Reiss on GSE Privatization

GlobeSt.com quoted me in Waiting to Say Goodbye to the GSEs. It reads in part,

US HUD Secretary Julian Castro added another “to do” item to the lame duck Congress’ list of things they should get done before they adjourn on Dec. 11: pass the bipartisan Johnson-Crapo Senate bill introduced earlier this year that would wind down the GSEs.

“This could be, I believe, a good victory in the lame duck session or next term of Congress for housing finance reform,” he said in an interview with Bloomberg Television earlier this week. The crux of the plan – doing away with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, creating a backstop for these loans and removing tax payer risk – are all supported by the Obama Administration, he said.

“Housing finance reform will continue to be a priority for the Obama Administration,” Castro said.

The multifamily finance industry has been expecting GSE reform for years now; certainly there have been calls for their dismantlement when they were placed in conservatorship in 2008 during the depth of the financial crisis. Many in the industry, in fact, would welcome their sunset, in the expectation that the private sector could fully and more efficiently and more cheaply provide the same level of funding.

That is not the unanimous sentiment though. In fact, opinions about the subject in commercial real estate range, widely, across the board from “it is about time” to “the politics are too strident for it to happen” to “maybe it will happen but it is difficult to believe the GSEs could entirely be replaced by the private sector.”

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David Reiss, a professor of Law and Research Director, Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship (CUBE) at Brooklyn Law School, has been calling for the privatization of Fannie and Freddie for some time and is dismissive of the “Chicken Little claims” that the sector will collapse if the government reduces its footprint in multifamily and single-family housing finance.

“With a carefully planned transition, it is eminently reasonable to believe that we can put private capital in a first loss position for multifamily housing so long as the government retains a role in subsidizing affordable housing and acting as a lender of last resort when necessary,” he tells GlobeSt.com.

FHA’s Financial Health Looking Up

HUD has released the Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Financial Status of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund Fiscal Year 2014. It appears that things are looking up for the FHA, particularly after last year’s mandatory appropriation from the Treasury, the first in the FHA’s 80 year history. For those of you who are not housing finance nerds, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMIF) is the financial backbone of the FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance program.  When it is in bad shape, the FHA is in bad shape.

As Secretary Castro notes in his forward to the report,

The value of the Fund has improved significantly, now standing at $4.8 billion. The increased economic value represents a capital reserve ratio of 0.41. This improvement shows tremendous progress, especially considering that the Fund had a negative value of $16.3 billion just two years ago. The two-year gain in Fund value is an impressive $21 billion. The performance of the portfolio has improved dramatically in a short period of time. Foreclosures are down 68 percent since the height of the crisis and recoveries to the Fund have improved 68 percent from their lowest level–saving billions of dollars. While FHA must still respond to challenges presented by legacy books and market volatility, the independent actuary’s report demonstrates that FHA is firmly on the right track and is projected to continue improving. (1)
The MMIF is supposed to have a capital reserve ratio of 2 percent, so the FHA is still quite a bit away from receiving a clean bill of health. But according to projections, it should achieve that level in 2016 and then continue to improve from there. (35, Ex. II-3)
While this is all pretty abstract, there are some pretty concrete aspects to the health of the MMIF. The size of FHA premiums, paid by homeowners borrowing FHA-insured mortgages, is set in the context of the health of the MMIF because the FHA is a self-funded government agency. So low reserves means that it is harder to cut premiums. Higher FHA premiums mean that  mortgages are more expensive for the low- and moderate income borrowers who make up a large part of the FHA’s book of business. So the health of the MMIF is an indicator of sorts of the health of the housing market overall.

