Tag Archives: housing crisis

Borrowing Constraints and The Homeownership Rate

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photo by Victor

Arthur Acolin, Jess Bricker, Paul Calem and Susan Wachter have posted a short paper on Borrowing Constraints and Homeownership to SSRN. The abstract reads,

This paper identifies the impact of borrowing constraints on home ownership in the U.S. in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The existence of credit rationing in the U.S. mortgage market means that some households for whom it would be optimal to choose to be homeowners may not be able to do so. Borrowers with certain wealth, income and credit characteristics are unable to obtain a loan even if they are willing to pay a higher cost of credit (Linneman and Wachter 1989). The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) canonical model sets up the rationale for this credit rationing. Using data from the 2001, 2004-2007 and 2010-2013 Surveys of Consumer Finance (SCF), this paper measures the impact of changes in the income, wealth and credit constraints on the probability of home ownership. Credit supply eased and then became considerably more restricted in the wake of the Great Recession. The loosening of borrowing constraints was accompanied by an increase in home ownership from the late 1990s until the start of the housing crisis. In this paper we estimate the role the tightening of credit has had on the probability of individual households to become homeowners and the decline in the aggregate home ownership rate following the crisis. The home ownership rate in 2010-2013 is predicted to be 5.2 percentage points lower than it would be if the constraints were at the 2004-2007 level and 2.3 percentage points lower than if the constraints were set at the 2001 level.

This paper builds on some of the other work of the authors (see here for instance) on the homeownership rate. The paper makes a valuable contribution by estimating the impact of credit rationing on the homeownership rate. To the extent we can identify an optimal amount of credit supply, it should help us to determine a target homeownership rate to guide policymakers.

Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning in NYC

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"East New York" by MMZach

New York City Comptroller Scott Stringer issued an analysis of Mandatory Inclusionary Housing and the East New York Rezoning. It opens,

In an effort to address the City’s ongoing affordable housing crisis, the New York City Planning Commission is currently proposing a series of zoning changes, including Mandatory Inclusionary Housing (MIH) and Zoning for Quality  and Affordability (ZQA), for potential application in communities across the city. One neighborhood targeted for significant redevelopment is the East New York/Cypress Hill area of Brooklyn. While many Community Boards have already expressed a variety of concerns about the proposed rezonings, the ultimate question comes down to this: does the proposal help or hurt the existing affordability crisis — in East New York and across the five boroughs? (1)

The analysis concludes that “the City’s own data shows that the current plan could inadvertently displace tens of thousands of families in East New York, the vast majority of whom will be unable to afford the relatively small number of new units that will be built.” (1)

In place of the Mayor’s plan, the Comptroller proposes the following principles, among others:

  • target density to sites primed for affordable housing
  • ensure affordability for existing, low-income residents

While the Comptroller is right to highlight the impact of zoning changes on existing residents, his principles do not seem to lead to a better result for a city starved of new housing. Targeting density to sites primed for affordable housing will result in many fewer housing units because it applies to far fewer parcels. Ensuring affordability for existing, low-income residents will mean that subsidy dollars will have to be concentrated on fewer units of affordable housing.

This debate between the Mayor and the Comptroller highlights two key issues. First, every plan to increase affordable housing has winners and losers. Second, affordable housing policies almost always have to choose between providing moderate subsidies to many units or deep subsidies to fewer units. While the Comptroller’s analysis highlights those tensions in the Mayor’s plan, it does not acknowledge them within its own. There are no easy answers here and those who are truly committed to increasing the supply of affordable housing in NYC must make sure not to let the perfect become the enemy of the good.

Reviewing the Big Short

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Jared

Wax Statue of Ryan Gosling at Madame Tussauds

Realtor.com quoted me in Explaining the Housing Crash With Jenga—Did ‘The Big Short’ Get It Right? The story reads in part,

One of the more hyped movie releases this Oscar season stars the housing crisis itself: “The Big Short,” in which four financial wheelers and dealers (Christian Bale, Steve Carell, Ryan Gosling and Brad Pitt) join forces to figure out what caused the housing bubble of 2003-2005 to burst (and how they could profit from it, of course). It’s based on the best-selling, intensively reported book by journalist Michael Lewis.

Granted, the subprime mortgage meltdown is a complicated subject… but this movie purports to illuminate all with a simple visual aid: a tower of Jenga blocks. As Gosling explains in [this video clip], mortgage bonds at that time were made up of layers called tranches, with the highest-rated and most secure loans stacked on top of the lower-rated “subprime” ones. And once holders of those subprime mortgages defaulted in droves, as they did starting in 2006, the whole structure collapsed. Jenga!

