What Do People Do When Mortgage Payments Drop?

I went to an interesting presentation today on a technical paper, Monetary Policy Pass-Through: Household Consumption and Voluntary Deleveraging. While the paper (by Marco Di Maggio, Amir Kermani & Rodney Ramcharan) itself is tough for the non-expert, it has some important implications that I discuss below. The abstract reads,

Do households benefit from expansionary monetary policy? We investigate how indebted households’ consumption and saving decisions are affected by anticipated changes in monthly interest payments. We focus on borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages originated between 2005 and 2007 featuring an automatic reset of the interest rate after five years. The monthly payment due from the average borrower falls by 52 percent ($900) upon reset, resulting in an increase in disposable income totaling tens of thousands of dollars over the remaining life of the mortgage. We uncover three patterns. First, the average household increases monthly car purchases by 40 percent ($150) upon reset. Second, this expansionary effect is attenuated by the borrowers’ voluntary deleveraging, as a significant fraction of the increased income is deployed to accelerate debt repayment. Third, the marginal propensity to consume is significantly higher for low income and underwater borrowers. To complement these household-level findings, we employ county-level data to provide evidence that consumption responded more to a reduction in short-term interest rates in counties with a larger fraction of adjustable rate mortgage debt. Our results shed light on the income channel of monetary policy as well as the role of debt rigidity in reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy. (1)

The paper cleverly exploits

the anticipated changes in monthly payments of borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) originated between 2005 and 2007, with a fixed interest rate for the first 5 years, which is automatically adjusted at the end of this initial period. These cohorts experience a sudden and substantial drop in the interest rates they pay upon reset, regardless of their financial position or credit worthiness and without refinancing. These cohorts are of particular interest because the interest rate reduction they experienced is sizeable: the ARMs originated in 2005 benefited from an average reduction of 3 percentage points in the reference interest rate in 2010. (3)

I will leave it to individual readers to work through how they designed this research project and move on to its implications:

The magnitude of the positive income shock for these households is large indeed: the monthly payment falls on average by $900 at the moment of the interest rate adjustment. Potentially, this could free up important resources for these indebted and mainly underwater households. We show that households increase their car purchase spending by more than $150 per month, equivalent to a 40 percent increase compared to the period immediately before the adjustment. Their monthly credit card balances also increase substantially, by almost $200 a month within the first year after the adjustment. Moreover, there is not any sign of intertemporal substitution or reversal within two years of the adjustment. . . . However, we also show that households use 15% of their increase in income to repay their debts faster, almost doubling the extent of this effort. (38-39)

There are all sorts of interesting implications that follow from this study, but I am particularly intrigued by its implications for “debt rigidity — the responsiveness of loan contracts to interest rate changes.” (6) While the authors are interested in how debt rigidity can impact monetary policy, I am interested in how it can impact households. There is much in the American housing finance system that keeps households from refinancing — high title insurance charges and other fees, for instance — but we do not often focus on the impact that rigid mortgage contracts have on the broader economy. This paper demonstrates that the effects are not borne by consumers alone. This paper quantifies the effects on the consumer economy to some extent and reveals that they are quite significant. Policy makers should take note of just how significant they can be.

Abusive Non-Rent Fees for Rent Stabilized Tenants

The Urban Justice Center’s Community Development Project has issued a report, The Burden of Fees: How Affordable Housing is Made Unaffordable. The introduction reads,

Tenants in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods are under attack. Despite the existence of laws such as rent stabilization to protect tenants from high rents, landlords are creating new ways to push rent stabilized tenants out of their homes. One such tactic is the use of non-rent fees, a confusing and often times unwarranted set of charges that are added to a monthly rent statement . . .. These include fees on appliances (air conditioner, washing machine, dryer, and dishwasher), legal fees, damage fees, Major Capital Improvement (MCI) rent increases and other miscellaneous fees. Often these fees appear on a tenant’s rent bill without any explanation. If a tenant fails to pay, even if they are unaware of why the fee was imposed, they are sent letters that make them feel that they are being harassed and are threatened with eviction by the landlord. Most tenants have a right to object to many of these fees, and landlords are legally prohibited from taking tenants to Housing Court solely for non-payment of additional fees. But many tenants don’t know their rights about the fees and often pay them when they shouldn’t. For low-income and working class tenants who struggle each month to pay rent, these fees add up and make their housing costs unaffordable. While some of the fees are legal, many of them are not, and the consistency and pattern of the way the fees are being charged and collected suggests that some landlords are intentionally increasing tenants’ rent burdens to push out long- term, rent stabilized tenants.

This problem is proliferating in the Bronx, where New Settlement’s Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) works to improve living conditions and maintain affordable housing. This is particularly apparent in buildings owned by Chestnut Holdings, a company that is fast becoming one of the biggest landlords of rent stabilized buildings in the Bronx.

