- Morgan Stanley agrees to pay the DOJ $2.6 billion to end investigation about its mortgage-backed securities deals during the financial crisis.
- MetLife settles with DOJ for $123.5 million for issuing mortgages that did not meet underwriting standards.
- State Farm will refund $352.5 million to customers for overcharging them for homeowners’ insurance.
- New York City apartment owners are suing Lexington Insurance Co. for failing to pay more than a third of its $95.3 million claims from Superstorm Sandy.
- Bank of America moves to dismiss Ambac’s $600 million claim that Countrywide issued faulty residential mortgage-backed securities.
Tag Archives: mortgages
Friday’s Government Report Roundup
- CRS Report, ‘Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI): Programs and Policy Issues’, by Sean Lowry. (Need Bloomberg BNA Subscription)
- Consumers’ mortgage shopping experience, by CFPB.
- HUD Subsidized More Than 106,000 Noncompliant Households. (Discussing HUD’s large-scale failure in oversight of requirement that persons living in subsidized housing perform eight hours of community service per month, or enroll in job training).
Wednesday’s Academic Roundup
- Banking Integration and House Price Comovement, by Augustin Landier, David Alexandre Sraer & David Thesmar, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10295.
- Second-Liens and the Leverage Option, by Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, U of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ Research Paper.
- Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe – From Themselves, by Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 163, Forthcoming NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 15-03.
- Who Wins Residential Property Tax Appeals?, by Randall K. Johnson, Columbia Journal of Tax Law, Forthcoming Mississippi College School of Law Research Paper No. 2015-01.
- The Theft of Affordable Housing: How Rent Stabilized Apartments are Disappearing from Fraudulent Individual Apartment Improvements and What Can Be Done to Save Them, by Justin R. La Mort, New York University Review of Law & Social Change, Forthcoming.
Hockett on NYC Eminent Domain
Bob Hockett has posted ‘We Don’t Follow, We Lead’: How New York City Will Save Mortgage Loans by Condemning Them to SSRN. The abstract reads,
This brief invited essay lays out in summary form the eminent domain plan for securitized underwater mortgage loans that the author has been advocating and helping to implement for some years now. It does so with particular attention in this case to New York City, which is now actively considering the plan. The essay’s first part addresses the plan’s necessity. Its second part lays out the plan’s basic mechanics. The third part then systematically addresses and dispatches the battery of remarkably weak legal and policy arguments commonly proffered by opponents of the plan.
Hockett has been advocating this plan for some time in the face of concerted opposition from the financial industry. One industry argument that I have found to be over the top is that lenders will refuse to lend in communities that employ eminent domain to address the foreclosure crisis. Hockett writes,
Another policy argument made by some members of the securitization industry is that using eminent domain to purchase loans will dry up the sources of mortgage credit, rendering the American dream of homeownership unattainable. The financial services industry and its legislative supporters have made this kind of claim against regulatory and consumer protection proposals emerging from national, state, or municipal legislatures.
One problem with this argument is that private credit has not flowed to non-wealthy mortgage borrowers since the crash. Federal lenders and guarantors are nearly the only game in town, and they are likely to remain so until the underwater PLS loan logjam is cleared.
Another problem with the credit withdrawal argument is that it characterizes a benefit as a burden. The housing bubble was, like most of the more devastating bubbles through history, the upshot of an over-extension of credit. Lenders extended excess credit through reverse redlining and other predatory lending practices perpetrated or aided and abetted by participants in the securitization industry itself. Hence the securitization industry’s warning that credit might not be overextended in the future is a warning of something that might well be desirable. (142-43, footnotes omitted)
Given that lenders always rush to lend to countries that have recently defaulted on their sovereign debt, I don’t find the credit withdrawal argument to be particularly convincing here. But it may succeed in convincing some local governments not to proceed with their eminent domain strategies. I do hope, however, that at least one locality will follow through during the current foreclosure crisis. That way, we will at least have a proof of concept for the next foreclosure crisis.
Cool Mortgage Tool
The Urban Institute has created a cool interactive tool to map mortgages in the United States. Enterprise describes the tool as follows: it
maps 12 years of data on more than 100 million mortgage originations throughout the U.S. by race and ethnicity, illustrating how the housing boom and bust affected borrowers of different backgrounds by metropolitan area. According to the data, not only were African-American and Hispanic communities particularly damaged by the housing bust, but they have also been the least likely to recover since the recession. The map also shows how geographically uneven the housing recovery has been. For instance, while mortgage originations have only decreased 18 percent in San Francisco and San Jose since 2005, they have fallen by 39 percent in Detroit.
