Author Archives: David Reiss

Paternalism or Consumer Protection?

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Adam Smith (not that one) and Todd Zywicki have posted Behavior, Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer Financial Protection to SSRN. It opens,

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is one of the most powerful and least accountable regulatory agencies in American history. Immune from budgetary oversight by Congress and headed by a single director whom the president cannot remove except under special circumstances, the agency wields unconstrained, vaguely defined powers to regulate virtually every consumer and small business credit product in America In part, the CFPB has justified its ongoing intervention into financial credit markets based on a prior belief in the inability of consumers to competently weigh their decisions. This belief is founded on research conducted in the area of behavioral economics, which shows that people are prone to a variety of errors in their decision-making.

Beginning with the seminal work of Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and his coauthor Amos Tversky, behavioral economics has identified numerous purported behavioral “anomalies” through extensive laboratory investigation. Anomalies (or behavioral biases) are defined as observed behavioral deviations from the predictions of neoclassical economic theory, where it is assumed that people rationally optimize according to a given set of information and constraints. Behavioral economists have sought to explain the sources of such anomalous choices by identifying and cataloging a variety of cognitive limitations and psychological biases.

Building on these findings, behavioral theorists have exported their research into the policy realm. This program, led by such luminaries as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein—and known as behavioral law and economics (BLE)—applies the insights gleaned from studies of human behavior to improve existing institutions by designing rules to compensate for (or take advantage of) behavioral biases. Starting from the premise that observed choices are inconsistent with neoclassical theory, behavioral economists argue that intervention is necessary to generate desirable outcomes for consumers who would otherwise make poor choices. (3-4, citation omitted)

As regular readers of this blog know, I am generally a fan of the CFPB. I recommend this paper to those who want the CFPB to be an effective tool of government. The paper critiques the CFPB in a variety of ways. I find a number of them convincing and one key one to be incredibly wrongheaded.

Convincing

  • The CFPB must avoid “confirmation bias” in its decision-making and its evidence-based analyses. (7)
  • The CFPB’s behavioral law and economics approach needs “a complementary behavioral political economy framework” to apply to the CFPB itself as a political actor. (39)
  • The CFPB should account for the ways that its actions might drive consumers to worse choices than they would face in the absence of heavy regulation of the credit markets. The paper gives illegal loan sharking as an example of a possible worse choice.
  • The CFPB would benefit from “‘adversarial review’ by a body of experts housed elsewhere in the Federal Reserve.” (40) This seems like a reasonable way to ensure that the CFPB both maintains its independence and avoids the echo chamber effect that an agency with one director (as opposed to an agency led by a bipartisan commission) might suffer from.

Wrongheaded

It amazes me that in 2014, commentators could say — “autonomous consumer choice should receive greater priority. Regulatory bodies inevitably will have an effect on the services firms choose to offer” — without addressing the negative impact of the unfettered consumer choices of the Subprime Boom that were a factor in the Subprime Bust. (39) We have not even finished with the foreclosure crisis that was the inevitable result of that boom and bust cycle. Yet law and economics scholars are already bemoaning the reduction of consumer choice caused by the regulatorily-favored Qualified Mortgage without also considering the Wild West atmosphere that characterized the mortgage market in the early 2000s. The regulatory state may not be able to craft a perfect credit market but the unfettered market failed to do so as well.

This paper does not take the full range of possible market structures (from heavy regulation to no regulation) seriously and so it is seriously flawed. It also cherry picks its facts and scholarly support at points. That being said, it does offer some trenchant comments and criticisms about the CFPB as currently structured and is therefore worth a read.

Affordable Housing and Air Rights in NYC

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NYU’s Furman Center released a report, Unlocking the Right to Build: Designing a More Flexible System for Transferring Development Rights. While its title does not reflect it, the report is really about increasing the supply of affordable housing in New York City. It opens,

New York City faces a severe shortage of affordable housing.  . . . Addressing this shortage of affordable housing is one of the biggest challenges facing the new de Blasio administration. The city’s affordable housing policy will undoubtedly require many strategies, from preserving the existing stock of affordable units to encouraging the construction of new affordable units. Over the past decades, the city has managed to subsidize the development of new affordable units in part by providing developers with land the city had acquired when owners abandoned properties or lost them through tax foreclosures during the fiscal crisis of the 1970s. Almost none of that land remains available, and the high cost of privately owned land poses significant barriers to the production of new affordable housing.

In this brief, we explore the potential of one strategy the city could use to encourage the production of affordable housing despite the high cost of land: allowing the transfer of unused development rights. As we describe in further detail below, the city’s zoning ordinance currently allows owners of buildings that are underbuilt to transfer their unused development capacity (often referred to as transferable development rights or TDRs) to another lot in certain circumstances. (1-2, footnotes omitted)

The report estimates that buildings below 59th Street in Manhattan that cannot use all of their development rights because of landmark restrictions could generate sufficient TDRs to produce about 7,000 affordable housing units. That number would be a significant step toward Mayor de Blasio’s goal of producing or preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing, so there is no doubt that this policy is worth a look. And the fact that one of the authors of the report, Vicki Been, is now the Commissioner of NYC’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development will ensure that it does get such a look!

