Tag Archives: renter

What Is Constructive Eviction?

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Realtor.com quoted me in What Is a Constructive Eviction? A Rental Gone Very, Very Wrong. It opens,

Most renters have certainly heard of eviction—the dreaded process in which a landlord kicks out a tenant for not paying rent or some other major infraction. But what is a constructive eviction?

That’s a whole different ballgame, where a landlord essentially “evicts” a tenant by not fixing an uninhabitable rental. And while “constructive” may sound like a positive word, it’s not. It means the landlord is failing to fulfill his legal duty.

Constructive eviction is rare, but tenants who face this dire scenario should know their rights, and how to fight back.

How Constructive Evictions Work

“A common way landlords attempt to force out tenants would be by failing to provide heat in the winter,” says Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss. Other ways a landlord could run into constructive eviction territory include turning off the water supply or failing to clean up flaking lead paint or toxic mold.

Constructive evictions are uncommon, because most landlords will usually help tenants with an issue. Or, if they are reluctant at first, they’ll eventually reach a compromise with a tenant through the court system, says Boston attorney Robert Pellegrini.

As such, tenants should attempt to work through any problems with the landlord first. That said, if a property owner won’t budge and the living environment puts a renter in harm’s way, a tenant can pursue a constructive eviction claim.

How To File A Constructive Eviction Claim

Unfortunately, tenants can’t file a constructive eviction claim if their floors creak or if their walls are painted a hideous shade of avocado green.

“More minor conditions like peeling (nonlead) paint, stuck windows, and drafty doors would be weak bases for a claim,” says Reiss.

Pellegrini agrees, adding, “The standards are very high for this, because you’re basically asking the court to conclude that the landlord essentially evicted you when he hasn’t.”

Here are five things a tenant must demonstrate to an attorney to prove a constructive eviction:

  1. Your landlord owed you (the tenant) a duty, such as providing heat in the winter or a residence free from toxic mold.
  2. The landlord neglected the duty.
  3. The apartment became uninhabitable as a result of the neglect.
  4. You gave the landlord notice of the neglect and time to take care of it.
  5. You left the apartment within a reasonable amount of time after the landlord’s failure to fix the issue.

The Rental Crisis and Household Formation

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The Mortgage Bankers Association has posted a Special Report: Diverted Homeowners, the Rental Crisis and Foregone Household Formation. The report’s bottom line is that people who should have been homeowners have displaced people who should have been renters. Those displaced people have been left in their original households, typically those headed by their parents.

The Report’s Executive Summary states that among the long term impacts of the Great Recession

have been the emergence of a rental housing shortage and an intensified affordability crisis in the rental market. In this report, we analyze various supply and demand factors that have led to this crisis.

In so doing, we provide detailed analysis of the shifts in homeowner and rental demand. As we note, these shifts cannot be analyzed without understanding the shifts in household formation that have occurred. We utilize data from the U.S. Census and focus the analysis on 3 distinct time periods (2000, 2006, 2012) to highlight housing epochs that are relatively normal, at the peak, and near the bottom of the market. Special attention is also placed on those younger than age 45 because they represent the households most commonly making first time decisions to form a household and to own a house.

Our primary findings:

• A sharp downturn in homeowner growth since 2006 suggests that 6.0 million would-be homeowners (the expected number compared to actual) have been shifted to renting or have left the housing market.

• These diverted homeowners triggered a cascade of adjustments throughout the rental housing sector that are measurable in different ways.

• A sizable portion (roughly a third) of the diverted homeowners likely have been absorbed into single-family rentals, especially among households aged 25 to 54.

• Although larger than expected, growth in the rental sector was too small to account for both the expected rental growth and also the large number of diverted homeowners. Before disruptions to the owner-occupied market, the rental sector had been expected to grow by 4.4 million occupied units after 2006, due to the arrival of the large Millennial generation. While diverted homeowners resulted in demand for nearly 6 million additional rental units, rental housing only grew by 5.2 million.

• New construction was crippled during the financial crisis and aftermath, slowing its response to the swelling rental demand, although multifamily construction volume nearly doubled in 2012 compared to 2010, and increased another third in 2014 compared to 2012.

• The clear inference is that slightly more than 5 million otherwise-expected renters left or never entered the housing market, their growth displaced by the diverted homeowners, and diminishing overall household growth far below expectations. (1)

• A further consequence of the resulting increase in demand and shortfall in supply in the rental market was an increase in rents, with rental affordability problems surging to record heights in 2010 and 2012. This dynamic created an increased incidence of high rental cost burdens that was remarkable for its relative uniformity across the nation.

There has been a fair amount written recently about household formation (here and here, for instance), but this Report is notable for its description of the cascading effect that the financial crisis has had on today’s housing market. We are around the fifty-year low for the homeownership rate.  If that rate has hit bottom, perhaps the trends identified in the MBA report are about to reverse course.