The Urban Institute argues that
For a full mortgage market recovery, we need to expand the credit box again. A number of reforms can be undertaken to encourage lending to creditworthy borrowers who would have qualified before the housing boom. A return to 2005 and 2006 lending practices would be ill-fated, but the pendulum has unquestionably swung too far. Today’s tight standards have locked out many prospective borrowers from homeownership, disproportionately preventing African American and Hispanic families from building wealth and benefiting from the recovery.
There is a growing outcry to loosen credit. It is important that those calling for that loosening also support reforms that ensure that new credit is sustainable credit. The last thing that people need is a mortgage that has a high likelihood of ending up in default. The Urban Institute acknowledges this point, but it can get lost in the political fight over the future of housing finance.
Policy folk also need to better understand how homeownership helps households build wealth, particularly given the rapid changes in the mortgage market. If households can readily access the equity in their homes through home equity loans, homeownership’s wealth-building function becomes more of a consumption spreading one. That is, if homeowners access equity in the present in order to supplement current income, they will not be building wealth over the long term.
The robust Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should protect consumers from predatory attempts to get them to refinance, but people may not protect their future selves from their current desires. This may just be the way it goes, but we should not make claims about wealth building until we know more about how homeownership in the 21st century actually promotes it.
Risky Cash-Out Refis
Anil Kumar of the Dallas Fed has posted Do Restrictions on Home Equity Extraction Contribute to Lower Mortgage Defaults? Evidence from a Policy Discontinuity at the Texas’ Border to SSRN. The abstract reads
Given that excessive borrowing helped precipitate the housing crisis, a key component of a policy agenda to prevent future meltdowns is effective regulation to curb unaffordable mortgage debt. Texas is the only US state that limits home equity borrowing to 80 percent of home value. Anecdotal reports have long suggested that home equity restrictions shielded Texas homeowners from the worst of the subprime mortgage crisis. But there is, as yet, no formal empirical investigation of these restrictions’ role in curbing mortgage default. This paper is the first to empirically estimate the impact of Texas home equity restrictions on mortgage default using individual and loan level data from three different sources. The paper exploits the policy discontinuity around Texas’ interstate borders induced by the home equity restrictions to identify the causal effect of home equity extraction on mortgage default in a border discontinuity design framework. The paper finds that limits on home equity borrowing in Texas lowered the likelihood of mortgage default by about 2 percentage points with a significantly larger impact on mortgage borrowers in the bottom quartile of the credit score distribution. Estimated default hazards for mortgages within 50 to 100 miles of the Texas’ border decline sharply as one crosses into Texas. Overall, the paper finds evidence that Texas’ home equity restrictions exert a robust negative impact on mortgage default.
This is a really important paper asking a really important question. If its findings are confirmed, it brings us back to that age-old question of paternalism in consumer financial protection: should we limit a consumer’s choice if that choice is consistently shown to have harmful effects? I am not sure where I come down in this particular case, but I wonder if some version of Quercia et al.‘s benefit ratio could help measure the costs and benefits of such a rule. The benefit ratio compares “the percent reduction in the number of defaults to the percent reduction in the number of borrowers who would have access to [a certain type of] mortgages.” (20) I am not sure whether access to cash out refi mortgages is of the same import as purchase mortgages or even plain old refis, but the concept of the benefit ratio might still make sense in this context.
Subprime Mortgage Conundrums
Joseph Singer has posted Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How to Fix Them (also on SSRN). Singer writes,
One of the striking features of the subprime era is that banks acted without adequate regard for state property law. They were intent on serving the national and international financial markets with new and more profitable products, and they treated state property law as an obstacle to get around rather than a foundation on which to build. Rather than sell mortgages to families that could afford them, they hoodwinked the vulnerable by picking their pockets. Rather than honestly disclose the high risks associated with subprime loans, they paid rating agencies to give them AAA ratings, inducing investors to take risks they neither were prepared for nor understood. The banks made huge amounts of money marketing mortgages to people who could not afford to pay them back while offloading the risks of such deals onto hapless third parties. And rather than observe longstanding laws and customs designed to clarify property titles, banks evaded requirements of publicity and formality that traditionally governed real estate transactions. In short, the banks misled both borrowers and investors while undermining property titles. This was both a clever and a profitable way to engage in business, but it was neither honorable nor responsible. (501, footnotes omitted)
Brad Borden and I have made a similar point in our debate with Joshua Stein, but Singer’s article plays it out in far greater depth. The article is a property prof’s cri de coeur over the near death of real property law principles during the early 2000s subprime boom, but it is also a very thorough inquest. The article concludes with a review of tools that are available to respond to failures in the mortgage market. All in all, it provides a nice overview of what led to the crisis as well as potential policy tools that are available to prevent future ones.
