“Modernizing” the Community Reinvestment Act

President Carter signs the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, which contains the Community Reinvestment Act

The Trump Administration has been signaling its intent to do a makeover of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) for quite a while, describing it as a much needed update.  Last June, Treasury stated in its Banks and Credit Unions report (one of a series of reports on A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities which I discuss here),

The CRA statute is in need of modernization, regulatory oversight must be harmonized, and greater clarity in remediating deficiencies is called for. It is very important to better align the benefits arising from banks’ CRA investments with the interest and needs of the communities that they serve and to improve the current supervisory and regulatory framework for CRA. . . . Aligning the regulatory oversight of CRA activities with a heightened focus on community investments is a high priority for the Secretary. (9)

Well, the modernization effort has now taken off with a Treasury Memorandum for The Office of The Comptroller of the Currency, The Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. By way of background, the memorandum notes that

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 was enacted to encourage banks to meet the credit and deposit needs of communities that they serve, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities, consistent with safe and sound operations. Banks are periodically assigned a CRA rating by one of the primary regulators – the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), collectively the CRA regulators – based on the bank’s performance under the appropriate CRA tests or approved Strategic Plan. CRA was enacted in response to concerns about disinvestment and redlining as well as a desire to have financial institutions “play the leading role” in providing the “capital required for local housing and economic development needs.”

The U.S. banking industry has experienced substantial organizational and technological changes; however, the regulatory and performance expectations under CRA have not kept pace. Interstate banking, mortgage securitization, and internet and mobile banking are just a few of the major changes that have come about in the past four decades. In this evolving banking environment, changes should be made to the administration of CRA in order for it to achieve its intended purpose. (1, footnotes omitted)

The bank that Treasury Secretary Mnuchin used to head up, OneWest, had its own run-ins with CRA compliance. As a result, we should look carefully at how Treasury seeks to “modernize” the CRA. The Treasury memo has four recommendations:

  • Assessment Areas. The concept of assessment areas originated within the banking environment that existed in 1977, when there was no interstate banking and deposits almost always came from the community surrounding a branch. Treasury offers recommendations for updating the definitions of geographic assessment areas to reflect the changing nature of banking arising from changing technology, customer behavior, and other factors.
  • Examination Clarity and Flexibility. Both banks and communities would benefit from additional flexibility in the CRA performance evaluation process, including increasing clarity in the examination guidance. Treasury recommends improvements that could be made to CRA performance evaluation criteria that would increase the transparency and effectiveness of CRA rating determinations.
  • Examination Process. Certain aspects of the examination process need to be addressed in order to improve the timeliness of performance evaluations and to allow banks to be more accountable in planning their CRA activity. Treasury recommends improvements that could be made with respect to the timing of CRA examinations and issuance of performance evaluations, and to the consistent use of census data throughout an assessment period.
  • Performance. The purpose of CRA is to encourage banks to meet the credit and deposit needs of their entire community. The law does not have explicit penalties for nonperformance. However, performance is incentivized as regulators must consider CRA ratings as a part of various bank application processes and performance evaluation reports are made available to the public. Treasury offers recommendations as to how the current regulatory approach to downgrades for violations of consumer protection laws and various applications from banks with less than a Satisfactory rating could be improved to incentivize CRA performance. (2, footnotes omitted)

While there is lot to chew on here, I think a key issue will be the scope of the Assessment Areas. As banks move from straight ‘bricks and mortar’ to ‘bricks and clicks’ or even to pure clicks, it is harder to identify the community each bank serves.

While the memo does not offer a new definition for Assessment Areas, one could imagine alternative definitions that are either loose or stringent as far as CRA compliance is concerned. Because the CRA was intended to ensure that low and moderate-income communities had access to mortgage credit after years of redlining, any new definition of Assessment Areas should be designed to support that goal. We’ll have to see how the Trump Administration proceeds in this regard, but given its attitudes toward fair housing enforcement, I am not hopeful that the Administration will take the CRA’s goals seriously.

Violations of Law and Consumer Harm

ffiec_logo (1)

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (CC Rating System). My comment letter reads as follows:

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (CC Rating System). The FFIEC is seeking to revise the CC Rating System “to reflect the regulatory, examination (supervisory), technological, and market changes that have occurred in the years since the current rating system was established.”  81 F.R. 26553.  It is a positive development that the federal government is seeking to implement a consistent approach to consumer protection across a broad swath of the financial services industry.  Nonetheless, the proposed CC Ratings System can be refined to further improve consumer protection in the financial services industry.

