Tag Archives: FHA

The FHA’s Ailing Reverse Mortgage Program

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photo by aag.com

The Fiscal Year 2017 Independent Actuarial Review of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund: Cash Flow Net Present Value from Home Equity Conversion Mortgage Insurance in Force has been released. It has some bad news:

FHA provides reverse mortgage insurance through the HECM program. HECMs enable senior homeowners to access the value of their homes. The program began as a pilot program in 1989 and became permanent in 1998. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of HECM endorsements grew because of increasingly widespread product awareness, lower interest rates, higher home values and higher FHA mortgage limits. Prior to fiscal year 2009, the HECM program was part of the General Insurance (GI) Fund. The FHA Modernization Act within the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) moved all new HECM program endorsements into the MMIF effective October 1, 2008.

The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA), enacted in 1990, introduced a minimum capital requirement for MMIF. By 1992, the capital ratio was to be at least 1.25%, and by 2000 the capital ratio was to be no less than 2.0%. The capital ratio is defined by NAHA as the ratio of capital plus Cash Flow NPV to unamortized insurance‐in-force (IIF). NAHA also implemented the requirement that an independent actuarial study of the MMIF be completed annually. HERA also amended 12 USC 1708(a)(4) to include the requirement for the annual actuarial study. Accordingly, an actuarial review must be conducted on HECM mortgages within the MMIF. In this report, we analyze the HECM portion of the MMIF, which is mortgages endorsed in fiscal year 2009 and later.

Pinnacle projects that, as of the end of fiscal year 2017, the HECM Cash Flow NPV is negative $14.2 billion. (4, citation omitted, emphasis in the original)

With the housing market on the mend, Congress should ensure that essential infrastructure of the housing finance market is on solid footing. The HECM program should not have a negative cash flow (net present value) while the housing market is healthy as that will compound the bad news when the market takes a turn for the worse.

How Important Is Skin in The Game?

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Haoyang Liu has posted a paper to SSRN that challenges the effectiveness of skin-in-the-game market discipline: Does Skin-in-the-Game Discipline Risk Management? Evidence from Mortgage Insurance. The abstract reads,

Many mortgage reform proposals suggest replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs) with private entities. A common assumption underlying these proposals is that unlike the GSEs, private insurers will properly manage risk and set fair prices. Inconsistent with this assumption, this paper presents evidence that private insurers less effectively managed home price risks during the 2000-2006 housing boom than the GSEs did. Mortgage origination data reveal that the GSEs were selecting loans with increasingly higher percentages of down payments, or lower loan to value ratios (LTVs), in boom areas than in other areas. These lower LTVs in boom areas reduced the GSEs’ exposure to overheated markets. Furthermore, the decline of LTVs in boom areas stems entirely from the segment insured by the GSEs only, and none of the decline stems from the segment where private mortgage insurers take the first loss position. Private insurers also did not lower their exposure to home price risks along other dimensions, including the percentage of high LTV GSE loans they insured and the percentage of insured mortgage balance. My results highlight that post-crisis reform of the mortgage insurance industry should carefully consider additional factors besides moral hazard induced by the government guarantees, such as mortgage insurers’ future home price assumptions and the industry organization of the mortgage origination chain.

The paper’s conclusions are sobering for those interested in increasing the role of private capital in the mortgage market (including yours truly):

Many mortgage market reform proposals assume that private insurers will set fair prices and properly manage risk. Evidence from this paper suggests that private insurers less effectively managed home price risk during the 2000-2006 housing boom than Fannie and Freddie did.

These somewhat surprising results are nevertheless consistent with the history of the private mortgage insurance industry, including its repeated and concentrated failures. Most recently in the 2008 crash, three out of the eight largest private mortgage insurers failed. However, perhaps 31 overshadowed by the highly publicized and controversial bailout of the GSEs, private mortgage insurers’ failures have received relatively little attention from academics and the popular press. Many post-crisis proposals also assume that replacing the GSEs by private insurers would be a panacea. My results suggest that privatizing the GSEs alone is unlikely to ensure sufficient risk management in the mortgage insurance industry. Additional factors besides private capital, such as assumptions about future house prices and bargaining power of private insurers in front of large lenders, are important in shaping risk management practices. One way to establish reasonable house price assumptions is to stress test mortgage insurers, forcing the industry to consider their exposure to the housing downturn scenarios proposed by regulators.

The mortgage insurance industry plays a crucial role in financing Americans’ mortgages. Their insurance reduces or removes mortgage default risks, thereby enhancing the liquidity of mortgage backed securities and lowering homebuyers’ borrowing costs. The risks they face and the optimal regulatory structure for them deserve more study to prevent them from being a source of systemic risk in the financial system. (31-32)

The paper suggests that we should not expect that private mortgage insurers can play an outsized role in keeping us safe from booms and busts. They have succumbed to bubble thinking in the past and there is no reason to think that they would not in the future as well.

Insuring Sustainable Housing

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photo by Mark Moz

I posted Insuring Sustainable Housing to SSRN (and BePress). The abstract reads,

Today’s FHA suffered from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many lenders during the 2000s. It had also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government announced in 2013 that the FHA would require the first bailout in its history. At the same time that it faced these financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop employing the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These arguments rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures but they fail to address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives in the future.

