The Prime Crisis

Ben Franklin, Founder of the University of Pennsylvania

Fernando Ferreira and Joseph Gyourko, both at Penn’s Wharton School, have posted A New Look at the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: Panel Data Evidence of Prime and Subprime Borrowers from 1997 to 2012 to SSRN. Unfortunately it is behind a National Bureau of Economic Research paywall. The paper makes the case for “a reinterpretation of the U.S. foreclosure crisis as more of a prime, rather than a subprime, borrower issue.” (1) The authors conclude,

The housing bust and its consequences are among the defining economic events of the past quarter century. Constructing and analyzing new and very large micro data spanning the cycle and all sectors of the mortgage market leads us to reinterpret the ensuing foreclosure crisis as something much more than a subprime sector issue. Many more homes were lost by prime mortgage borrowers, and their loss rates not only increased relatively early in the crisis, but stayed high through 2012. This new characterization of the crisis motivates a very different empirical strategy from previous research on this topic. Rather than focus solely on the subprime sector and subprime traits, we turn to the traditional home mortgage default literature that explains outcomes in terms of common factors such as negative equity and borrower illiquidity.

The key empirical finding is that negative equity conditions can explain virtually all of the difference in foreclosure and short sale outcomes of Prime borrowers compared to all Cash owners. This is true on average, over time (including the spike in their foreclosure rate beginning in 2009), and across metropolitan areas. Given the predominance of this group in terms of foreclosures and short sales, this is tantamount to explaining the crisis itself. We can explain much, but not all, of the variation in Subprime borrower outcomes in terms of negative equity or borrower illiquidity conditions, so something potentially ‘special’ about the subprime sector still is unaccounted for. That said, it also could be that a less noisy measure of borrower illiquidity would be able to account for this residual variation. That remains for future research.

None of the other ‘usual suspects’ raised by previous research or public commentators change this conclusion. Housing quality traits, household demographics (race or gender), buyer income, and speculator status do not have a material influence on outcomes across borrower types. Certain loan-related attributes such as initial LTV, whether a refinancing occurred or a second mortgage was taken on, and loan cohort origination quarter do have some independent influence, but they are much weaker than that of current LTV. (27)

I will have to leave it to other empiricists to evaluate whether this sure-to-be-controversial study is methodologically sound, but I sure did find their policy conclusion to be interesting:

We are not able to provide a definitive recommendation one way or another, but we can rule out one noteworthy reason offered for not aiding homeowners—namely, that the crisis was mostly about irresponsible subprime sector actors (both lenders and borrowers) who were undeserving of transfers. Of course, this is not to say that there was no such behavior. The evidence from other research and serious journalists is that there was. However, it is clear from the passage of time (and the accumulation and analysis of new data that provides) that the problem was much more widespread and systemic.  (28)

Hopefully, this is a lesson that we can take with us into the next (inevitable) housing crisis so we lay the foundation for policy solutions based on facts and not rely on moral judgments about borrowers that are built on shaky ground.

New FHA Guidelines No Biggie

Welcome_to_Levittown_sign

(Original Purchases in Levittown Funded in Large Part by FHA Mortgages)

Law360 quoted me in New Guidelines For Bad FHA Loans Won’t Boost Lending (behind paywall). It opens,

The federal government on Thursday provided lenders with a streamlined framework for how it determines whether the Federal Housing Administration must be paid for a loan gone bad, but experts say the new framework will have limited effect because it failed to alleviate the threat of a Justice Department lawsuit.

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development provided lenders with what it called a “defect taxonomy” that it will use to determine when a lender will have to indemnify the FHA, which essentially provides insurance for mortgages taken out by first-time and low-income borrowers, for bad loans. The new framework whittled down the number of categories the FHA would review when making its decisions on loans and highlighted how it would measure the severity of those defects.

All of this was done in a bid to increase transparency and boost a sagging home loan sector. However, HUD was careful to state that its new default taxonomy does not have any bearing on potential civil or administrative liability a lender may face for making bad loans.

And because of that, lenders will still be skittish about issuing new mortgages, said Jeffrey Naimon, a partner with BuckleySandler LLP.

“What this expressly doesn’t address is what is likely the single most important thing in housing policy right now, which is how the Department of Justice is going to handle these issues,” he said.

