The Unzoned City

Matt Festa has posted an interesting, short article, Land Use in the Unzoned City, to SSRN. He writes,

The popular conception that Houston is unzoned because it is some sort of ultra-Texan free-market landscape is not accurate. Houston’s land use is in fact highly regulated. While no Houston ordinance explicitly uses the “z-word,” and its rules for the most part don’t prescribe limitations on use, there are numerous land use regulations that, in any other city, would be part of the zoning code. Houston defines certain areas as “urban” versus “suburban,” with different regulations.There are laws prescribing minimum lot sizes, which in turn restrict density. There are setbacks from the street, buffer zones for development, and regulated street widths. There are other laws that affect land use, such as the new historical preservation ordinance, which allows citizens to petition the council for designation as a historic area, which comes with additional restrictions. These are all government measures that, in my opinion, operate as “de facto zoning”— they prescribe different land use rules based partly on geographic location. And even these rules pale in comparison to the extensive regime of private covenants and deed restrictions that govern a majority of the property in Houston. (17)

Festa explains that this lack of zoning may have some partial explanations that have to do with the culture of the city. But he finds a more compelling explanation in the ban on zoning contained in the Houston City Charter. This ban, which can only be overturned by referendum, has been challenged three times but zoning supporters have come up a bit short each time.

Festa is certainly correct that land use scholars (Edward Glaeser, for instance) use Houston as a foil to communities that heavily limit new construction with restrictive zoning provisions. So Festa’s thesis is an important one that I hope he develops in a longer article. Until we determine how much less restrictive Houston’s land use regime is than other American cities’ formal zoning ordinances, we can’t fully understand the interaction between restrictive land use policies and the housing crisis affecting cities across the country.

Affordable Flood Insurance in NYC

The Rand Corporation has posted Flood Insurance in New York City Following Hurricane Sandy. The report has a chapter on affordability issues that is worth a read, particularly as the de Blasio Administration undertakes its ambitious affordable housing plan. The report notes that

many New Yorkers will face substantially higher flood insurance premiums moving forward. Many more structures will be in areas considered high-risk than in the past, and premiums for many structures already in high-risk areas will be based on considerably higher flood levels.

*     *    *

These substantial premium increases will reduce the disposable income or wealth (or both) of many households and may well be unaffordable for some. In the absence of intervention, the consequences may be foreclosures, turnover, and hardship for some of New York City’s more-vulnerable citizens.(63)

The book goes on to review a variety of approaches “for addressing the affordability issue.” (67) It reviews “tax credits, grants, and vouchers that could be applied toward the cost of flood insurance.” (63) It also notes that such interventions distort “the price signal that incentives property owners to invest in risk-mitigation measures in order to reduce premiums.” (67) It considers proposals to deal with such distortion, such as a means-tested voucher program that is coupled “with a requirement that mitigation measures be taken that make sense for the property.” (67) The book only scratches the surface of this topic, noting that more “information is needed to address the advantages and disadvantages of alternative strategies for addressing affordability.” (68)

As the de Blasio Administration considers the preservation portion of its affordable housing agenda, one could imagine that a concerted effort to incentivize risk mitigation while also promoting affordability could be a significant component of the final plan. Solutions could range from deferred payment, due on sale or refinance of a home, to outright subsidies as outlined by the Rand report. Whatever the ultimate solution is, the problem should be incorporated into the City’s planning now.

Can You Help Someone Become Financially Capable?

Researchers at the World Bank have posted Can You Help Someone Become Financially Capable? A Meta-Analysis of the Literature.The abstract reads,

This paper presents a systematic and comprehensive meta-analysis of the literature on financial education interventions.  The analysis focuses on financial education studies designed to strengthen the financial knowledge and behaviors of consumers. The analysis identifies188 papers and articles that present impact results of interventions designed to increase consumers’ financial knowledge (financial literacy) or skills, attitudes, and behaviors (financial capability). These papers are diverse across a number of dimensions, including objectives of the  program intervention, expected outcomes, intensity and duration of the intervention, delivery channel used, and type of population targeted. However, there are a few key outcome indicators where a subset of papers are comparable, including those that address savings behavior, defaults on loans, and financial skills, such as record keeping. The results from the meta analysis indicate that financial literacy and capability interventions can have a positive impact in some areas (increasing savings and promoting financial skills such a record keeping) but not in others (credit default).

I hope that policy makers at the CFPB have reviewed this paper carefully. The Bureau has a financial education mission that must be built on solid research if it hopes to improve outcomes for consumers. A lot of the scholarly work in this area has questioned the efficacy of financial education, but the Bureau seems to be going full speed ahead with it. The Bureau should bore down into the literature to determine which types of interventions are effective before allocating funds indiscriminately to new initiatives.