This short article is drawn from Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration and The Low Down Payment Loan, 50 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2016).

Understanding Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI)

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photo by David Hilowitz

LendingTree quoted me in Guide to Understanding Private Mortgage Insurance (That’s PMI). It opens,

Part I: Basics of private mortgage insurance (PMI)

What is PMI?

If you’ve ever purchased a home without a large down payment, you may have faced the possibility of paying PMI, or private mortgage insurance. This financial product is a type of loan insurance typically bought by consumers when they purchase a house. However, the premiums paid toward PMI aren’t intended to protect the consumer. Rather, they provide protection for the lender, in case you stop making payments on your home loan.

As the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) notes, PMI is typically arranged by your lender during the home loan process and comes into play when you have a conventional loan and put down less than 20 percent of the property’s purchase price. However, private mortgage insurance is not just associated with home purchases; it can also be required when a consumer refinances his or her home and has less than 20 percent equity in it.

Generally speaking, PMI can be paid in three different ways — as a monthly premium, a one-time upfront premium or a mix of monthly premiums with an upfront fee.

There are also ways to avoid paying PMI altogether, which we’ll address later in this guide.

PMI versus MIP: What’s the difference?

While PMI is private mortgage insurance consumers buy to insure their conventional home loans, the similarly named MIP –  that’s mortgage insurance premium — is mortgage insurance you buy when you take out an FHA home loan.

MIP works kind of like PMI, in that it’s required for FHA (Federal Housing Administration) loans with a down payment of less than 20 percent of the purchase price. With MIP, you pay both an upfront assessment at the time of closing and an annual premium that is calculated every year and paid within your monthly mortgage premiums.

Generally speaking, the upfront component of MIP is equal to 1.75 percent of the base loan amount. The annual MIP premiums, on the other hand, are based on the amount of money you owe each year.

The biggest difference between PMI and MIP is this: PMI can be canceled after a homeowner achieves at least 20 percent equity in his/her property, whereas homeowners paying MIP in conjunction with a FHA loan that originated after June 13, 2013, cannot cancel this coverage until their mortgage is paid in full. You can also get out from under MIP by refinancing your FHA loan into a new, conventional loan. However, you’ll need to leave at least 20 percent equity in your home to avoid having to pay private mortgage insurance on the refi.

Which types of home loans require PMI? MIP?

If you’re thinking of buying a home and wondering if you’ll be on the hook for PMI or MIP, it’s important to understand different scenarios in which these extra charges may apply.

Here are the two main loan situations where you’ll absolutely need to pay mortgage insurance:

  • FHA loans with less than 20 percent down – If you’re taking out a FHA loan to purchase a home, you may only be required to come up with a 3.5 percent down payment. You will, however, be required to pay both upfront and annual mortgage insurance premium (MIP).
  • Conventional loans with less than 20 percent down – If you’re taking out a conventional home loan and have less than 20 percent of the home’s purchase price to put down, you’ll need to pay PMI.

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Part V: Frequently asked questions (FAQs)

Before you decide whether to pay PMI – or whether you should try to avoid it – it pays to learn all you can about this insurance product. Consider these frequently asked questions and their answers as you continue your path toward homeownership.

Q. Is PMI tax-deductible?

According to David Reiss, professor of law and academic program director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School, PMI may be tax-deductible but it all depends on your situation. “The deduction phases out at higher income levels,” he says.

According to IRS.gov, the deduction for PMI starts phasing out once your adjusted gross income exceeds $100,000 and phases out completely once it exceeds $109,000 (or $54,500 if married filing separately).

The Long-Term Effects of Redlining

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Daniel Aaronson et al. have posted The Effects of the 1930s HOLC “Redlining” Maps to SSRN. The paper provides empirical support for the argument that discriminatory government policies have consequences that can last for decades, including increased segregation. The abstract reads,

In the wake of the Great Depression, the Federal government created new institutions such as the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) to stabilize housing markets. As part of that effort, the HOLC created residential security maps for over 200 cities to grade the riskiness of lending to neighborhoods. We trace out the effects of these maps over the course of the 20th and into the early 21st century by linking geocoded HOLC maps to both Census and modern credit bureau data. Our analysis looks at the difference in outcomes between residents living on a lower graded side versus a higher graded side of an HOLC boundary within highly close proximity to one another. We compare these differences to “counterfactual” boundaries using propensity score and other weighting procedures. In addition, we exploit borders that are least likely to have been endogenously drawn. We find that areas that were the lower graded side of HOLC boundaries in the 1930s experienced a marked increase in racial segregation in subsequent decades that peaked around 1970 before beginning to decline. We also find evidence of a long-run decline in home ownership, house values, and credit scores along the lower graded side of HOLC borders that persists today. We document similar long-run patterns among both “redlined” and non-redlined neighborhoods and, in some important outcomes, show larger and more lasting effects among the latter. Our results provide strongly suggestive evidence that the HOLC maps had a causal and persistent effect on the development of neighborhoods through credit access.