The U.S. housing market has been slow to recover since the 2008 financial crisis due to a combination of economics, regulatory changes and, according to the industry, the threat of litigation over questionable loans from the Justice Department, the FHA and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

In recent years, the Justice Department has reached settlements reaching into the hundreds of millions of dollars with banks and other lenders over bad loans backed by the government using the False Claims Act and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act.

The most recent settlement came in February when MetLife Inc. agreed to a $123.5 million deal.

In April, Quicken Loans Inc. filed a preemptive suit alleging that the Justice Department and HUD were pressuring the lender to admit to faulty lending practices that they did not commit. The Justice Department sued Quicken soon after.

Policymakers at the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which serves as the conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and HUD have attempted to ease lenders’ fears that they will force lenders to buy back bad loans or otherwise indemnify the programs.

HUD on Thursday said that its new single-family loan quality assessment methodology — the so-called defect taxonomy — would do just that by slimming down the categories it uses to categorize mortgage defects from 99 to nine and establishing a system for categorizing the severity of those defects.

Among the nine categories that will be included in HUD’s review of loans are measures of borrowers’ income, assets and credit histories as well as loan-to-value ratios and maximum mortgage amounts.

Providing greater insight into FHA’s thinking is intended to make lending easier, Edward Golding, HUD’s principal deputy assistant secretary for housing, said in a statement.

“By enhancing our approach, lenders will have more confidence in how they interact with FHA and, we anticipate, will be more willing to lend to future homeowners who are ready to own,” he said.

However, what the new guidelines do not do is address the potential risk for lenders from the Justice Department.

“This taxonomy is not a comprehensive statement on all compliance monitoring or enforcement efforts by FHA or the federal government and does not establish standards for administrative or civil enforcement action, which are set forth in separate law. Nor does it address FHA’s response to patterns and practice of loan-level defects, or FHA’s plans to address fraud or misrepresentation in connection with any FHA-insured loan,” the FHA’s statement said.

And that could blunt the overall benefits of the new guidelines, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“To the extent it helps people make better decisions, it will help them reduce their exposure. But it is not any kind of bulletproof vest,” he said.

Mortgaging the Future

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s most recent Economic Letter is titled Mortgaging the Future? In it, Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor evaluate the “Great Mortgaging” of the American economy:

In the six decades following World War II, bank lending measured as a ratio to GDP has quadrupled in advanced economies. To a great extent, this unprecedented expansion of credit was driven by a dramatic growth in mortgage loans. Lending backed by real estate has allowed households to leverage up and has changed the traditional business of banking in fundamental ways. This “Great Mortgaging” has had a profound influence on the dynamics of business cycles. (1)

I was particularly interested by the Letter’s Figure 2, which charted the ratio of mortgage debt to value of the U.S. housing stock over the last hundred years or so. The authors write,

The rise of mortgage lending exceeds what would be expected considering the increase in real estate values over the same time. Rather, it appears to also reflect an increase in household leverage. Although we cannot measure historical loan-to-value ratios directly, household mortgage debt appears to have risen faster than total real estate asset values in many countries including the United States. The resulting record-high leverage ratios can damage household balance sheets and therefore endanger the overall financial system. Figure 2 displays the ratio of household mortgage lending to the value of the total U.S. housing stock over the past 100 years. As the figure shows, that ratio has nearly quadrupled from about 0.15 in 1910 to about 0.5 today. (2)

An increase in leverage for households is not necessarily a bad thing. it allows households to make investments and to smooth their consumption over longer periods. But it can, of course, get to be too high. High leverage makes households less able to handle shocks such as unemployment, divorce and death. it would be helpful for economists to better model a socially optimal level of household leverage in order to guide regulators. The CFPB has taken a stab at this with its relatively new Ability-to-Repay regulation but we do not yet know if they got it right.

Countercyclical Regulation of Housing Finance

Pat McCoy has posted Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Following the 2008 financial crisis, countercyclical regulation emerged as one of the most promising breakthroughs in years to halting destructive cycles of booms and busts. This new approach to systemic risk posits that financial regulation should clamp down during economic expansions and ease during economic slumps in order to make financial firms more resilient and to prick asset bubbles before they burst. If countercyclical regulation is to succeed, however, then policymakers must confront the institutional and legal challenges to that success. This Article examines five major challenges to robust countercyclical regulation – data gaps, early response systems, regulatory inertia, industry capture, and arbitrage – and discusses a variety of techniques to defuse those challenges.

