- Former Freddie Mac executives, who were accused of lying about Freddie’s exposure to subprime mortgages before the financial crisis, settled with the SEC.
- Citibank shareholders slam the Bank’s motion to dismiss a case over mortgage-backed securities worth more than $17 billion as NY federal courts have rejected similar arguments to dismiss similar cases.
- The Second Circuit dismisses a class action against Royal Bank of Scotland PLC finding that the bank did not lie about its exposure to residential mortgage-backed securities.
- DC federal judge certified a class action of evicted homeowners, with a lead representative who lost his home over a $134 unpaid tax bill. The court will decide whether district law creates a property interest in equity, if its tax-sale statutes effect a taking of the property and if class members were properly compensated.
Tag Archives: Citibank
Reiss on Citigroup Settlement
Law360 quoted me in Feds Deploy Potent Bank Fraud Law In $7B Citi Pact (behind a paywall). It reads in part:
The U.S. Department of Justice’s $7 billion mortgage bond settlement with Citigroup Inc. on Monday may not have been possible without the help of a once-obscure fraud law that has become a legal magic wand for prosecutors.
Citigroup’s settlement included a $4 billion civil fine under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act, the largest such penalty in history. FIRREA was passed in the wake of the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis but has been dusted off in recent years as prosecutors have targeted major Wall Street banks that packaged and sold toxic residential mortgage-backed securities before the 2008 economic collapse.
The law’s government-friendly provisions are well-documented. FIRREA contains a 10-year statute of limitations, rather than the typical five-year window for fraud suits. That has permitted the government to comfortably sue banks over conduct that occurred in 2006 and 2007, when many of the shoddy loans implicated in the crisis were securitized. Prosecutors can use tolling agreements to keep potential claims alive even longer.
* * *
The sheer size of the government’s FIRREA fines thus far, combined with the lack of case law underpinning the statute, has placed banks and their defense counsel in a difficult negotiating position, according to David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
“The message for people in negotiations is: Expect to pay a lot, or else, the government is going to call your bluff,” Reiss said. “It’s the Wild West for civil penalties.”
Monday’s settlement relates to Citigroup’s due diligence on loans that were packaged into securities and sold to investors for tens of billions of dollars. According to an agreed-upon statement of facts, the bank “received information indicating that, for certain loan pools, significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations provided to investors about the pools of loans to be securitized.”
In one case, a Citigroup trader wrote an internal email questioning the quality of loans in mortgage-backed securities issued in 2007. The trader said that he “went through the diligence reports and think that we should start praying … I would not be surprised if half of these loans went down.”
The bank did not admit to breaking any particular law, and neither it nor any individual employees were criminally charged. At the same time, DOJ officials were quick to point out that the settlement did not release Citigroup or any individuals from potential criminal liability.
Reiss said the threat of criminal prosecution could become a hallmark of FIRREA cases, giving banks another cause for concern.
“That again demonstrates a lot of leverage on the side of the government,” Reiss said. “It’s a powerful tool to keep in your back pocket.”
Premature End to Foreclosure Review
Congressman Cummings (D), the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, has sent a letter to Congressman Issa, the Chairman of the Committee, regarding the Independent Foreclosure Review. It opens,
I am writing to request that the Committee hold a hearing on widespread foreclosure abuses and illegal activities engaged in by mortgage servicing companies. I request that the hearing also examine why the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) appear to have prematurely ended the Independent Foreclosure Review (IFR) and entered into a major settlement agreement with most of the servicers just as the full extent of their harm was beginning to be revealed. (1)
It goes on to assert that “some mortgage servicing companies engaged in widespread and systemic foreclosure abuses, including charging improper and excessive fees, failing to process loan modifications in accordance with federal guidelines, and violating automatic stays after borrowers filed for bankruptcy.” (2) It concludes that it “remains unclear why the regulators terminated the IFR prematurely, how regulators determined the compensation amounts servicers were required to pay under the settlement, and how regulators could claim that borrowers who were harmed by these servicers would benefit more from the settlement . . . than by allowing the IFR to be completed.” (2)
The letter raises a number of important concerns, but I will focus on just one — “how did the regulators arrive at the compensation amounts in the settlement?” (9) This particular settlement was for billions of dollars from BoA, PNC, JPMorgan and Citibank. This is an extraordinarily large sum, but the public is left with no sense of whether this sum is proportional to the harm done. I have raised this concern with other billion dollar settlements. As the federal government moves forward with these large settlements, it should carefully consider their expressive function — does the penalty fit the wrongdoing? And if so, how was that calculated? People want to know.
