Failure to Refinance

photo by GotCredit

Benjamin Keys, Devin Pope and Jaren Pope have recently had their Failure to Refinance paper accepted in the Journal of Financial Economics.  A version of the paper can be found on SSRN. This academic paper has a lot of relevance to many a homeowner. The abstract reads,

Households that fail to refinance their mortgage when interest rates decline can lose out on substantial savings. Based on a large random sample of outstanding U.S. mortgages in December of 2010, we estimate that approximately 20% of households for whom refinancing would be optimal and who appeared unconstrained to do so, had not taken advantage of the lower rates. We estimate the present-discounted cost to the median household who fails to refinance to be approximately $11,500, making this a particularly large consumer financial mistake. To shed light on possible mechanisms and corroborate our main findings, we also provide results from a mail campaign targeted at a sample of homeowners that could benefit from refinancing.

 The authors conclude,

Our results suggest the presence of information barriers regarding the potential benefits and costs of refinancing. Expanding and developing partnerships with certified housing counseling agencies to offer more targeted and in-depth workshops and counseling surrounding the refinancing decision is a potential direction for policy to alleviate these barriers for the population most in need of financial education.

In addition, the magnitude of the financial mistakes that households make suggest that psychological factors such as procrastination, trust, and the inability to understand complex decisions are likely barriers to refinancing. One policy that has been suggested to overcome the need for active household participation would require mortgages to have fixed interest rates that adjust downward automatically when rates decline To the extent that it is undesirable to reward only those households that are able to overcome the computational and behavioral barriers of the refinance process, policies such as an automatically-refinancing mortgage may be beneficial. Although an automatically-refinancing mortgage contract would be more expensive up-front for all borrowers in equilibrium, it would remove the cross-subsidization in the current mortgage finance system, where savvier homeowners who use their refinancing option when rates decline are subsidized by those households who fail to do so. (20, citation omitted)

I have heard a number of proposals that call for automatically refinancing mortgages. Such a mortgage product would shake up the mortgage market in its current form and require a transition period to figure out how it should be priced. But the net result would certainly benefit homeowners in the aggregate.

Shaking up the Title Industry

Deeds

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit issued an opinion in Edwards v. The First American Corporation et al., No. 13-555542 (Aug. 24, 2015) that may shake up how the title insurance industry works. As the court notes,

The national title insurance industry is highly concentrated, with most states dominated by two or three large title insurance companies. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Title Insurance: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of the Title Industry and Better Protect Consumers 3 (Apr. 2007). A “factor that raises questions about the existence of price competition is that title agents market to those from whom they get consumer referrals, and not to consumers themselves, creating potential conflicts of interest where the referrals could be made in the best interest of the referrer and not the consumer.” Id. Kickbacks paid by the title insurance companies to those making referrals lead to higher costs of real estate settlement services, which are passed on to consumers without any corresponding benefits. (9)

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) is intended to eliminate illegal kickbacks in the real estate industry. In this case, the 9th Circuit has reversed the District Court’s denial of class certification in a case in which home buyers alleged that First American engaged in a scheme of paying title agencies for referring title insurance business to First American in violation of RESPA. The reversal does not get to the merits of the underlying claims, but it does open up a can of worms for title companies.

The title industry is not only highly concentrated but it is also highly profitable. In some jurisdictions like NY its prices are set by regulation at rates that greatly exceed the actuarial risks they face. Regulators like the NYS Department of Financial Services have begun to pay more attention to the title insurance industry. This is a welcome development, given that title insurance is one of the most expensive closing costs a homeowner faces when buying a home or refinancing a mortgage.

The Prime Crisis

Ben Franklin, Founder of the University of Pennsylvania

Fernando Ferreira and Joseph Gyourko, both at Penn’s Wharton School, have posted A New Look at the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: Panel Data Evidence of Prime and Subprime Borrowers from 1997 to 2012 to SSRN. Unfortunately it is behind a National Bureau of Economic Research paywall. The paper makes the case for “a reinterpretation of the U.S. foreclosure crisis as more of a prime, rather than a subprime, borrower issue.” (1) The authors conclude,

The housing bust and its consequences are among the defining economic events of the past quarter century. Constructing and analyzing new and very large micro data spanning the cycle and all sectors of the mortgage market leads us to reinterpret the ensuing foreclosure crisis as something much more than a subprime sector issue. Many more homes were lost by prime mortgage borrowers, and their loss rates not only increased relatively early in the crisis, but stayed high through 2012. This new characterization of the crisis motivates a very different empirical strategy from previous research on this topic. Rather than focus solely on the subprime sector and subprime traits, we turn to the traditional home mortgage default literature that explains outcomes in terms of common factors such as negative equity and borrower illiquidity.