Which seems simple enough. Only is this depiction accurate, or just a Hollywood set piece?

Well, according to David Reiss, Research Director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School, this movie’s high-concept depiction of the mortgage crisis is largely on the money.

“There is a lot that is accurate in the clip: the history of mortgage-backed securities, the degradation of mortgage quality during the subprime boom, the loss of value of lower grade tranches,” he says.

*     *     *

Yet there is one thing that the movie did fudge, according to Reiss.

“I would argue that there is one big inaccuracy that exists, I am sure, for dramatic effect,” he says. “I would have put the AAA [tranches] at the bottom of the Jenga stack. In fact, the failure of the Bs and BBs did not cause the failure of AAAs, and many AAAs survived just fine or with modest losses.”

In other words, only the top half of the Jenga tower should have crumbled … but that wouldn’t have looked quite as flashy, would it?

“It would not sound as cool if only the top part of the stack crashed,” Reiss concedes. “But the bigger point, that the failures of the secondary mortgage market led to the crash of the housing market, is spot on.”

And hopefully one that won’t play out again in real life.

Preserving Workforce Housing

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"Affordable housing" by BrightFarm Systems

The Urban Land Institute has issued Preserving Multifamily Workforce and Affordable Housing: New Approaches for Investing in a Vital National Asset. Stockton Williams, the Executive Director of the ULI Terwilliger Center for Housing, opens the report with a Letter from the Author,

Real estate investors seeking competitive returns increasingly view lower- and middle-income apartments as an attractive target for repositioning to serve higher-income households. In response, creative approaches are emerging for preserving the affordability of this critical asset class for its current residents and those of similar means—while still delivering financial returns to investors.

This report from the ULI Terwilliger Center for Housing provides a broad-based overview of this rapidly evolving landscape. It profiles 16 leading efforts to preserve multifamily workforce and affordable housing, including below-market debt funds, private equity vehicles, and real estate investment trusts.

Collectively, the entities leading these efforts have raised or plan to raise more than $3 billion and have acquired, rehabilitated, and developed nearly 60,000 housing units for lower- and middle-income renters, with thousands of additional units in the pipeline. Several are actively raising more capital to expand their activities. They are meeting a pressing social need while delivering cash-on-cash returns to equity investors ranging from 6 to 12 percent.

The report is written with the following primary audiences in mind:

■ Developers and owners looking for new sources of capital to acquire, rehabilitate, and develop multifamily workforce and affordable properties;

■ Local officials and community leaders seeking options for attracting or creating new sources of financing to meet their rising rental housing needs for lower- and middle-income families; and

■ Real estate investors and lenders interested in more fully understanding their range of options for a product type that offers financial as well as social returns.

As the country continues to grapple with the worst housing crisis for lower- and middle-income renters it has ever known, the private sector and community-based institutions must play an ever-greater role in ensuring that existing affordable properties remain available to the many who need them, while doing what they can to produce new units where possible. The financing vehicles profiled here show what is possible and suggest opportunities for further progress. (iv)

I found Part II particularly useful, with its overview of financing vehicles. Many readers of this blog will benefit from a description of below-market debt funds, private equity vehicles and real estate investment trusts, particularly as they are illustrated with real world examples like the Bay Area Transit-Oriented Affordable Housing Fund, Avanath Capital Management and the Community Development Trust.

Buy-To-Rent Investing

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"Foreclosedhome" by User:Brendel

James Mills, Raven Molloy and Rebecca Zarutskie have posted Large-Scale Buy-to-Rent Investors in the Single-Family Housing Market: The Emergence of a New Asset Class? to SSRN. The abstract reads,

In 2012, several large firms began purchasing single-family homes with the stated intention of creating large portfolios of rental property. We present the first systematic evidence on how this new investor activity differs from that of other investors in the housing market. Many aspects of buy-to-rent investor behavior are consistent with holding property for rent rather than reselling quickly. Additionally, the large size of these investors imparts a few important advantages. In the short run, this investment activity appears to have supported house prices in the areas where it is concentrated. The longer-run impacts remain to be seen.

