- The Impact on LEED Neighborhood Certification on Condo Prices, Julia Freybote, Hua Sun & Xi Yang, Real Estate Economics, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 586-608, 2015.
- Information Externalities, Neighborhood Characteristics and Home Mortgage Pricing and Underwriting, Ioan Voicu, Irina Paley, Andres E. Lopex, Irene Fang, Real Estate Economics, Vol. 43, Issue. 3, pp. 719-749, 2015.
- Do House Price Levels Anticipate Subsequent Price Changes within Metropolitan Areas?, Nai Jia Lee, Tracey Seslen & William C. Wheaton, Real Estate Economics, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 782-806, 2015.
- Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns, Hangqing Zhou, Yuan Yuan, Christopher Lako, Michael Sklarz & Charles McKinney, Real Estate Economics, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 682-718, 2015.
Tag Archives: underwriting
Dodd-Frank and Mortgage Reform at Five
The Department of Treasury has issued a report, Dodd-Frank at Five Years: Reforming Wall Street and Protecting Main Street. The report is clearly a political document, trumpeting the achievements of the Obama Administration. It is interesting nonetheless. It opens,
When President Obama took office in January 2009, the U.S. economy was in crisis. The nation was shedding more than 750,000 jobs per month, and confidence in our financial system had been shaken to its core. The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression exposed a toxic mix of excessive risk-taking, shoddy lending practices, inadequate capital levels, unstable funding, and weaknesses in regulatory oversight. A collapsing financial system choked off credit to consumers seeking to purchase a car, a home, groceries, or to finance an education. Nearly 9 million Americans lost their jobs, and over 5 million lost their homes. Nearly $13 trillion of families’ wealth was destroyed, wiping out almost two decades of gains.
In response to the crisis, the Administration released a proposed set of reforms in June 2009. Congress held numerous hearings and crafted legislation based on the Administration’s proposal, incorporating ideas from both Republicans and Democrats throughout the process. On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law, a historic and comprehensive set of financial reforms, which put in place critical new protections for consumers, investors, and taxpayers. Five years later—as a result of Dodd-Frank and other Wall Street reforms—our financial system is stronger, safer, more resilient, and more supportive of sustainable economic growth. Regulators also have better tools to deal with financial shocks when they occur, to protect Main Street and taxpayers from Wall Street recklessness.
Critics of reform have claimed that Wall Street Reform would deter lending and choke off the recovery. But, today it is clear that the opposite is true. Reform has served as a building block for economic growth, providing Americans with safe places to invest their savings and enabling banks to lend to individuals, businesses, and communities. Only a financial system strong enough to withstand a major financial shock is capable of promoting sustainable economic growth. Five years after the President signed Wall Street Reform into law, nearly all of the major elements of financial reform are in place. Today, our financial system is safer and stronger as a result of these hard-won reforms, and our economy is in a far better position to continue growing and creating jobs. (1)
I was struck by the fact that the report does not address the biggest financial reform failure of the last five years, the lack of reform of the housing finance system. Fannie and Freddie remain in conservatorship, putting the housing finance system at risk of another crisis.
I was also struck by the following passage:
In the run-up to the financial crisis, abusive lending practices and unclear underwriting standards resulted in risky mortgages which hurt consumers and ultimately threatened financial stability. Wall Street Reform bans many of the abusive practices in mortgage markets that helped cause the crisis, and requires lenders to determine that borrowers can repay their loans. (2)
My recollection from academic conferences over the course of the last six or seven years is that many leading academics denied the link between abusive lending practices and systemic risk. It seemed pretty clear to me, but I was in the minority on that one. I am glad to see that at least the Treasury agrees with me.
Costly Mortgage Mistakes
Consumer Reports Money Adviser quoted me in Don’t Make This Costly Mortgage Mistake; How to Weigh Your Options Before Your Settle on a Deal (only available in Spanish without a subscription!) (UPDATE: NOW IN ENGLISH TOO). It reads, in part (and in English),
As with anything you buy, scoring the best deal on a mortgage or refinancing involves shopping around. Yet 77 percent of borrowers applied for a loan with a single lender instead of checking out several to compare costs, according to a recent study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. “People may well put more time and effort into shopping for smaller products such as appliances and televisions than they do in shopping for the right mortgage,” the bureau’s director, Richard Cordray, said in a statement. But the potential savings from doing your homework are significant. If you get a $250,000 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at 4 percent interest from a lender instead of paying 4.5 to another, you’ll save $26,345 over the life of the loan.