The key empirical finding is that negative equity conditions can explain virtually all of the difference in foreclosure and short sale outcomes of Prime borrowers compared to all Cash owners. This is true on average, over time (including the spike in their foreclosure rate beginning in 2009), and across metropolitan areas. Given the predominance of this group in terms of foreclosures and short sales, this is tantamount to explaining the crisis itself. We can explain much, but not all, of the variation in Subprime borrower outcomes in terms of negative equity or borrower illiquidity conditions, so something potentially ‘special’ about the subprime sector still is unaccounted for. That said, it also could be that a less noisy measure of borrower illiquidity would be able to account for this residual variation. That remains for future research.

None of the other ‘usual suspects’ raised by previous research or public commentators change this conclusion. Housing quality traits, household demographics (race or gender), buyer income, and speculator status do not have a material influence on outcomes across borrower types. Certain loan-related attributes such as initial LTV, whether a refinancing occurred or a second mortgage was taken on, and loan cohort origination quarter do have some independent influence, but they are much weaker than that of current LTV. (27)

I will have to leave it to other empiricists to evaluate whether this sure-to-be-controversial study is methodologically sound, but I sure did find their policy conclusion to be interesting:

We are not able to provide a definitive recommendation one way or another, but we can rule out one noteworthy reason offered for not aiding homeowners—namely, that the crisis was mostly about irresponsible subprime sector actors (both lenders and borrowers) who were undeserving of transfers. Of course, this is not to say that there was no such behavior. The evidence from other research and serious journalists is that there was. However, it is clear from the passage of time (and the accumulation and analysis of new data that provides) that the problem was much more widespread and systemic.  (28)

Hopefully, this is a lesson that we can take with us into the next (inevitable) housing crisis so we lay the foundation for policy solutions based on facts and not rely on moral judgments about borrowers that are built on shaky ground.

Borrowing from Yourself

MainStreet.com quoted me in Dipping Into Your 401(k) to Finance the Purchase of a Home is a Tricky Decision. It reads, in part,

Dipping into the funds she had amassed in her 401(k) account to make up the remaining difference for her down payment was not a decision that Alyson O’Mahoney embarked on lightly.

After contemplating the benefits and disadvantages of borrowing $40,000 from her retirement account to use for a down payment on her mortgage, the marketing executive for Robin Leedy & Associates in Mount Kisco, N.Y. was certain that she making the right choice.

O’Mahoney was undaunted by the prospect of having another bill each month, even though she opted out of discussing this critical decision with her financial advisor — as she knew he would discourage her.

“It all fit into my debt and income ratio and the bank was fine with it,” she said. “I pay it back automatically with each paycheck and the 5% interest goes to me. It was the easiest process.”

Many financial advisors steer their clients away from borrowing from their retirement, because employers will typically demand that you repay the loan within a short period if you leave your job or get fired. If you can’t pay it back from your savings, then the loan will be treated as a distribution that is subject to federal and state income tax, as well as an early withdrawal penalty of 10% if you’re under the age of 59.5, said Shomari Hearn, a certified financial planner and vice president at Palisades Hudson Financial Group in the Fort Lauderdale, Fla. office.

“If you’re contemplating leaving your company within the next few years or are concerned about job security, I would advise against taking out a loan from your 401(k),” he said.

*     *     *

If you accept another job offer, refinancing your mortgage may be difficult when you are facing a time crunch, said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“If you leave your job, the loan will come due, and you will have to figure out how to repay it – potentially just at the time it would be hardest to do so,” he said. “Given that it might be hard to refinance the property on such short notice, you might find yourself stuck between a rock and a hard place.”

En-Titled Insurance

Benjamin M. Lawsky, the New York State Superintendent of Financial Services, has promulgated a proposed regulation regarding title insurance that is sure to shake up the title industry and, more importantly, reduce closing costs for NY homeowners.

The proposed regulation opens with a statement of its scope and purpose:

(a) The purpose of this Part is to promote the public welfare by proscribing practices that are not in accordance with Insurance Law section 2303, which provides that insurance rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. This Part also interprets and implements Insurance Law section 6409(d), which prohibits giving any consideration or valuable thing as an inducement for title insurance business, as well as Insurance Law section 6409(e), which states that title insurance premiums shall reflect the anti-inducement prohibition of Insurance Law section 6409(d).

