Tag Archives: Dodd Frank

Bank Break-ins

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Chris Odinet has posted Banks, Break-Ins, and Bad Actors in Mortgage Foreclosure to SSRN. The abstract reads,

During the housing crisis banks were confronted with a previously unknown number mortgage foreclosures, and even as the height of the crisis has passed lenders are still dealing with a tremendous backlog. Overtime lenders have increasingly engaged third party contractors to assist them in managing these assets. These property management companies — with supposed expertise in the management and preservation of real estate — have taken charge of a large swathe of distressed properties in order to ensure that, during the post-default and pre-foreclosure phases, the property is being adequately preserved and maintained. But in mid-2013 a flurry of articles began cropping up in newspapers and media outlets across the country recounting stories of people who had fallen behind on their mortgage payments returning home one day to find that all of their belongings had been taken and their homes heavily damaged. These homeowners soon discovered that it was not a random thief that was the culprit, but rather property management contractors hired by the homeowners’ mortgage servicer.

The issues arising from these practices have become so pervasive that lawsuits have been filed in over 30 states, and legal aid organizations in California, Florida, Michigan, Nevada, and New York report that complaints against lender-engaged property managements firms number among their top grievances. This Article analyzes lender-engaged property management firms and these break-in foreclosure activities. In doing so, the paper makes a three-part call to action, which includes the implementation of bank contractor oversight regulations, the creation of a private cause of action for aggrieved homeowners, and the curtailment of property preservation clauses in mortgage contracts.

This is a timely article about a cutting edge issue. All too often I have heard pro-bank lawyers claim that banks almost never foreclose improperly. The news reports and lawsuits discussed in this article counter that claim. And yet, I hope that some empirically-minded person could quantify the frequency of such misbehavior to better inform policymakers going forward.

Dodd-Frank and Mortgage Reform at Five

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The Department of Treasury has issued a report, Dodd-Frank at Five Years: Reforming Wall Street and Protecting Main Street. The report is clearly a political document, trumpeting the achievements of the Obama Administration. It is interesting nonetheless. It opens,

When President Obama took office in January 2009, the U.S. economy was in crisis. The nation was shedding more than 750,000 jobs per month, and confidence in our financial system had been shaken to its core. The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression exposed a toxic mix of excessive risk-taking, shoddy lending practices, inadequate capital levels, unstable funding, and weaknesses in regulatory oversight. A collapsing financial system choked off credit to consumers seeking to purchase a car, a home, groceries, or to finance an education. Nearly 9 million Americans lost their jobs, and over 5 million lost their homes. Nearly $13 trillion of families’ wealth was destroyed, wiping out almost two decades of gains.

In response to the crisis, the Administration released a proposed set of reforms in June 2009. Congress held numerous hearings and crafted legislation based on the Administration’s proposal, incorporating ideas from both Republicans and Democrats throughout the process. On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law, a historic and comprehensive set of financial reforms, which put in place critical new protections for consumers, investors, and taxpayers. Five years later—as a result of Dodd-Frank and other Wall Street reforms—our financial system is stronger, safer, more resilient, and more supportive of sustainable economic growth. Regulators also have better tools to deal with financial shocks when they occur, to protect Main Street and taxpayers from Wall Street recklessness.

Critics of reform have claimed that Wall Street Reform would deter lending and choke off the recovery. But, today it is clear that the opposite is true. Reform has served as a building block for economic growth, providing Americans with safe places to invest their savings and enabling banks to lend to individuals, businesses, and communities. Only a financial system strong enough to withstand a major financial shock is capable of promoting sustainable economic growth. Five years after the President signed Wall Street Reform into law, nearly all of the major elements of financial reform are in place. Today, our financial system is safer and stronger as a result of these hard-won reforms, and our economy is in a far better position to continue growing and creating jobs. (1)

I was struck by the fact that the report does not address the biggest financial reform failure of the last five years, the lack of reform of the housing finance system.  Fannie and Freddie remain in conservatorship, putting the housing finance system at risk of another crisis.

I was also struck by the following passage:

In the run-up to the financial crisis, abusive lending practices and unclear underwriting standards resulted in risky mortgages which hurt consumers and ultimately threatened financial stability. Wall Street Reform bans many of the abusive practices in mortgage markets that helped cause the crisis, and requires lenders to determine that borrowers can repay their loans. (2)

My recollection from academic conferences over the course of the last six or seven years is that many leading academics denied the link between abusive lending practices and systemic risk. It seemed pretty clear to me, but I was in the minority on that one. I am glad to see that at least the Treasury agrees with me.

