Tag Archives: FRB

Consumer Protection’s Holy Grail

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The Round Table experiences a vision of the Holy Grail by Évrard d'Espinques

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has issued a notice and request for comment regarding the Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System (the CC Rating System). The FFIEC’s six members represent the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, State Liaison Committee and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This veritable roundtable of regulators is seeking to revise the CC Rating System “to reflect the regulatory, examination (supervisory), technological, and market changes that have occurred in the years since the current rating system was established.” (81 F.R. 26553)

I know, I know, this is a deeply technical issued and you are wondering why I am writing about it for a somewhat general audience. The answer is that I think this is a good thing for people to know about: the federal government is seeking to implement a consistent approach to consumer protection across a broad swath of the financial services industry.

One of the CC Rating System’s categories is Violations of Law and Consumer Harm. The request for comment notes that over the last few decades, the financial services

industry has become more complex, and the broad array of risks in the market that can cause consumer harm has become increasingly clear. Violations of various laws, including, for example, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 5 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as well as fair lending violations, may potentially cause significant consumer harm and raise serious supervisory concerns. Recognizing this broad array of risks, the proposed guidance directs examiners to consider all violations of consumer laws, based on the root cause, severity, duration, and pervasiveness of the violation. This approach emphasizes the importance of a range of consumer protection laws and is intended to reflect the broader array of risks and the potential harm caused by consumer protection related violations. (81 F.R. 26556)

This is all to the good. A big part of the problem the last time around (pre-Subprime Crisis) was that financial services companies used regulatory arbitrage to avoid scrutiny. Lots of mortgage lending migrated to nonbanks. Nonbanks did not need to worry about unwanted attention from the regulators that scrutinized banks and other heavily regulated mortgage lenders. (To be clear, Alan Greenspan and other regulators did not do a good job of scrutinizing the banks. But let’s leave that for another post.) With the CFPB now regulating nonbanks and with this coordinated approach to consumer protection, we should expect that regulatory arbitrage will decrease.

If successful, this would amount to a regulatory equivalent of finding the Holy Grail.  So, while this is a technical issue, it is something to feel good about.

Comments due July 4th, so get crackin’!

Couples Leave Money on Closing Table

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photo by Dustin Moore

Geng Li, Weifeng Wu and Vincent Yao, three Fed economists, have posted a research note, Do People Leave Money on the Table? Evidence from Joint Mortgage Applications and the Minimum FICO Rule. The authors state that there “is mounting evidence that households make suboptimal savings and investment decisions” and find that

many mortgage borrowers appear to have failed to apply for mortgages that give the lowest interest rates. Specifically, we find that nearly 10 percent of prime borrowers who applied for their loans jointly could have lowered their mortgage interest rate at least one eighth of 1 percentage point if the mortgage was applied for by the applicant with a higher credit score and an income high enough to qualify for the mortgage. Furthermore, among the joint applicants with a lower credit score below 740, for whom mortgage interest rates are most sensitive to credit scores, more than 25 percent could have significantly reduced their borrowing cost by having the individual with a higher credit score apply. This is due to the fact that when lenders price mortgages with joint applications, the interest rates are determined by the lower score of the two–often known as the minimum FICO rule. We estimate that such borrowers could reduce their annual interest payment by between $220 and $1,400. Consistent with the existing literature, we find that couples who appeared to have left money on the table tend to have lower credit scores and be much younger and less financially sophisticated. (1, emphasis added)

This note provides an example of just how complicated the mortgage underwriting process is, particularly for less financially sophisticated borrowers.

One wonders if the CFPB should take a look at this. Should lenders be required to evaluate if joint mortgage applicants would get a better rate if only one of them ended up taking out the mortgage? And when the answer is yes, should lenders be required to share that information with the applicants? I can think of a variety of reasons why that should not be the case (not the least of which is that it could leave just one member of the family holding the bag if things go south), but it might be worth exploring this question more systematically.