Is Banks’ $200 Billion Payout from RMBS Lawsuits Enough?
S&P issued a brief, The Largest U.S. Banks Should Be Able To Withstand The Ramifications Of Legal Issues, that quantifies the exposure that big banks have from litigation arising from the Subprime Crisis:
Since 2009, the largest U.S. banks (Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo) together have paid or set aside more than $45 billion for mortgage representation and warranty (rep and warranty) issues and have incurred roughly $50 billion in combined legal expenses . . . This does not include another roughly $30 billion of expenses and mortgage payment relief to consumers to settle mortgage servicing issues. We estimate that the largest banks may need to pay out an additional $55 billion to $105 billion to settle mortgage-related issues, some of which is already accounted for in these reserves. (2)
S&P believes “that the largest banks have, in aggregate, about a $155 billion buffer, which includes a capital cushion, representation and warranty reserves, and our estimate of legal reserves, to absorb losses from a range of additional mortgage-related and other legal exposures.” (2) As far as their ratings go, S&P has already incorporated “heightened legal issues into our ratings, and we currently don’t expect legal settlements to result in negative rating actions for U.S. banks.” (2) But it warns, “an immediate and unexpected significant legal expense could result in the weakening of a bank’s business model through the loss of key clients and employees, as well as the weakening of its capital position.” (2) S&P also acknowledges that there are some not yet quantifiable risks out there, such as DoJ’s FIRREA suits.
As the endgame of the financial crisis begins to take shape and financial institutions are held accountable for their actions, one is left wondering about a group who is left relatively unscathed: financial institution employees who received mega bonuses for involving these banks in these bad deals. As we think about the inevitable next crisis, we should ask if there is a way to hold those individuals accountable too.
Not That I’m Complaining, But
Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall and Sonia Steinway have posted Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints on SSRN. It is interesting both for the details it documents, but also for what it represents. Details first:
Analyzing a new data set of 110,000 consumer complaints lodged with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, we find that
(i) Bank of America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than the average financial institution;
(ii) consumers of some of the largest financial services providers, including Wells Fargo, Amex, and Bank of America, were significantly more likely than average to dispute the company‘s response to their initial complaints; and
(iii) among companies that provide mortgages, OneWest Bank, HSBC, Nationstar Mortgage, and Bank of America all received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than other banks. (1)
The financial services industry has complained that the CFPB complaint system would unfairly expose companies to unverified complaints. But this kind of comparative look at financial services companies shows the great value of the CFPB’s approach. As the authors’ note, this dataset is a treasure trove for researchers and should result in helpful information for consumers and regulators alike. Sunlight is the best disinfectant!
Bad Faith Remedies for Loan Modification Negotiations
New York Supreme Court Justice Torres (Bronx) issued a Decision and Order in Citibank, N.A. v. Barclay et al., No. 381649-09 (June 21, 2013), in which he evaluated what the appropriate remedies were for failing to negotiate in “good faith” as required by CPLR section 3408(f). Like other cases, it recites a litany of facts that make the owner of the note look comically (darkly comically) incompetent or even malevolent.
In an earlier decision, the Court “found that the plaintiff had failed to act in good faith.” (3) In particular, the Court found that Citibank “made it impossible for Barclay to comply with its conflicting ever changing, never written requests for documentation. Moreover, the plaintiff refused to review applications that were complete and it never took a clear position on the defendant’s loan modification application.” (3) The details in the decision add Dickensian color to this summary.
CPLR section 3408(f) requires that both “the plaintiff and defendant shall negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable conclusion, including a loan modification, if possible.” As NY courts have noted, the CPLR does not offer up any remedies for a party’s failure to negotiate in good faith, thereby leaving the appropriate sanction up to “judicial discretion.” (6)
Other cases have granted remedies such as barring “banks and loan servicers from collecting interest, legal fees, and expenses. Other penalties have included exemplary damages and staying the foreclosure proceeding.” (6, citations omitted) The Court notes that remedies such as dismissal of the foreclosure, cancelling the note and mortgage, or ordering “a specific judicially imposed loan modification agreement.” (6) The court’s remedy in this case “is a bar on the collection of any arrears, including interest, costs and fees” from the date Barclay “received the unsupported HAMP denial.” (6)
On the one hand, this seems like a measured remedy because it punishes Citibank for the time period that it was not acting in good faith. But given how common this behavior seems to be, one wonders if it will deter future bad faith negotiations.
