Author Archives: David Reiss

Micro-Units for Millennials

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Construction Dive quoted me in An Emerging Megatrend? Developers Experiment with Microunits to Target Millennial Market. It opens,

As U.S. home prices and rents continue to soar, some developers are taking aim at a new target market — those willing to sacrifice square footage to be able to live near their work and area nightlife at a more budget-friendly price.

These microhousing units, also known as microapartments and microcondos, have most of the amenities of their full-size counterparts but typically range from around 350 square feet to 550 square feet, with some buildings offering up units at a relatively roomy 1,000 square feet. Many also come outfitted with furnishings specifically designed for the unit — folding beds, hidden storage and convertible pieces that do double duty, such as a dining table that also functions as a work desk.

However, the growing concept is seeing mixed results in the U.S. Is microhousing just a passing fad as younger renters look for an affordable stepping stone to a larger space, or does it represent a shift in what some Americans are looking for in a home?

The Draw of Smaller Spaces

Jam-packed cities like Tokyo are prime markets for these tiny units because the cost of land is at a premium, according to David Reiss, professor of law and academic program director at the Center for Urban Entrepreneurship at the Brooklyn Law School. Microunits are particularly appealing to single, young professionals who spend a lot of time working and hanging out with friends rather than entertaining in their own homes, he said.

The primary draw, however, is “location, location, location,” Reiss said. “When young adults are choosing between a small space in the center city or a larger space further afield, there will always be some who opt for the former.”

This hasn’t always been the case, according to architect David Senden, partner at international design firm KTGY. Americans used to put a premium on living space, but there’s been a “shift on the priority list,” and “location and has jumped to the absolute top,” he said. There’s also a growing desire for shorter commuting times.

However, whether the overall demand for microhousing is on the uptick is debatable. Some developers see microunits as the solution that will provide millennials with the opportunity to live in vibrant urban settings, as well as offer baby boomers or those looking to downsize a minimalist living space without having to give up the modern conveniences they’ve come to expect.

When Microhousing Is a Viable Concept

Reiss said population density  and high prices need to be components of any successful micro project . When prices, in both rent and homes, “outpace middle-class income,” as they have done in cities like San Francisco and New York City, then some people will give up square footage in order to stay close to their friends or jobs. “The microunit might present a very attractive trade-off of space and cost for that demographic,” he said. Reiss added that New York City is even amending its zoning laws to allow for more micro developments.

Loan Mod Racketeering?

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James Cagney in "Public Enemy"

James Cagney and Mae Clarke in “Public Enemy”

Bloomberg BNA Banking quoted me in BofA Must Face RICO Claims on Loan Modifications (behind paywall). It opens,

Bank of America must face claims that it and another company violated federal anti-racketeering laws by denying loan modifications to eligible borrowers, a federal appeals court said Aug. 15 ( George v. Urban Settlement Svcs., 10th Cir., No. 14-cv-01427, 8/15/16 ).

The ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reinstates purported class claims by Richard George and other borrowers that Bank of America and Urban Settlement Services (“Urban”), a settlement company, feigned compliance with guidelines under the Home Affordable Modification program (HAMP) while modifying as few loans as possible.

A district court dismissed the claims, saying the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), but the Tenth Circuit reversed, saying they made a “facially plausible” claim.

The ruling sends the case back to the district court to consider that and other allegations.

Case Moves Forward

The decision is the latest in connection with HAMP, a 2009 Treasury Department effort aimed at stabilizing the housing market that was closely related to disbursement of government funds to banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bank of America received $45 billion in TARP funds.

The plaintiffs are represented by Steve Berman, Ari Y. Brown, Kevin K. Green, and Tyler S. Weaver in the Seattle and San Diego offices of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro.

