Buying A Home After Retirement

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HSH.com quoted me in Buying A Home After Retirement Is Possible, but Challenging. It reads, in part,

The ideal situation is to enter your retirement years without any monthly mortgage payments. But what if you’ve finally found your dream home at the same time that you’re leaving the working world? What if you’re ready to buy a home in a new city in which you’ve always wanted to live, but you’re approaching your 70th birthday?

The good news is that the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act law prohibits lenders from denying potential borrowers because of their age. The bad news is that you’ll have a mortgage payment and the burden of caring for a house in your retirement years.

“It can be bad to have a mortgage payment in your 80s,” says Keith Baker, professor of mortgage banking at North Lake College in Irving, Texas. “All sorts of things can happen to you, unfortunately. What if you develop Alzheimer’s? What if your children aren’t financially sophisticated and can’t take over handling your mortgage for you? There are all kinds of reasons not to have a mortgage when you’re that age. But if you can afford a mortgage payment when you’re in your 60s and early 70s and you’re in good health, why not buy that home that you’ve always wanted?”

If you want to buy a home after you’ve retired, you’ll need to first consider several factors, and you’ll need to overcome a variety of hurdles both to qualify for a mortgage loan and to find a home that fits your changing needs as you get older.

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Many borrowers apply for 30-year loans because they generally come with the lowest monthly payments. But such a long-term loan might not make sense for borrowers who are already in their retirement years, says David Reiss, professor of law and research director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School in New York City.

“If you are 62, you will not have paid [the loan] off until you are 92,” says Reiss. “Retirees should look at their expected incomes over those 30 years to ensure that they have sufficient income to cover the mortgage over the whole period.”

Income can fluctuate during the retirement years. Maybe payments from a legal settlement run out. You might struggle to find renters for your investment properties. Royalties can dwindle. At the same time, expenses — especially medical ones — might rise.

Reiss says that it makes sense for retirees to take out a loan with a shorter term, such as a 15-year fixed-rate loan, if they can afford the higher monthly payments that come with such loans.

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

CFPB Mortgage Highlights

Richard Cordray 2010

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued its most recent Supervisory Highlights. The CFPB is “committed to transparency in its supervisory program by sharing key findings in order to help industry limit risks to consumers and comply with Federal consumer financial law.” (3)

There were a lot of interesting highlights relating to mortgage origination and servicing, including,

  • one or more instances of failure to ensure that the HUD-1 settlement statement accurately reflects the actual settlement charges paid by the borrower.
  • at least one servicer sent borrowers loss mitigation acknowledgment notices requesting documents, sometimes dozens in number, inapplicable to their circumstances and which it did not need to evaluate the borrower for loss mitigation.
  • one or more servicers failed to send any loss mitigation acknowledgment notices. At least one servicer did not send notices after a loss mitigation processing platform malfunctioned repeatedly over a significant period of time. . . . the breakdown caused delays in converting trial modifications to permanent modifications, resulting in harm to borrowers, and may have caused other harm.
  • At least one other servicer did not send loss mitigation acknowledgment notices to borrowers who had requested payment relief on their mortgage payments. One or more servicers treated certain requests as requests for short-term payment relief instead of requests for loss mitigation under Regulation X.
  • At least one servicer sent notices of intent to foreclose to borrowers already approved for a trial modification and before the trial modification’s first payment was due without verifying whether borrowers had a pending loss mitigation plan before sending its notice. As the notice could deter borrowers from carrying out trial modifications, it likely causes substantial injury . . .
  • at least one servicer sent notices warning borrowers who were current on their loans that foreclosure would be imminent. (14-18, emphasis added)

All of these highlights are interesting because they reflect the types of problems the CFPB is finding and it thus helps the industry comply with federal law. But from a public policy perspective, the CFPB’s approach is lacking. By repeating that each failure was found at “one or more” company, a reader of these Highlights cannot determine how widespread these problems are throughout the industry. And because the Highlights do not say how many borrowers were affected by each company’s failure, it is hard to say whether these problems are isolated and technical or endemic and intentional.

Future Supervisory Highlights should include more information about the number of institutions and the number of consumers who were affected by these violations.

HAMP-ered Foreclosure Prevention

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The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) released a report, Treasury’s Opportunity to Increase HAMP’s Effectiveness by Reaching More Homeowners in States Underserved by HAMP. The Introduction opens,

TARP’s signature foreclosure prevention program, the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), has struggled to reach the expected number of homeowners Treasury envisioned for the program. According to Treasury, TARP’s housing support programs were intended to “help bring relief to responsible homeowners struggling to make their mortgage payments, while preventing neighborhoods and communities from suffering the negative spillover effects of foreclosure.” Treasury announced that HAMP itself aimed “to help as many as three to four million financially struggling homeowners avoid foreclosure by modifying loans to a level that is affordable for borrowers now and sustainable over the long term,.” The only long-term sustainable help provided through HAMP is a permanent mortgage modification, which become effective after the homeowner successfully completes a trial period plan. Through December 31, 2014, according to Treasury data, 1,514,687 homeowners have been able to get into a more affordable permanent HAMP modification (of which, 452,322 homeowners, or 29%, subsequently redefaulted on their HAMP modifications), while there have been 6,165,544 foreclosures nationwide over the same period based on CoreLogic data.” (1, footnotes omitted)

There is a lot of soul searching in this report about why HAMP has been so ineffective and the report offers tweaks to the program to improve it. But perhaps the problem is structural — a program like HAMP was never really in a position to make a bigger impact on the foreclosure crisis.

When compared to the federal government’s intervention during the Great Depression, HAMP seems too modest. President Roosevelt’s Home Owners’ Loan Corporation bought out mortgages from banks in bulk and then refinanced them on more attractive terms than the private sector offered. HAMP, on the other hand, has trouble getting homeowners to apply to the program in the first place.

Bottom line: HAMP is too retail and what we needed and need is something that could be done wholesale.