Tag Archives: risk

Deductible Up, Premium Down

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photo by Stewart Black

InsuranceQuotes.com quoted me in Homeowners Insurance: Higher Deductibles Lower Premiums, But Can You Afford to Take the Risk? It opens,

Raising the deductible on your home insurance policy is one proven way to save money on your premiums, but it’s not the best financial decision for every homeowner.

Before you reach for the phone to bump up your deductible there are two important factors to consider: Do you have enough money saved to cover higher out-of-pocket claim costs, and have you discussed potential savings and ramifications with an insurance agent?

“The bottom line is that you want to make sure you are comfortable with the deductible amount you’ve selected,” says Stacy Molinari, personal lines and claims manager of Insurance Marketing Agencies, Inc. “And that means you need to make sure you have enough of a financial cushion to cover the deductible. Otherwise it could cost you more in the long run.”

So, just how much savings are out there when switching to a higher deductible? Let’s break it down by looking at a report commissioned by insuranceQuotes.com.

The 2016 Quadrant Information Services study examined the average economic impact of increasing a home insurance deductible (i.e. how much you pay out of pocket for a claim before your insurance coverage kicks in). Using a hypothetical two-story, single-family home covered for $140,000, the study looked at how much an annual U.S. home insurance premium can decrease after increasing the deductible.

According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), the average home insurance premiums is $1,034, and the study examined three different percentage increases and their respective premium savings:

  • Increase from $500 to $1,000: 7 percent savings.
  • Increase from $500 to $2,000: 16 percent savings.
  • Increase from $500 to $5,000: 28 percent savings.

What makes home insurance deductibles so significant?

In short, a home insurance deducible is one of many gauges an insurance company uses to determine how much risk the consumer is willing to accept. A higher deductible means more risk being taken on by the homeowner, and that additional risk makes it cheaper to insure the policyholder.

“A higher deductible is a signal to the insurance company that the homeowner is less likely to file claims because they are agreeing to a higher threshold for doing so,” says David Reiss, law professor and research director at Brooklyn Law School’s Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship. “And the less likely you are to make a claim, the lower your premium is going to be.”

Spreading Mortgage Credit Risk

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photo by A Syn

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has released the Single-Family Credit Risk Transfer Progress Report. Important aspects of Fannie and Freddie’s future are described in this report. It opens,

Since 2012, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has set as a strategic objective that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac share credit risk with private investors. While the Enterprises have a longstanding practice of sharing credit risk on certain loans with primary mortgage insurers and other counterparties, the credit risk transfer transactions have taken further steps to share credit risk with private market participants. Since the Enterprises were placed in conservatorship in 2008, they have received financial support from the U.S. Department of the Treasury under the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs). The Enterprises’ credit risk transfer programs reduce the overall risk to taxpayers under these agreements.

These programs have made significant progress since they were launched in 2012 and credit risk transfer transactions are now a regular part of the Enterprises’ businesses. This progress is reflected in FHFA’s 2016 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions (2016 Scorecard), which sets the expectation that the Enterprises will transfer risk on 90 percent of targeted single-family, 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages. FHFA works with the Enterprises to ensure that credit risk transfer transactions are conducted in an economically sensible way that effectively transfers risk to private investors.

This Progress Report provides an overview of how the Enterprises share credit risk with the private sector, including through primary mortgage insurance and the Enterprises’ credit risk transfer programs. The discussion includes year-end 2015 data, a discussion of which Enterprise loan acquisitions are targeted for the credit risk transfer programs, and an overview of investor participation information. (1, footnotes omitted)

This push to share credit risk with private investors is a significant departure from the old Fannie/Freddie business model and it should do just what it promises: reduce taxpayer exposure to credit risk for the trillions of dollars of mortgages the two companies guarantee through their mortgage-backed securities. That being said, this is a relatively new initiative and the two companies (and the FHFA, as their conservator and regulator) have to navigate a lot of operational issues to ensure that this transfer of credit risk is priced appropriately.

There are also some important policy issues that have not been settled. The FHFA has asked for feedback on a series of issues in its Single-Family Credit Risk Transfer Request for Input, including,

  • how to “develop a deeper mortgage insurance structure” (RfI, 17)
  • how to develop credit risk transfer strategies that work for small lenders (RfI, 18)
  • how to price the fees that Fannie and Freddie charge to guarantee mortgage-backed securities (RfI, 19)

Congress has abdicated its responsibility to implement housing finance reform, so it is left up to the FHFA to make it happen. Indeed, the FHFA’s timeline has this process being finalized in 2018. The only way for the public to affect the course of reform is through the type of input the FHFA is now seeking:

FHFA invites interested parties to provide written input on the questions listed [within the Request for Input] 60 days of the publication of this document, no later than August 29, 2016. FHFA also invites additional input on the topics discussed in this document that are not directly responsive to these questions.

