Tag Archives: mortgage

Co-signing: Smart or Stupid?

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1200px-Alice_Sara_Ott_-_Signature

Realtor.com quoted me in Co-signing a Mortgage: Smart or Stupid? It opens,

There’s no doubt about it: Buying a home these days is hard. Even if you’re lucky enough to be a homeowner yourself, that doesn’t mean your kids or assorted loved ones can easily follow in your footsteps—at least, not without help.

One way that “help” can occur for home buyers who don’t qualify for a mortgage? Getting someone else—like you, dear reader—to co-sign. In a nutshell, that means that if they can’t pay their monthly dues, the lender will expect you to cough up the cash instead.

 It’s a noble idea, helping someone buy a home. But also, of course, a scary one. It’s no surprise that many co-signers are parents doing what parents do: putting their own financial well-being aside to help their children move into a home.

But let’s be clear here: The risks are huge. Some of them are obvious, but there are plenty more that you may not have even considered. So if you’re considering co-signing, it’s best you know exactly what you’re getting into, and how to protect your finances in case things don’t go well. Here are the main caveats and considerations to keep in mind.

Identify if your borrowers (and you) are good candidates

We’re not saying co-signing is a terrible idea across the board. There are plenty of legit reasons why those near and dear to you may have trouble getting the loan on their own—say, because they’re self-employed, which makes banks leery. But if your kid can’t get a loan because he just can’t seem to pay his AmEx card on time, well, that’s a different story. Judge your own risk accordingly.

Co-signers should also consider whether they’re good candidates to be taking on more financial commitments. Generally, you should consider co-signing only if you meet a few requirements. For example, “You own your home free and clear and don’t require much credit or have a need for it,” says Mary Anne Daly, senior mortgage adviser with San Francisco–based Sindeo.

Consider the pitfalls

If your borrower has a less-than-stellar history of paying back creditors or holding down a job, proceed with caution. Extreme caution.

“Unfortunately, I’ve seen parents dig further into their savings to pay the mortgage when their child can’t make the payment,” says Ryan Halset, a Realtor® with Seattle-based Boardwalk Real Estate. And if you can’t pay, it will tarnish your credit history and future odds of borrowing money.

“Your chance of getting a loan yourself in the future could be in jeopardy,” says Janine Acquafredda, an associate broker with Brooklyn-based House N Key Realty. “Not to mention the risk of ruining relationships if things go sour.” But maybe that last part’s a given.

Think like a lender

Hard as it might be, try to keep your personal relationship with the home buyer from coloring your decision. Even if it’s your child or a longtime pal, it shouldn’t (entirely) trump the warning signs.

“Before you commit, think like a lender and look at the borrower’s income, work history, and existing debt to determine if the borrower is worthy and not a potential liability to your good credit,” says Frank Tarala, owner of Sterling Heights, MI–based Principal Brokers Network.

Saying no may be tough, but it could save you tons of heartache down the road. David Reiss, professor of law and academic program director for the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship, recounts a situation where parents stepped in as co-signers just before the financial crisis hit. The home’s value plunged by more than half. The borrower then left the area—and his home—in search of a new gig and couldn’t make both the mortgage payments and the rent on his new apartment.

“The parents, retirees living on a modest pension in their own home, found themselves dealing with the default of their son’s mortgage with no financial resources available as a buffer,” Reiss says. “This situation has devolved into a nightmare of defaults and attempted short sales with no end in sight.”

Creative Credit Union Mortgages

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Credit Union

DepositAccounts.com quoted me in Types of Institutions in the U.S. Banking System – Credit Unions. It reads, in part,

What You Need to Know About Credit Unions

For more than 100 years, credit unions have been providing financial services to their members. Forget about what you thought you knew about credit unions. Long gone are the days when credit unions were seemingly only a “bank” for government employees. Today some 100 million Americans are member-owners of 6,900 credit unions and credit unions have more than $1 trillion in assets.

The Credit Union National Association (CUNA) defines a credit union as a non-for-profit, member-owned financial cooperative, democratically managed by its members, and operated for the purpose of promoting thrift, providing credit at competitive rates, and providing other financial services to its members.

Simply put — credits unions are about their members, not profits.

 *     *     *

How are credit unions different from banks?