The report acknowledges that loosening the restrictions on TDRs has downsides as well, such as the possible construction of big buildings that are out context of neighboring properties. But the report is intended as a “first step” in the exploration of an innovative land use policy. (19) And it certainly is a step in the right direction.

Fannie and Freddie’s Debt to Treasury

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Larry Wall of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta has posted one of his Notes from the Vault, Have the Government-Sponsored Enterprises Fully Repaid the Treasury? It opens,

Have U.S. taxpayers been fully compensated for their bailout of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? The Treasury is reported to have argued that “the value of Treasury’s commitment to the GSEs was “incalculably large,'” with the implication that it could never be repaid. Richard Epstein, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution [and who discloses that he consults “with several hedge funds with positions in Fannie and Freddie”], responded that “the level of the Treasury commitment was not ‘incalculably large’: it was $188 billion, all of which will shortly be repaid.” The significance of Epstein’s argument is that if Treasury has been fully compensated for its bailout of Fannie and Freddie, a case can be made that the future profits of the two GSEs should go to their private shareholders.

As an accounting matter, one could argue that Epstein is correct; the dividends equal the amount of Treasury funds provided to the GSEs. And as a legal matter, the issue may ultimately be resolved by the federal courts. However, as an economic matter, the value of the government’s contribution clearly exceeds $188 billion once the risk borne by taxpayers is taken into account.

In this Notes from the Vault I examine the value of the taxpayers’ contribution to Fannie and Freddie from an economic perspective. My analysis of these contributions is divided into three parts: (1) the GSEs’ profitability prior to the 2008 conservatorship agreement (bailout), (2) the value of the taxpayer promise at the time of the bailout, and (3) support of new investments since they were placed in conservatorship. (1)

The article goes on to explain each of these three parts of the taxpayers’ contribution and concludes,

The claim that the taxpayers and Treasury have been fully repaid for their support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is based on an accounting calculation that does not withstand economic analysis. The claim that Treasury’s commitment has been fully repaid attributes no dividend payments to Treasury starting in 2012, attributes no value to the government guarantee to absorb whatever losses arose in the pre-conservatorship book of business, and arguably reflects Treasury setting too low of a dividend rate on its senior preferred stock. Moreover, the profits that are being used to pay the dividends did not arise from the contributions of private shareholders but rather entirely reflect risks borne by the Treasury and taxpayers. Thus, the Treasury claim that the value of the aid was “incalculable” is an exaggeration; the value surely can be fixed within reasonable bounds. However, the implication of this claim, that the GSEs cannot repay the economic value on behalf of their common shareholders, is nevertheless accurate. (2)

This article offers a useful corrective to the story one hears from those representing Fannie and Freddie’s shareholders. They have constructed a simple narrative of the bailout of the two companies that ignores the way that the two companies’ fortunes have been intrinsically tied to the federal government’s support of them. That simple narrative just nets out the monies that Treasury fronted Fannie and Freddie with the payments that the two companies made back to Treasury.  After netting the two, they say, “Case closed!” Wall has demonstrated that there are a lot more factors at play than just those two.

I would also highlight something that Wall did not: the federal government actually determines the level of profits that Fannie and Freddie can make by setting the fees the two companies charge for guaranteeing mortgages. So, the federal government could wipe away future profits by lowering the guaranty fees. And wiping away those profits would make those outstanding shares worthless.

So the question remains: what is the endgame for the investors who have brought these lawsuits?

Is $50 Billion of Mortgage Relief Enough?

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The National Mortgage Settlement Monitor issued his Final Crediting Report. The report states that

In total, the servicers have provided more than $50 billion of gross dollar relief, which translates into more than $20 billion in credited relief under the Settlement’s scoring system. More than 600,000 families received some form of relief under the Settlement. Aggregate credited relief includes:

• $7,589,277,740, or 37 percent of total credited relief, of first lien principal forgiveness.

• $3,105,152,359, or 15 percent of total credited relief, of second lien forgiveness.

• $3,587,672,814, or 17 percent of total credited relief, of refinancing assistance.

• $6,410,554,173, or 31 percent of total credited relief, of other forms of relief, including, but not  limited to, assistance related to short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure. (2)

I am not going to criticize the substance of the mortgage settlement. But I have a hard time translating these massive numbers into an understanding of how much help people got from the settlement. $20 Billion of credited relief divided by 600,000 households comes out to about $33,000 in relief per household. The Monitor gives us no sense as to whether that $33,000 made a difference to the affected families.

