Mortgage Market, Hiding in Plain Sight

David Jackmanson

I blogged about the Center for Responsible Lending’s take on the 2014 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data yesterday.  The mere act of aggregating this data reveals so much about the state of the mortgage market. Today I am digging into it a bit on my own.

There is a lot of good stuff in the analysis of the HMDA data released by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). I found the discussion of the effects of the Qualified Mortgage and Ability to Repay rules most interesting:

The HMDA data provide little indication that the new ATR and QM rules significantly curtailed mortgage credit availability in 2014 relative to 2013. For example, despite the QM rule that caps borrowers’ DTI ratio for many loans, the fraction of high-DTI loans does not appear to have declined in 2014 from 2013. However, as discussed in more detail later, there are significant challenges in determining the extent to which the new rules have influenced the mortgage market, and the results here do not necessarily rule out significant effects or the possibility that effects may arise in the future. (4)

This analysis is apparently reacting to those who have claimed that the new regulatory environment is restricting lending too much. The mortgage market is generally too complicated for simple assertions like “new regulations have restricted credit too heavily” or “not enough” There are so many relevant factors, such as changes in the interest rate environment, the unemployment rate and the change in the cost of housing, to be confident about the effect of the change in regulations, particularly over a short time span. But the FFIEC analysis seems to have it right that the new regs did not have such a great impact when they went into effect on January 1, 2014, given the similarities in the 2013 and 2014 data. This reflects well on the rule-writing process for the QM and ATR rules. Time will tell whether and how they will need to be tweaked.

While the discussion of the new rules was comforting, I found the discussion of FHA mortgages disturbing: “The higher-priced fraction of FHA home-purchase loans spiked from about 5 percent in early 2013 to about 40 percent after May 2013 and continued at monthly rates between 35 and 52 percent through 2014, for an annual average incidence of about 44 percent in 2014.” (15) Higher-priced first-lien loans are those with an APR that is at least one and a half percentage points higher than the average prime offer rate for loans of a similar type.

The FHA often provides the only route to homeownership for first-time, minority and lower-income homebuyers, but it must be monitored to make sure that it is insuring mortgages that homeowners can pay month in and month out. If FHA mortgages are not sustainable for the long run, they are likely to do homebuyers more harm than good.

Homeowners Keeping the Wolf at Bay

Wolf at the Door by Gidi

The Center for Responsible Lending has released a policy brief with the lengthy title, 2014 HMDA data shows that Federal rules did not have a chilling effect on lending, despite lender predictions. Borrowers of color continue to be under-served by the mortgage market. While it is not a pithy title, it does say it all. The brief opens with some finer detail:

The 2014 mortgage data submitted by lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reflects a slowly recovering mortgage market, but one that troublingly continues to under-serve important market segments. The implementation of federal mortgage underwriting standards (known as Ability-to-Repay or “ATR” and the Qualified Mortgage rule or “QM”) in early 2014 did not cause a departure from mortgage lending trends in recent years. However, access to credit remains tight; people of color and low and moderate-income families continue to receive a far lower share of home purchase loans than they have historically and than would be expected based on their share of the population. These borrowers also are much more likely to be served by government-backed loan programs than by the conventional market, and are increasingly paying more for mortgages than other borrowers. (1, footnote omitted)

The brief closes, arguing that

recent mortgage lending reforms support sustainable homeownership and wealth building opportunities for lower-wealth households. However, continued problems with access to credit stem from the constrained lending of the post crisis market. Since the crisis, mortgage lending has been mostly limited to borrowers with the most pristine credit history. This constrained lending environment is reflected in the 2014 HMDA data. This environment is most harmful to lower-wealth households as well as to borrowers of color. (5)

The missing piece in this analysis is a proposal for to how to loosen mortgage underwriting so that homeownership can be achieved by more households while also making sure that they can keep making their mortgage payments over the long term.

The key to a sustainable homeownership policy is a plan to keep the wolf at bay while households deal with the unemployment, sickness and divorce that is predictably going to affect some of them all of the time. This policy brief does not chart a path forward to that goal. There is more work to be done.

Severely Cost-Burdened Renters

Geoff Stearns

Enterprise Community Partners and the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University have issued a report, Projecting Trends in Severely Cost-Burdened Renters: 2015-2025. The report opens,

At last measure in 2013, over one in four renters, or 11.2 million renter households, were severely burdened by rents that took up over half their incomes. This total represented a slight reduction from the record level of 11.3 million set in 2011, but remains dramatically higher than the start of the last decade, having risen by more than 3 million since 2000. With substantial growth in renter households expected over the next decade and little sign of a turnaround in the income and rent trends that produced these record levels of cost burdens, there is little prospect for substantial improvement in these conditions over the coming decade. (4)

And it concludes,

Overall, our analysis projects a fairly bleak picture of severe renter burdens across the U.S. for the coming decade. Under nearly all of the scenarios performed, we found that the renter affordability crisis will continue to worsen without intervention. According to our projections, annual income growth would need to exceed annual rent growth by 1 percent in order to reduce the number of severely burdened renters in 10 years. Importantly, that decline would have a net impact on fewer than 200,000 households, only because continued increases in burdens among minorities would be offset by declines among whites. Under the more likely scenario that rents will continue to outpace incomes, the number of severely rent-burdened households would increase by a range of 1.7 – 3 million, depending on the magnitude.

Given these findings, it is critical for policymakers at all levels of government to prioritize the preservation and development of affordable rental housing. Even if the economy continues its slow recovery and income growth improves, there are simply not enough quality, affordable rental units to house the millions of households paying over half their income in rental costs. (16)

It is unsurprising that the policy takeaway of these two housing organizations is to prioritize the preservation and development of affordable housing. But given the pervasive nature of the problem, I wonder if it is better to just say that this is an income inequality problem and address the root cause — low-income families just don’t have enough money to make ends meet.

Affordable Enough for NYC?

 

Real Affordability for All has released a report, Real Affordable Communities: Mayor Bill De Blasio and the Future of New York City. The report opens,

Across the five boroughs, the affordability crisis is growing every day. Today, low- and moderate-income New Yorkers continue to be priced out of their neighborhoods. The incomes of countless New Yorkers are not increasing while rents keep rising. The growing gap between lower incomes and higher rents is making New York City increasingly unaffordable.

Indeed, a recent study released by StreetEasy, The High Burden of Low Wages: How Renting Affordably in NYC is Impossible on Minimum Wage, found that a New Yorker earning $15 an hour could afford just one neighborhood: Throgs Neck in the Bronx.

“The extent to which rent growth has outpaced income growth in New York City means low-wage workers face three options: find several roommates to lower their personal rent burden, take on more than one job, or move out of New York City,” the study finds.

According to a close analysis of the most recent Census data, Bloomberg’s housing efforts generated a shortage of more than 400,000 affordable units for low-income New Yorkers. Low-income here is defined as a household earning less than 50% of Area Median Income (AMI). For a household of four, that means an approximate annual income of less than $42,000. (In 2012 New York City area median income was $83,600 for a family of four; the 2015 New York City area median income for a family of four is $86,300).

Overall, utilizing the 2012 census data, more than 700,000 low-income New Yorkers were left behind by Bloomberg’s housing plan. To tackle the affordability crisis, Mayor de Blasio has proposed preserving or creating 200,000 units of affordable housing. He wants to achieve that goal through mandatory inclusionary zoning and dense new residential development in various neighborhoods.

To succeed, de Blasio will need to avoid repeating the mistakes of Bloomberg’s housing agenda, and ensure that real affordable housing is created for the huge number of low-income New Yorkers who were not served by the previous administration and still struggle to survive. (1-2)

The Real Affordability for All advocates that “Low-income neighborhoods like East New York and the South Bronx will be empowered to offer a ‘density bonus’ to developers in exchange for real affordable housing below 50 % of AMI and for career-oriented union construction jobs for local residents at new development sites.” (7)

The report provides an example pro forma for one building to demonstrate that this plan is do-able. The report does not, however, indicate where the De Blasio Administration would find the $15 million in additional subsidies it would take for this one building to be built according to the Real Affordability for All guidelines.

At this point, the plan is more of a wish list than a serious proposal, but it does make clear that there is a deep need for deep housing subsidies among low- and moderate-income households.

Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist

image: www.solvencyiiwire.com

Robert Rhee has posted Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Although credit rating agencies exist and are important to the capital markets, there remains a question of why they should exist. Two standard theories are that rating agencies correct a problem of information asymmetry and that they de facto regulate investments. These theories do not fully answer the question. This paper suggests an alternative explanation. While rating agencies produce little new information, they sort information available in the credit market. This sorting function is needed due to the large volume of information in the credit market. Sorting facilitates better credit analysis and investment selection, but bond investors or a cooperative of them cannot easily replicate this function. Outside of their information intermediary and regulatory roles, rating agencies serve a useful market purpose even if credit ratings inherently provide little new information. This alternative explanation has policy implications for the regulation of the industry.

I do not think that there is much new in this short paper, but it does summarize recent research on the function of rating agencies. Rhee’s takeaway is that, “given their dominant public function, rating agencies should be subject to greater regulatory scrutiny and supervision qualitatively on levels similar to the regulation of auditors and securities exchanges.” (15) Amen to that.

Valuing Rental Property

cincy Project

Money quoted me in Here’s How Much You Should Pay for a Rental PropertyIt opens,

Q: I want to invest in a rental property. Is there a formula I can use to determine the value of a building based on the rent it takes in?

A: One useful calculation to use is the capitalization (or “cap”) rate, which is the ratio of net rental income to the purchase price of the property, says Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

Start with your gross rental income, which is simply the total of one year’s worth of rents for all of the units combined. Subtract 5% or so to account for occasional vacancies throughout the year. It’s safest to use existing rents, but you can conservatively increase the amounts if you are planning to improve the units and raise rents.

Then add up the yearly operating expenses — property taxes, insurance, utilities, plus at least 5% of gross income for a maintenance/repair fund — and subtract that from the annual income. To get your cap rate, divide that number (the net operating income) by the purchase rate.

Run the Numbers

Let’s say you’re buying a five-family house and anticipate gross annual income of $100,000. If you calculate your total annual operating expenses at $30,000, you end up with $70,000 in net operating income. For a property that cost, let’s say, $1 million, that equates to a 7% cap rate.

But is 7% a worthwhile return on your investment for the work and risk of being a property owner and a landlord?

“That depends on the building,” says Reiss. “For a brand new, fully rented, high-quality building in a prime neighborhood, a reliable, low-risk 4% to 10% return might be reasonable.

“But if you’re talking about a rundown building, in an borderline neighborhood, with a several vacant units that you’re planning to fill after you undertake major improvements, you might reasonably hold out for a 20% cap rate,” he explains, because you’ll have renovation costs on the expense side, perhaps a higher vacancy rate while you fix it up — and you’re taking a bigger risk with your money.

Using a Mortgage

Also, the cap rate assumes a cash purchase. When you take a mortgage to buy an investment property, lenders will likely demand a down payment of 25% or more, says Reiss.

So in that case, he suggests also calculating your return on upfront costs.

In our example, if you invest $300,000 in upfront costs (down payment plus other initial expenses like closing costs and renovations) and expect to earn $20,000 a year (after $50,000 annual mortgage payments), that’s just under a 7% annual return on your money.

Again, you need to consider the relative risk of the particular investment property to determine whether that payback rate is high enough. Look at several properties to get a better feel for how the risks and rewards compare.

Does Historic Preservation Destroy Affordable Housing?

Spencer Means

The Real Estate Board of New York released a report about Rent Regulated Units in Landmark Districts. The report opens,

This analysis was conducted to examine the frequent assertion that landmarking helps preserve existing affordable housing. It is based on data that recently became publicly available that provides a snapshot of the number of rent-stabilized units in 2007 and again in 2014.

Contrary to statements made by advocates, affordable housing is not preserved at higher levels in NYC’s historic districts. The data shows that properties located within New York City’s historic districts showed a greater net loss of rent regulated apartments than those located in non-landmarked parts of the City.

FINDINGS

An analysis of the data found that, from 2007 to 2014, the decline in the number of rent regulated apartments located within New York City’s landmarked properties was four times higher than in non-landmarked parts of the City.

Citywide, landmarked properties showed a much greater decrease in the number of rent stabilized units (-22.5%) than non-landmarked properties (-5.1%). At the end of this seven year period, there was a net loss of nearly 10,000 rent-stabilized units in landmarked districts in the City.

The Manhattan and Brooklyn numbers are particularly startling. Manhattan landmarked properties lost 24.5% of their rent-stabilized units compared to a loss of 11.5% in nonlandmarked properties. And Brooklyn landmarked properties lost 27.1% of their rent-stabilized units compared to 3.4% in non-landmarked properties.

The historic districts that had the highest net loss of rent stabilized units were Greenwich Village (-1432 units) and the Upper West Side/Central Park West (-2730 units). Combined, these two historic districts showed a decrease of 30% in rent stabilized units during this seven-year period. (1, footnotes and references omitted)

This study has been criticized for conflating causation with correlation. I think the criticism is warranted. The relevant question appears to be whether landmarking causes an increase or decrease in the number of rent stabilized units. The REBNY study does nothing to demonstrate causation.

Intuitively, it would seem that residents of hot neighborhoods like Greenwich Village would both seek to keep out new, large developments (which landmarking would achieve) and see higher and higher rents over time (which would lead to a reduction in rent-regulated units through a variety of mechanisms). It is not obvious how landmarking itself would lead to a reduction in rent stabilized units.

It is a shame that the REBNY study is so flawed. It raises important questions, but just leaves us more confused than before. There are serious arguments that historic preservation reduces affordable housing overall. If REBNY wants to take a meaningful position in this debate, it should produce a serious study.