Tag Archives: fiduciary

Fannie and Freddie Visit the Supreme Court

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Justice Gorsuch

Fannie and Fredddie investors have filed their petition for a writ of certiorari in Perry Capital v. Mnuchin. The question presented is

Whether 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f), which prohibits courts from issuing injunctions that “restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of” the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) “as a conservator,” bars judicial review of an action by FHFA and the Department of Treasury to seize for Treasury the net worth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in perpetuity. (i)

What I find interesting about the brief is that relies so heavily on the narrative contained in Judge Brown’s dissent in the Court of Appeals decision. As I had noted previously, I do not find that narrative compelling, but I believe that some members of the court would, particularly Justice Gorsuch. The petition’s statement reads in part,

In August 2012—nearly four years after the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac1 in conservatorship during the 2008 financial crisis—FHFA, acting as conservator to the Companies, agreed to surrender each Company’s net worth to the Treasury Department every quarter. This arrangement, referred to as the “Net Worth Sweep,” replaced a fixed-rate dividend to Treasury that was tied to Treasury’s purchase of senior preferred stock in the Companies during the financial crisis. FHFA and Treasury have provided justifications for the Net Worth Sweep that, as the Petition filed by Fairholme Funds, Inc. demonstrates, were pretextual. The Net Worth Sweep has enabled a massive confiscation by the government, allowing Treasury thus far to seize $130 billion more than it was entitled to receive under the pre-2012 financial arrangement—a fact that neither Treasury nor FHFA denies. As was intended, these massive capital outflows have brought the Companies to the edge of insolvency, and all but guaranteed that they will never exit FHFA’s conservatorship.

Petitioners here, investors that own preferred stock in the Companies, challenged the Net Worth Sweep as exceeding both FHFA’s and Treasury’s respective statutory powers. But the court of appeals held that the Net Worth Sweep was within FHFA’s statutory authority, and that keeping Treasury within the boundaries of its statutory mandate would impermissibly intrude on FHFA’s authority as conservator.

The decision of the court of appeals adopts an erroneous view of conservatorship unknown to our legal system. Conservators operate as fiduciaries to care for the interests of the entities or individuals under their supervision. Yet in the decision below, the D.C. Circuit held that FHFA acts within its conservatorship authority so long as it is not actually liquidating the Companies. In dissent, Judge Brown aptly described that holding as “dangerously far-reaching,” Pet.App. 88a, empowering a conservator even “to loot the Companies,” Pet.App. 104a.

The D.C. Circuit’s test for policing the bounds of FHFA’s statutory authority as conservator—if one can call it a test at all—breaks sharply from those of the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, which have held that FHFA cannot evade judicial review merely by disguising its actions in the cloak of a conservator. And it likewise patently violates centuries of common-law understandings of the meaning of a conservatorship, including views held by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), whose conservatorship authority under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), served as the template for FHFA’s own conservatorship authority. Judge Brown correctly noted that the decision below thus “establish[es] a dangerous precedent” for FDIC-regulated financial institutions with trillions of dollars in assets. Pet.App. 109a. If the decision below is correct, then the FDIC as conservator could seize depositor funds from one bank and give them away—to another institution as equity, or to Treasury, or even to itself—as long as it is not actually liquidating the bank. The notion that the law permits a regulator appointed as conservator to act in a way so manifestly contrary to the interests of its conservatee is deeply destabilizing to our financial regulatory system. (1-2)

We shall see if this narrative of government overreach finds a sympathetic ear at the Court.

Dual Agency Explained

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photo by Richard P J Lambert

Trulia quoted me in What Is Dual Agency? (And Why You Should Beware). It opens,

Home sellers and homebuyers are two sides of a complementary transaction. Should they each have their own agent, or is one agent enough? The answer: It depends.