Perhaps going forward, massive settlements like this should include metrics that help to break down these large numbers into categories that make more intuitive sense:  for instance, did the mortgage relief reduce the monthly payment to a sustainable level?  What percent reduction was there in monthly mortgage payments? How many mortgages were converted from underwater mortgages into ones that were in the money as a result of the settlement? Metrics such as these would help give an understanding of how many people were helped (certainly more than one of the metrics often repeated by the monitor, “My team spent 36,000 hours reviewing and testing the consumer relief and refinancing activities reported by the banks.”

As counter-intuitive as the question may seem, do we have enough information to really know whether $50 Billion of mortgage relief made a meaningful difference for American households?

Unsexy but Essential: NYC’s Infrastructure Needs

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The Center for an Urban Future has released a much-needed report, Caution Ahead: Overdue Investment for New York’s Aging Infrastructure. The report finds that

too much of the city’s essential infrastructure remains stuck in the 20th Century—a problem for a city positioning itself to compete with other global cities in today’s 21st Century economy.

*     *     *

This report finds that city agencies and authorities will have to invest approximately $47.3 billion to maintain the safety and functioning of New York’s infrastructure—leaving a $34.2 billion capital funding gap at the city, Port Authority, New York City Transit, Housing Authority and CUNY over the next five years. This funding gap includes only the replacement and repair of existing infrastructure—not new structures or increased capacity. (3)

Good government reports like this are often heeded for a day or two in the press and then filed away with other examples of wishful thinking. The fact is that it is hard for politicians to fix the old when it is so much more noteworthy to do ribbon cuttings for the new. But given that Mayor de Blasio has placed housing construction at the top of his agenda, a report like this might gain more traction than usual.

The report highlights work that is needed to be in the following areas, among others:

  • Roads
  • Subways
  • Natural Gas
  • Electricity Distribution
  • Water Mains
  • Sewage Pipes
  • Stormwater Management
  • Parks

All of these infrastructure needs are integral to large scale housing construction. Large, new buildings need to be supported with investments across these areas. This is a cost. But large scale housing construction also provides the opportunity to upgrade infrastructure more broadly. Concentrated development makes it more cost-effective to upgrade and modernize the infrastructure that supports new developments as well as their surrounding areas. There is no question that the de Blasio Administration should integrate infrastructure improvement with its ambitious affordable housing agenda. It may not be able to get two for the price of one. But with proper planning, it certainly could get two for less than the price of two.

CFPB Strategy on Mortgage Data

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The CFPB released its Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and Report which provides a good summary of what the Bureau has done to date. I was particularly interested in this summary of its work to build a representative database of mortgages:

In FY 2013, the CFPB began a partnership with the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to build the National Mortgage Database (NMDB). This work continues in FY 2014. For this database, the FHFA and the Bureau have procured (from a credit reporting agency) credit information with respect to a random and representative sample of 5% of mortgages held by consumers. The NMDB is the first dataset that will provide a truly representative sample of mortgages so as to allow analysis of mortgages over the life of the loans, including firsts, seconds, and home equity loans.

In all of the data used for its analyses, the Bureau will work to ensure that strong protections are in place around personally identifiable information. (66)

Such a database (assuming privacy concerns are adequately addressed) will be an invaluable tool for the Bureau (and researchers too, to the extent that they are allowed to access it). One question that the Strategic Plan does not answer is how fresh will the mortgage data be. The mortgage market can innovate at warp speed, as it did in the mid-2000s, so it will be important for the CFPB database to be as current as possible and accessible to researchers as quickly as possible. That being said, even if the data is a bit stale, it will still provide invaluable guidance regarding abusive behaviors in the market. It should also provide guidance regarding a lack of sustainable credit in the market generally as well as within those communities that have historically suffered from such a lack, low- and moderate-income communities as well as communities of color.

On a separate note, I would say that the Strategic Plan makes some assumptions about the efficacy of financial education that should probably be studied carefully. There is a lot of research that challenges the usefulness of financial education. The Bureau should grapple with that research before it invests heavily in financial education implementation.

Reiss on Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation

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I have posted An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation to  SSRN (and to BePress as well). The abstract reads:

The fate of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to the vagaries of politics, regulation, public opinion, the economy, and not least of all the numerous cases that have been filed in 2013 against various government entities arising from the placement of the two companies into conservatorship. This short article will provide an overview of the last of these. The litigation surrounding Fannie and Freddie’s conservatorship raises all sorts of issues about the federal government’s involvement in housing finance. These issues are worth setting forth as the proper role of these two companies in the housing finance system is still very much up in the air. The plaintiffs, in the main, argue that the federal government has breached its duties to preferred shareholders, common shareholders, and potential beneficiaries of a housing trust fund authorized by the same statute that authorized their conservatorships. At this early stage, it appears that the plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe.