintaining good credit are the most potent tools that potential home buyers can employ, whether they are seeking their first home, a larger home or are scaling down to smaller quarters as empty nesters. Obtaining prequalification can provide home seekers with a better idea of precisely how much house they can afford, Reiss said.

Reiss on Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation

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I have posted An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation to  SSRN (and to BePress as well). The abstract reads:

The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to the vagaries of politics, regulation, public opinion, the economy, and not least of all the numerous cases that have been filed in 2013 against various government entities arising from the placement of the two companies into conservatorship. This short article will provide an overview of the last of these. The litigation surrounding Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorship raises all sorts of issues about the federal government’s involvement in housing finance. These issues are worth setting forth as the proper role of these two companies in the housing finance system is still very much up in the air. The plaintiffs, in the main, argue that the federal government has breached its duties to preferred shareholders, common shareholders, and potential beneficiaries of a housing trust fund authorized by the same statute that authorized their conservatorships. At this early stage, it appears that the plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe.