The Rescue of Fannie and Freddie

Federal Reserve researchers, W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery, have posted a staff report, The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The abstract reads,

We describe and evaluate the measures taken by the U.S. government to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. We begin by outlining the business model of these two firms and their role in the U.S. housing finance system. Our focus then turns to the sources of financial distress that the firms experienced and the events that ultimately led the government to take action in an effort to stabilize housing and financial markets. We describe the various resolution options available to policymakers at the time and evaluate the success of the choice of conservatorship, and other actions taken, in terms of five objectives that we argue an optimal intervention would have fulfilled. We conclude that the decision to take the firms into conservatorship and invest public funds achieved its short-run goals of stabilizing mortgage markets and promoting financial stability during a period of extreme stress. However, conservatorship led to tensions between maximizing the firms’ value and achieving broader macroeconomic objectives, and, most importantly, it has so far failed to produce reform of the U.S. housing finance system.

 This staff report provides a nice overview of the two companies since the financial crisis. I was particularly interested by a couple of sections. First, I found the discussion of receivership versus conservatorship helpful. Second, I liked how it outlined the five objectives for an optimal intervention:

(i) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be enabled to continue their core securitization and guarantee functions as going concerns, thereby maintaining conforming mortgage credit supply.

(ii) The two firms would continue to honor their agency debt and mortgage-backed securities obligations, given the amount and widely held nature of these securities, especially in leveraged financial institutions, and the potential for financial instability in case of default on these obligations.

(iii) The value of the common and preferred equity in the two firms would be extinguished, reflecting their insolvent financial position.

(iv) The two firms would be managed in a way that would provide flexibility to take into account macroeconomic objectives, rather than just maximizing the private value of their assets.

(v) The structure of the rescue would prompt long-term reform and set in motion the transition to a better system within a reasonable period of time. (14-15)

You’ll have to read the paper to see how they evaluate the five objectives in greater detail.

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Whitman on Foreclosing on E-Note

Professor Dale Whitman posted a commentary on Good v. Wells Fargo Bank, 18 N.E.3d  618 (Ind. App. 2014) on the Dirt listserv. The case addresses whether a lender foreclosing a mortgage securing an electronic note must provide proof that it had “control” of the note when it filed the foreclosure action. This is an interesting new take on an old issue. Dale’s commentary reads:

By now, everyone is familiar with the requirements of UCC Article 3 with respect to enforcement of negotiable notes. Article 3 requires either proof that the party enforcing the note has possession of the original note, or as an alternative, requires submission of a lost note affidavit. With conventional paper notes, it has become common for courts in judicial foreclosure states to require, as a condition of standing to foreclose, that the note holder or its servicer have had possession of the note on the date the foreclosure complaint or petition was filed. This requirement is problematic if (as is often true) the endorsement on the note is undated. In such cases, the servicer will usually be expected to provide additional proof (commonly in the form of affidavits of employees of the holder and/or servicer) that the note had been delivered to the foreclosing party before the date of filing of the action. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank N.T. v. Beneficial New Mexico, Inc., 335 P.3d 217 (N.M. App. 2014); Boyd v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 143 So.3d 1128 (Fla.App. 2014); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Faruque, 991 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y.App.Div. 2014).

Suppose, however, that the note was electronic rather than paper. Such notes are enforceable under eSign and UETA, but these statutes modify the concepts of delivery and possession. Because an electronic note can be reproduced as many times as desired, and each copy is indistinguishable from the original, eSign creates the concept of the note as a “transferrable record.” Such records must have the following characteristics:

1.  The record must be held within a system in which “a single authoritative copy of the record (the note) exists, which is unique, identifiable, and unalterable.”

2.  To have the equivalent of possession of such a note, if it has been transferred, a person must have “control” in the sense that the system for tracking such notes must reliably establish that the person enforcing the note is the one to whom the record was transferred.

3.  Finally, if the record has been transferred, the authoritative copy of the record itself must indicate the identity of the person who whom it was most recently transferred.