What’s Behind Rising Mortgage Bond Issuance?

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GlobeSt.com quoted me in What Else Is Behind Rising Mortgage Bond Issuance, Demand?. It opens,

Investor demand for mortgage bonds, both that have agency backing and not, is quite high these days.

Last week Bloomberg reported that issuance of home-loan securities that don’t have government backing reached more than $32 billion this year, compared to $18 billion a year ago, citing data compiled by Bloomberg and Bank of America Corp. These securities include rental-home bonds, a relatively new asset class that developed after the recession.

Agency and GSE securities are also in high demand, as a recent report from the Mortgage Bankers Association indicates. The level of commercial/multifamily mortgage debt outstanding increased by $40.4 billion in the first quarter of 2015 — a 1.5% increase over the fourth quarter of 2014. Said Jamie Woodwell, MBA’s Vice President of Commercial Real Estate Research with the report’s release: “Multifamily mortgages continued to grow even more quickly than the market as a whole, with banks increasing their portfolios by $8 billion and agency and GSE portfolios and MBS increasing their holdings by $10 billion.”

There are a number of economic-based drivers behind the demand for mortgage bonds of course: the fundamentals in the real estate space and the low interest rates that have driven investors to consider all manner of securities to eek out yield.

However, there is another possibility to consider as well and that is that the changing financial regulations are driving both issuance and investment.

On one hand, mortgages and private-label mortgage backed securities are much more regulated per Dodd-Frank and its Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential Mortgage rules, according to David Reiss, professor of Law and research director of the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship (CUBE) at Brooklyn Law School. On the other, post-crisis rules put in place for mortgage bonds have made these securities far more attractive for banks to hold as various news reports suggest.

For example, new rules have made ratings on mortgage bonds less crucial, allowing US lenders to use an alternative approach to calculating capital requirements, according to another recent article in Bloomberg. In essence, these rules allow lenders to reduce the amount needed for junk-rated mortgage bonds that are trading at discounts.

In addition, banks are finding that “treasury debt and MBS pass-throughs meet regulators’ standards much more easily than other assets”, according to a report by Deutsche Bank analysts Steven Abrahams and Christopher Helwig, per a third recent article in Bloomberg.

Two Opinions

With these facts in mind we turned to two experts to see how much of an impact new regulations are having. As it turned out, they are driving some of the change – but what is actually moving the needle in terms of demand is yet another trend. Read on.

For starters, there are some caveats. It can be misleading to throw the new rental home bonds in the mix in such a comparison, Reiss tells GlobeSt.com. “They are a post-crisis product when Wall Street firms saw that single-family housing prices were so low that they could make money from buying them up in bulk and then renting them out,” he says.

“They are not regulated in the same way as private-label MBS.”

Meanwhile issuers are still navigating Dodd-Frank’s Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential Mortgage rules, he says. They “are still trying to figure out how to operate within these rules — and outside of them, with the origination of non-QM mortgages. The market is still in transition with these products.”

As he sees it, the surge in issuance is a reflection of market players trying to understand how to operate in a new regulatory environment. They “are increasing their issuances as they get a better sense of how to do so.”

Arbitration and The Common Mortgage

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau posted its Arbitration Study. This is a report to Congress that was required by Dodd-Frank. By way of background, the study states that

Companies provide almost all consumer financial products and services subject to the terms of a written contract. Whenever a consumer obtains a consumer financial product such as a credit card, a checking account, or a payday loan, he or she typically receives the company’s standard form, written legal contract.

*     *     *

As a general rule, the parties to a dispute can agree, after the dispute arises, to submit the dispute for resolution to a forum other than a court — for example, to submit a particular dispute that has arisen to resolution by an arbitrator. (3)

Arbitration provisions typically do not directly apply to residential mortgages because Dodd-Frank “prohibited the use of ‘arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure’ for resolving disputes arising from residential mortgage loans or extensions of credit under an open-end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c.” (Arbitration Study § 5.4, n.34) But they can apply in mortgage-related contracts, such as those for title insurance, mortgage insurance and forced-place flood insurance. (§ 8.3, n.24 & Appendix S, § 8)

The Study thus holds some interest for those of us interested housing finance. The Executive Summary (§ 1.4) provides an overview of the CFPB’s research findings about arbitrations and other proceedings.

My overall impression after having reviewed the report is that consumers do not often raise claims against consumer finance companies in any forum, whether with an arbitrator or with a judge. The Study does not provide any information that would allow one to conclude what the socially optimal level of formalized disputes would be. It would be helpful for the CFPB to try to model that.