“We are more than pleased the court has ruled our complaint has sufficiently alleged that Bank of America’s massive HAMP mortgage-modification program was in fact a RICO enterprise,” Berman, the firm’s managing partner, said in an Aug. 15 statement. “For years, we have tirelessly fought this major Wall Street kingpin to right the wrongs it committed against hundreds of thousands of homeowners and taxpayers who footed the $45 billion government bailout BoA took in, only to have it used to propagate a scheme to squeeze every dollar from BoA customers and wrongfully foreclose thousands of homes in the process.”

Bank of America spokesman Rick Simon said the bank denies the claims, which he said paint a false picture of the bank’s practices and its employees.

“In fact, Bank of America has been an industry leader in HAMP and other beneficial mortgage modifications,” Simon told Bloomberg BNA in an Aug. 15 e-mail. “We are reviewing the Circuit court’s decision and considering our options.”

The lawsuit, which involved loans originally held by Countrywide Home Loans, said Bank of America and Urban were part of a fraudulent scheme to keep borrowers from acquiring permanent HAMP loan modifications, allegedly because defaulted loans were more profitable.

They said Urban functioned as a “black hole” for HAMP-related documents submitted by borrowers, ensuring that trial modifications would not be made permanent.

Tenth Circuit Reverses

In its September 2014 ruling, the district court said the plaintiffs failed to allege, as required by RICO, that Bank of America was distinct from the alleged racketeering enterprise.

The Tenth Circuit reversed in a decision by Judge Nancy Moritz, who wrote for a three-judge panel. The plaintiffs, she said, “don’t contend that either a parent corporation or its subsidiary corporation is the enterprise. Rather, they assert that BOA and Urban—two separate legal entities— joined together, along with several other entities, to form and conduct the affairs of the BOA-Urban association-in-fact enterprise.”

According to the plaintiffs, she said, Bank of America and Urban “performed distinct roles within the enterprise while acting in concert with other entities to further the enterprise’s common goal of wrongfully denying HAMP applications.”

That is enough to “plausibly allege” that Bank of America meets the “enterprise” requirement, she said.

Crisis Cases Continue

Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss said the decision shows that financial crisis-era litigation is not over. “This case is an example of litigation that arises from the supposed fixes for the crisis—fixes that were often implemented poorly, as can be seen from a variety of cases and regulatory actions,” Reiss told Bloomberg BNA in an Aug. 15 e-mail.

The lawsuit alleged in part that documents submitted by borrowers were intentionally “scattered” across various computer databases and systems, allegedly with the goal of creating the appearance that borrowers had not completed the paperwork required to convert their trial plans into permanent modifications.

Reiss called it significant that the court accepted, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ theory that the alleged “black hole” treatment of documents could rise to the level of a RICO violation.

“While courts have held against defendants in individual cases with similar facts, the possibility that they could hold against lenders and servicers in a class action raises the stakes quite a bit for defendants,” Reiss said.

No Mortgages for New Moms

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photo by tipstimes.com/pregnancy

Realtor.com quoted me in Mom on Maternity Leave Denied a Mortgage: Could It Happen to You? It opens,

Hopeful home buyers can be denied loans for all kinds of reasons, from a poor credit score to low income. It sucks, but it makes sense: Lenders prefer giving cash to people who can pay them back. (Can you blame them?) Yet, sometimes people are turned away for dumb reasons. Take, for instance, the recent case of a Philadelphia mom who was denied a mortgage because she was on maternity leave. It was even paid maternity leave, with a firm date to return to her job. What’s up with that?

According to the Washington Post, the mom in question (who remains anonymous) had applied for financing with her husband to fund renovations on a house in Philadelphia. But due to her maternity leave, her pay stubs showed she was on “short-term disability,” which prompted the loan’s underwriter to surmise she might not resume working full time—even though her employer was happy to submit a letter indicating the day she’d return to the office.

And this mom is hardly alone: Over the past six years, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has documented over 200 cases alleging maternity-related discrimination against women seeking mortgages. In one case, a lender in Arkansas allegedly told the applicant that she’d have to be back at work before her loan could close!

