- HSBC facing suit for breaching its duties as trustee for 271 residential mortgage-backed securities trusts.
- The US Supreme Court considered whether debtors should have an absolute right to appeal denial of proposed bankruptcy plan after three circuit courts have found that debtors can automatically can appeal, while in other jurisdictions, the bankruptcy judge must permit the appeal.
- BNP Paribas Mortgage Corp. suit from 2009 regarding Bank of America’s mishandling of hundreds of millions of dollars of mortgage-backed notes issued by Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corp. finally settles.
Tag Archives: residential mortgage-backed securities
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- New Jersey Condominium Association files a complaint alleging that the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) breached its contracts by failing to pay flood insurance benefits for damage from Hurricane Sandy.
- The US Supreme Court justices are reviewing an Eleventh Circuit decision that allows second-mortgage liens to disappear for Chapter 7 debtors when the first mortgage is undersecured. The justices expressed concern in letting this happen.
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. suit against RBS Securities Inc. for $140 million over residential mortgage-backed securities is dismissed as time-barred under recent US Supreme Court ruling in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger.
- UBS Americas Inc. has settled confidentially with Capital Ventures International over alleged $109 million of risky mortgage-backed securities.
Frannie Conservatorships: What A Long, Strange Trip It’s Been
The Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General has posted a White Paper, FHFA’s Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Long and Complicated Journey. This White Paper on conservatorships updates a first one that OIG published in 2012. This one notes that over the past six years,
FHFA has administered two conservatorships of unprecedented scope and simultaneously served as the regulator for these large, complex companies that dominate the secondary mortgage market and the mortgage securitization sector of the U.S. housing finance industry. Congress granted FHFA sweeping conservatorship authority over the Enterprises. For example, as conservator, FHFA can exercise decision-making authority over the Enterprises’ multi-trillion dollar books of business; it can direct the Enterprises to increase the fees they charge to guarantee mortgage-backed securities; it can mandate changes to the Enterprises’ credit underwriting and servicing standards for single-family and multifamily mortgage products; and it can set policy governing the disposition of the Enterprises’ inventory of approximately 121,000 real estate owned properties. (2)
I was particularly interested by the foreward looking statements contained in this White Paper:
Director Watt has repeatedly asserted that conservatorship “cannot and should not be a permanent state” for the Enterprises. Director Watt has indicated that under his stewardship FHFA will continue the conservatorships and build a bridge to a new housing finance system, whenever that system is put into place by Congress. In this phase of the conservatorships, FHFA seeks to place more decision-making in the hands of the Enterprises. (3)
Those who have been hoping that the FHFA will act decisively in the face of Congressional inaction should let that dream go. And given that just about nobody believes (I still hope though) that there will be Congressional reform of Fannie and Freddie during the remainder of the Obama Administration, we must face the reality that we are stuck with the conservatorships and all of the risks that they foster for the foreseeable future. Today’s risks include historically high rates of mortgage delinquencies and exposure to defaults by counterparties like private mortgage insurers. As I have said before, the risks that Fannie and Freddie are nothing to laugh at. Let’s hope that the FHFA is up to managing them until Congress finally acts.
Reiss on Toxic Debt Claims
Bloomberg quoted me in Nomura First to Fight U.S. Toxic Debt Claims at Trial. The article reads in part,
Nomura Holdings Inc. will defend claims by a U.S. regulator that it sold defective mortgage-backed securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before the 2008 financial crisis, becoming the first bank to take such a case to trial.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency, suing on behalf of the two government-owned companies, claims Nomura sold them $2 billion of bonds backed by faulty mortgages. The agency seeks more than $1 billion in damages in the trial, which is set to start Monday in Manhattan federal court.
Nomura, the Tokyo-based investment bank, is choosing to fight claims that 16 other banks settled after the blow-up of toxic mortgage bonds led to the global credit crunch. FHFA has reached $17.9 billion in settlements from banks including Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs & Co. If Nomura prevails at trial, it may embolden other firms facing mortgage-related suits to defend themselves rather than settle.
* * *
For Nomura and RBS to succeed, they will have to overcome Cote’s rulings as well as the widely held perception that banks packaged toxic debt and pushed it off on unsuspecting investors, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
Reiss said Nomura may believe it can show it was more careful than other banks in structuring mortgage-backed bonds and stands a good chance of winning.
As the trial approaches, a settlement becomes less likely, Bloomberg Intelligence analysts Elliott Stein and Alison Williams said yesterday. Stein said a resolution this late in the proceedings may exceed his earlier estimate of $100 million to $300 million, particularly if Cote’s rulings continue to favor FHFA.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Shareholders of Deutsche Bank petitioned for cert to the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the standard for a claim for pleading a fraudulent claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 following the Second Circuit tossing their suit in July 2014.
- 10th Circuit revives National Credit Union Administration’s $550 million suit against Barclays for misrepresentation of the quality of over $555 million in RMBS.
- First wave of Hurricane Sandy cases settle with FEMA and insurers over the improper cutting of the homeowners’ payouts following the storm.
Monday’s Adjudication Roundup
- Morgan Stanley agrees to pay the DOJ $2.6 billion to end investigation about its mortgage-backed securities deals during the financial crisis.
- MetLife settles with DOJ for $123.5 million for issuing mortgages that did not meet underwriting standards.
- State Farm will refund $352.5 million to customers for overcharging them for homeowners’ insurance.
- New York City apartment owners are suing Lexington Insurance Co. for failing to pay more than a third of its $95.3 million claims from Superstorm Sandy.
- Bank of America moves to dismiss Ambac’s $600 million claim that Countrywide issued faulty residential mortgage-backed securities.
Treasury Gives RMBS a Workout
The Treasury has undertaken a Credit Rating Agency Exercise. According to Michael Stegman, Treasury
recognized that the PLS market has been dormant since the financial crisis partly because of a “chicken-and-egg” phenomenon between rating agencies and originator-aggregators. Rating agencies will not rate mortgage pools without loan-level data, yet originator-aggregators will not originate pools of mortgage bonds without an idea of what it would take for the bond to receive a AAA rating.
Using our convening authority, Treasury invited six credit rating agencies to participate in an exercise over the last several months intended to provide market participants with greater transparency into their credit rating methodologies for residential mortgage loans.
By increasing clarity around loss expectations and required subordination levels for more diverse pools of collateral, the credit rating agencies can stimulate a constructive market dialogue around post-crisis underwriting and securitization practices and foster greater confidence in the credit rating process for private label mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The information obtained through this exercise may also give mortgage originators and aggregators greater insight into the potential economics of financing mortgage loans in the private label channel and the consequent implications for borrowing costs.
While this exercise is very technical, it contains some interesting nuggets for a broad range of readers. For instance,
The housing market, regulatory environment, and loan performance have evolved significantly from pre-crisis to present day. Credit rating agency models appear to account for these changes in varying ways. All credit rating agency models incorporate the performance of loans originated prior to, during, and after the crisis to the degree they believe best informs the nature of credit and prepayment risk reflected in the market. Credit rating agency model stress scenarios may be influenced by loans originated at the peak of the housing market, given the macroeconomic stress and home price declines they experienced. The credit rating agencies differ, however, in how their models adjust for the post-crisis regime of improved underwriting practices and operational controls. Some credit rating agencies capture these changes directly in their models, while other credit rating agencies rely on qualitative adjustments outside of their models. (10)
It is important for non-specialists to realize how much subjectivity can be built into rating agency models. Every model will make inferences based on past performance. The exercise highlights how different rating agencies address post-crisis loan performance in significantly different ways. Time will tell which ones got it right.
