Author Archives: David Reiss

Saving on Home Insurance (en Español y Ingles)

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Woman with alarm system

Univision quoted me in 5 Ways to Save on Your Home Insurance (the article is in Spanish). It opens,

The cost of homeowners insurance can vary by hundreds of dollars depending on various factors. If you are looking to obtain a discount keep in mind these five tips when you purchase a policy.

1. Increase your deductible. Even though it is common for homeowners to have a deductible of $500 in their insurance policy, raising it to $1,000 could represent a significant reduction in the premium, says David Reiss, Professor of Law at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School.

Extra tip:  You should have an emergency fund to cover any additional expenses which may be incurred. Use this fund instead of putting in a claim to your insurance, since this can increase your rate.

Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership

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Mesa-Mesa Journal-Tribune FHA Demonstration Home-1925" by Marine 69-71

I have posted Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration and the Low Down Payment Loan to SSRN (and to BePress). It is forthcoming in the Georgia Law Review. The abstract reads,

The United States Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) has been a versatile tool of government since it was created during the Great Depression. The FHA was created in large part to inject liquidity into a moribund mortgage market. It succeeded wonderfully, with rapid growth during the late 1930s. The federal government repositioned it a number of times over the following decades to achieve a variety of additional social goals. These goals included supporting civilian mobilization during World War II; helping veterans returning from the War; stabilizing urban housing markets during the 1960s; and expanding minority homeownership rates during the 1990s. It achieved success with some of its goals and had a terrible record with others. More recently, the FHA is in the worst financial shape it has ever been in.

Today’s FHA suffers from many of the same unrealistic underwriting assumptions that have done in so many other lenders during the 2000s. It has also been harmed, like other lenders, by a housing market as bad as any seen since the Great Depression. As a result, the federal government recently announced the first bailout of the FHA in its history. At the same time that it has faced these financial challenges, the FHA has also come under attack for the poor execution of some of its policies to expand homeownership. Leading commentators have called for the federal government to stop using the FHA to do anything other than provide liquidity to the low end of the mortgage market. These critics rely on a couple of examples of programs that were clearly failures but they do not address the FHA’s long history of undertaking comparable initiatives. This article takes the long view and demonstrates that the FHA has a history of successfully undertaking new homeownership programs. At the same time, the article identifies flaws in the FHA model that should be addressed in order to prevent them from occurring if the FHA were to undertake similar initiatives in the future.

In order to demonstrate this, the article first sets forth the dominant critique of the FHA. Relying on often overlooked primary sources, it then sets forth a history of the FHA and charts its constantly changing roles in the housing finance sector. In order to give a more detailed picture of the federal government’s role in housing finance, the article also incorporates the scholarly literature regarding (i) the intersection of race and housing policy and (ii) the economics and finance literature regarding the role that down payments play in the appropriate underwriting of mortgages for low- and moderate-income households. The article concludes that the FHA can responsibly address objectives other than the provision of liquidity to the residential mortgage market. It further proposes that FHA homeownership programs for low- and moderate-income families should be required to balance access to credit with households’ ability to make their mortgage payments over the long term. Such a proposal will ensure that the FHA extends credit responsibly to low- and moderate-income households while minimizing the likelihood of future bailouts.

Shaking up the Title Industry

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Deeds

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit issued an opinion in Edwards v. The First American Corporation et al., No. 13-555542 (Aug. 24, 2015) that may shake up how the title insurance industry works. As the court notes,

The national title insurance industry is highly concentrated, with most states dominated by two or three large title insurance companies. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Title Insurance: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of the Title Industry and Better Protect Consumers 3 (Apr. 2007). A “factor that raises questions about the existence of price competition is that title agents market to those from whom they get consumer referrals, and not to consumers themselves, creating potential conflicts of interest where the referrals could be made in the best interest of the referrer and not the consumer.” Id. Kickbacks paid by the title insurance companies to those making referrals lead to higher costs of real estate settlement services, which are passed on to consumers without any corresponding benefits. (9)

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) is intended to eliminate illegal kickbacks in the real estate industry. In this case, the 9th Circuit has reversed the District Court’s denial of class certification in a case in which home buyers alleged that First American engaged in a scheme of paying title agencies for referring title insurance business to First American in violation of RESPA. The reversal does not get to the merits of the underlying claims, but it does open up a can of worms for title companies.

