Reforming Fannie & Freddie’s Multifamily Business

Mark Willis & Andrew Neidhardt’s article, Reforming the National Housing Finance System: What’s at Risk for the Multifamily Rental Market if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Go Away?, was recently published in a special issue of the NYU Journal of Law & Business. Most of the ink spilled about the reform of Fannie and Freddie addresses their single-family lines of business. The single-family business is much bigger, but the multifamily business is also an important part of what they do.

The author’s conclude that

Reform of the nation’s housing finance system needs to be careful not to disrupt unnecessarily the existing multifamily housing market. The near collapse of Fannie and Freddie’s single-family business over five years ago resulted in conservatorship and has spawned calls for their termination. While a general consensus has since emerged that Fannie and Freddie should be phased out over time, no consensus exists as to which, if any, of their functions need to be replaced in order to preserve the affordability and availability of housing in general, and multifamily rentals in particular.

On the multifamily side, Fannie and Freddie have built specialized units using financing models that involve private sector risk-sharing (i.e., DUS lender capital at risk or investors holding subordinate tranches of K-series securities) and that have resulted in low default rates and limited credit losses. These units have benefited from an implicit government guarantee of their corporate debt, which has expanded their access to capital and lowered its cost. As a result of the implicit guarantee, Fannie and Freddie have been able to: 1) offer longer term mortgages than generally available from banks, 2) provide countercyclical support to the rental market by funding new mortgages throughout the recent housing and economic downturn, and 3) ensure that the vast majority of the mortgages they fund offer rents affordable to households earning less than even 80% of area median income.

The potential for moral hazard can be reduced without disrupting the multifamily housing market simply by separating out and nationalizing the government guarantee It would then be possible to: 1) spin off the multifamily businesses of Fannie and Freddie into self-contained entities and 2) create an explicit government guarantee, offered by a government entity, and paid for through premiums on the insured MBS. The first step could happen now with FHFA authorization. These new subsidiaries could also begin to pay their respective holding companies for providing the guarantee on their MBS. The second step requires Congressional legislation. Once the public guarantor is up and running, the guarantee would be purchased from it and these subsidiaries could then be sold to private investors. As for other reforms that would explicitly restrict market access to the government guarantee, the best approach would be to first test the private sector’s appetite for risk on higher-end deals. (539-40)

This article has a lot to offer in terms of analyzing how Fannie and Freddie’s multifamily business is distinct from their single-family business. But I do not think that it fully makes the case that the multifamily sector suffers from some sort of market failure that requires so much government intervention as it advocates. I suspect that private capital could be put into a first loss position for much more of the lending in this sector. The government could continue to support the low- and moderate-income rental market without being on the hook for the rest of the multifamily market.

Homeless in America

The Department of Housing Urban Development released Part 1 of The 2014 Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress.  Part 1 provides Point-in-Time Estimates of Homelessness. Its key findings include,

  • In January 2014, 578,424 people were homeless on a given night. Most (69 percent) were staying in residential programs for homeless people, and the rest (31 percent) were found in unsheltered locations.
  • Nearly one-quarter of all homeless people were children under the age of 18 (23 percent or 135,701). Ten percent (or 58,601) were between the ages of 18 and 24, and 66 percent (or 384,122) were 25 years or older.
  • Homelessness declined by 2 percent (or 13,344 people) between 2013 and 2014 and by 11 percent (or 72,718) since 2007. (1)

The report notes that in “2010, the Administration released Opening Doors: Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness, a comprehensive plan to prevent and end homelessness in America.” (3) The plan had four goals:

  1. Finish the job of ending chronic homelessness in 2015
  2. Prevent and end homelessness among Veterans by 2015
  3. Prevent and end homelessness for families, youth, and children by 2020
  4. Set a path to ending all types of homelessness (3)

HUD claims success on all four fronts:

  1. The number of individuals experiencing chronic homelessness declined by 21 percent, or 22,892 people, between 2010 and 2014.
  2. The number of homeless veterans declined by 33 percent (or 24,837 people) since 2010, and most of the decline was in the number of veterans staying in unsheltered locations.
  3. Since 2010 the number of homeless people in families has declined by 11 percent (or 25,690 people).
  4. Overall, homelessness has declined by more than 62,000 people since 2010 (62,042), a 10 percent reduction since the release of Opening Doors. (3)

In many ways, the success of American housing policy comes down to the question — can all Americans have a safe and affordable place to call home? The Administration answers this question in the affirmative. And this report appears to demonstrate that the Administration’s plan to end homelessness is working.