Fannie/Freddie 2016 Scorecard

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Anne Madsen

The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted the 2016 Scorecard for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Common Securitization Solutions. The FHFA assesses the three entities using the following criteria, among others:

  • The extent to which each Enterprise conducts initiatives in a safe and sound manner consistent with FHFA’s expectations for all activities;
  • The extent to which the outcomes of their activities support a competitive and resilient secondary mortgage market to support homeowners and renters . . . (2)

The FHFA expects Fannie and Freddie to “Maintain, in a Safe and Sound Manner, Credit Availability and Foreclosure Prevention Activities for New and Refinanced Mortgages to Foster Liquid, Efficient, Competitive, and Resilient National Housing Finance Markets.” (3) The specifics are, unfortunately, not too specific when it comes to big picture issues like maintaining credit availability in a safe and sound manner, although the scorecard does discuss particular programs and policies like the Reps and Warranties Framework and the expiration of HAMP and HARP.

The FHFA also expects Fannie and Freddie to “Reduce Taxpayer Risk Through Increasing the Role of Private Capital in the Mortgage Market.” Here, the FHFA has more specifics, as it outlines particular risk transfer objects, such as requiring the Enterprises to transfer “credit risk on at least 90 percent of the unpaid principal balance of newly acquired single-family mortgages in” certain loan categories. (5)

The last goals relate to the building of the Common Securitization Platform and Single Security: Fannie and Freddie are to “Build a New Single-Family Infrastructure for Use by the Enterprises and Adaptable for Use by Other Participants in the Secondary Market in the Future.” (7) The FHFA us moving with all deliberate speed to reshape the secondary mortgage market in the face of indifference or gridlock in Congress.

The FHFA may implement the reform of Fannie and Freddie all by its lonesome. Maybe that’s the best result, given where Congress is these days.

 

Feds Financing Multifamily

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Brett VA

The Congressional Budget Office has released The Federal Role in the Financing of Multifamily Rental Properties. The report opens,

Multifamily properties—those with five or more units— provide shelter for approximately one-third of the more than 100 million renters in the United States and account for about 14 percent of all housing units. Mortgages carrying an actual or implied federal guarantee have been an important source of financing for acquiring, developing, and rehabilitating multifamily properties, particularly after the collapse in house prices and credit availability that accompanied the 2008–2009 recession. According to the Federal Reserve, the share of outstanding multifamily mortgages carrying such a guarantee increased by 10 percentage points, from 33 percent at the beginning of 2005 to 43 percent at the end of the third quarter of 2014. (A slightly larger increase of about 16 percentage points occurred in the federal government’s market share of the much larger single-family market.) Such guarantees are made by a variety of entities, and some policymakers are looking for ways to make the federal government’s involvement more effective. Other policymakers have expressed concern about that expanded federal role and are looking at ways to reduce it. (1)

This debate is, of course, key to housing policy more generally: to what extent should the government be involved in the provision of credit in that sector?

This report does a nice job of summarizing the state of the multifamily housing sector, particularly since the financial crisis. It provides an overview of federal mortgage guarantees for multifamily projects and reviews the choices that Congress faces when it decides to determine Fannie and Freddie’s fate. That is, should we have a federal agency guarantee multifamily mortgages; take a hybrid public/private approach; authorize a federal guarantor of last resort; or take a largely private approach?

We should start by asking if there is a market failure in the housing finance sector and then ask how the government should intercede to correct that market failure. My own sense is that we intercede too much and we should move toward a federal guarantor of last resort with additional support for the low- and moderate-income subsector of the market.

 

 

 

Primer on NYC Affordability Crisis

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"2014 July NYC's 432 Park Avenue" by The Hornet

Enterprise has released a report, 2015 New York City Housing Security Profile and Affordability Housing Gap Analysis. Its conclusions are not shocking, but they are sobering:

  • Of 2 million renter households in New York City, nearly 640,000 are low-income and severely cost-burdened.
  • There is not a single neighborhood in NYC that provides enough affordable housing to match the number of very low-income households in that community.
  • Both the regulated and unregulated rental housing markets of NYC are not meeting the affordable housing needs of low-income renters.
  • Even though the market added rent stabilized units between 2011 and 2014, the stock affordable to lower income families declined.
  • Competition exacerbates the gap between the number affordable units and the number of low-income renters, forcing many to pay beyond their means. (33)

As with many such studies, it offers a cogent analysis of the problem but offers very little by way of possible solutions. It hints at one such solution when it notes that

By any measure, the demand for affordable housing in New York City outstrips supply – even on the rent regulated market. Low-income households are squeezed even further by competition from higher income households for the cheapest units. The acute shortage forces the majority of lower income households in housing that costs beyond their means. (27)

Increasing the supply of housing will, if everything else is equal, reduce the cost of housing. The de Blasio Administration is certainly on board with an approach to increase density in NYC but many other elected officials are not — or at least resist it when it comes to their own backyards.  While more housing is not a sufficient solution to the affordability problem in NYC, it is certainly a necessary component of a solution.