We know it can be difficult to find the right mortgage; the process can be intimidating. Following these steps will help you navigate better:
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2. Decide which type of mortgage is right for you
Before you shop, determine how much you want to borrow, which type of mortgage you want, and how long a term you need so that you can compare lenders’ products.
Most borrowers go with a fixed-rate mortgage, usually for a 30-year term, to spread out the cost of a home purchase over time while making predictable payments each month, says David Reiss, a professor who teaches real-estate finance law at Brooklyn Law School. Those loans make sense especially when rates are low and for buyers who intend to own their house for a long time.
But also consider an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), also called a variable-rate or floating-rate mortgage), Reiss says. It has an interest rate that’s fixed for an introductory period of time, then changes periodically, usually in relation to an index. The introductory rate is often lower than the rate on fixed-rate mortgages. For example, the average 30-year fixed-rate mortgage recently had an annual percentage rate (APR) of 3.5 percent, according to Bankrate.com; the average 5/1 ARM (which adjusts annually after five years) was 2.67 percent.
When the rate adjusts, it can sometimes result in a sizable increase in monthly mortgage payments. “ARMs are appropriate for people who anticipate relocating or paying off the loan before it adjusts,” Reiss says, “or for empty nesters who don’t plan to stay in a home for many years.”
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4. Push for a better deal
After you have found the best offer, try to negotiate even better terms. Ask the lender whether he will waive or reduce any of the fees he is charging or offer you an even lower interest rate (or fewer points). You are unlikely to get fees waived from third parties, like those for a title search, government processing fees, and appraiser fees, Reiss says. “But you may be able to cut the lender’s fees, like its underwriting, document processing, and document preparation costs,” he says.
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Seismic Shift in Lending?
Researchers at the American Enterprise Institute’s International Center on Housing Risk have posted a study that shows a “seismic shift in lending away from large banks to nonbanks.” (1) The key takeaways are
- The dramatic decline in agency market share for large banks continued unabated in February, offset by an equally dramatic increase in the nonbank share.
- Since November 2012, the large bank share has dropped from 61% to 33%, a move of 28 points, including a 1.2 point drop in February, a dramatic decline that has been met point-for-point by a 27 point increase in the nonbank share from 24% to 51%. Large nonbanks and other nonbanks have participated equally in the increase, accounting for 14 points and 13 points respectively.
- Large banks have reduced the riskiness of their agency mortgage originations over the past few years. Nonbanks, in contrast, have shifted toward riskier loans as they have increased their market share.
- Loans originated through the retail channel are less risky than loans originated through the broker and correspondent channels. This is true both for large banks and for nonbanks. But retail channel loans from nonbanks are substantially riskier than such loans from large banks.
- The bottom line is that large banks attempting to regain market share would have to move well out the risk curve. (1)
While these findings are presented as negative developments, it is unclear to me that they are. Market share among big players in the mortgage market does vary dramatically over time. Given the new regulatory environment imposed by Dodd Frank, it is not surprising that the industry would readjust in some ways and that specialized nonbanks might increase market share once the financial crisis subsided. It is also unclear that moving out the risk curve is bad in today’s environment. Today’s lenders are quite conservative compared to the pre-crisis ones and there is good reason to think that lenders could safely loosen their underwriting somewhat. This is not to say, of course, that they should return to the bad old days. Just that there are more creditworthy borrowers out there.
Frannie Conservatorships: What A Long, Strange Trip It’s Been
The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General has posted a White Paper, FHFA’s Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Long and Complicated Journey. This White Paper on conservatorships updates a first one that OIG published in 2012. This one notes that over the past six years,
FHFA has administered two conservatorships of unprecedented scope and simultaneously served as the regulator for these large, complex companies that dominate the secondary mortgage market and the mortgage securitization sector of the U.S. housing finance industry. Congress granted FHFA sweeping conservatorship authority over the Enterprises. For example, as conservator, FHFA can exercise decision-making authority over the Enterprises’ multi-trillion dollar books of business; it can direct the Enterprises to increase the fees they charge to guarantee mortgage-backed securities; it can mandate changes to the Enterprises’ credit underwriting and servicing standards for single-family and multifamily mortgage products; and it can set policy governing the disposition of the Enterprises’ inventory of approximately 121,000 real estate owned properties. (2)
I was particularly interested by the foreward looking statements contained in this White Paper:
Director Watt has repeatedly asserted that conservatorship “cannot and should not be a permanent state” for the Enterprises. Director Watt has indicated that under his stewardship FHFA will continue the conservatorships and build a bridge to a new housing finance system, whenever that system is put into place by Congress. In this phase of the conservatorships, FHFA seeks to place more decision-making in the hands of the Enterprises. (3)
Those who have been hoping that the FHFA will act decisively in the face of Congressional inaction should let that dream go. And given that just about nobody believes (I still hope though) that there will be Congressional reform of Fannie and Freddie during the remainder of the Obama Administration, we must face the reality that we are stuck with the conservatorships and all of the risks that they foster for the foreseeable future. Today’s risks include historically high rates of mortgage delinquencies and exposure to defaults by counterparties like private mortgage insurers. As I have said before, the risks that Fannie and Freddie are nothing to laugh at. Let’s hope that the FHFA is up to managing them until Congress finally acts.