(b) This Part further protects consumers, pursuant to the authority of Insurance Law sections 2110 and 2119 and Article 24 and Financial Services Law sections 301 and 302, by ensuring that the title insurance industry provides valuable products and services to consumers at reasonable rates and fees and does not overcharge consumers or charge improper and excessive fees that constitute engaging in untrustworthy behavior and unfair and deceptive acts and practices. (Section 227.0 )

New York has long had some of the most expensive title insurance premiums in the country, so homeowners and other owners of real estate should welcome this development. Title insurance agents are not allowed to compete on price in NY, so they compete for business from real estate lawyers (who typically select the title insurance agent for any given transaction) by offering them all sorts of perks such as hard-to-get tickets to events and fancy meals. The proposed regulation attempts to rein in this behavior.

The NYS Department of Financial Services will be accepting comments for 45 days after the proposed regulation is published in the State Register, so get crackin’.

HELOC vs. Cash-out Refinance for Card Debt Repayment

CreditCards.com quoted me in HELOC vs. Cash-out Refinance for Card Debt Repayment. It reads, in part,

On paper, it may look as if it makes a lot of sense to replace high interest card debt with a low interest payment if you have home equity you can tap into. If it’s available and will ease your pay-off pain, why not use it, right?

While using a home equity line of credit (HELOC) or cash-out refinance (in which you refinance your mortgage, but tack on an additional cash payout) to rectify your debt woes might seem like a no-brainer, there are lots of factors to consider to determine which avenue is right for you or if you should go that route at all.

“One size doesn’t fit all,” says Malcolm Hollensteiner, director of retail lending sales at TD Bank. “Utilizing equity to pay down or eliminate higher interest rate consumer debt can be a very beneficial strategy, but it should be done in moderation, accessing some — not all — of your equity,” he says.

Gone are the days when banks allowed homeowners to tap into 125 percent of their home value (thanks to the lessons learned during the real estate market meltdown, which left many people “underwater,” owing more on their home loans than the value of the home). And, you’ll need to have a respectable credit score to qualify. But even with more restrictions in place now than in years past, borrowers still should tread carefully if they’re contemplating borrowing against their home.

“Although the interest rates are much lower on a HELOC or cash-out, the issue becomes that you’re taking your short-term debt and turning it into something you’re going to be paying back for 30 years,” says John Walsh, CEO of Total Mortgage Services.

And then there’s the risk factor. Before you jump on that lower rate, you have to understand that if you cannot keep up with your new payments, you risk going into foreclosure, warns David Reiss, professor of law and research director of the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School, who also writes the REFinBlog. “In other words, you are getting the lower rate in exchange for putting up your house as collateral for the debt,” he says.

With stakes this high, it’s not as simple as using a HELOC or cash-out refinance as your “get out of debt free” card. Here are the factors you need to consider.

*     *     *

As you consider your options, think about both the short-term and long-term benefits and costs, says Reiss. “You can’t think of home equity as free money. That’s your retirement, money you may leave to your children or use for an emergency. It’s money that your future self may need,” he says. If you do decide to move forward, make sure you’re using your home equity wisely — paying off your debt would fall into that category, as long as you commit to smart spending habits moving forward.

Take an honest assessment of where you are in life, and think through your ability to pay off the debt in whatever form it may take. “Run some numbers, and talk this through with someone whose financial judgment you trust,” says Reiss. By being honest with yourself and becoming an educated consumer, you can figure out which option makes the most sense for you.

Tall Mortgage Tales

Todd Zywicki has posted The Behavioral Law and Economics of Fixed-Rate Mortgages (and Other Just-So Stories) to SSRN. The article contains

SPOILER ALERT!

a spoof, in order to make a larger point.

The abstract reads,

A major cause of the recent financial crisis was the traditional American mortgage, which is distinctive for the following features: it is a thirty-year, self-amortizing loan with an unlimited right to prepay. The United States is unique in the world for standardizing on a mortgage product with these features. Yet not only have a majority of the foreclosures that occurred during the financial crisis been fixed-rate mortgages, the fixed-interest-rate characteristics have undermined efforts by the Federal Reserve and government to assist recovery of the housing market. Moreover, the long fixed-rate term and ability to refinance are highly expensive and suboptimal features for many consumers. Nevertheless, many consumers persist in purchasing this mortgage. Drawing on the methodology of behavioral law and economics, this article provides rationalizations for how behavioral law and economics can explain the persistence of a product that is so harmful to many consumers and to the economy at large. The article then draws conclusions about what this analysis means for the behavioral law and economics research program generally and for the use of behavioral law and economics in government policymaking.

 I have a lot to say about this article but I don’t want to ruin it for you!  Suffice it to say, the article is a provocative critique of behavioral law and economics. Those of us who hope to see a healthy mortgage market develop would do well to take this critique seriously — even if you end up rejecting its broader implications.