“They are structured very differently. Credit unions don’t issue stock or pay dividends to outside shareholders, so they are not beholden to outside third party interests,” says Steve Rick, chief economist of CUNA Mutual Group, an insurer and maker of financial productions within credit unions.

Each person who holds an account is a member, and each member has one vote, “rather than the voices of only the powerful few stockholders heard at for-profit banks. And all earnings go straight back to members in the form of favorable interest rates and lower fees that other for-profit institutions can’t beat,” he adds.

Banks are governed by paid shareholders and voting rights depend on the number of shares owned. Earnings go to outside bond and stockholders in the form of dividends.

As cooperatives, credit unions are part of a broader cooperative community that shares philosophies around benefiting their member owners. One of the core missions of the credit union system is to educate its members on financial issues to ensure their financial health.

“It’s worth noting that credit unions can offer creative types of mortgages that should be explored by first-time and experienced homebuyers alike. The PenFed Credit Union, along with some other credit unions, has a 5/5 ARM that adjusts every five years. A product like this combines aspects of a fixed rate mortgage (fewer, but not the fewest) surprises about payment sizes, with aspects of an ARM (lower, but not the lowest) interest rates,” says David Reiss, a Brooklyn Law School professor specializing in real estate.

Did Dodd-Frank Make Getting a Mortgage Harder?

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Christopher Dodd

Christopher Dodd

Barney Frank

 

 

____________________________________________________________

The short answer is — No. The longer answer is — No, but . . .

Bing Bai, Laurie Goodman and Ellen Seidman of the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center have posted Has the QM Rule Made it Harder to Get a Mortgage? The QM rule was originally authorized by Dodd-Frank and was implemented in January of 2014, more than two years ago. The paper opens,

the qualified mortgage (QM) rule was designed to prevent borrowers from acquiring loans they cannot afford and to protect lenders from potential borrower litigation. Many worry that the rule has contributed to the well-documented reduction in mortgage credit availability, which has hit low-income and minority borrowers the hardest. To explore this concern, we recently updated our August 2014 analysis of the impact of the QM rule. Our analysis of the rule at the two-year mark again finds it has had little impact on the availability of mortgage credit. Though the share of mortgages under $100,000 has decreased, this change can be largely attributed to the sharp rise in home prices. (1, footnotes omitted)

The paper looks at “four potential indicators of the QM rule’s impact:”

  1.  Fewer interest-only and prepayment penalty loans: The QM rule disqualifies loans that are interest-only (IO) or have a prepayment penalty (PP), so a reduction in these loans might show QM impact.
  2. Fewer loans with debt-to-income ratios above 43 percent: The QM rule disqualifies loans with a debt-to-income (DTI) ratio above 43 percent, so a reduction in loans with DTIs above 43 percent might show QM impact.
  3. Reduced adjustable-rate mortgage share: The QM rule requires that an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) be underwritten to the maximum interest rate that could be charged during the loan’s first five years. Generally, this restriction should deter lenders, so a reduction in the ARM share might show QM impact.
  4. Fewer small loans: The QM rule’s 3 percent limit on points and fees could discourage lenders from making smaller loans, so a reduction in smaller loans might show QM impact. (1-2)

The authors find no impact on on interest only loans or prepayment penalty loans; loans with debt-to-income ratios greater than 43 percent; or adjustable rate mortgages.

While these findings seem to make sense, it is important to note that the report uses 2013 as its baseline for mortgage market conditions. The report does acknowledge that credit availability was tight in 2013, but it implies that 2013 is the appropriate baseline from which to evaluate the QM rule. I am not so sure that this right — I would love to see some modeling that shows the impact of the QM rule under various credit availability scenarios, not just the particularly tight credit box of 2013.

To be clear, I agree with the paper’s policy takeaway — the QM rule can help prevent “risky lending practices that could cause another downturn.” (8) But we should be making these policy decisions with the best possible information.

Final Accounting for National Mortgage Settlement

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Attributed to Jacopo de' Barbari

Luca Pacioli, A Founding Father of Accounting

Joseph Smith, the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement, has issued his Final Compliance Update. He writes,

I have filed a set of five compliance reports with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement (NMS or Settlement). The following report summarizes these reports, which detail my review of each servicer’s performance on the Settlement’s servicing reforms. This report includes:

• An overview of the process through which my team and I have reviewed the servicers’ work.

• Summaries of each servicer’s performance for the third quarter 2015.

