Tag Archives: government-sponsored enterprise

More on GSE Litigation

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Inside Mortgage Finance did a longer story on the GSE litigation that profiled my take on it, Expert: GSE Shareholder Suits at ‘Early Stage’ of a Long Process; Litigation No Barrier to Dissolution, Says Group.

Look for the various lawsuits filed by private owners of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock against the federal government to take a “very long time to be decided,” as the courts may take up to a year to resolve just the introductory motions, according to a legal expert. Beyond that, the litigation over shares in the two government-sponsored enterprises could stretch out to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss, speaking during a Bloomberg Industries webinar last week, noted that lawsuits stemming from the savings and loan debacle of 20 years ago give a sense of the possible timeframe, but litigation brought by disenfranchised Fannie and Freddie investors against the government offers an entirely different and deeper set of legal complexities.

“These are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks this is a slam dunk for any one of the parties,” said Reiss. He added that neither the government nor shareholders of the two government-sponsored enterprises can cut a deal and settle for anything short of total victory.

“I think we have plaintiffs that are going to go all the way on this because they have a lot at stake and they have a lot of resources to pursue their claims. You have a government that doesn’t have an incentive to settle like a normal private party does. They’re not worried about litigation costs or time, so I foresee this going on for a very, very long time,” said Reiss.

More than a dozen lawsuits filed against the government – led by hedge funds Perry Capital and Fairholme Capital Management – are pending in federal district court in Washington, DC, and in the Court of Federal Claims. The shareholder plaintiffs allege that the Treasury’s 2012 change in the dividend structure of its preferred stock leaves no funds to pay dividends to junior shareholders.

The government in its pending motion to dismiss gives some clear indication as to the tactics it will take to derail the various shareholder suits, Reiss explained. The government’s brief states that not a single plaintiff is entitled to recover anything – either on their individual or derivative claims – in light of the extensive powers that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act vests in the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as conservator to the GSEs.

“Until we have some motions to dismiss decided, we’re not really going to know how wide a scope these cases will have,” he said. “Only when we having a ruling on a summary judgment motion, will we have a sense of the real issues in contention. I will say that we are at an absolutely early stage.”

With the “entire range of private, administrative and constitutional principles” due to be called into question through the litigation, Reiss said there’s a great deal of uncertainty how the courts will decide the issue, including whether the Supreme Court will hear the inevitable appeal by plaintiffs or the defendant.

Although the pending shareholder litigation and investors’ claims of a government taking “must be taken seriously,” there’s no barrier – either from a legal or safety and soundness standpoint – preventing Fannie and Freddie from being dissolved, the Heritage Foundation argued in an issue brief.

“Protecting property rights, however, does not mean that taxpayers and consumers must continue to be put at risk by these government-sponsored housing giants,” said Heritage. “The ongoing lawsuits need not impede and should not distract Congress from the critical task of dissolving these economically dangerous institutions.”

Each of the GSE charters explicitly grants Congress the power to dissolve the corporations free of any conditions. After dissolution, Heritage notes that creditors would be paid off, with any remaining assets divided among shareholders, taking into account the priorities of different classes of shares.

“Because the United States is a defendant in the lawsuits, the litigation can proceed independently of the GSEs’ dissolution,” said Heritage. “If shareholders prevail on their takings claim, or any other monetary claim, they would still be able to receive full restitution for any legitimate claims.”

Reiss on GSE Litigation

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Inside Mortgage Finance profiled me in Legal Expert: GSE Shareholder Plaintiffs, U.S. Want ‘Total’ Victory (behind a paywall). It reads,

Look for the various GSE shareholder lawsuits against the federal government to take a “very long time to be decided” with the courts taking up to a year to resolve just the introductory motions and an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

That’s the view of one legal expert speaking during a recent Bloomberg Industries webinar on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac litigation. Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss noted there are some parallels to the savings and loan lawsuits brought by owners against the federal government 20 years ago. But the attorney stressed that the litigation from the Fannie and Freddie investors against the government offers an entirely different and deeper set of legal complexities.

“These are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone that thinks this is a slam dunk for any one of the parties,” predicted Reiss. He added that neither the government nor GSE shareholders can cut a deal and settle for anything short of total victory.

In its motion to dismiss, the government argues that the plaintiffs – hedge funds that have speculated in the junior preferred – are not entitled to recover anything, either on their individual or derivative claims, in light of the extensive powers that the Housing and Economic Recovery Act granted to the Federal Housing Finance Agency in its capacity as conservator.

With the “entire range of private, administrative and constitutional principles” due to be called into question in this litigation, Reiss said there’s a great deal of uncertainty over how the courts will decide the issue, including whether the Supreme Court will hear the inevitable appeal by plaintiffs or defendant.

Reiss in Bloomberg Industries Q&A on Frannie Litigation

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Bloomberg Industries Litigation Analyst Emily Hamburger interviewed me about The Government as Defendant: Breaking Down Fannie-Freddie Lawsuits (link to audio of the call). The blurb for the interview is as follows:

As investors engage in jurisdictional discovery and the government pleads for dismissals in several federal cases over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock, Professor David Reiss of Brooklyn Law School will provide his insights on the dynamics of the lawsuits and possible outcomes for Wall Street, the U.S. government and GSEs. Reiss is the author of a recent article, An Overview of the Fannie and Freddie Conservatorship Litigation.

Emily questioned me for the first half of the one hour call and some of the 200+ participants asked questions in the second half.

Emily’s questions included the following (paraphrased below)

  • You’re tracking several cases that deal with the government’s role in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and I’d like to go through about 3 of the major assertions made by investors – investors that own junior preferred and common stock in the GSEs – against the government and hear your thoughts:
    • The first is the accusation that the Treasury and FHFA’s Conduct in the execution of the Third Amendment was arbitrary and capricious. What do you think of this?
    •  Another claim made by the plaintiffs is that the government’s actions constitute a taking of property without just compensation, which would be seen as a violation of the 5th Amendment – do you think this is a stronger or weaker claim?
    • And finally – what about plaintiffs asserting breach of contract against the government? Plaintiffs have said that the Net Worth Sweep in the Third Amendment to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement nullified Fannie and Freddie’s ability to pay dividends, and that the two companies can’t unilaterally change terms of preferred stock, and that the FHFA is guilty of causing this breach.
  • Is the government correct when they say that the section 4617 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act barred plaintiff’s right to sue over the conservator’s decisions?
  • Former Solicitor General Theodore Olson, an attorney for Perry Capital, has said that the government’s powers with respect to the interventions in Fannie and Freddie “expired” – is he correct?
  • Can you explain what exactly jurisdictional discovery is and why it’s important?
  • Do we know anything about what might happen if one judge rules for the plaintiffs and another judge rules for the government?
  • Is there an estimate that you can provide as to timing?
  • Are there any precedents that you know of from prior crises? Prior interventions by the government that private plaintiffs brought suit against?
  • How do you foresee Congress and policymakers changing outcomes?
  • What do we need to be looking out for now in the litigation?
  • How does this end?

You have to listen to the audiotape to hear my answers, but my bottom line is this — these are factually and legally complex cases and don’t trust anyone who thinks that this is a slam dunk for any of the parties.

 

Wary of FHA HAWKing Mortgage Access

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The Federal Housing Administration issued its Access Blueprint: What FHA is Doing to Expand Access to Mortgage Credit for Underserved Borrowers. The blueprint identifies a serious problem:

The economic crisis significantly constrained credit making it tough for anyone with less than perfect credit to obtain a mortgage.

According to the Urban Institute, the average credit score for loans sold to the GSEs is 752. Currently, there are 13 million people with credit scores ranging from 580 to 680. Shutting these consumers out of the market hurts American families and undermines our efforts to build more stable communities, create pathways to the middle class, and increase homeownership opportunities for minority and low-wealth borrowers.

A healthy mortgage market serves all qualified borrowers. FHA is committed to finding ways to responsibly increase access for underserved borrowers. (3)

Unfortunately, the FHA’s solutions to this problem seem half-baked. The blueprint states that “Responsible access can be enhanced by ensuring borrowers are well-educated about the home- buying and mortgage finance process.” (3) Under the heading, Homeowners Armed with Knowledge (HAWK), the blueprint states that “Housing Counseling works.  Research shows a strong correlation between housing counseling and mortgage performance.” (4)

As the FHA should know, correlation is not the same thing as causation. It could be that those who have the traits that make them likely to sign up for housing counseling also make them more likely to make their mortgage payments. In fact, the scholarly literature on making people financially capable is not so comforting when it comes to decreasing credit defaults.

The blueprint has other disturbing passages that make one wonder if the FHA is keeping safety and soundness concerns as high priorities. For instance, it states that

FHA primarily selects higher-risk loans for review, e.g. loans evidencing payment challenges. FHA recognizes that this risk-based approach does not accurately reflect a lenders overall underwriting quality as it is primarily focused on non-performing loans. Going forward, we plan to expand our evaluation of loans to include random sampling of performing loans closer to the time of endorsement. This approach provides a more balanced view of underwriting quality. (5)

This is kind of the inverse of the old saw about the drunk who is searching for something for a long time under a lamp post.  When asked why he is looking so long and so unsuccessfully in that one place, he responds that that is is where the light is. FHA appears to be saying that it is going to be spending less time looking in the problem areas because that is where they are likely to find problems. What is that about?#@!?

Obviously, the FHA should be focused on promoting sustainable homeownership for “all qualified borrowers.” (3)  Obviously, the FHA should find ways to “responsibly increase access for underserved borrowers.” (3) What is not obvious is whether the FHA’s blueprint will achieve those goals.

Stealing Fannie and Freddie?