Readers of this blog will be particularly interested in the section titled “Sectoral Regulatory Tools.” (34 et seq.) This section gives an overview of countercyclical tools that can be employed in the housing finance sector:  loan-to value limits; debt-to-income limits; and ability-to-repay rules. McCoy ends this section by noting,

The importance of the ability-to-repay rule and the CFPB’s exclusive role in promulgating that rule has another, very different ramification. It is a mistake to ignore the role of market conduct supervisors such as the CFPB in countercyclical regulation. The centrality of consumer financial protection in ensuring sensible loan underwriting standards – particularly for home mortgages – underscores the vital role that market conduct regulators such as the CFPB will play in the federal government’s efforts to prevent future, catastrophic real estate bubbles. (44)

While this seems like an obvious point to me — sensible consumer protection acts as a brake on financial speculation — many, many academics who study financial regulation disagree. If this article gets some of those academics to reconsider their position, it will make a real contribution to the post-crisis financial literature.

Kroll on Mortgage Performance

The Kroll Bond Rating Agency has issued an update of its residential mortgage-backed securities model methodology, Residential Mortgage Default and Loss Model. Before the financial crisis, ratings models seemed to be very reliable, data-driven models of probity and caution. We have since learned that different mortgage vintages (the year of origination) can behave very differently and ratings models could be based on simplistic assumptions. Hopefully, the updated Kroll model does not suffer from those flaws, although their key takeaways seem pretty basic to me:

  • Underwriting standards are the fundamental determinant of mortgage quality.
  • Negative home equity creates a major incentive for borrower default, resulting in substantial credit loss.
  • Credit scores continue to have value as a relative indicator of risk.
  • Inflation of real home prices above the long-term mean is unsustainable and represents increased credit risk. (4-5)

Kroll’s update does include some interesting revisions, including,

Reduced default expectations for purchase loans. It has long been observed that purchase loans generally have lower default risk than refinancings, all else being equal. This is attributed to the fact that a purchase represents an actual arms-length transaction which yields a more accurate view of a home’s value than an equivalent refinancing transaction. However the pre-crisis mortgage vintages showed high levels of default associated with purchase mortgages. This was largely due to the practice of extending credit to first time homebuyers, often on very favorable terms despite these borrowers having little credit history or poor credit history. This poor performance by purchase loans was reflected in the historical data regression analysis used to develop the RMBS model.

Based on analysis focused on both jumbo and conforming prime mortgages, KBRA has found that, for these loans, the traditional benefits of purchase loans remain well established, and we have adjusted the model ‘s treatment of purchase loans to reflect lower default expectations relative to equivalent refinancing mortgages. This revision is effective with the publication of this report.

*     *     *

Penalty for high debt-to-income (DTI) loans. While the KBRA RMBS model does not contain a specific risk parameter based on DTI, it is our opinion that very high DTI loans can bear significant incremental risk. When we began to encounter newly originated loans with back-end DTIs in excess of 45%, we assigned an additional default penalty to such loans. This has been documented in presale reports for those rated RMBS backed by loans with high DTIs. (3)

Time will tell if Kroll got it right . . ..

Mortgage Leverage and Bubbles

Albert Alex Zevelev has posted Regulating Mortgage Leverage: Fire Sales, Foreclosure Spirals and Pecuniary Externalities to SSRN. The abstract reads,

The US housing boom was accompanied by a rise in mortgage leverage. The subsequent bust was accompanied by a rise in foreclosure. This paper introduces a dynamic general equilibrium model to study how leverage and foreclosure affect house prices. The model shows how foreclosure sales, through their effect on housing supply, amplify and propagate house price drops. A calibration to match the bust shows consumption and housing need to be sufficiently complementary to fit the data. Since leverage plays a key role in foreclosure, a regulator can reduce systemic risk by placing a cap on leverage. Counterfactual experiments show that in a world with less leverage, the same economic shock leads to less foreclosure and less severe, shorter busts in house prices. A 90% cap on loan-to-value ratios in 2006 predicts house prices would have fallen 12% rather than 18% as in the data. The regulator faces a trade-off in that less leverage means less housing for constrained households, but also fewer foreclosures and less severe busts in house prices. A regulator with reasonable preference parameters would choose a cap of 95%.