You’ve probably heard the phrase “You can’t have your cake and eat it too.” But if you’ve ever puzzled over it’s meaning, here’s a hint: If you eat your cake now, you won’t have any left over to look forward to eating later. In other words, sometimes a person is forced to make a choice between two good options. In the real estate world, dual agency breaks the cake rule: If your real estate agent also represents the sellers of the home you want to buy, you don’t necessarily need to ditch them. In many cases, you can keep your agent and get the house too — if you want to, that is.

Whether you’re buying a home in Providence, RI, or Tampa, FL, it’s typical for one agent to represent the seller and another agent to represent the buyer. With dual agency, one agent works for both the buyer and seller — and keeps the full commission. Dual agency also occurs when agents from the same brokerage represent each party. But like enjoying a huge slice of cake and in return getting a bellyache, there are definitely pros and cons to agreeing to dual agency.

Pro: Streamlined communication

Because one real estate agent or brokerage represents the buyer and the seller, the agent doesn’t need to wait every time communication needs to happen between the parties. Streamlined communication often creates a smoother transaction. “You are in charge of both sides, including paperwork, scheduling, and deadlines,” says Mindy Jensen, a Colorado agent and community manager of BiggerPockets.com. “We’ve all been involved in a sale with an agent who didn’t respond in a timely manner, missed deadlines, and in general did not perform their duties as they should have. For us control freaks, dual agency can seem like a great thing.”

Con: No advice

Because a dual agent is working in a potential conflict-of-interest situation — one client (the seller) wants to get as high a price as possible, while the other client (the buyer) wants to pay as little as possible — the agent can’t take sides or give advice. Bruce Ailion, an Atlanta, GA, real estate agent and attorney, compares dual agency to having one attorney representing both husband and wife in a divorce. “The parties’ interests are adverse and are best represented by independent professionals,” he says.

The agent in a dual agency situation becomes, instead of a coach, more of a referee. “The agent cannot disclose confidential information to either party and has to act in a neutral position during the transaction,” says Emily Matles, a New York, NY, agent with Douglas Elliman. Matthew Berger, another New York, NY, agent with Douglas Elliman, says: “When the listing agent steps into the role of dual agent, they cannot give advice to the seller nor the buyer.” On the other hand, when you have an independent agent, “You are more likely to get the benefits of being a principal getting fiduciary benefits,” Ailion says.

Pro: There must be full disclosure

Whether you’re a seller or a buyer, there’s nothing to fear about dual agency: If you don’t consent to the practice, it won’t happen. “The dual-agent broker must ensure that both parties know of the arrangement and consent to it,” says David Reiss, professor of law at Brooklyn Law School. His advice: “Home sellers should review the terms of the listing agreement before they sign it to see if dual agency is being contemplated.”

Protecting Seniors’ Home Equity

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photo by Ethan Prater

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued and Advisory and Report for Financial Institutions on Preventing Elder Financial Abuse. The Report defines elder financial exploitation as

the illegal or improper use of an older person’s funds, property or assets. Studies suggest that financial exploitation is the most common form of elder abuse and yet only a small fraction of incidents are reported. Estimates of annual losses range from $2.9 billion to $36.48 billion. Perpetrators who target older consumers include, among others, family members, caregivers, scam artists, financial advisers, home repair contractors, and fiduciaries (such as agents under power of attorney and guardians of property).

Older people are attractive targets because they may have accumulated assets or equity in their homes and usually have a regular source of income such as Social Security or a pension. In 2011, the net worth of households headed by a consumer age 65 and older was approximately $17.2 trillion, and the median net worth was $170,500. These consumers may be especially vulnerable due to isolation, cognitive decline, physical disability, health problems, and/or the recent loss of a partner, family member, or friend.

Cognitive impairment is a key factor in why older adults are targeted and why perpetrators succeed in victimizing them. Even mild cognitive impairment (MCI) can significantly impact the capacity of older people to manage their finances and to judge whether something is a scam or a fraud. Mild cognitive impairment is an intermediate stage between the expected cognitive decline of normal aging and the more serious decline of dementia. Studies indicate that 22 percent of Americans over age 70 have MCI and about one third of Americans age 85 and over have Alzheimer’s disease. (8-9, footnotes omitted)

The CFPB recommends that financial institutions consider

  • training staff to recognize abuse;
  • using fraud detection technologies;
  • offering age-friendly services; and
  • reporting suspicious activities to authorities.