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All survey respondents live in rent stabilized buildings owned by Chestnut Holdings. In total, the coalition collected 172 surveys from 23 buildings, representing 13% of the number of apartments in those buildings. The research sample accounts for 4% of all the apartments that Chestnut Holdings owns, and 28% of the buildings. Researchers also collected rent bills and other supplemental materials (including letters to and from landlords, housing court decisions, and more) from 196 Chestnut Holdings tenants. Coalition members chose to focus on these buildings because they are rent stabilized and located in the neighborhoods where each organization is actively working. Data in this report comes from surveys, recent rent bills collected from Chestnut Holdings’ tenants and interviews with tenants.

Overall, we found that the problem of non-rent fees is serious and widespread in the Bronx. 81% of the tenants we surveyed had been charged some sort of fee. From the rent bills we reviewed for this report, the average tenant had $671.13 in non-rent fees on their most recent rent bill. (1-2)

This document is obviously an advocacy document and not a piece of objective scholarship. Moreover, its methodology may not be rigorous enough to allow us to extrapolate much from its findings. That being said, the survey responses themselves reveal a serious problem: alleged average non-rent fees of nearly $700 for each survey respondent seems very, very high, even if we limit the findings to the respondents themselves.

In the 1970s, predatory landlords hired bruisers with bats and pit bulls to frighten tenants into leaving their homes. In the 2000s, a new generation of predatory landlords used abusive court filings to achieve the same purpose. There is a very real risk that high non-rent fees represent a new tactic for predatory landlords to drive out rent-regulated tenants with under-market rents. To the extent that non-rent fees represent a new tactic to harass tenants, government regulators should actively seek to end it and punish those who employ it.

Fannie & Freddie and Multifamily

The Urban Institute has posted a Housing Finance Policy Center Brief, The GSEs’ Shrinking Role in the Multifamily Market. It opens,

Though the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—are best known for their dominant role in the single-family mortgage market, they have also been major providers of multifamily housing financing for more than 25 years. Their role in the multifamily market, however, has declined substantially since the housing crisis and has reverted to more normalized levels. In addition, even as the GSEs continue to meet or exceed their multifamily affordable housing goals, their financing for certain underserved segments of the market has fallen steeply in recent years.

Given recent declines, policymakers and regulators should consider maintaining or increasing the GSEs’ footprint in the multifamily market, especially in underserved segments. The scorecard cap increases and exemptions recently employed by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to slow the decline in GSE multifamily volume have been somewhat effective, but they may not be enough to prevent the GSEs’ role from shrinking further. (1)

The policy brief’s main takeaway is that “policymakers and regulators should consider maintaining or increasing GSEs’ role in the multifamily market.” (8) I was struck by the fact that this policy brief pretty much took for granted that it is good for the GSEs to have such a big (and increasing) role in the multifamily market:

Though the multifamily market continues to remain strong and private financing is readily available today, it is also poised to grow significantly because of rising property prices and higher future demand. This raises the question of whether the GSEs should continue to shrink their multifamily footprint even further below the level of early 2000s, a period of relatively stable housing market. (8)

Government intervention in markets is usually called for when there is a market failure. The policy brief indicates the opposite — “private financing is readily available today.” The brief does argue that financing “backed by pure private capital is likely to be concentrated within the more profitable mid-to-high end of the market.” (9) That does not indicate that there is a market failure, just that borrowing costs should be cheaper for such projects. If the federal government is going to effectively subsidize a functioning credit market through the GSEs, it should make sure that it is getting something concrete in return, like affordable housing. Just supporting a credit market generally because it tends to support affordable housing is an inefficient way to achieve public goods like affordable housing. It also is a recipe for special interest capture and a future housing finance crisis. To the extent that this private credit market can function on its own, the government should limit its role to safety and soundness regulation and affordable housing creation.

The Good, Bad & Ugly of Real Estate

U.S. News & World Report quoted me in The Good, Bad and Ugly of Real Estate Investments. It reads, in part,

While many investors get a rise when it comes to the potential profits in real estate, that doesn’t mean all properties rise enough in value to justify the commitment.

“Some people buy real estate expecting it to appreciate a lot over time,” says David Reiss, a professor of law and research director of the Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. “But it can be risky – or even foolish – to pay so much for a property that you’re losing money on an operating basis just because you think it will appreciate.”

The wisdom in real estate, then, applies just as it would with stocks, commodities or any other investment class: The variables are many, the can’t-miss propositions few. So where should the savvy money go? And how does real estate fit into your overall portfolio?

Here, experts and observers weigh in on the essentials that should guide your decisions, as well as the ways to guide your financial forays toward success.

Know your market well. If you pay market price for an investment property, you probably won’t see particularly robust returns. “It will make a market return, and if you want to do better than that, you have to pound the pavement,” Reiss says. “Look for deals that are underpriced for one reason or another. And you won’t know which deals are underpriced unless you have a good sense of how properties are priced.”

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Increase your profit potential with an investment of time. Property development, management and administration often require an army of specialists. But if you’re adept at repairs, accounting or showing a vacancy to prospective renters, you can forego the fees associated with hired help. “Depending on your availability and your skills, these could be trade-offs that are worth making for you,” Reiss says.

Reiss on Anatomy of a Mortgage

MainStreet quoted me in The Anatomy of a Mortgage – Determining Which Fees You Need to Pay. It reads in part,

All mortgages are not created equal, so reading the fine print before you agree to a long-term commitment is crucial.

Mortgage lenders now have become “very risk averse” since the financial crisis and are doing everything “pretty much by the book,” said Greg McBride, the chief financial analyst for Bankrate.com, a New York-based personal finance content company. “The rules on the ability of a homeowner to be able to repay are stricter than ten years ago,” he said. “Niche products have gone back to niche borrowers.”

While lenders are offering fewer risky products such as interest only mortgages to run-of-the-mill consumers, there are still hidden fees and other deceptive practices to be wary of, said Jason van den Brand, CEO of Lenda, the San Francisco-based online mortgage company.

In 2013, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau issued guidelines to protect consumers from the types of mortgages that contributed to the financial crash. In the past, lenders were approving mortgages that allowed consumers to borrow large sums of money without any documentation such as pay stubs and offered extremely low interest rates to lure people into buying homes.

 “It also doesn’t mean that the potential to get bad mortgage advice has been eliminated,” van den Brand said. “There aren’t bad mortgage products, just bad advice and decisions.”

Here are the top seven things consumers should consider carefully.

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Avoid choosing an adjustable rate mortgage or ARM when it makes more sense to select a fixed rate mortgage. Those low initial rates offered by ARMs are enticing, but they only make sense for homeowners who know that in less than ten years, they plan to upgrade to a large home, move to another neighborhood or relocate for work. Many ARMs are called a 5/1 or 7/1, which means that they are fixed at the introductory interest rate for five or seven years and then readjust every year after that, which increases your monthly mortgage payment said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School.

While many homeowners gravitate toward a 30-year mortgage, younger owners “should seriously consider getting an ARM if they think that they might move sooner rather than later,” he said. If you are single and buying a one-bedroom condo, it is likely you could sell that condo and buy a house in the future. “That person might not want to pay for the long-term safety of a 30-year fixed rate mortgage and instead save money with a 7/1 ARM,” Reiss said.

How Can Tech Support Housing Rights?

Here is Linda Raftree’s write up of the Technology Salon Brooklyn event on How Can Tech Support Housing Rights in Brooklyn? The salon co-hosted the event with the Brooklyn Community Foundation (BCF) and AfroLatin@ Project.  The salon attendees explored the issue of tenant rights within the wider context of structural discrimination:

We aimed to think about how new technology and social media might be a tool for helping community organizations to support Brooklyn residents to know their rights and report violations. We were also curious about how better use of data (and ‘big data’) might help housing rights activists and community organizations to more successfully engage residents and advocate for change.

Our lead discussant was David Reiss from Brooklyn Law School, who provided an overview of the wider housing market and challenges in New York City as well as information on some applications that are helping landlords do a better job of keeping properties up to standard. We also heard from Tynesha McHarris (BCF) and Amilcar Priestly (AfroLatin@ Project).

Clearly, tech offers no magic bullets for the gap between the supply and demand of housing in NYC, but there were some intriguing ideas about how to protect rent-regulated tenants from harassment. There were also some interesting ideas about how public housing tenants could use technology to track and organize around bad housing conditions. The write up of the salon is here and is worth a read.

Reiss on Low Interest Rates & Down Payments

MainStreet quoted me in How to Get the Lowest Mortgage Rates Without a Large Down Payment. It reads in part,

Low mortgage rates can play a large factor whether homeowners are able to save tens of thousands of dollars in interest.

Even a 1% difference in the mortgage rate can save a homeowner $40,000 over 30 years for a mortgage valued at $200,000. Having a top-notch credit score plays a critical factor in determining what interest rate lenders will offer consumers, but other issues such as the amount of your down payment also impact it.

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Opt For an FHA or ARM

Both an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) and a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage are good options if homeowners are concerned about receiving a lower interest rate and have not been able to accumulate the 20% standard down payment.

The biggest benefit of an ARM is that they have lower interest rates than the more common 30-year fixed rate mortgage. Many ARMs are called a 5/1 or 7/1, which means that they are fixed at the introductory interest rate for five or seven years and then readjust every year after that, said David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School in N.Y. The new rate is based on an index, perhaps LIBOR, as well as a margin on top of that index.

While many homeowners gravitate toward a 30-year mortgage, younger owners “should seriously consider getting an ARM if they think that they might move sooner rather than later,” he said.

FHA loans can be a good option for consumers purchasing their first home because they require much smaller down payment of 3.5%.

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Given that young households tend not to have the savings for a substantial down payment, they can be an attractive option, Reiss said.