Countercyclical Regulation of Housing Finance
Pat McCoy has posted Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges to SSRN. The abstract reads,
Following the 2008 financial crisis, countercyclical regulation emerged as one of the most promising breakthroughs in years to halting destructive cycles of booms and busts. This new approach to systemic risk posits that financial regulation should clamp down during economic expansions and ease during economic slumps in order to make financial firms more resilient and to prick asset bubbles before they burst. If countercyclical regulation is to succeed, however, then policymakers must confront the institutional and legal challenges to that success. This Article examines five major challenges to robust countercyclical regulation – data gaps, early response systems, regulatory inertia, industry capture, and arbitrage – and discusses a variety of techniques to defuse those challenges.
Readers of this blog will be particularly interested in the section titled “Sectoral Regulatory Tools.” (34 et seq.) This section gives an overview of countercyclical tools that can be employed in the housing finance sector: loan-to value limits; debt-to-income limits; and ability-to-repay rules. McCoy ends this section by noting,
The importance of the ability-to-repay rule and the CFPB’s exclusive role in promulgating that rule has another, very different ramification. It is a mistake to ignore the role of market conduct supervisors such as the CFPB in countercyclical regulation. The centrality of consumer financial protection in ensuring sensible loan underwriting standards – particularly for home mortgages – underscores the vital role that market conduct regulators such as the CFPB will play in the federal government’s efforts to prevent future, catastrophic real estate bubbles. (44)
While this seems like an obvious point to me — sensible consumer protection acts as a brake on financial speculation — many, many academics who study financial regulation disagree. If this article gets some of those academics to reconsider their position, it will make a real contribution to the post-crisis financial literature.
Treasury Gives RMBS a Workout
The Treasury has undertaken a Credit Rating Agency Exercise. According to Michael Stegman, Treasury
recognized that the PLS market has been dormant since the financial crisis partly because of a “chicken-and-egg” phenomenon between rating agencies and originator-aggregators. Rating agencies will not rate mortgage pools without loan-level data, yet originator-aggregators will not originate pools of mortgage bonds without an idea of what it would take for the bond to receive a AAA rating.
Using our convening authority, Treasury invited six credit rating agencies to participate in an exercise over the last several months intended to provide market participants with greater transparency into their credit rating methodologies for residential mortgage loans.
By increasing clarity around loss expectations and required subordination levels for more diverse pools of collateral, the credit rating agencies can stimulate a constructive market dialogue around post-crisis underwriting and securitization practices and foster greater confidence in the credit rating process for private label mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The information obtained through this exercise may also give mortgage originators and aggregators greater insight into the potential economics of financing mortgage loans in the private label channel and the consequent implications for borrowing costs.
While this exercise is very technical, it contains some interesting nuggets for a broad range of readers. For instance,
The housing market, regulatory environment, and loan performance have evolved significantly from pre-crisis to present day. Credit rating agency models appear to account for these changes in varying ways. All credit rating agency models incorporate the performance of loans originated prior to, during, and after the crisis to the degree they believe best informs the nature of credit and prepayment risk reflected in the market. Credit rating agency model stress scenarios may be influenced by loans originated at the peak of the housing market, given the macroeconomic stress and home price declines they experienced. The credit rating agencies differ, however, in how their models adjust for the post-crisis regime of improved underwriting practices and operational controls. Some credit rating agencies capture these changes directly in their models, while other credit rating agencies rely on qualitative adjustments outside of their models. (10)
It is important for non-specialists to realize how much subjectivity can be built into rating agency models. Every model will make inferences based on past performance. The exercise highlights how different rating agencies address post-crisis loan performance in significantly different ways. Time will tell which ones got it right.