Homeless in America

The Department of Housing Urban Development released Part 1 of The 2014 Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress.  Part 1 provides Point-in-Time Estimates of Homelessness. Its key findings include,

  • In January 2014, 578,424 people were homeless on a given night. Most (69 percent) were staying in residential programs for homeless people, and the rest (31 percent) were found in unsheltered locations.
  • Nearly one-quarter of all homeless people were children under the age of 18 (23 percent or 135,701). Ten percent (or 58,601) were between the ages of 18 and 24, and 66 percent (or 384,122) were 25 years or older.
  • Homelessness declined by 2 percent (or 13,344 people) between 2013 and 2014 and by 11 percent (or 72,718) since 2007. (1)

The report notes that in “2010, the Administration released Opening Doors: Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness, a comprehensive plan to prevent and end homelessness in America.” (3) The plan had four goals:

  1. Finish the job of ending chronic homelessness in 2015
  2. Prevent and end homelessness among Veterans by 2015
  3. Prevent and end homelessness for families, youth, and children by 2020
  4. Set a path to ending all types of homelessness (3)

HUD claims success on all four fronts:

  1. The number of individuals experiencing chronic homelessness declined by 21 percent, or 22,892 people, between 2010 and 2014.
  2. The number of homeless veterans declined by 33 percent (or 24,837 people) since 2010, and most of the decline was in the number of veterans staying in unsheltered locations.
  3. Since 2010 the number of homeless people in families has declined by 11 percent (or 25,690 people).
  4. Overall, homelessness has declined by more than 62,000 people since 2010 (62,042), a 10 percent reduction since the release of Opening Doors. (3)

In many ways, the success of American housing policy comes down to the question — can all Americans have a safe and affordable place to call home? The Administration answers this question in the affirmative. And this report appears to demonstrate that the Administration’s plan to end homelessness is working.

While I am skeptical of claims that we have finally figured out how to systematically address homelessness, I am happy to see that it is trending downward over the last few years.  This report was authored by some serious people, including Dr. Dennis Culhane of the National Center on Homelessness among Veterans at the University of Pennsylvania, so there is reason to trust these numbers. One can hope that this trend continues, but given the financial insecurity so many households face, I am worried that it will not.

Housing Opportunity for Kids

The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities issued a report, Creating Opportunity for Children: How Housing Location Can Make a Difference. There is some research on the positive effects that homeownership has on outcomes for children. But it is hard to determine whether it is homeownership per se which causes the positive effects as opposed to a stable housing situation more generally. Thus, further research on the role of stable housing options, like that found in this report, is quite welcome.  This report finds that the Housing Choice Voucher program

has performed much better than HUD’s project-based rental assistance programs in enabling more low-income families with children—and particularly more African American and Latino families—to live in lower-poverty neighborhoods. . . . Having a housing voucher also substantially reduces the likelihood of living in an extreme-poverty neighborhood, compared with similar families with children that either receive project-based rental assistance or don’t receive housing assistance at all. (6)
The report concludes that

Based on the evidence on how housing location affects low-income families, particularly children, and the performance of federal rental assistance programs on location-related measures, we recommend two closely related near-term goals for federal rental assistance policy: 1) federal rental assistance programs should provide greater opportunities for families to choose affordable housing outside of extreme-poverty neighborhoods; and 2) the programs should provide better access for families to low-poverty, safe communities with better-performing schools. (7)
The report also recommends four policy changes to achieve these goals:
  1. Create strong incentives for local and state housing agencies to achieve better location outcomes.
  2. Modify policies that discourage families from living in lower-poverty communities.
  3. Minimize jurisdictional barriers to families’ ability to choose to live in high-opportunity communities.
  4. Assist families in using vouchers to live in high-opportunity areas. (7-8)

This is a pretty hefty report and it is worth digging into more deeply.

Housing Vouchers for Landlords

Collinson and Ganong have posted The Incidence of Housing Voucher Generosity to SSRN. The abstract of this important paper is a little technical for non-economists. It reads:

What is the incidence of housing vouchers? Housing voucher recipients in the US typically pay their landlord a fixed amount based on their income and the government pays the rest of the rent, up to a rent ceiling. We consider a policy that raises the generosity of the rent ceiling everywhere, which is equivalent to an income effect, and a policy which links generosity to local unit quality, which is equivalent to a substitution effect.