Gentrification & Socioeconomic Diversity

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Lisa Brewster

Lei Ding et al. have posted a Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper, Gentrification and Residential Mobility in Philadelphia, to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Gentrification has provoked considerable debate and controversy about its effects on neighborhoods and the people residing in them. This paper draws on a unique large-scale consumer credit database to examine the mobility patterns of residents in gentrifying neighborhoods in the city of Philadelphia from 2002 to 2014. We find significant heterogeneity in the effects of gentrification across neighborhoods and subpopulations. Residents in gentrifying neighborhoods have slightly higher mobility rates than those in nongentrifying neighborhoods, but they do not have a higher risk of moving to a lower-income neighborhood. Moreover, gentrification is associated with some positive changes in residents’ financial health as measured by individuals’ credit scores. However, when more vulnerable residents (low-score, longer-term residents, or residents without mortgages) move from gentrifying neighborhoods, they are more likely to move to lower-income neighborhoods and neighborhoods with lower values on quality-of-life indicators. The results reveal the nuances of mobility in gentrifying neighborhoods and demonstrate how the positive and negative consequences of gentrification are unevenly distributed.
I am not in a position to fully evaluate the methodology of this paper in this post. At first glance, however, it appears to be a well-constructed and large study, tracking “the residential location and financial health of a random sample of more than 50,000 adults.” (1) At the same time, useful household characteristics like income and race were not available to the authors, so the study has some significant limitations.

Given the intensive debates that gentrification engenders in NYC and elsewhere, it is still helpful that the authors offer up some facts and grounded interpretation of those facts. The authors specifically find that “gentrification is associated with positive changes in residents’ financial health: Residents in gentrifying neighborhoods experience an average increase of 11 points in their credit scores, compared with those who are not residents.” (1) At the same time, their results “suggest that less advantaged residents generally gained less from gentrification than others, and those who were unable to remain in a gentrifying neighborhood had negative residential and financial outcomes in the gentrification process.” (2)

Those who decry gentrification as well as those who promote it (quietly, more often than not) will find support for their positions in this paper. But those who are trying to understand just what we are talking about when we talk about gentrification and its effects will be left with a more textured understanding of how the demographics of gentrifying neighborhoods change. If cities are serious about promoting socioeconomic diversity, they must understand what is happening when neighborhoods are in flux.

Hypothetically Reforming Fannie and Freddie

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Ben Turner

S&P issued a report, Fannie, Freddie, and the FHLB System: Plus Ca Change . . . The report opens, “Despite reform talk in the years since the U.S. housing crisis, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services believes the likelihood of extraordinary government support for key U.S. housing government­-related entities (GREs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system remains “almost certain” in case of need.” (1) Notwithstanding the fact that S&P expects that this extraordinary support will last well into the next presidential administration, S&P “can envisage three “tail risk” scenarios in which such support could become less likely under certain conditions, but view each of these scenarios as improbable.” (1) The three scenarios, which S&P characterizes as plausible, albeit improbable, are

  • An electoral sweep, with favorable macroeconomic conditions and few competing legislative priorities;
  • Court judgments, pursuant to shareholder lawsuits, forcing the legislators’ hand; or
  • A renewed housing market crisis, with one or more of these GREs viewed as more cause than cure. (4)

In the first scenario, “an election gives one party control of all three legislative actors (the president, House of Representatives, and Senate), precluding the need for bipartisan compromise to enact major reforms to Fannie and Freddie via legislation.” (4)

In the second, Fannie and Freddie shareholders win lawsuits that stem from the “U.S. Treasury’s decision to modify, in 2012, the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) governing the terms of its financial support to Fannie and Freddie . . ..” (4)

The final scenario,

is a renewed housing market crisis, on a scale at least similar to that of 2008. Like the other two scenarios, we don’t view this as likely, at least in the coming few years . . . perhaps as a result of the unfortunate confluence of several negative surprises- ­­including, for example, overreaction to Federal Reserve monetary policy normalization, terms­-of­-trade shocks (geopolitical conflicts that cause a rapid and dramatic spike in energy costs, perhaps), fresh financial sector  problems that suddenly tighten the sector’s funding costs, and an abnormally long spell of bad weather. (5)

This seems like a pretty reasonable analysis of the likelihood of reform for Fannie and Freddie. But that should not stop us from bemoaning Congressional inaction on this topic. Obviously, Congress is too ideologically driven to bridge the gap between the left and right, but the likelihood that we are building toward some new kind of crisis increases with time. I can’t improve on S&P’s analysis in this report, but I’m sure unhappy about what it means for the long-term health of our housing finance system.

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Mortgaging the Future

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The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s most recent Economic Letter is titled Mortgaging the Future? In it, Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor evaluate the “Great Mortgaging” of the American economy:

In the six decades following World War II, bank lending measured as a ratio to GDP has quadrupled in advanced economies. To a great extent, this unprecedented expansion of credit was driven by a dramatic growth in mortgage loans. Lending backed by real estate has allowed households to leverage up and has changed the traditional business of banking in fundamental ways. This “Great Mortgaging” has had a profound influence on the dynamics of business cycles. (1)

I was particularly interested by the Letter’s Figure 2, which charted the ratio of mortgage debt to value of the U.S. housing stock over the last hundred years or so. The authors write,