The paper’s conclusion is just as interesting:

That the pattern begins to revert starting in the 1970s is at least suggestive that Federal interventions like the Fair Housing Act of 1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 may have played a role in reversing the increase in segregation caused by the HOLC maps. . . . We believe our results highlight the key role that access to credit plays on the growth and long-running development of local communities. (33)

Rethinking FHA Insurance

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The Congressional Budget Office issued a report on Options to Manage FHA’s Exposure to Risk from Guaranteeing Single-Family Mortgages. FHA insurance stands out from other forms of mortgage insurance because it guarantees all of a lender’s loss, rather than just a portion of it. It is certainly a useful exercise to determine whether the FHA could reduce its exposure to those potential credit losses while also making home loans available to people who would otherwise have difficulty accessing them. This report evaluates the options available to the FHA:

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures the mortgages of people who might otherwise have trouble getting a loan, particularly first-time homebuyers and low-income borrowers seeking to purchase or refinance a home. During and just after the 2007–2009 recession, the share of mortgages insured by FHA grew rapidly as private lenders became more reluctant to provide home loans without an FHA guarantee of repayment. FHA’s expanded role in the mortgage insurance market ensured that borrowers could continue to have access to credit. However, like most other mortgage insurers, FHA experienced a spike in delinquencies and defaults by borrowers.

Recently, mortgage borrowers with good credit scores, large down payments, or low ratios of debt to income have started to see more options in the private market. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the share of FHA-insured mortgages going to such borrowers is likely to keep shrinking as credit standards in the private market continue to ease. That change would leave FHA with a riskier pool of borrowers, creating risk-management challenges similar to the ones that contributed to the agency’s high levels of insurance claims and losses during the recession.

This report analyzes policy options to reduce FHA’s exposure to risk from its program to guarantee single-family mortgages, including creating a larger role for private lenders and restricting the availability of FHA’s guarantees. The options are designed to let FHA continue to fulfill its primary mission of ensuring access to credit for first-time homebuyers and low-income borrowers.

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What Policy Options Did CBO Analyze?

Many changes have been proposed to reduce the cost of risk to the federal government from FHA’s single-family mortgage guarantees. CBO analyzed illustrative versions of seven policy options, which generally represent the range of approaches that policymakers and others have proposed:

■ Guaranteeing some rather than all of the lender’s losses on a defaulted mortgage;

■ Increasing FHA’s use of risk-based pricing to tailor up-front fees to the riskiness of specific borrowers;

■ Adding a residual-income test to the requirements for an FHA-insured mortgage to better measure borrowers’ ability to repay the loan (as the Department of Veterans Affairs does in its mortgage guarantee program);

■ Reducing the limit on the size of a mortgage that FHA can guarantee;

■ Restricting eligibility for FHA-insured mortgages only to first-time homebuyers and low- to moderate-income borrowers;

■ Requiring some borrowers to receive mortgage counseling to help them better understand their financial obligations; and

■ Providing a grant to help borrowers with their down payment, in exchange for which FHA would receive part of the increase in their home’s value when it was sold.

Although some of those approaches would require action by lawmakers, several of the options could be implemented by FHA without legislation. In addition, certain options could be combined to change the nature of FHA’s risk exposure or the composition of its guarantees. CBO did not examine the results of combining options.

What Effects Would the Policy Options Have?

Making one or more of those policy changes would affect FHA’s financial position, its role in the broader mortgage market, and the federal budget. All of the options would improve the agency’s financial position by reducing its exposure to the risk of losses on the mortgages it insures (see Table 1). The main reason for that reduction would be a decrease in the amount of mortgages guaranteed by FHA. CBO projects that under current law, FHA would insure $220 billion in new single-family mortgages in 2018. The options would lower that amount by anywhere from $15 billion to $77 billion (see Figure 1). Some options would also reduce FHA’s risk exposure by decreasing insurance losses as a percentage of the value of the guaranteed mortgages. (1-2)

First-Time Homebuyer Tips

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The Lenders Network quoted me in First-Time Home Buyer Tips and Advice from Top Mortgage & Real Estate Experts. It reads, in part,

If you’re in the market to purchase your first home, then you know there’s much for you to learn. First-time homebuyers often make many mistakes they wish they didn’t. You’re making the biggest financial decision in your life, you want to make sure you don’t make any mistakes. So we asked mortgage and real estate experts what advice they would give first-time homebuyers.

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8. Look into a HomeReady HomePath Loan

“Many first-time home buyers look to Federal Housing Administration –insured mortgages which have low down payment requirements.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both offer loan programs to lenders who lend to first –time homebuyers of one-unit residences.

These programs have down payment requirements that are as low as 3 percent. Fannie’s program is called HomeReady.

It defines a first-time homebuyer as “An individual is to be considered a first-time home buyer who

1. Is purchasing the security property;

2. Will reside in the security property as a principal residence; and

3.  Had no ownership interest (sole or joint) in a residential property during the three-year period preceding the date of the purchase of the security property.

In addition, an individual who is a displaced homemaker or single parent also will be considered a first-time home buyer if he or she had no ownership interest in a principal residence (other than a joint ownership interest with a spouse) during the preceding three-year time period.”