Hypothetically Reforming Fannie and Freddie

Ben Turner

S&P issued a report, Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLB System: Plus Ca Change . . . The report opens, “Despite reform talk in the years since the U.S. housing crisis, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes the likelihood of extraordinary government support for key U.S. housing government­-related entities (GREs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system remains “almost certain” in case of need.” (1) Notwithstanding the fact that S&P expects that this extraordinary support will last well into the next presidential administration, S&P “can envisage three “tail risk” scenarios in which such support could become less likely under certain conditions, but view each of these scenarios as improbable.” (1) The three scenarios, which S&P characterizes as plausible, albeit improbable, are

  • An electoral sweep, with favorable macroeconomic conditions and few competing legislative priorities;
  • Court judgments, pursuant to shareholder lawsuits, forcing the legislators’ hand; or
  • A renewed housing market crisis, with one or more of these GREs viewed as more cause than cure. (4)

In the first scenario, “an election gives one party control of all three legislative actors (the president, House of Representatives, and Senate), precluding the need for bipartisan compromise to enact major reforms to Fannie and Freddie via legislation.” (4)

In the second, Fannie and Freddie shareholders win lawsuits that stem from the “U.S. Treasury’s decision to modify, in 2012, the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) governing the terms of its financial support to Fannie and Freddie . . ..” (4)

The final scenario,

is a renewed housing market crisis, on a scale at least similar to that of 2008. Like the other two scenarios, we don’t view this as likely, at least in the coming few years . . . perhaps as a result of the unfortunate confluence of several negative surprises- ­­including, for example, overreaction to Federal Reserve monetary policy normalization, terms­-of­-trade shocks (geopolitical conflicts that cause a rapid and dramatic spike in energy costs, perhaps), fresh financial sector  problems that suddenly tighten the sector’s funding costs, and an abnormally long spell of bad weather. (5)

This seems like a pretty reasonable analysis of the likelihood of reform for Fannie and Freddie. But that should not stop us from bemoaning Congressional inaction on this topic. Obviously, Congress is too ideologically driven to bridge the gap between the left and right, but the likelihood that we are building toward some new kind of crisis increases with time. I can’t improve on S&P’s analysis in this report, but I’m sure unhappy about what it means for the long-term health of our housing finance system.

 

 

 

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

  • United States Government Accountability Office releases report: “Collateral Requirements Discourage Some Community Development Financial Institutions from Seeking Membership”.
  • The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) released its Out of Reach 2015 report, in which it asserts that low wages and high rents are preventing people from living in many different areas of the country. It states that the most expensive city to live in is San Francisco, where a worker would need to make $40/hour to afford a decent two-bedroom apartment.
  • The Federal Reserve released its Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2014, which reveals how adult-consumers feel they are doing financially. Though in a number of categories adults’ beliefs on how they are doing went up beneficially, half of all renters that wanted to purchase a home could not afford the down payment and 31% were unable to qualify for a mortgage.

AG Lynch on Wall Street

Loretta_Lynch_US_Attorney

Institutional Investor quoted me in Will New Attorney General Loretta Lynch Shake up Wall Street? It opens,

Those unhappy with the lack of personal accountability for the 2008–’09 financial crisis are running out of time to see justice served: In the U.S., the statute of limitations for many bank-related criminal charges is ten years. But the recent appointment of Loretta Lynch as the first black woman to the post of attorney general could present a window of opportunity.

Given mounting public frustration over the failure to punish financial executives who helped push the world to the brink of another Great Depression, Lynch may be well positioned to act where her predecessor, Eric Holder, was unsuccessful. The U.S. Department of Justice has often talked up its efforts to hold individuals responsible for crimes they may have committed, but there hasn’t been much progress. Last year, however, saw an uptick in the size of bank settlements related to the crash, including a $16.65 billion deal with Bank of America Corp. and a $7 billion agreement with Citigroup.

Some industry observers believe Lynch, who turns 56 on Thursday, could use this momentum to target people. “If she does anything differently [than Holder did], she may push her folks to try to make those cases against individuals higher up the corporate ladder,” says Glen Kopp, former assistant U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York and a New York–based partner in the white-collar practice at law firm Bracewell & Giuliani.

Lynch’s critics have griped that she may be not be strict enough with Wall Street. They point to her 1980s stint with law firm Cahill Gordon & Reindel, which has counted among its clients BofA, Credit Suisse Group and HSBC Holdings, and to a spell early last decade at Hogan & Hartson (now Hogan Lovells), where she practiced white -collar criminal defense.

Detractors say both positions, as well as her tenure at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 2003 to 2005, have compromised her ability to prosecute big banks by establishing relationships that she may not wish to jeopardize as attorney general. During Lynch’s lengthy confirmation process, Republicans criticized her for being too soft on HSBC in a 2012 settlement; the British bank agreed to pay $1.92 billion in a money-laundering case after New York and federal authorities decided that criminal charges might bring down the institution.