The rise of mortgage lending exceeds what would be expected considering the increase in real estate values over the same time. Rather, it appears to also reflect an increase in household leverage. Although we cannot measure historical loan-to-value ratios directly, household mortgage debt appears to have risen faster than total real estate asset values in many countries including the United States. The resulting record-high leverage ratios can damage household balance sheets and therefore endanger the overall financial system. Figure 2 displays the ratio of household mortgage lending to the value of the total U.S. housing stock over the past 100 years. As the figure shows, that ratio has nearly quadrupled from about 0.15 in 1910 to about 0.5 today. (2)

An increase in leverage for households is not necessarily a bad thing. it allows households to make investments and to smooth their consumption over longer periods. But it can, of course, get to be too high. High leverage makes households less able to handle shocks such as unemployment, divorce and death. it would be helpful for economists to better model a socially optimal level of household leverage in order to guide regulators. The CFPB has taken a stab at this with its relatively new Ability-to-Repay regulation but we do not yet know if they got it right.

Independent Foreclosure Review: Case Closed?

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The Federal Reserve Board issued its Independent Foreclosure Review. By way of background,

Between April 2011 and April 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued formal enforcement actions against 16 mortgage servicing companies to address a pattern of misconduct and negligence related to deficient practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing identified by examiners during reviews conducted from November 2010 to January 2011. Beginning in January 2013, 15 of the mortgage servicing companies subject to enforcement actions for deficient practices in mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing reached agreements with the OCC and the Federal Reserve (collectively, the “regulators”) to provide approximately $3.9 billion in direct cash payments to borrowers and approximately $6.1 billion in other foreclosure prevention assistance, such as loan modifications and the forgiveness of deficiency judgments. For participating servicers, fulfillment of these agreements satisfies the foreclosure file review requirements of the enforcement actions issued by the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the OTS in 2011 and 2012. (1)

The government’s actions regarding the Independent Foreclosure Review have been its controversial, with some believing that it was completed too hastily. I am less interested in that debate than in FRB’s sense of the the servicing sector going forward.

The report states that “the initial supervisory review of the servicer and holding company action plans has shown that the banking organizations under Consent Orders have implemented significant corrective actions with regard to their mortgage servicing and foreclosure processes, but that some additional actions need to be taken.” (24) Overall, the report reflects an optimism that endemic servicer problems are a thing of the past.

A drumbeat of reports and cases seems to be at odds with that assessment, although there is obviously a significant lag between the occurrence of  problems and the report of them in official sources. As a close observer of the mortgage industry, however, I am not yet convinced that regulators have their hands around the problems in the servicer industry. Careful monitoring remains the order of the day.

Foreclosure Review

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The US Government Accountability Office issued a report, Foreclosure Review:  Regulators Could Strengthen Oversight and Improve Transparency of the Process. GAO did this study because it was asked to examine the amended consent order process relating to foreclosures. This process was pretty controversial. By way of background,

In 2011 and 2012, OCC and the Federal Reserve signed consent orders with 16 mortgage servicers that required the servicers to hire consultants to review foreclosure files for errors and remediate harm to borrowers. In 2013, regulators amended the consent orders for all but one servicer, ending the file reviews and requiring servicers to provide $3.9 billion in cash payments to about 4.4 million borrowers and $6 billion in foreclosure prevention actions, such as loan modifications. One servicer continued file review activities. (no page number)

GAO concluded that

One of the goals that motivated the original file review process was a desire to restore public confidence in the mortgage market. In addition, federal internal control standards and our prior work highlight the importance of providing relevant, reliable, and timely communications, including providing information about the processes used to realize results, to increase the transparency of activities to stakeholders — in this case, borrowers and the public. Without making information about the processes used to categorize borrowers available to the public, such as through forthcoming public reports, regulators may miss a final opportunity to address questions and concerns about the categorization process and increase confidence in the results. (66)

GAO also found that in “the absence of specific expectations for evaluating and testing servicers’ actions to meet the foreclosure prevention principles, regulators risk not having enough information to determine whether servicers are implementing the principles and protecting borrowers.” (66)

So we are left with an ongoing crisis in confidence for the public and homeowners in particular. We are also left with regulators who are at risk of not being able to properly regulate financial institutions. With much of the news we are receiving these days, it feels as if we have let our financial crisis go to waste. No foreclosure reform, no housing finance reform, no real leadership to create a housing finance system for the 21st Century.

During the Great Depression, the federal government created the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal Housing Administration, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. We have created a black hole — Fannie and Freddie are in that limbo known as conservatorship. The President must take a lead on housing finance reform. Otherwise, my money is on another bailout in the not so distant future.