I am particularly concerned about the last sentence of the abstract which indicates that interventions have failed to improve consumer behavior when it comes to credit default. That seems to be a big problem for any financial skills initiative. Further research should focus on alternative interventions that might be effective in reducing credit default by consumers. And funds should not be wasted in the interim on unproven initiatives in this area.

Open Season on Homeowners

A case coming out of California, Peng v. Chase Home Finance LLC et al., California Courts of Appeal Second App. Dist., Div. 8, April 8th, 2014, has attracted a lot of attention in the blogosphere. This is particularly notable because this case is not to be published in the official reports and thus has no precedential value. Judge Rubin’s dissent has attracted much of the attention. It opens,

The promissory note signed by appellants Jeffry and Grace Peng obligated them to repay their home loan. In August 2007, Freddie Mac acquired the promissory note from Chase. Based on Freddie Mac owning the note, appellants seek to amend their complaint to allege Chase did not have authority to enforce the promissory note or to foreclose on their home, but the majority rejects appellants’ proposed amendment. Relying on case law rebuffing a homeowner’s challenge to a creditor-beneficiary’s authority to foreclose, the majority notes that courts have traditionally reasoned that the homeowner’s challenge is futile because, even if successful, the homeowner “merely substitute[s] one creditor for another, without changing [the homeowner’s] obligations under the note.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 271.) The only party prejudiced by an illegitimate creditor-beneficiary’s enforcement of the homeowner’s debt, courts have reasoned, is the bona fide creditor-beneficiary, not the homeowner.

Such reasoning troubles me. I wonder whether the law would apply the same reasoning if we were dealing with debtors other than homeowners. I wonder how most of us would react if, for example, a third-party purporting to act for one’s credit card company knocked on one’s door, demanding we pay our credit card’s monthly statement to the third party. Could we insist that the third party prove it owned our credit card debt? By the reasoning of Fontenot and similar cases, we could not because, after all, we owe the debt to someone, and the only truly aggrieved party if we paid the wrong party would, according to those cases, be our credit card company. I doubt anyone would stand for such a thing. (Dissent, 1)

The dissent’s concern is justified. As Professor Whitman has recently noted on the Dirt Listserv and elsewhere, it is a “bizarre notion that anyone can foreclose a mortgage without showing that they have the right to enforce the note.” He also notes that the majority (and even the dissent) in Peng confuse ownership of the note with the right to enforce it. Until courts fully understand how the UCC governs the enforcement of notes, one should worry that some state court judges might declare an open season on homeowners as the majority does here in Peng.

Inside Johnson-Crapo

Enterprise Community Partners, Inc. has posted Inside Johnson-Crapo: What the Senate Housing Finance Reform Bill Could Mean for Low- and Moderate-income Communities. Parsing the various Congressional proposals for housing finance reform is hard enough for an expert, let alone for an interested observer. This policy brief provides a helpful overview of the proposal that is setting the terms for the debate today, with a focus on low- and moderate-income homeownership. Its key findings include:

  • The bill, called the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 or S. 1217, lays a clear and thoughtful path forward for the nation’s housing finance system, including the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
  • A new federal agency, modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, would oversee the entire secondary mortgage market and establish a new system of government-insured mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In exchange for a fee, the agency would provide limited insurance against catastrophic losses on qualifying securities issued by private companies. Investors in the private companies would need to incur significant losses before the insurance pays out to holders of the MBS. The bill also winds down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage companies that were placed under government conservatorship in 2008.
  • The bill includes several provisions to ensure that the new system adequately serves low- and moderate-income communities. First, it requires any issuer of government-insured securities to serve all eligible single-family and multifamily mortgages. Second, it preserves the GSEs’ current businesses for financing rental housing, while ensuring that those businesses continue to support apartments that are affordable to low-income families. Third, it requires issuers to contribute funding to programs that support the creation and preservation of affordable housing. Finally, it creates new market-based incentives to serve traditionally underserved segments of the housing market.
  • Enterprise strongly supports the direction laid out in this bill and appreciates the inclusion of important multifamily provisions. At the same time, we suggest several proposals to further strengthen the bill. Among other things, we recommend that lawmakers promote a level playing field among eligible risk-sharing models; authorize the federal regulator to enforce the bill’s “equitable access” rule; expand the scope of the affordable housing fee; simplify the incentives for supporting underserved market segments; and establish separate insurance funds for single-family and multifamily securities. (1)

The left has criticized Johnson-Crapo for not doing enough for low- and moderate-income homeownership. The right has criticized it for leaving too much risk with the taxpayer. But it seems that a broad center finds that the outline provided by the bill provides a way forward from the zombie-state housing finance finds itself in, with a Fannie and Freddie neither fully alive nor fully dead. Nobody seems to think that a bill will pass this year. But hopefully Congress will keep attending to this issue and we can soon see a resurrected housing finance system, one that can take us through much of the 21st Century just as Fannie and Freddie got us through the 20th.