And this is a shame, because housing discrimination—based on gender, familial status, disability, race, and other factors—has been illegal since the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Yet apparently it still exists even at prominent mortgage companies, as evidenced by the cases against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, PNC Mortgage, and others.

As for why this happens, experts surmise it’s because some lenders have outdated notions of women in the workplace, presuming most will bail or scale back on their jobs once kids enter the picture, permanently reducing the family’s income and eligibility for a loan. But it’s hardly the norm: Census data suggest that more than half of first-time mothers return to work within three months. Another study by the Department of Health and Human Services’ Maternal and Child Health Bureau found that the average maternity leave lasted a mere 10 weeks.

Bottom line: These days, many moms return to the office—yet some mortgage companies have missed that memo. But luckily, some moms are fighting back—like the Philadelphia woman above, who has recently reached a “conciliation agreement” with the lender, Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania. Although the company denied discriminating against her, it also agreed to conduct fair lending training sessions with staff.

And more should follow, Shanna Smith, president and chief executive of the National Fair Housing Alliance, told the Post: “There needs to be much better training for [lenders] about how to deal with interrupted income for loan closings when a woman is pregnant and [on] paid maternity leave.

All of which may have women everywhere wondering: If they hope to buy a home, might maternity leave get in their way? And if so, what should they do? Probably the first step is just knowing that it’s wrong: Maternity leave—paid or unpaid—is not a legitimate reason to refuse a loan.

“It always helps when you know your rights,” says David Reiss, research director at the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. “If your lender appears to be violating fair lending laws, you may want to raise the issue directly with your banker and ask to speak to the supervisor to ask the bank to clarify its policy. If your lender continues to enforce a discriminatory policy, you can reach out to the relevant regulators, including HUD and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.”

Homeownership in NYC

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photo by Nathan Hart

Brooklyn’s Charles Millard Pratt House

NYU’s Furman Center and Citi have released their joint Report on Homeownership & Opportunity in New York City. It opens,

In New York City, the notoriously high costs of rental housing are well documented. But becoming a homeowner in the New York City real estate market is also a considerable challenge for low- to middle-income households. Households earning less than $114,000 face a severely constrained supply of homeownership opportunities in New York City.

This report seeks to shed light on the extreme variation in homeownership rates among New Yorkers and quantify the homeownership options that exist at different income levels. We do this by analyzing 2014 home sales prices and examining the potential purchasing power of households at various income levels in New York City, as well as in the nearby counties of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester.

We use five income categories for this analysis—Low-Income, Moderate-Income, Middle-Income, NYC-Middle-Income, and High-Income. These income bands are based on percentages of Area Median Family Income (AMFI) for the New York City metropolitan statistical area established by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and are based on data from the 2006-2010 American Community Survey. This report includes an additional middle-income band (NYC-Middle-Income), given that affordable housing programs in New York City serve households up to 165 percent of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) area median income (AMI). (3)

You’re all wondering, of course, what NYC-Middle Income is, so the report provides the following explanation of the income categories:

“Low-Income” households have an annual income of $34,000 or less, or 50 percent of AMFI;

“Moderate-Income” households have an annual income between $34,001-$55,000, or 50 percent to less than 80 percent of AMFI;

“Middle-Income” households have an annual income of $55,001-$83,000, or 80 percent to less than 120 percent of AMFI;

“NYC-Middle-Income” households have an annual income of $83,001-$114,000, or 120 percent to less than 165 of AMFI; and

“High-Income” households have an annual income above $114,001, or 165 percent of AMFI or greater. (3, emphasis added)

The report finds that

the purchasing power of most New York City households is limited, largely due to growing housing prices and stagnating incomes since 1990. In addition, while New York City had a relatively low share of homeowners compared to the U.S. in 2014, it was disproportionately low for Low-Income and Moderate-Income households relative to their U.S. counterparts.