I had been very skeptical of this asset class when it first appeared, thinking that the housing crisis presented a one-time opportunity for investors to profit from this type of investment. The conventional wisdom had been that it was too hard to manage so many units scattered over so much territory. The authors identify reasons to think that that conventional wisdom is now outdated:

To the extent that technological improvements, economies of scale, and lower financing costs have substantially reduced the operating costs of buy-to-rent investors relative to smaller investors, large portfolios of single-family rental property may become a permanent feature of the real estate market. As such, the events of the past three years may signal the emergence of a new class of real estate asset. A similar transformation occurred in the market for multifamily structures in the 1990s, when large firms began to purchase multifamily property and created portfolios of professionally-managed multifamily units that were traded on public stock exchanges as REITs. (32-33)

Nonetheless, the authors are cautious (rightfully so, as far as I am concerned) in their predictions: “only time will tell whether the recent purchases of large-scale buy-to-rent investors reflect the emergence of a new asset class or whether the business model will fail to be viable over the longer-term.” (33, footnote omitted)

Hypothetically Reforming Fannie and Freddie

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Ben Turner

S&P issued a report, Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLB System: Plus Ca Change . . . The report opens, “Despite reform talk in the years since the U.S. housing crisis, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes the likelihood of extraordinary government support for key U.S. housing government­-related entities (GREs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system remains “almost certain” in case of need.” (1) Notwithstanding the fact that S&P expects that this extraordinary support will last well into the next presidential administration, S&P “can envisage three “tail risk” scenarios in which such support could become less likely under certain conditions, but view each of these scenarios as improbable.” (1) The three scenarios, which S&P characterizes as plausible, albeit improbable, are

  • An electoral sweep, with favorable macroeconomic conditions and few competing legislative priorities;
  • Court judgments, pursuant to shareholder lawsuits, forcing the legislators’ hand; or
  • A renewed housing market crisis, with one or more of these GREs viewed as more cause than cure. (4)

In the first scenario, “an election gives one party control of all three legislative actors (the president, House of Representatives, and Senate), precluding the need for bipartisan compromise to enact major reforms to Fannie and Freddie via legislation.” (4)

In the second, Fannie and Freddie shareholders win lawsuits that stem from the “U.S. Treasury’s decision to modify, in 2012, the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) governing the terms of its financial support to Fannie and Freddie . . ..” (4)

The final scenario,

is a renewed housing market crisis, on a scale at least similar to that of 2008. Like the other two scenarios, we don’t view this as likely, at least in the coming few years . . . perhaps as a result of the unfortunate confluence of several negative surprises- ­­including, for example, overreaction to Federal Reserve monetary policy normalization, terms­-of­-trade shocks (geopolitical conflicts that cause a rapid and dramatic spike in energy costs, perhaps), fresh financial sector  problems that suddenly tighten the sector’s funding costs, and an abnormally long spell of bad weather. (5)

This seems like a pretty reasonable analysis of the likelihood of reform for Fannie and Freddie. But that should not stop us from bemoaning Congressional inaction on this topic. Obviously, Congress is too ideologically driven to bridge the gap between the left and right, but the likelihood that we are building toward some new kind of crisis increases with time. I can’t improve on S&P’s analysis in this report, but I’m sure unhappy about what it means for the long-term health of our housing finance system.

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From Owners to Renters

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Frank Nothaft

Frank Nothaft

CoreLogic’s July issue of The MarketPulse has in interesting piece by Frank Nothaft, Rental Remains Robust (registration required). It opens,

A vibrant rental market has been an outgrowth of the Great Recession and housing market crash. Apartment vacancy rates are down to their lowest levels since the 1980s, rental apartment construction is the most robust in more than 25 years, rents are up, and apartment building values are at or above their prior peaks. But the rental market is more than just apartments in high-rise buildings.

Apartments in buildings with five or more residences account for 42 percent of the U.S. rental stock. Additionally, two-to-four-family housing units comprise an additional 18 percent of the rental stock, and one-family homes make up the remaining 40 percent.

The foreclosure crisis resulted in a large number of homes being acquired by investors and turned into rentals.  Between 2006 and 2013, three million single-family detached houses were added to the nation’s rental stock, an increase of 32 percent. The increase in the single-family rental stock has been geographically broad based, but has impacted some markets more than others.

*     *     *

While the growth in the rental stock has been large, so has been the demand. Some of the households seeking rental houses were displaced through foreclosure. Others were millennials who had begun or were planning families, but were unable or unwilling to buy. (1-2, footnotes omitted)

Nothaft’s focus is on the investment outlook for rental housing, but I find that his summary has a lot to offer the housing policy world as well. He describes a large change in the balance between the rental and homeowner housing stock, one that has had an outsized effect on certain communities and certain generations.

Housing policy commentators generally feel that the federal government provides way too much support to homeowners (mostly through the tax code) and not enough to renters. Perhaps this demographic shift will spur politicians to rethink that balance. Renters should not be treated like second class citizens.