Consumer Thoughts on Credit Reports

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued a report, Consumer Voices on Credit Reports and Scores. This report builds on other recent work from the CFPB about how much people really understand about consumer finance. The answer — they still have a lot to brush up on. The CFPB conducted a series of focus groups about credit reports and credit scores. The CFPB concluded that

that many consumers are interested in and concerned about credit reports and scores. We found that some of the consumers we talked to expressed confusion about the best way to access credit reports and scores, what makes up credit reports and scores, and how to improve their scores. Some of the consumers we spoke to often do not feel empowered to take action to improve their credit histories, to use their credit reports and scores to negotiate better credit terms, or, ultimately, to use credit reports and scores as a helpful tool in achieving their financial goals.
The diversity of consumer perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors we heard around credit reports and scores suggests that there is much work to do in helping consumers understand and manage this complicated financial topic. Because consumers have a wide range of knowledge about and perceptions of credit reports and scores, there is no single message or approach to encourage consumers to engage more fully with their credit histories.
However, consumer perspectives on credit reports do suggest that many consumers feel that the credit reports are “hard to get, and hard to read.” Efforts by credit reporting agencies to make it easier for consumers to access and interpret their reports could be a useful contribution tohelping consumers navigate their credit histories.
The growing number of financial services companies that provide their customers with regular access to their credit scores on monthly credit card statements or online provides an opportunity to engage consumers around their credit reports. Once consumers see their credit scores, they may be motivated to learn more about their credit histories, check their full credit reports, and take action to improve their credit reports and scores. (19)
I am happy to see that the CFPB is trying to understand where consumers are at in terms of their financial literacy. This should help them to target their financial education efforts realistically. The report notes that the subject of credit reports is a complicated one. The mortgage application process is far, far more complicated so this report gives us a sense of how much work is to be done for consumers to achieve financial well-being.

GSE Conservatorship History Lesson

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Mark Calabria, the Director of Financial Regulation Studies at the Cato Institute, has posted a very interesting paper, The Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Lessons from Fannie and Freddie. This is a more formal version of what he presented at the AALS meeting early this month. I do not agree with all of Mark’s analysis, but this paper certainly opened my eyes about what can happen in committee when important statutes are being drafted. It opens,

There was perhaps no issue of greater importance to the financial regulatory reforms of 2010 than the resolution, without taxpayer assistance, of large financial institutions. The rescue of firms such as AIG shocked the public conscience and provided the political force behind the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. Such is reflected in the fact that Titles I and II of Dodd-Frank relate to the identification and resolution of large financial entities. How the tools established in Titles I and II are implemented are paramount to the success of Dodd-Frank. This paper attempts to gauge the likely success of these tools via the lens of similar tools created for the resolution of the housing government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
An additional purpose of this paper is to provide some additional “legislative history” to the resolution mechanisms contained in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), which established a resolution framework for the GSEs similar to that ultimately created in Title II of Dodd-Frank. The intent is to inform current debates over the resolution of systemically important financial institutions by revisiting how such issues were debated and agreed upon in HERA. (1-2)
As an outside-the-Beltway type, I found the “legislative history” very interesting, even if it wouldn’t qualify as any type of legislative history that a judge would consider in interpreting a statute. It does, however, offer policy wonks, bureaucrats and politicians an inside view of how a Congressional staffer helps to make the sausage that is legislation. It also shows that in the realm of legislation, as in the realm of fiction, author’s intent can play out in tricky ways.

Calabria concludes,

The neglect of HERA’s tools and the likely similar neglect of Dodd-Frank’s suggest a much deeper reform of our financial regulatory system is in order. The regulatory culture of “whatever it takes” must be abandoned. A respect for the rule of law and obedience to the letter of the law must be instilled in our regulatory culture. More important, the incentives facing regulators must be dramatically changed. If we hope to end “too-big-to-fail” and to curtail moral hazard more generally, significant penalties must be created for rescues as well as deviations from statute. A very difficult question is that lack of standing for any party to litigate to enforce statutory prohibitions against rescues. (19)

I take a couple of lessons from this paper. First, tight drafting of legislation that is supposed to kick in during a crisis is key. If a statute has wiggle room, decision makers are going to stretch it out as they see fit. And second, I agree with Mark that even tight drafting won’t necessarily keep government actors from acting as they see fit in a crisis.

If Congress really want to constrain the choices of future decision makers, it will need to grant a third party standing to enforce that decision as it is unlikely that crisis managers will have the self-restraint to forgo options that they would otherwise prefer. Congress should be very careful about constraining the choices of these future decision makers. But if it chooses to do so, that would be the way to go.