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Jonathan Macey and Logan Beirne have posted a short working paper, Stealing Fannie and Freddie, to SSRN. It advocates a position similar to that taken by the plaintiffs in the GSE shareholder litigation. They argue,

Politicians are running rough-shod over the rule of law as they seek to rob private citizens of their assets to achieve their own amorphous political objectives. If we were speaking of some banana republic, this would be par for the course – but this is unfolding in the United States today.

“The housing market accounts for nearly 20 percent of the American economy, so it is critical that we have a strong and stable housing finance system that is built to last,” declares the Senate Banking Committee Leaders’ Bipartisan Housing Finance Reform Draft. The proposed legislation’s first step towards this laudable goal, however, is to liquidate the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – in defiance of the rule of law. This paper analyzes the current House and Senate housing finance reform proposals and faults their modes of liquidation for departing from legal norms, thereby harming investors and creditors, taxpayers, and the broader economy.

Under proposals before Congress, virtually everyone loses. First, the GSEs’ shareholders’ property rights are violated. Second, taxpayers face the potential burden of the GSEs’ trillions in liabilities without dispensing via the orderly and known processes of a traditional bankruptcy proceeding or keeping the debts segregated as the now-profitable GSEs seek to pay them down. Finally, the rule of law is subverted, thereby making lending and business in general a riskier proposition when the country and global economy are left to the political whims of the federal government. (1)

I found a number of unsupported assertions throughout the piece. For instance, they assert, without support, that Fannie and Freddie “never reached the point of insolvency.” (3)  Badawi & Casey convincingly argue that without “government intervention, [Fannie and Freddie] would have defaulted on their guaranty obligations and more generally on obligations to all creditors.” (Badawi & Casey at 5) All in all, I don’t find this short working paper to be compelling reading — perhaps a more comprehensive one is in the works.

Watt’s up with Fannie and Freddie

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There has been a lot of press coverage of FHFA Director Watt’s first public speech since taking on his job. Watt emphasized that

we must ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate in a safe and sound manner.  It means that we’ll work to preserve and conserve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets.  And it means that we’ll work to ensure a liquid and efficient national housing finance market.  Our job at FHFA is to balance these obligations . . ..

He also set forth three goals for his FHFA:

Strategic Goal 1: MAINTAIN, in a safe and sound manner, foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages to foster liquid, efficient, competitive and resilient national housing finance markets. 

Strategic Goal 2: REDUCE taxpayer risk through increasing the role of private capital in the mortgage market.

Strategic Goal 3: BUILD a new single-family securitization infrastructure for use by the Enterprises and adaptable for use by other participants in the secondary market in the future.

These goals are all totally reasonable for the FHFA to pursue. But it is also clear that Director Watt is taking the FHFA in a direction that is quite different than the one pursued by his predecessor, Acting Director DeMarco.  DeMarco had taken the position that the best way to protect taxpayers was to be pretty tough on everyone else. “Everyone else” included defaulting and underwater homeowners as well as originating lenders who had sold Fannie and Freddie tons of mortgages that did not comply with the reps and warranties that the parties had agreed to about the quality of those mortgages. DeMarco’s strategy was much criticized but also quite coherent.

Watt has made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with homeowners. He highlighted a pilot program in Detroit that will include “deeper loan modifications.”  He has also made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with lenders, relaxing rep and warranty standards for mortgages that Fannie and Freddie purchase from lenders. These may be very good policies to pursue, but it would be helpful if he set forth a clearer vision of how safety and soundness is best balanced with liquidity and efficiency. Federal housing finance policy typically goes off the rails when its goals get all mixed up. Director Watt should ensure that FHFA’s safety and soundness goals are clearly set forth and that other goals for Fannie and Freddie are designed to work in harmony with them.

Reiss on Bloomberg Terminals regarding GSE Litigation

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I was quoted on the Bloomberg Terminals (behind a very expensive paywall!) on May 6th about the Fannie and Freddie litigation:

Even if the Junior Preferred Shareholders get the Court to void the Third Amendment to the PSPA, they cannot force the companies to issue dividends so that shareholders receive a payoff. And if the government were to lower the guarantee fee that the two companies can charge or if it were to remove the government’s guarantee of the two companies, Fannie and Freddie’s profits would dissipate altogether.

Given that junior preferred shareholders have developed a multi-pronged strategy to squeeze as much value out of their shares as possible, it is worth attempting to determine the possible endgames that they have in mind. It is hard for me to identify a litigation outcome that results in money in their pockets for the reasons stated above. So the litigation strategy must be part of a broader strategy that involves lobbying over housing finance reform in Congress, lobbying the FHFA and other regulators or negotiating with the two companies. Given the amount of money at stake and the depth of the pockets of the junior preferred shareholders, one can imagine that they are playing a very long-term game, one that might last longer than all of the current decision-makers in DC right now. Some disputes arising out of the S&L crisis took many, many years to resolve so there is reason to think that the junior preferred shareholders have a multi-year or even decades-long perspective on this. And the farther away we are from the events of the 2000s and the emotions that they elicit from decisionmakers, the more likely it is that the junior preferred shareholders can negotiate a favorable result for themselves.