Pursuant to the Settlement, the requirement to comply with the servicing standards ended for Bank of America, Chase, Citi, Ditech and Wells Fargo as of the end of the third quarter 2015. Accordingly, this is my last report under the NMS for these servicers. Like all mortgage servicers, they are still required to follow servicing-related rules issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). (2)

Smith concludes,

The Settlement has improved the way these servicers treat distressed borrowers, and, under its consumer relief requirements, the banks provided more than 640,000 borrowers with $51 billion in debt forgiveness, loan modifications, short sale assistance and refinancing at a time when families and the market were subject to distress and uncertainty.

I believe the Settlement has contributed towards the rebuilding of public trust and confidence in the mortgage market and hope that it will inform future regulation of financial institutions and markets. I look forward to further discussions on these topics among policymakers, consumer advocates and mortgage servicers. (13)

I have blogged about the Monitor’s earlier reports and have been somewhat unhappy with them. Of course, his primary audience is the District Court to which he is submitting these reports. But I do not believe that the the reports have “contributed towards the rebuilding of public trust and confidence in the mortgage market” all that much. The final accounting should be accurate, but it should also be understandable to more than a select few.

The reports have been opaque and have not give the public (even the pretty well-informed members of the public, like me) much information with which to contextualize their findings. I hope that future settlements like this take into account the need to explain the findings of decision makers and court-appointed monitors so that the public can have a better sense of whether justice was truly done.

Risky Rent-to-Own

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photo by Steve Snodgrass

The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review quoted me in Rent-to-Own Option for Home Shoppers Rife with Pitfalls, Experts Caution. It opens,

Finding the right rental house was more difficult than Phyllis Lombardi anticipated.

“It’s hard to find a big enough house that allows pets, for the number of people we have in South Fayette,” said Lombardi, 45. She and her husband have four children living at home.

The Lombardis are moving because the owners of the house they are renting want to sell. But the couple isn’t ready to buy. The husband’s income was cut by more than half when they relocated to the Pittsburgh area several years ago, and they are repairing their finances after a short sale on a home.

Finding no rentals in South Fayette that meet her criteria and price, Lombardi is going with an option suggested by her real estate broker: Pick a house for sale on the market and do a rent-to-own contract with an investor who would buy it.

Rent-to-own agreements require prospective buyers to pay rent with an option to purchase the house at a later date, usually within two to five years. It can broaden the options for people with checkered credit histories who think they might soon be in a position to buy.

But it is an industry with a lot of shady operators and which can prove costly to prospective buyers who are not careful, said David Reiss, a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School.

“In some cases, these programs are based on the idea of hope springs eternal,” Reiss said. “But a large percentage of them are likely to fail.”

The terms of these contracts vary, but renters often pay a premium above market price, with a portion of that going toward the eventual cost to buy the home.

Many times, renters reach the end of the agreement and are still unable to buy, forfeiting everything they have paid — rent, fees and any premium toward the purchase price — to the owner and walk away with nothing, said Max Beier, a real estate attorney Downtown.

“Traditionally, what you’re going to have in these agreements is a default provision that’s pretty harsh,” he said. “Commonly, you’re going to lose 100 percent of the equity you’ve paid.”

And many don’t come with the same renter protections. For example, maintenance and upkeep costs are often the tenant’s responsibility — just as if they owned the home.

Also, the penalty for late rent payments tends to be more severe than the standard 5 percent for a late mortgage payment, and even cause someone to be kicked out of the home, Reiss said.

“The rights you have as a tenant in a rent-to-own situation are not as clear and not as good as if you were a homeowner,” Reiss said.

The Future of Securitization

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SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Piwowar

SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar’s Remarks at ABS Vegas 2016 are worth a look for all of those interested in the future of the mortgage-backed securities market. I have interspersed selections of his remarks with my comments:

As our country’s capital markets regulator, the SEC’s tripartite mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.  Securitization can transform illiquid assets like mortgages, auto loans, credit card receivables, and future sales of David Bowie albums into marketable securities.  By serving as an efficient means of allocating scarce capital, securitization supports economic growth, business development, and job creation.  Securitization further fosters resiliency by diversifying the funding base of our economy.

There are many other benefits associated with securitization, including the potential for reduced costs of, and expanded access to, credit for borrowers, the ability to match risk profiles for specific investor demands, and increased secondary market liquidity.  Because banks and other originators can move loans off of their balance sheets into asset-backed securities (ABS), securitization can increase the availability of credit for both businesses and individuals.  In many instances, securitization can allow a person to obtain more favorable terms than can be obtained from a bank or other financial institution.