See 15 U.S.C. sec. 7021.

There are very few cases thus far involving foreclosures of mortgages securing e-notes, and little authority on exactly what the holder must prove in order to properly foreclose. In the Good case Wells Fargo was acting as servicer for Fannie Mae, the holder of an e-note that was registered in the MERS e-registry. (MERS’ role with e-notes is very different than for paper notes. In paper note transactions, MERS does not take possession of the note and has no dealings with it, but in e-note transactions, MERS operates a registry to track who has control of the note.)

Accompanying its foreclosure complaint, Wells filed an affidavit by one of its officers, stating that Wells was the servicer, that it maintained a copy of the note, and that its systems provided controls to assure that each note was maintained accurately and protected against alteration. Finally, it stated that the paper copy it submitted with the foreclosure complaint was a true and correct copy of the original e-note.

Unfortunately for Wells, the court found that this affidavit was woefully inadequate to establish Wells’ standing to foreclose the mortgage. Here is the court’s list of particulars:

1.  The affidavit stated that Wells possessed the note, but the court couldn’t tell whether it meant the electronic note or a paper copy.

2.  The affidavit did not assert that Wells had “control” of the record, either by maintaining the single authoritative copy itself in its own system, or by being identified as having control of the single authoritative copy in the MERS registry system.

3.  In fact, Wells never even mentioned the MERS registry system in its affidavit, even though it is obvious from the facts that the note was being tracked within that system.

Wells tried to repair the damage at trial; an employee of Wells testified that Wells was in control of the note, currently maintained it, and serviced the loan. But the court found that this testimony was “conclusory” (as indeed it was) and was insufficient to establish that Wells had control of the note.

Comment: The court provides an extremely useful road map for counsel representing a servicer in the judicial foreclosure of a e-note. The statute itself provides (in 15 U.S.C. 7021(f)) that the person enforcing the note must provide “reasonable proof” that it was in control of the note, and the court felt this must be detailed information and not merely a bare statement.

While the case involved a judicial foreclosure, one might well ask how the “reasonable proof” requirement would be satisfied in a nonjudicial foreclosure. In about eight states, the courts have held (with paper notes) that their nonjudicial foreclosure statutes do not require any assertion or proof of possession of the note. But it is arguable that, if the note is electronic rather than paper, eSign overrides this conclusion by virtue of its express requirement of “reasonable proof.” And since eSign is a federal statute, it is quite capable of preempting any contrary state legislation.  On the other hand, the “reasonable proof” requirement only applies “if requested by a person against which enforcement is sought.” In a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding, how would the borrower make such a request? These are interesting, but highly speculative questions.

GSE Nationalization and Necessity

Nestor Davidson has posted Nationalization and Necessity: Takings and a Doctrine of Economic Emergency to SSRN. This essay will be of interest to those following the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation. The abstract reads,

Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently, shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the obligation to pay just compensation should be recognized as a natural extension of the doctrine of emergency in takings. Public officials must be able to respond quickly to serious economic threats, no less than when facing the kinds of imminent physical or public health crises — such as wildfires and contagion — that have been a staple of traditional takings jurisprudence. Far from an affront to the rule of law, this reflection of necessity through an extension of emergency doctrine would reaffirm the flexibility inherent in property law in times of crisis.

Davidson looks at the various companies that were nationalized during the financial crisis, including Fannie and Freddie, and concludes,

It does no violence to norms of ownership—or the rule of law—to acknowledge that overriding necessity in times of crisis can be as relevant to economic emergency as it has always been to more prosaic threats. The doctrine of economic emergency that this Essay has proposed accords with the deepest traditions of our system of property, and rightly should be so recognized. (215)

 

Davidson reaches a very different conclusion than does Richard Epstein, who argues that just compensation is warranted for shareholders in the two companies. I have no doubt that the judges deciding these cases will have to struggle with very same issues that Davidson sets forth in this article, so it is worth a read for those who are closely following these cases.