This is pretty important stuff as it attempts to model the impact of different LTV ratios on prices and foreclosure rates. Now Zevelev is not the first to see these interactions, but it is important to  model how consumer finance regulation (for instance, loan to value ratios) can impact systemic risk. This is particularly important because many commentators downplay that relationship.

I am not in a position to evaluate the model in this paper, but its conclusion is certainly right: “Leverage makes our economy fragile by increasing the risk of default. It is clear that
foreclosure has many externalities and they are quantitatively significant. Since borrowers
and lenders do not fully internalize these externalities, there is a case for regulating mortgage leverage.” (31)

Housing Finance Reform at a Glance

The Urban Institute has posted its November Housing Finance At A Glance.  This is a really valuable resource. The introduction provides a nice overview of recent developments in the area:

With a sweeping midterm election victory for the GOP, the path to legislative GSE reform got considerably narrower. Thus, the focus for reform turns to the FHFA and FHA, where we expect significant movement in the coming months. Over the past six months, the FHFA has asked for input on a variety of issues, and we have commented on them all: guarantee fees and loan level pricing adjustments, Private Mortgage Insurance Eligibility requirements (PMIERs), the single security, and affordable housing goals.
The FHFA has made a concerted effort to open the credit box, strengthening the provision by which lenders are relieved from much of their put-back risk and raising the maximum loan-to-value ratio for some GSE loans from 95 to 97. Both will help expand access without unduly increasing GSE risk. FHFA Director Mel Watt has indicated in recent speeches that work is underway to further clarify reps and warrants, with more guidance on the sunset provision, an independent resolution process for put-back disputes, and remedies short of a put-back for lesser mistakes.
As our new credit availability index indicates, these actions to open the credit box are very important. Our index shows that post-crisis loans have half the credit risk of loans made in the 2000-2003 period. The GSE channel is particularly tight, with about a third of the risk of the 2000-2003 period. This is corroborated by the data in our special feature, which shows that only 8.3 percent of recent Fannie loans (page 34) and 7.4 percent of recent Freddie loans (page 36) have FICOs under 700, compared to 35-37 percent in 1999-2004.
On the FHA side, there have also been initiatives to open the credit box, as outlined in the Blueprint for Access program. Since then, the FHA has released the initial critical draft chapters of their guidebook and a draft of the taxonomy of defects. Many hope to see lower mortgage insurance premiums to broaden access and lessen the risk of adverse selection as better credit flees to the less costly GSEs. Given that their actuary now projects that the FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund will not reach the statutory reserve requirements until 2016, however, such a move is far from certain.
Risk Sharing Developments
The GSEs continue to broaden their risk sharing activities, now turning to front-end risk sharing deals. Prior to this month, they had focused exclusively, and with much success, on laying off risk already on their books, known as back-end risk sharing. Fannie has laid off risk on 7.5 percent of their book of business and Freddie on 11.9 percent of theirs (page 21), both far exceeding the requirements of the Conservatorship Scorecard. The GSEs started including mortgages over 80 LTV in these transactions in May.
This month saw a very meaningful step in bringing private capital back into the mortgage market: the first front-end risk sharing deal, JPMorgan’s Madison Avenue Securities 2014-1 (page 21). JP Morgan warehoused loans made by JP Morgan Chase bank, then sold them in bulk into a newly issued Fannie Mae MBS, presumably for a very meaningful reduction in guarantee fees. JP Morgan retained the first 4.75 percent subordinated interest, and a 26.88 bps servicing strip that absorbs losses before the subordinated interest. The risk on the 4.75 percent subordinated interest was sold in the capital markets in the form of credit linked notes. Redwood Trust is also reported to be contemplating a front-end risk sharing transaction.
Front-end risk sharing bears important similarities to the private capital/catastrophic insurance structure contemplated by many GSE reform proposals. It is thus an administrative opportunity to experiment deliberately with a truly reduced government footprint in the conventional mortgage market. (3)
I am very excited by the possibility of putting private capital in a first loss position for residential mortgages and agree with UI that the stars are aligning, at least a little bit, for this to become a reality. Many interests will need to be balanced for this to move forward, but politicians of all stripes should be worried about leaving Fannie and Freddie in limbo for much longer.