The report also does not deal with the big elephant in the affordable housing policy room — the social demographics of NYC are undergoing a secular shift as the city gets hotter and hotter for global elites. It is unclear how much government can affect that trend, particularly at the local level.

What’s Pushing Down The Homeownership Rate?

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S&P has posted a report, What’s Pushing Down The U.S. Homeownership Rate? It opens,

Seven years after the Great Recession began, a number of key economic factors today have reverted from their short-term extremes. Home prices are rebounding, unemployment is declining, and optimism is rising ­­among economists if not among financial markets­­ that the U.S. economy may finally be strong enough to withstand a rate hike from the Federal Reserve. All these trends point to reversals from the recession’s dismal conditions. Even so, one telling trend for the nation’s economy hasn’t yet reverted to its historic norm: the homeownership rate. The rising proportion of renters to owner ­occupants that followed the housing market turmoil has yet to wane. Compound this with tougher mortgage qualifying requirements over recent years, and it’s not surprising that the homeownership rate, which measures the percentage of housing units that the owner occupies, dropped to a 50­ year low of 63.4% in first­ quarter 2015. However, the further decreases in unemployment and increases in hourly wages that our economists forecast for the next two years may set the stage for an eventual comeback, if only a modest one. (1)

S&P concludes that many have chosen not to become homeowners because of diminished “mortgage availability and income growth.” (8) Like many others, S&P assumes inthat the homeownership rate is unnaturally depressed, having fallen so far below its pre-bubble high of 69.2%. While the current rate is low, S&P does not provide any theory of a “natural” rate of homeownership (cf. natural rate of unemployment). Clearly, the natural rate in today’s economy s higher than something in the 40-50 percent range that existed before the federal government became so involved in housing finance.  And clearly, it is lower than 100% — not everyone should be or wants to be a homeowner. But merely asserting that it is lower than its high is an insufficient basis for identifying the appropriate level today.

I think that the focus should remain on income growth and income inequality. If we address those issues, the homeownership rate should find its own equilibrium. If we push people into homeownership without ensuring that they have stable incomes, we are setting them up for a fall.

The Housing/Income Affordability Gap

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We need affordable housing

The Urban Institute has issued a policy brief, The Housing Affordability Gap for Extremely Low-Income Renters in 2013. The brief opens,

Since 2000, rents have risen while the number of renters who need low-priced housing has increased. These two pressures make finding affordable housing even tougher for very poor households in America. Nationwide, only 28 adequate and affordable units are available for every 100 renter households with incomes at or below 30 percent of the area median income. Not a single county in the United States has enough affordable housing for all its extremely low-income (ELI) renters. The number of affordable rental homes for every 100 ELI renters ranges from 7 in Osceola County, Florida, to 76 in Worcester County, Maryland.

*     *     *

This brief is the first publication on housing affordability to combine detailed county-level data on ELI renter households (those with incomes at or below 30 percent of the area median) and the impact of US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rental assistance. Its four key findings:

  • Supply is not keeping up with demand. Between 2000 and 2013, the number of ELI renter households increased 38 percent, from 8.2 million to 11.3 million. At the same time, the supply of adequate, affordable, and available rental homes for these households increased only 7 percent, from 3.0 million to 3.2 million.
  • The gap between ELI renter households and suitable units is widening over time. From 2000 to 2013, the number of adequate, affordable, and available rental units for every 100 ELI renter households nationwide declined from 37 to 28.
  • Extremely low-income renters increasingly depend on HUD programs for housing. More than 80 percent of adequate, affordable, and available homes for ELI renter households are HUD-assisted, up from 57 percent in 2000.
  • The supply of adequate, affordable, and available units varies widely across the country. Among the 100 largest US counties, Suffolk County, which includes Boston, comes closest to meeting its area’s need, with 51 units per 100 ELI renter households.Denton County, part of the Dallas-Ft. Worth metropolitan area, has the largest housing gap,with only 8 units per 100 ELI renters. Rust Belt areas (e.g., Detroit, MI; Chicago,IL, and Milwaukee, WI) have seen large declines in adequate, affordable, and available units. Most counties had fewer units available in 2013 than 2000. Notable exceptions to this trend include Suffolk, MA; Los Angeles, CA; and Miami, FL, which have expanded their number of available units since 2000. (1-2, footnote omitted)

The brief concludes, “Simply put, virtually no affordable housing units would be available to ELI households absent the continued investment in federally assisted rental housing.” (14)

This is an affordable housing story, but it is just as much an income story — low-income households are getting left behind in the race between rising income and expenses. One solution is to expand housing assistance for low-income families. Another is to increase income, one way or another. The bottom line, though, is that low-income households don’t have enough to make a go of it in these United States.