The title industry is not only highly concentrated but it is also highly profitable. In some jurisdictions like NY its prices are set by regulation at rates that greatly exceed the actuarial risks they face. Regulators like the NYS Department of Financial Services have begun to pay more attention to the title insurance industry. This is a welcome development, given that title insurance is one of the most expensive closing costs a homeowner faces when buying a home or refinancing a mortgage.

Principal-ed Reduction

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Torn Dollar

 

The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has issued a report, Principal Reduction and the GSEs: The Moment for a Big Impact Has Passed. It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) prohibits Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) from unilaterally reducing the principal balance of loans that they guarantee, known as principal reduction. When director Ed DeMarco established the prohibition, he was concerned that reducing principal would cost the GSEs too much, not only in setting up the systems required to implement it, but also— and to him more important — in encouraging borrowers to default in order to receive the benefit. DeMarco’s position generated significant controversy, as advocates viewed principal reduction as a critical tool for reducing borrower distress and pointed out that the program the Obama administration had put forward to provide the relief had largely eliminated the cost to the GSEs, including the moral hazard. We believe that at the time the advocates had the better side of the argument.

The FHFA is now revisiting that prohibition, though in a very different economic environment than the one faced by Director DeMarco. Home prices are up 35.4 percent since the trough in 2011, adding $5 trillion in home equity and reducing the number of underwater homeowners from a peak of 25 percent to 10 percent. This means that far fewer borrowers would likely benefit under a GSE principal reduction program today. (1, footnote omitted)

Principal reduction was highly disfavored at the start of the financial crisis as it was perceived as a sort of giveaway to irresponsible borrowers. Some academics have disputed this characterization, but it probably remains a political reality.

In any event, I think this report has the analysis of the current situation right — the time for principal reduction has passed. But it is worth considering the conditions under which it might be appropriate in the future (for that next crisis, or the one after that). The authors make four  assumptions for a politically feasible principal reduction program:

  1. borrowers must be delinquent at the time the program is announced, in order to avoid the moral hazard of encouraging borrowers to default;
  2. borrowers must be underwater;
  3. the house must be owner-occupied; and
  4. the principal reduction is in the economic interest of Fannie and Freddie.

It is worth noting that during the Great Depression, the federal government figured out ways to reduce the burden of rapidly dropping house prices on lenders and borrowers alike without resorting to principal reduction much. Borrowers benefited from longer repayment terms and lower interest rates. Below-market interest rates are similar to principal reduction because they also reduce monthly costs for borrowers. They are also politically more feasible. It would be great to have a Plan B stored away at the FHFA, the FHA and the VA that outlines a systematic response to a nation-wide drop in housing prices. It could involve principal reduction but it does not need to.

Bank Settlements and the Arc of Justice

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Ron Cogswell

MLK Memorial in DC

Martin Luther King, Jr. said that the “arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.” A recent report by SNL Financial (available here, but requires a lot of sign-up info) offers us a chance to evaluate that claim in the context of the financial crisis.

SNL reports that the six largest bank holding companies have paid over $132 billion to settle credit crisis and mortgage-related lawsuits brought by governments, investors and other financial institutions.

In the context of the litigation over the Fannie and Freddie conservatorships, I had considered whether it is efficient to respond to financial crises by allowing the government to do what it needs to do during the crisis and then “use litigation to make an accounting to all of the stakeholders once the situation has stabilized.” (121)

Given that the biggest bank settlements are now in the rear view window, we can now say that the accounting for the financial crisis comes in at around $132 billion give or take. Does that number do justice for the wrongs of the boom times?  I don’t think I have my own answer to that question yet, but it is certainly worth considering.

On the one hand, we should acknowledge that it is a humongous number, a number so big that that no one would have considered it a likely one at the beginning of the financial crisis. This crisis made nine and ten digit settlement numbers a routine event.

On the other hand, wrongdoing (along with good old-fashioned boom mentality) during the financial crisis almost sent the global economy into a depression.  It also wreaked havoc on so many individuals, directly and indirectly.

I look forward to seeing metrics that can make sense of this (ratio of settlement amounts to annual profits of Wall Street firms; ratio to bonus pools; ratio to home equity lost), but I will say that I am struck by the lack of individual accountability that has come out of all of this litigation.