 

Reiss on BoA-FHFA Settlement

Inside The GSEs quoted me in BofA MBS Lawsuit Settlement Shrinks List of FHFA Defendants (behind a paywall). It reads,

It’s only a matter of time before the remaining big bank defendants settle lawsuits filed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency over billions in non-agency mortgage-backed securities sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the years leading up to the housing crisis, predicts a legal expert.

Last week, Bank of America agreed to a $9.3 billion settlement that covers its own dealings as well as those of Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch, which it acquired in 2008. The agreement covers some $57 billion of MBS issued or underwritten by these firms.

BofA did not admit liability or wrongdoing but it will pay $5.8 billion in cash to Fannie and Freddie and repurchase about $3.5 billion in residential MBS at market value. In return, FHFA’s lawsuits against the bank will be dismissed with prejudice.

The FHFA said it is working to resolve the remaining lawsuits regarding non-agency MBS purchased by the GSEs between 2005 and 2007. The suits involve alleged violations of federal and state securities laws and allegations of common law fraud. One week earlier, the Finance Agency announced that Credit Suisse Group had agreed to pay $885 million to settle a similar lawsuit.

Under the terms of that agreement, Credit Suisse will pay approximately $234 million to Fannie and approximately $651 million to Freddie. In exchange, certain claims against Credit Suisse related to the securities involved will be released.

So far, the FHFA’s lawsuits have recovered $19.5 billion in total payments. Expect more where that came from, said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

“Every case is different and each institution has a different risk profile in terms of litigation strategy,” said Reiss. “The BofA settlement is so high profile because it’s Countrywide. It gives a lodestar when trying to figure out how low [defendants] can go in a settlement offer.”

Prior to the BofA deal, the FHFA had collected $8.9 billion in prior settlements. The Morgan Stanley settlement is the fourth largest of those settlements, behind Deutsche Bank, which agreed to pay $1.93 billion in December, and JPMorgan Chase, which reached a $4 billion settlement in October.

The bank defendants have repeatedly tried and failed to dismiss the FHFA suits on procedural grounds, including a claim that the cases were no longer timely.

In October, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the banks, prompting the expectation in legal circles that few, if any, of the remaining cases will ever go to trial.

“I don’t think that if you are a [big bank] defendant, that you see a particularly favorable judiciary,” said Reiss. “You see that the government is able to reach deals with companies in front of you and I think you’re thinking about settling.”

Entities that have yet to settle non-agency MBS claims with the FHFA include Barclays Bank, First Horizon National Corp., Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Nomura Holding America and the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Reiss on Dimming of FIRREA

Inside MBS & ABS quoted me in Judge Recommends Dismissal of DOJ’s Fraud Case Against BofA, But It May Not End FIRREA Claims (behind paywall). It reads,

A North Carolina federal magistrate has recommended that a Justice Department fraud case against Bank of America be dismissed, but he also said a separate Securities and Exchange Commission lawsuit against the bank based on a different federal law should proceed.

The DOJ last August filed suit against BofA under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, accusing the bank of defrauding investors in the sale of $855 million of nonagency MBS. Last week, U.S. Magistrate David Cayer of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina found that the government failed to prove the bank made “material” false statements to the former Federal Housing Finance Board.

The DOJ claimed that BofA “willfully” misled investors, including the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco and Wachovia Corp. – now owned by Wells Fargo – about the risks in the 2008 offering by failing to fully disclose the risk of 1,191 jumbo adjustable-rate mortgages backing the deal.

FIRREA allows the government to seek civil penalties equal to losses suffered by federally insured financial institutions, with a maximum of $1.1 million per violation. The 1989 law was a little used relic of the savings and loan aftermath until government lawyers began recently to invoke it widely in addition to other charges.

The law gives agency lawyers the ability to tap grand jury material and to subpoena documents. FIRREA also has a 10-year statute of limitations, longer than the typical five years for fraud cases, allowing government lawyers more time to pursue cases related to the 2007-2008 financial crisis.

The magistrate rejected the government’s claim that BofA’s statements were in violation of FIRREA because the FHLBank of San Francisco was within the jurisdiction of the FHFB. Cayer found that policing such statements did not fall within the agency’s purview and there was no indication that either the FHFB or the FHLBank ever complained about the MBS.

The magistrate recommended the DOJ’s case be dismissed without prejudice, although District Judge Max Cogburn will have the final word. Cayer allowed a parallel complaint filed by the SEC to move forward.

David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, noted that U.S. district judges often give deference to reports from magistrate judges. But even if Cogburn opts to dismiss the DOJ’s case, it’s less an indictment against the use of FIRREA and more an indication that the government filed its case incorrectly, he said.

“Is it a harbinger that all other judges are going to change their minds about the broad reading of FIRREA? I don’t see that at all,” Reiss told Inside MBS & ABS. “I see judges in New York and in other jurisdictions continuing to allow the government to broadly interpret FIRREA based on its plain language. They are reading the text of the statute and saying the government can act.”