The vast majority of home sales in New York City in 2014 were at prices unaffordable to Low-Income and Moderate-Income households, which comprised 51 percent of New York City households. Of the nine percent of sales in the city affordable to these households, three percent were affordable to Low-Income households and an additional six percent were affordable to Moderate-Income households. Home sales with prices that were affordable to Low-Income and Moderate-Income households in 2014 were, for the most part, concentrated outside of Manhattan.

Prospects for homeownership were not much better for Middle-Income households. In 2014, Middle-Income households, which comprise 15 percent of New York City households, could afford an additional 13 percent of sales (based on a total purchase price of up to $364,000), leaving 78 percent of sales out of reach for households with incomes of less than $83,000 annually. Less than half of sales in 2014 (42%) were affordable to 77 percent of New York households, including those characterized as NYC-Middle-Income.

Moving outside of New York City does not necessarily improve a New York City household’s potential to buy a home. In Westchester County, only two percent of sales were affordable to New York City Low-Income and Moderate-Income homebuyers combined in 2014. In Nassau County, only 24 percent of sales were affordable to New York City Low-Income, Moderate-Income, and Middle-Income homebuyers in 2014. In Suffolk County, 42 percent of sales were affordable to New York City Low-Income, Moderate-Income, and Middle-Income households. (4)

New Yorkers, and a lot of non-New Yorkers, are going to eat up the graphs in this report (what IS the median sales price in Brooklyn?!?), so it is worth a read for the real estate obsessed (yes, you). But it also has policy implications about the housing stock of the City and the surrounding region. The report itself does not make any policy recommendations, but it offers a stark reminder of how important rental housing policy is to any effort to maintain socio-economic diversity in the City.

 

Fannie & Freddie G-Fee Equilibrium

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Division of Housing Mission & Goals has issued its report on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single-Family Guarantee Fees in 2015. Guarantee fees (also known as g-fees) are another one of those incredibly technical subjects that actually have a major impact on the housing market. The g-fee is baked into the cost of the mortgage, so the higher the g-fee, the higher the mortgage’s Annual Percentage Rate. Consumer groups and housing trade associations have called upon the FHFA to lower the g-fee to make mortgage credit even cheaper that it is now. This report gives reason to think that the FHFA won’t do that.

The report provides some background on guarantee fees, for the uninitiated:

Guarantee fees are intended to cover the credit risk and other costs that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incur when they acquire single-family loans from lenders. Loans are acquired through two methods. A lender may exchange a group of loans for a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac guaranteed mortgage-backed security (MBS), which may then be sold by the lender into the secondary market to recoup funds to make more loans to borrowers. Alternatively, a lender may deliver loans to an Enterprise in return for a cash payment. Larger lenders tend to exchange loans for MBS, while smaller lenders tend to sell loans for cash and these loans are later bundled by the Enterprises into MBS.

While the private holders of MBS assume market risk (the risk that the price of the security may fall due to changes in interest rates), the Enterprises assume the credit risk on the loans. The Enterprises charge a guarantee fee in exchange for providing this guarantee, which covers administrative costs, projected credit losses from borrower defaults over the life of the loans, and the cost of holding capital to protect against projected credit losses that could occur during stressful macroeconomic conditions. Investors are willing to pay a higher price for Enterprise MBS due to their guarantee of principal and interest. The higher value of the MBS leads to lower interest rates for borrowers.

There are two types of guarantee fees: ongoing and upfront. Ongoing fees are collected each month over the life of a loan. Upfront fees are one-time payments made by lenders upon loan delivery to an Enterprise. Fannie Mae refers to upfront fees as “loan level pricing adjustments,” while Freddie Mac refers to them as “delivery fees.” Both ongoing and upfront fees compensate the Enterprises for the costs of providing the guarantee. Ongoing fees are based primarily on the product type, such as a 30-year fixed rate or a 15-year fixed rate loan. Upfront fees are used to price for specific risk attributes such as the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and credit score.