Individuals who made six, seven and eight figure paychecks from this wrongdoing were able to move on relatively unscathed.  We should think about how to avoid that result the next time around. Otherwise the arc of justice will bend in the wrong direction.

 

Debt Collection in Flux

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Until Debt Tear Us Apart

Bloomberg BNA Banking Daily quoted me in Loans in Flux as Appeals Court Rebuffs Midland Funding (behind a paywall). It opens,

Lenders, investors and others are watching to see whether the U.S. Supreme Court is the next stop for a case raising questions about how a host of loans are collected, purchased, structured, and priced (Madden v. Midland Funding LLC, 2015 BL 162010, 2d Cir., No. 14-cv-02131, 5/22/15).

At issue is a May ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that said a debt collector cannot claim protection from state-law claims under the National Bank Act for loans acquired from a national bank (100 BBD, 5/26/15).

The ruling, which jolted banking lawyers who say the decision upsets expectations that assignees may charge and collect interest at rates that were valid at origination, hit with renewed force Aug. 12, when the Second Circuit turned away a petition to rehear the case (156 BBD, 8/13/15).

New questions about the impact of the case arise almost daily, but for many the main question is whether the debt collector, Midland Credit Management, will take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Many expect the company to seek review by the justices. Midland has until early November to do so.

Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss isn’t making a prediction, but ticked off a list of factors that might make the difference, including a possible circuit split, questions raised by the case that have “serious doctrinal consequences” for the National Bank Act and other federal statutes, and the potential for friend-of-the-court briefs by the banking industry to grab the justices’ attention.

“While it is a fool’s game to predict confidently which cases will be picked up by the Supreme Court, this case has a bunch of characteristics that make it a contender,” Reiss said Aug. 17.

Smoldering FIRREA

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Jens Buurgaard Nielsen

American Banker quoted me in Banks Take Losses in MBS Case Appeals; Is Supreme Court Next? (behind a paywall) The story reads, in part,

Banks that sold faulty mortgage-backed securities right before the crisis have suffered a string of legal defeats over the timing of government lawsuits, but some experts believe the industry may still have a shot in the Supreme Court.

Since the crisis regulators have brought a slew of actions against big banks for assets they sold to acquirers that ultimately failed. But in some cases, the parties have tussled over whether the government missed the statutory deadline for bringing a claim.

Appeals courts lately have disagreed with banks that plaintiffs missed court filing deadlines imposed by state law and other regimes, which are stricter than deadlines in federal law. Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit ruled in favor of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in the agency’s case against RBS Securities and other issuers related to the 2009 failure of Guaranty Bank.

Still, other cases are pending and some say banks may be emboldened after the Supreme Court last year favored state-mandated timelines in an environmental case.

“I would expect that [banks] would continue to try to pursue the issue and get relief from the Supreme Court,” said Paul Rugani, a partner at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP based in Seattle.

The government has sought billions from MBS issuers that officials say misrepresented the quality of securities leading up to the crisis. The FDIC and National Credit Union Administration sued companies that had sold assets to institutions that ultimately failed, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency brought claims over securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

But many banks have fought the agencies over whether they could bring the suits in the first place. Defendants seemed to gain ground in the lower courts and when the Supreme Court handed down its decision last year in a North Carolina environmental case.

*     *     *

“The Supreme Court generally does not take a case where there isn’t a split among different circuit appeals courts, and the 5th and 10th circuits are in agreement,” said an attorney familiar with the situation.

But other decisions are still pending. Rulings have yet to come from the 9th circuit as well as a separate case still to be decided in the 2nd circuit. Both involve the FDIC’s extender statute related to MBS losses at the failed Colonial Bank.

“I would think that the parties that lost the case would wait for the 2nd and 9th circuits to decide and then hope that either of them disagrees with the 5th circuit before deciding to take the case up to the Supreme Court,” said Sanford “Sandy” Brown, a partner at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP.

Others said the extender statute in the law at issue in the Supreme Court’s environmental decision – the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act – is different enough from the extender statute in FIRREA that the justices on the high court may want to weigh in.

The 5th circuit decision “is a well-reasoned opinion, but there is no question that such an interpretation could be challenged in an appeal to the Supreme Court,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School. “While circuit courts have had a consistent interpretation of the FIRREA extender statute, there is enough interpretation going on that the Supreme Court could come up with a reasonable alternative to the courts of appeal that have ruled on this issue.”