One of the CC Rating System’s categories is Violations of Law and Consumer Harm.  The request for comment notes that over the last few decades, the financial services industry has become more complex, and the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm has become increasingly clear.  Violations of various laws – including the Fair Housing Act and other fair lending laws, for example – may cause significant consumer harm that should raise supervisory concerns.  Recognizing this broad array of risks, the proposed revisions directs examiners to consider all violations of consumer laws based on the root cause, severity, duration, and pervasiveness.  This approach emphasizes the importance of various consumer protection laws, and is intended to reflect the broader array of risks and potential harm caused by consumer protection violations.  81 F.R. 26556.

This is all to the good.  Prior to the Subprime Crisis, a big part of the problem was that financial services companies used regulatory arbitrage to avoid scrutiny.  Lots of mortgage lending migrated to nonbanks that did not need to worry about unwanted attention from the regulators that scrutinized banks and other heavily regulated mortgage lenders.  (To be clear, Alan Greenspan and other federal regulators did not do a good job of scrutinizing the banks. But let’s leave that for another day.)  With the CFPB now regulating many nonbanks and with an updated CC Rating System in place, we should expect that regulatory arbitrage will decrease in the face of this coordinated regulatory action.

I would note, however, an ambiguity in the “Violations of Law and Consumer Harm” category, an ambiguity that should be cleared up in favor of additional consumer protections.  The category title, “Violations of Law and Consumer Harm,” implies that there are some types of consumer harm that are distinct from violations of law and that is obviously true. The discussion of the category emphasizes this by stating that it encompasses “the broad range of violations of consumer protection laws and evidence of consumer harm.” 81 F.R. 26556 (emphasis added).  And the text of the guidance itself states this as well, indicating that the category’s assessment factors “evaluate the dimensions of any identified violation or consumer harm.”  81 F.R. 26558 (emphasis added).

But the remainder of the discussion of this category only focuses on violations of law and pays little attention to “the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm” that are not also violations of law.  81 F.R. 26556.  Indeed, the four assessment factors for this category are all premises on causes of identified “violations of law.”  This is a significant failing for the CC Rating System because of the many types of consumer harm that are not clear violations of law.  As proposed, the “Violations of Law and Consumer Harm” category appears to be as much about protecting the bank from legal liability from lawsuits brought on behalf of consumers as it is about addressing the legitimate interests of the consumers of financial services.

As we sort out the after-effects of the Subprime Crisis, we have seen many situations where there was no clear violation of law but homeowners suffered from outrageous industry practices.  For instance, many borrowers are suffering needlessly at the hands of their mortgage servicers.  Some servicers are under-resourced, intentionally or not, and continue to treat their borrowers with a maddening disregard.  In some cases, this outrageous behavior does not amount to a clear violation of law, but is behavior that reflects most badly on the parties engaged in it.  The CC Rating System should both acknowledge this type of harm and address it to maximize the benefits that can flow from this forthcoming revision to it.

Consumer Protection’s Holy Grail

The Round Table experiences a vision of the Holy Grail by Évrard d'Espinques

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (the CC Rating System). The FFIEC’s six members represent the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, State Liaison Committee and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This veritable roundtable of regulators is seeking to revise the CC Rating System “to reflect the regulatory, examination (supervisory), technological, and market changes that have occurred in the years since the current rating system was established.” (81 F.R. 26553)

I know, I know, this is a deeply technical issued and you are wondering why I am writing about it for a somewhat general audience. The answer is that I think this is a good thing for people to know about: the federal government is seeking to implement a consistent approach to consumer protection across a broad swath of the financial services industry.

One of the CC Rating System’s categories is Violations of Law and Consumer Harm. The request for comment notes that over the last few decades, the financial services

industry has become more complex, and the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm has become increasingly clear. Violations of various laws, including, for example, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 5 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as well as fair lending violations, may potentially cause significant consumer harm and raise serious supervisory concerns. Recognizing this broad array of risks, the proposed guidance directs examiners to consider all violations of consumer laws, based on the root cause, severity, duration, and pervasiveness of the violation. This approach emphasizes the importance of a range of consumer protection laws and is intended to reflect the broader array of risks and the potential harm caused by consumer protection related violations. (81 F.R. 26556)

This is all to the good. A big part of the problem the last time around (pre-Subprime Crisis) was that financial services companies used regulatory arbitrage to avoid scrutiny. Lots of mortgage lending migrated to nonbanks. Nonbanks did not need to worry about unwanted attention from the regulators that scrutinized banks and other heavily regulated mortgage lenders. (To be clear, Alan Greenspan and other regulators did not do a good job of scrutinizing the banks. But let’s leave that for another post.) With the CFPB now regulating nonbanks and with this coordinated approach to consumer protection, we should expect that regulatory arbitrage will decrease.

If successful, this would amount to a regulatory equivalent of finding the Holy Grail.  So, while this is a technical issue, it is something to feel good about.

Comments due July 4th, so get crackin’!