These recommendations are a step in the right direction, although they offer no panacea. As the Report acknowledges, even if financial institutions report suspicious activities to government authorities, there is no guarantee that they will be acted on. But if these recommendations are publicized, they may deter some predators who think that they can act freely within the fog of their victims’ cognitive decline. And a few well-publicized prosecutions of relatives, caregivers and advisors who violate the trust that was placed in them would help to spread the message that ripping off senior citizens is no easy path to riches.

What Should the 21st Century Mortgage Market Look Like?

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Treasury is requesting Public Input on Development of Responsible Private Label Securities (PLS) Market.  Comments are due on August 8, 2014. The request for information wants input on the following questions:

1. What is the appropriate role for new issue PLS in the current and future housing finance system? What is the appropriate interaction between the guaranteed and non-guaranteed market segments? Are there particular segments of the mortgage market where PLS can or should be most active and competitive in providing a channel for funding mortgage credit?

2. What are the key obstacles to the growth of the PLS market? How would you address these obstacles? What are the existing market failures? What are necessary conditions for securitizers and investors to return at scale?

3. How should new issue PLS support safe and sound market practices?

4. What are the costs and benefits of various methods of investor protection? In particular, please address the costs and benefits of requiring the trustee to have a fiduciary duty to investors or requiring an independent collateral manager to oversee issuances?

5. What is the appropriate or necessary role for private industry participants to address the factors cited in your answer to Question #2? What can private market participants undertake either as part of industry groups or independently?

6. What is the appropriate or necessary role for government in addressing the key factors cited in your answer to Question #2? What actions could government agencies take? Are there actions that require legislation?

7. What are the current pricing characteristics of PLS issuance (both on a standalone basis and relative to other mortgage finance channels)? How might the pricing characteristics change should key challenges be addressed? What is the current and potential demand from investors should key challenges be addressed?

8. Why have we seen strong issuance and investor demand for other types of asset-backed securitizations (e.g., securitizations of commercial real estate, leveraged loans, and auto loans) but not residential mortgages? Do these or other asset classes offer insights that can help inform the development of market practices and standards in the new issue PLS market?

These are all important questions that go way beyond Treasury’s portfolio and touch on those of the FHFA, the FHA and the CFPB to name a few. Nonetheless, it is important that Treasury is framing the issue so broadly because it gets to the 10 Trillion Dollar Question:  Who Should Be Providing Mortgage Credit to American Households?

Some clearly believe that the federal government is the only entity that can do so in a stable way and certainly history is on their side.  Since the Great Depression,when the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the Federal Housing Administration and Fannie Mae were created, the federal government has had a central role in the housing finance market.

Others (including me) believe that private capital can, and should, take a bigger role in the provision of mortgage finance. There is some question as to how much capacity private capital has, given the size of the residential mortgage market (more than ten trillion dollars). But there is no doubt that it can do more than the measly ten percent share or so of new mortgages that it has been originating in recent years.

Treasury should think big here and ask — what do we want our mortgage finance to look like for the next eight or nine decades? Our last system lasted for that long, so our next one might too. The issue cannot be decided by empirical means alone. There is an ideological component to it. I am in favor of a system in which private capital (albeit heavily-regulated private capital) should be put at risk for a large swath of residential mortgages and the taxpayer should only be on the hook for major liquidity crises.

I also favor a significant role for government through the FHA which would still create a market for first-time homebuyers and low- and moderate-income borrowers. But otherwise, we would look to private capital to price risk and fund mortgages to the extent that it can do so.  Round out the system with strong consumer protection regulation from the CFPB, and you have a system that may last through the end of the 21st century.

Comments are due August 8th, so make your views known too!