Using data on the universe of housing vouchers and quasi-experimental variation from HUD policy changes, we analyze the incidence of these policies. Raising the generosity of the rent ceiling everywhere appears to primarily benefit landlords, who receive higher rents with very little evidence of medium-run quality improvements. Setting ZIP code-level rent ceilings causes rent increases in expensive neighborhoods and decreases in low-cost neighborhoods, with little change in aggregate rents. The ZIP code policy improves neighborhood quality as much as other, far more costly, voucher interventions.

The eye-catching part is that raising “the generosity of the rent ceiling everywhere appears to primarily benefit landlords, who receive higher rents with very little evidence of medium-run quality improvements.” The paper itself fleshes this out more: “a $1 increase in the rent ceiling raises rents by 41 cents; consistent with this policy change acting like an income effect, we find very small quality increases of around 5 cents, meaning that as much as 89% of the increase in government expenditure accrues to landlords.” (20-21)

Given the inelasticity of the supply in many housing markets, this is not such a surprising result. That is, if demand increases because of an increase in income but supply does not, the producer (landlords) can capture more of that income just by raising prices. This finding should give policymakers pause as they design and implement voucher programs. The question that drives them.should be — how can they maximize the portion of the subsidy that goes to the voucher recipient?

Are the FHA’s Losses Heartbreaking?

The Inspector General of the Department of of Housing and Urban Development issued an audit of FHA’s Loss Mitigation Program (2014-KC-0004).  The Office of the Inspector General (the OIG) did the audit because of its “concern that FHA might have incurred costs while allowing lenders to make large amounts of money by modifying defaulted FHA-insured loans. Our audit objective was to determine the extent to which loans modified under the FHA program generated gains for the lenders.” (1)

The OIG found that

Lenders generated an estimated $428 million in gains from the sale of Government National Mortgage Association securities when modifying defaulted FHA loans in fiscal year 2013. These loan modifications were completed as part of FHA’s loss mitigation program. None of these lender generated gains were used to offset FHA’s insurance fund costs. As a result, FHA missed opportunities to strengthen its insurance fund. (1)

Given that the FHA had to be bailed out for the first time in its 80 year history, the findings of this audit are a bit heartbreaking, at least for a housing finance nerd like me.  $428 million would cover more than a quarter of the amount that Treasury had to advance to the FHA, no small potatoes.

The OIG found that the FHA “may have missed opportunities to strengthen its insurance fund. Lenders could be required to offset gains they obtained from the sale of securities for incentive fees and claims for modified loans that redefault.” (5)

The Auditee Comments and the OIG’s Evaluation of Auditee Comments make it clear that the extent of the gains had by lenders is very contested because the OIG did not “know the costs of the lenders.” (17) This seems like a pretty important missing piece of the story. Nonetheless, I hope that HUD, as the parent of both the FHA and Ginnie Mae, takes questions raised by this audit seriously to ensure that public monies are being put to their best use.

Location Affordability in NYC

Following up on two earlier posts (here and here) about Citizens Budget Commission policy briefs on housing affordability, I turn to a third one, Location Affordability in Large U.S. Cities. As a refresher, “Location affordability recognizes that the costs of housing and transportation, usually the two largest items in household budgets, are inextricably linked, and considering them together in relation to income gives a good sense of a city’s location affordability.” (1) the CBC’s key findings are that,

  • For moderate- and middle-income households, location costs in New York City are below the 45 percent affordability threshold due mostly to low commuting costs. New York City ranks well—ranging from second to sixth most affordable—among the 22 large cities.
  • For low-income households, location costs in New York City exceed the affordability threshold. A low-income family requires 47 percent of income for these costs and a single worker household requires 56 percent; for a single person earning a wage at the national poverty line, location costs in New York City are particularly burdensome at 101 percent of income. Almost all cities examined were unaffordable to low-income households. (1, citation omitted)

There are a lot of interesting implications that arise from these policy briefs.  Most important, they provide another (if it were even necessary) argument that scarce affordable housing dollars should be concentrated on low-income households. After all, NYC moderate- and middle-income households are doing better than in most other large American cities when transportation expenses are taken into account in an affordability index.

It would be most worthwhile for the de Blasio Administration to incorporate something like HUD’s Location Affordability Index into its housing plan.