Ongoing fees are set by the Enterprises with lenders that exchange loans for MBS, while those fees are embedded in the price offered to lenders that sell loans for cash. In contrast to ongoing fees, the upfront fees are publicly posted on each Enterprise’s website. Upfront fees are paid by the lender at the time of loan delivery to an Enterprise, and those charges are typically rolled into a borrower’s interest rate in the same manner as ongoing fees.

Under the existing protocols of the Enterprises’ conservatorships, FHFA requires that each Enterprise seek FHFA approval for any proposed change in upfront fees. The upfront fees assessed by the two Enterprises generally are in alignment. (2-3)

The report finds that “The average single-family guarantee fee increased by two basis points in 2015 to 59 basis points. This stability is consistent with FHFA’s April 2015 determination that the fees adequately reflected the credit risk of new acquisitions after years of sharp fee increases. During the five year period from 2011 to 2015, fees had more than doubled from 26 basis points to 59 basis points.” (1)

At bottom, your position on the right g-fee level reflects your views about the appropriate role of the government in the housing finance market. If you favor lowering the g-fee, you want to further subsidize homeownership  through cheaper mortgage credit, but you risk a taxpayer bailout.

If you favor raising it, you want to to reduce the government’s footprint in the housing finance market, but you risk rationing credit to those who could use it responsibly.

From this report, it looks like today’s FHFA thinks that it has the balance between those two views in some kind of equilibrium.

The Future of Mortgage Default

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photo by Diane BassfordThe Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has shared its Principles for the Future of Loss Mitigation. It opens,

This document outlines four principles, Accessibility, Affordability, Sustainability, and Transparency, that provide a framework for discussion about the future of loss mitigation as the nation moves beyond the housing and economic crisis that began in 2007. As the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is phased out, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is considering the lessons learned from HAMP while looking forward to the continuing loss mitigation needs of consumers in a post-HAMP world. These principles build on, but are distinct from, the backdrop of the Bureau’s mortgage servicing rules and its supervisory and enforcement authority. This document does not establish binding legal requirements. These principles are intended to complement ongoing discussions among industry, consumer groups and policymakers on the development of loss mitigation programs that span the full spectrum of both home retention options such as forbearance, repayment plans and modifications, and home disposition options such as short sales and deeds-in-lieu.

The future environment of mortgage default is expected to look very different than it did during the crisis. Underwriting based on the ability to repay rule is already resulting in fewer defaults. Mortgage investors have recognized the value of resolving delinquencies early when defaults do occur. Mortgage servicers have developed systems and processes for working with borrowers in default. The CFPB’s mortgage servicing rules have established clear guardrails for early intervention, dual tracking, and customer communication; however, they do not require loss mitigation options beyond those offered by the investor nor do they define every element of loss mitigation execution.

Yet, even with an improved horizon and regulatory guardrails, there is ample opportunity for consumer harm if loss mitigation programs evolve without incorporating key learnings from the crisis. While there is broad agreement within the industry on the high level principles, determining how they translate into programs is more nuanced. Further development of these principles and their implementation is necessary to prevent less desirable consumer outcomes and to ensure the continuance of appropriate consumer protections.

The CFPB concludes,

The CFPB believes these principles are flexible enough to encompass a range of approaches to loss mitigation, recognizing the legitimate interests of consumers, investors and servicers. One of the lessons of HAMP is that loss mitigation that is good for consumers is usually good for investors, as well. The CFPB therefore seeks to engage all stakeholders in a discussion of the principles for future loss mitigation.

I have no beef with this set of principles as far as it goes, but I am concerned that it does not explicitly include a discussion of the role of state court foreclosures in loss mitigation. As this blog has well documented, homeowners are facing Kafkaesque, outrageous, even hellish, behavior by servicers in state foreclosure actions. Even if the federal government cannot address state law issues directly, these issues should be included as part of the discussion of the problems that homeowners face when their mortgages go into default.