Input may be submitted electronically using this response form. You may also want to review the FHFA’s update on Implementation of the Single Security and the Common Securitization Platform and its credit risk transfer page as it has links to other relevant documents.

Nonbank Servicers Pose Risks for Homeowners

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Christy Goldsmith Romero, Special Inspector General for the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP)

SIGTARP Special Inspector General Romero

The Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) has released its Quarterly Report to Congress (April 27, 2016). The Report focuses on how nonbank servicers raise risks for homeowners participating in the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). (65) The report states that

Mortgage servicers are the single largest factor in determining whether homeowners applying for, or participating in, TARP’s signature foreclosure prevention program HAMP are given a fair shot, and whether the program runs effectively and efficiently. This is because Treasury has contracted with mortgage servicers to play a predominant role in HAMP, by making the day-to-day decisions related to HAMP that have enormous implications for homeowners seeking relief. Mortgage servicers decide whether homeowners are eligible for HAMP, whether homeowners get a trial run in the program, and whether that trial run should result in the servicer permanently modifying the homeowners’ mortgages. Mortgage servicers decide how the mortgage will be modified, such as whether a homeowner will get a lower interest rate, and if so, what rate. Mortgage servicers decide how much the homeowner will have to pay each month. Mortgage servicers also apply payments they receive, and they make decisions on whether a homeowner should be terminated from the program. Because of this outsized role, all mortgage servicers are required to comply with HAMP rules, and federal laws. Following HAMP rules and federal laws is necessary to protect homeowners from harm.

Non-banks who service mortgages have increased their participation in HAMP, and now play a larger role in HAMP than bank servicers, but that was not always the case.

*     *      *

HAMP and its related programs have become a lucrative business and reliable source of income for non-bank servicers. Treasury pays mortgage servicers for every homeowner who receives a permanent mortgage modification in HAMP. Nonbank mortgage servicers have received $1.1 billion in Federal TARP dollars from Treasury through the HAMP program.

As non-bank servicers increase their role in HAMP, the risk to homeowners has also increased. Non-bank servicers have less federal regulation than banks that service mortgages. Some of the largest non-bank servicers have already been found to have violated laws in their treatment of homeowners, and have been the subject of enforcement actions by the federal or a state government. Some of the largest non-bank servicers also have been found to have violated HAMP’s rules in their treatment of homeowners. This increased risk to homeowners must be met with increased oversight to ensure that homeowners are treated fairly, and that HAMP and its related programs are effective and efficient. (65, notes removed)

Regulators and other government agencies have been taking a hard look at servicers recently (take a look at this and this). It is important for federal regulators to get their oversight of servicers right because they can and do cause mountains of misery for homeowners when things goes wrong.

Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Wednesday’s Academic Roundup

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Friday Government Report Roundup

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Accurately Measuring Mortgage Availability

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The Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has posted a research report, Measuring Mortgage Credit Availability Using Ex-Ante Probability of Default. This report tackles an important subject:

How to strike a balance between credit availability and risk to achieve a sustainable housing market is a much-debated topic today, but these discussions are not grounded in good measurements of credit availability and risk. We address this problem below with a new index that measures credit availability and risk simultaneously

The first section of the paper discusses the limitations of the existing measures. The second section describes our development of the new index, which distills borrower credit profiles, loan products and terms, and macro economic conditions into a measurement of the weighted average probability of default for mortgages originated at a given time. The third section illustrates the value of this measure by empirically exploring the varying risk appetites of the market as a whole, and of market segments, which directly aids evidence-based policymaking on how to open the tight credit box. The final section discusses the limitations of this new index. (1)
The report concludes,
Measuring a concept as complicated and varied as credit access is no easy task. Yet this is an important time to ensure that it is being measured accurately. As we seek to reform the housing finance system, Congress, the housing finance industry, advocacy groups, policymakers, and even the general public need to clearly understand how well the market is providing access to mortgage credit for borrowers. (18)
I say amen to that. There is a slim chance that housing finance reform may be back on the table in Washington, given the midterm election results. We need as much good data we can get in order to structure a system based on solid principles rather than on the views of special interests that typically dominate this debate.
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