Tag Archives: loss mitigation

CFPB Mortgage Highlights

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Richard Cordray 2010

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued its most recent Supervisory Highlights. The CFPB is “committed to transparency in its supervisory program by sharing key findings in order to help industry limit risks to consumers and comply with Federal consumer financial law.” (3)

There were a lot of interesting highlights relating to mortgage origination and servicing, including,

  • one or more instances of failure to ensure that the HUD-1 settlement statement accurately reflects the actual settlement charges paid by the borrower.
  • at least one servicer sent borrowers loss mitigation acknowledgment notices requesting documents, sometimes dozens in number, inapplicable to their circumstances and which it did not need to evaluate the borrower for loss mitigation.
  • one or more servicers failed to send any loss mitigation acknowledgment notices. At least one servicer did not send notices after a loss mitigation processing platform malfunctioned repeatedly over a significant period of time. . . . the breakdown caused delays in converting trial modifications to permanent modifications, resulting in harm to borrowers, and may have caused other harm.
  • At least one other servicer did not send loss mitigation acknowledgment notices to borrowers who had requested payment relief on their mortgage payments. One or more servicers treated certain requests as requests for short-term payment relief instead of requests for loss mitigation under Regulation X.
  • At least one servicer sent notices of intent to foreclose to borrowers already approved for a trial modification and before the trial modification’s first payment was due without verifying whether borrowers had a pending loss mitigation plan before sending its notice. As the notice could deter borrowers from carrying out trial modifications, it likely causes substantial injury . . .
  • at least one servicer sent notices warning borrowers who were current on their loans that foreclosure would be imminent. (14-18, emphasis added)

All of these highlights are interesting because they reflect the types of problems the CFPB is finding and it thus helps the industry comply with federal law. But from a public policy perspective, the CFPB’s approach is lacking. By repeating that each failure was found at “one or more” company, a reader of these Highlights cannot determine how widespread these problems are throughout the industry. And because the Highlights do not say how many borrowers were affected by each company’s failure, it is hard to say whether these problems are isolated and technical or endemic and intentional.

Future Supervisory Highlights should include more information about the number of institutions and the number of consumers who were affected by these violations.

Friday’s Government Reports Roundup

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Are the FHA’s Losses Heartbreaking?

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The Inspector General of the Department of of Housing and Urban Development issued an audit of FHA’s Loss Mitigation Program (2014-KC-0004).  The Office of the Inspector General (the OIG) did the audit because of its “concern that FHA might have incurred costs while allowing lenders to make large amounts of money by modifying defaulted FHA-insured loans. Our audit objective was to determine the extent to which loans modified under the FHA program generated gains for the lenders.” (1)

The OIG found that

Lenders generated an estimated $428 million in gains from the sale of Government National Mortgage Association securities when modifying defaulted FHA loans in fiscal year 2013. These loan modifications were completed as part of FHA’s loss mitigation program. None of these lender generated gains were used to offset FHA’s insurance fund costs. As a result, FHA missed opportunities to strengthen its insurance fund. (1)

Given that the FHA had to be bailed out for the first time in its 80 year history, the findings of this audit are a bit heartbreaking, at least for a housing finance nerd like me.  $428 million would cover more than a quarter of the amount that Treasury had to advance to the FHA, no small potatoes.

The OIG found that the FHA “may have missed opportunities to strengthen its insurance fund. Lenders could be required to offset gains they obtained from the sale of securities for incentive fees and claims for modified loans that redefault.” (5)

The Auditee Comments and the OIG’s Evaluation of Auditee Comments make it clear that the extent of the gains had by lenders is very contested because the OIG did not “know the costs of the lenders.” (17) This seems like a pretty important missing piece of the story. Nonetheless, I hope that HUD, as the parent of both the FHA and Ginnie Mae, takes questions raised by this audit seriously to ensure that public monies are being put to their best use.

Protecting Homeowners During Mortgage Servicing Transfers

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued a Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance on Mortgage Servicing Transfers (Bulletin 2014-01). Mortgage Serving Transfers have been receiving a lot of attention (also here) recently from regulators as the servicing industry is going through many changes.

The CFPB is right to focus on the impact of the transfer of mortgage servicing rights on homeowners. Many complaints made directly to regulators and seen in foreclosure cases relate to the Kafkaesque treatment that homeowners receive as their servicer point-of-contact changes from interaction to interaction.

The Bulletin indicates that servicers will have to do a fair amount of planning to ensure that consumers are not harmed by the transfer of servicing rights. In particular, the CFPB will be watching to see that servicers are (WARNING:  Boring and Technical Language Alert!):

  • Ensuring that contracts require the transferor to provide all necessary documents and information at loan boarding.
  • Developing tailored transfer instructions for each deal and conducting meetings to
    discuss and clarify key issues with counterparties in a timely manner; for large transfers, this could be months in advance of the transfer. Key issues may include descriptions of proprietary modifications, detailed descriptions of data fields, known issues with document indexing, and specific regulatory or settlement requirements applicable to some or all of the transferred loans.
  • Using specifically tailored testing protocols to evaluate the compatibility of the
    transferred data with the transferee servicer’s systems and data mapping protocols.
  • Engaging in quality control work after the transfer of preliminary data to validate that the data on the transferee’s system matches the data submitted by the transferor.
  • Recognizing when the transfer cannot be implemented successfully in a single batch and implementing alternative protocols, such as splitting the transfer into several smaller transactions, to ensure that the transferee can comply with its servicing obligations for every loan transferred. (3)

As a bonus, the Bulletin provides an overview of statutes and regulations that govern the transfer of mortgage servicing.

Foreclosure Prevention: The Real McCoy

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Patricia McCoy has posted Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis (also on SSRN). In the early 2000s, Pat was one of the first legal scholars to identify predatory behaviors in the secondary mortgage market. These behaviors resulted in homeowners being saddled with expensive loans that they had trouble paying off. As many unaffordable mortgages work themselves through the system, Pat has now turned her attention to the other end of the life cycle of many an abusive mortgage — foreclosure.

The article opens,

Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed for sale. Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market—the so-called “shadow inventory”—were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.

Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing their homes, but in appropriate cases—where modifications can increase investors’ return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments—loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all. (725)

The article then evaluates the various theories that are meant to explain the barriers to the loan modification and determines “that servicer compensation together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications.” (726) It identifies “three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right policy solution.” (726)

It seems to me that the federal government dealt with foreclosures much more effectively in the Great Depression, with the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation. In our crisis, we have muddled through and have failed to systematically deal with the foreclosure crisis. McCoy’s article does a real service in identifying what we have done wrong this time around. No doubt, we will have another foreclosure crisis at some point in our future. It is worth our while to identify the impediments to effective foreclosure prevention strategies so we can act more effectively when the time comes.

A Shared Appreciation for Underwater Mortgages

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New York State’s Department of Financial Services has proposed a rule that would allow for “shared appreciation” of a property’s value if an underwater loan is refinanced. The Department states that this will provide a helpful option for underwater homeowners facing foreclosure. If a homeowner were to take a shared appreciation mortgage, he or she would get a principal reduction (and thus lower monthly payments) in exchange for giving up as much as fifty percent of the increase in the home’s value, payable when the property is sold or the mortgage is satisfied.

The precise formula for the holder of the mortgage is as follows:

The Holder’s share of the Appreciation in Market Value shall be limited to the lesser of:

1. The amount of the reduction in principal (deferred principal), plus interest on such amount calculated from the date of the Shared Appreciation       Agreement to the date of payment based on a rate that is applicable to the Modified Mortgage Loan; or

2. Fifty percent of the amount of Appreciation in Market Value. Section 82-2.6(b).

The principal balance of a shared appreciation mortgage “shall be no greater than: (i) an amount which when combined with other modification factors, such as lower interest rate or term extension, results in monthly payments that are 31% or less of the Mortgagor’s DTI; or (ii) 100% of the Appraised Value.” Section 82-2.11(i). The proposed regulation contains mandatory disclosures for the homeowner, including some examples of how a shared appreciation mortgage can work.

How does this all play out for the homeowner? We should note that similarly situated homeowners can be treated differently in a variety of ways. Here are a few examples. First, two similarly situated homeowners with different incomes can receive different principal balances because of the DTI limitation contained in section 82-2.11(i). Second, similarly situated homeowners can receive different principal balances because their houses appraise for different amounts. And third, different rates of appreciation of homes can make two similarly situated homeowners give up very different absolute dollars in appreciated value.

All of this is to say that homeowners will have to consider many variables in order to evaluate whether a share appreciation mortgage is a good option for them. They should also know that what is a good deal for one homeowner may not be a good deal for a similarly situated one. It is unlikely that the mandatory disclosures will be sufficient to explain this to them in all of its complexity. It is not even clear that loan counselors could do a great job with this either.

I am not arguing that the share appreciation mortgage is a bad innovation. But I do think that lenders will be able evaluate when offering one is a good deal for them while homeowners may have trouble evaluating when accepting one is a good deal on their end. I would guess that many may take one for non-economic reasons — I want to keep my home — and just take their chances as to how it all will play out financially.

Sloppy Servicers

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I have blogged about the Alice In Wonderland-like and Dickensian situations faced by defaulting homeowners, but now the CFPB has offered a broader look at the problems that borrowers confront when facing foreclosure. The CFPB’s Supervisory Highlights Summer 2013 profiles some of the problems in the loss mitigation field, including

  • Inconsistent borrower solicitation and communication;
  • Inconsistent loss mitigation underwriting;
  • Inconsistent waivers of certain fees or interest charges;
  • Long application review periods;
  • Missing denial notices;
  • Incomplete and disorganized servicing files;
  • Incomplete written policies and procedures; and
  • Lack of quality assurance on underwriting decisions. (14)

The CFPB also noted some serious violations in the transfer of loans between servicers: “For example, examiners found noncompliance with the requirements of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) to provide disclosures to consumers about transfers of the servicing of their loans.” (12)

They also found problems processing default-related fees: “Examiners identified a servicer that charged consumers default-related fees without adequately documenting the reasons for and amounts of the fees. Examiners also identified situations where servicers mistakenly charged borrowers default-related fees that investors were supposed to pay under investor agreements.” (13-14)

Now, obviously, not all servicers had all of these problems, but the CFPB’s findings are consistent with what many courts have described anecdotally in their opinions.  Time will tell whether the CFPB will be able to get servicers to devote the necessary resources to reduce these types of problems to more acceptable levels.