But many in the legal community believe the more likely outcome will be somewhere in the middle.

“The financial industry will be dealing with an extremely well-informed AG who will seek to balance the competing concerns that arise when investigating and prosecuting large enterprises like those that dominate Wall Street,” says David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School with expertise in property, mortgage lending and consumer financial services matters.

The Rescue of Fannie and Freddie

Federal Reserve researchers, W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery, have posted a staff report, The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The abstract reads,

We describe and evaluate the measures taken by the U.S. government to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. We begin by outlining the business model of these two firms and their role in the U.S. housing finance system. Our focus then turns to the sources of financial distress that the firms experienced and the events that ultimately led the government to take action in an effort to stabilize housing and financial markets. We describe the various resolution options available to policymakers at the time and evaluate the success of the choice of conservatorship, and other actions taken, in terms of five objectives that we argue an optimal intervention would have fulfilled. We conclude that the decision to take the firms into conservatorship and invest public funds achieved its short-run goals of stabilizing mortgage markets and promoting financial stability during a period of extreme stress. However, conservatorship led to tensions between maximizing the firms’ value and achieving broader macroeconomic objectives, and, most importantly, it has so far failed to produce reform of the U.S. housing finance system.

 This staff report provides a nice overview of the two companies since the financial crisis. I was particularly interested by a couple of sections. First, I found the discussion of receivership versus conservatorship helpful. Second, I liked how it outlined the five objectives for an optimal intervention:

(i) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be enabled to continue their core securitization and guarantee functions as going concerns, thereby maintaining conforming mortgage credit supply.

(ii) The two firms would continue to honor their agency debt and mortgage-backed securities obligations, given the amount and widely held nature of these securities, especially in leveraged financial institutions, and the potential for financial instability in case of default on these obligations.

(iii) The value of the common and preferred equity in the two firms would be extinguished, reflecting their insolvent financial position.

(iv) The two firms would be managed in a way that would provide flexibility to take into account macroeconomic objectives, rather than just maximizing the private value of their assets.

(v) The structure of the rescue would prompt long-term reform and set in motion the transition to a better system within a reasonable period of time. (14-15)

You’ll have to read the paper to see how they evaluate the five objectives in greater detail.

Friday’s Government Reports Round-Up

Accurately Measuring Mortgage Availability

The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has posted a research report, Measuring Mortgage Credit Availability Using Ex-Ante Probability of Default. This report tackles an important subject:

How to strike a balance between credit availability and risk to achieve a sustainable housing market is a much-debated topic today, but these discussions are not grounded in good measurements of credit availability and risk. We address this problem below with a new index that measures credit availability and risk simultaneously

The first section of the paper discusses the limitations of the existing measures. The second section describes our development of the new index, which distills borrower credit profiles, loan products and terms, and macro economic conditions into a measurement of the weighted average probability of default for mortgages originated at a given time. The third section illustrates the value of this measure by empirically exploring the varying risk appetites of the market as a whole, and of market segments, which directly aids evidence-based policymaking on how to open the tight credit box. The final section discusses the limitations of this new index. (1)
The report concludes,
Measuring a concept as complicated and varied as credit access is no easy task. Yet this is an important time to ensure that it is being measured accurately. As we seek to reform the housing finance system, Congress, the housing finance industry, advocacy groups, policymakers, and even the general public need to clearly understand how well the market is providing access to mortgage credit for borrowers. (18)
I say amen to that. There is a slim chance that housing finance reform may be back on the table in Washington, given the midterm election results. We need as much good data we can get in order to structure a system based on solid principles rather than on the views of special interests that typically dominate this debate.
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Reiss on Refis Redux

Refinancing must be in the air because I was interviewed twice in the last week about them. The first story appeared here. The second story, This Could Be Your Last Shot to Refinance a Mortgage, is in the Fiscal Times. It reads, in part,

After the Fed’s announcement Wednesday that it would end its historic $3 trillion bond-buying program, mortgage rates predictably began to rise.

The good news is that they were rising from the lowest rates of the year, after tumbling through most of October. At just over 4 percent, today’s mortgages rates still remain extremely low by historical standards. In 2008, before the housing busts, rates were around 6.5 percent.

*     *     *

Banks are stilled scarred from the housing bust and are dealing with significant changes to the regulatory environment, so lending standards are much tighter than they were in the past. Even former Fed chair Ben Bernanke recently admitted to having had his mortgage refinance application rejected.

To get the best rate, you’ll need excellent credit and lots of documentation of your income and assets. The average credit score for closed loans in September was 726, according to Ellie Mae.

Finally, shop around. “Talk to a big bank, talk to a little bank, talk to a mortgage broker,” says David Reiss, a professor of real estate finance at Brooklyn Law School. The gap between the best and the worst mortgage deals can be as much as a full percentage point.