Thus, the ABS market serves as a critical source of capital, providing funding for home and automobile loans, credit cards, and many other purposes.  Yet, as shown during the recent financial crisis, investors may abandon the ABS market if they do not believe they possess sufficient information to evaluate the risks associated with a particular asset-backed security and to price it accordingly.

While I generally agree with Piwowar’s assessment of securitization’s value, it is worth noting that he does not acknowledge how important robust consumer protection is to maintaining a healthy securitization market over the long run.

I found his discussion of the Dodd-Frank credit risk retention rules particularly interesting:

For the record, I voted against the credit risk retention rules.  These rules require a securitizer to retain a minimum 5% credit risk of any securitization transaction and generally prohibit the sponsor from hedging its retained interest.  I was particularly dismayed by the “one-size-fits-all” approach taken by the regulators to create a flat 5% risk retention requirement for all asset classes, except for securitizations involving so-called “qualified residential mortgages” (QRMs) for which the risk retention level is zero.  These were arbitrary choices.

Residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, credit card receivables, and automobile loans each have distinct and different attributes associated with their underlying borrowers.  Rather than carefully examining these attributes to determine an optimal credit risk retention rate for each asset class, prudential regulators in Washington, D.C., took the easy way out – they simply set it at the maximum statutory rate and ignored the authorization from Congress to create lower risk retention requirements or use alternative methods to align interests.

Perhaps the prudential bureaucrats had their own conflict of interests in setting these requirements.  After all, a prudential bureaucrat has a strong interest in self-preservation.  Will a prudential bureaucrat get credit if optimally tailored risk retention rates increase economic growth and provide additional opportunities to families and businesses across America?  No.  Will a prudential bureaucrat take the blame if the next financial crisis – and there will be one eventually – relates at all to securitizations?  Probably.  Hence, what better way to side step responsibility than to refrain from using reasoned judgment and rely solely on the most risk-averse interpretation of statute instead?

Bureaucratic self-preservation might also explain the decision to adopt as broad of an exemption for QRMs as possible, so as to minimize any political fallout from the real estate and housing industries.  Few will disagree that residential mortgage-backed securities played an important role in the 2008 financial crisis.  For those in the audience involved in RMBS offerings, you must be quite happy with the broad exemption from the risk retention rules.  For those of you in the audience who are involved in other types of securitizations that had little, if any, part in causing the financial crisis, you are probably wondering why you were unfairly targeted.  Unfortunately, unlike Las Vegas, what happens in Washington does not stay in Washington. (footnotes omitted)

Piwowar gives short shrift to the benefits of clear and simple rules, but it is still worth paying attention to his critique of the “one size fits all” risk retention rules. If researchers can demonstrate that these rules are not optimally tailored, perhaps that would provide a reason to reconsider them. This is, of course, a long shot, given that the rules have been finalized, but Piwowar is right to shine light on the issue nonetheless.

Candid and thoughtful remarks from regulators are always refreshing. These make the grade.

Docs You Need for A Mortgage

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photo by LaurMG

HSH.com quoted me in The Documents You Need To Apply for a Mortgage. It opens,

When it comes time to apply for a mortgage in 2016, you might be surprised at how much documentation you’ll need when applying for a home loan.

J.D. Crowe, president of Southeast Mortgage in Lawrenceville, Georgia, says most of the documentation should be familiar to you if you have applied for a mortgage loan in the last five years. If you’re new to the mortgage market this year, he says, this is all new.

The new Qualified Mortgage rules that took effect on January 10, 2014 make this paperwork even more important. To meet the new Qualified Mortgage rules, lenders will be even more diligent in collecting the paperwork that proves that you can afford your monthly mortgage payments.

David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School in Brooklyn, N.Y., says that while the documentation requirements under the new Qualified Mortgage rules might come as a shock to those who haven’t applied for a mortgage since 2008, they are common-sense requirements for the most part.

“These are really common-sense rules,” Reiss says. “The new rules say that mortgage lenders are no longer allowed to throw out the common-sense standards of lending money during boom times, when they might be tempted to overlook long-term financial goals for quick profits. If the rules help that happen, they’ll be a good thing.”