While I am skeptical of claims that we have finally figured out how to systematically address homelessness, I am happy to see that it is trending downward over the last few years.  This report was authored by some serious people, including Dr. Dennis Culhane of the National Center on Homelessness among Veterans at the University of Pennsylvania, so there is reason to trust these numbers. One can hope that this trend continues, but given the financial insecurity so many households face, I am worried that it will not.

Reiss on Catching FIRREA

Inside ABS & MBS quoted me in Experts: New AG Likely to Continue Aggressive Use of FIRREA Against Industry, Individual Executives Targeted (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

Mortgage industry executives should be aware and expect continued – and perhaps even more muscular – use of a 1989 federal law by government prosecutors to pursue mortgage-related claims. At the direction of Attorney General Eric Holder, the Department of Justice embraced the use of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) in MBS lawsuits. Despite Holder’s announcement late last month that he is stepping down after six years as AG, there is little reason to expect that President Obama’s new attorney general will surrender use of such a “potent statute” that has employed a lower burden of proof and long statute of limitations to exact large tribute from the mortgage industry, according to Marjorie Peerce of the Ballard Spahr law firm.

*     *    *

Brooklyn Law School Professor David Reiss agrees. He added that throughout President Obama’s term, the White House at the highest level has set an agenda for corporate accountability so it’s likely that one of the chief mandates of Holder’s successor will be the continuation of the DOJ’s vigorous use of tools such as FIRREA.

During a speech last month prior to announcing his resignation, Holder called for making the FIRREA statute even stronger, with whistleblower bounties raised to induce more testimony. However, Reiss noted it’s unlikely the White House would be keen to encourage lawmakers to take another look at FIRREA given that Congress next year will likely be in Republican hands.

However, Reiss called attention to a part of Holder’s speech where the AG expressed frustration with the DOJ’s inability to hold financial services executives criminally liable for alleged misconduct. Holder suggested several ways for the DOJ to do so, including extending the “responsible corporate officer doctrine” to the financial services industry.

Under this doctrine, an individual may be prosecuted criminally under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act even absent culpable intent or knowledge of wrongdoing if the executive was in a position to prevent the wrongdoing and failed to do so.

“Focusing on individual culpability could be a new charge of the new attorney general,” said Reiss. “Given the events of the last 10 years, [a significant number of] people think that fewer individuals were held accountable for the financial crisis than should have been, so I think the Department of Justice may have heard that message as well.”

Housing Goals and Housing Finance Reform

The Federal Housing Finance Agency issued a proposed rule that would establish housing goals for Fannie and Freddie for the next three years. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 required that Fannie and Freddie’s regulator set annual housing goals to ensure that a certain proportion of the companies’ mortgage purchases serve low-income households and underserved areas. Among other things, the proposed rule would “establish a new housing subgoal for small multifamily properties affordable to low-income families,” a subject that happens to be near and dear to my heart.(54482)

This “duty to serve” is very controversial, at the heart of the debate over housing finance reform. Many Democrats oppose housing finance reform without it and many Republicans oppose reform with it. Indeed, it was one of the issues that stopped the Johnson-Crapo reform bill dead in its tracks.

While this proposed rule is not momentous by any stretch of the imagination, it is worth noting that the FHFA, for all intents and purposes, seems to be the only party in the Capital that is moving housing finance reform forward in any way.

Once again, we should note that doing nothing is not the same as leaving everything the same. As Congress fails to strike an agreement on reform and Fannie and Freddie continue to limp along in their conservatorships, regulators and market participants will, by default, be designing the housing finance system of the 21st century. That is not how it should be done.

Comments are due by October 28, 2014.

Fannie+Freddie=FRANNIE?!?

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has posted a Request for Input on “the proposed structure for a Single Security that would be issued and guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.” The FHFA’s press release states that

The Single Security project is intended to improve the overall liquidity of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities by creating a Single Security that is eligible for trading in the to-be-announced (TBA) market.  FHFA is requesting public input on all aspects of the proposed Single Security structure and is especially focused on issues regarding the transition from the current system to a Single Security.  Specific questions FHFA is asking relate to TBA eligibility, legacy Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities, potential industry impact of the Single Security initiative, and the risk of market disruption.

 The particular questions for which the FHFA invites feedback are

  1. What key factors regarding TBA eligibility status should be considered in the design of and transition to a Single Security?
  2. What issues should be considered in seeking to ensure broad market liquidity for the legacy securities?
  3. As discussed above, this is a multi-year initiative with many stakeholders. What operational, system, policy (e.g., investment guideline), or other effects on the industry should be considered?
  4. What can be done to ensure a smooth implementation of a Single Security with minimal risk of market disruption? (8)

The FHFA states it is most concerned with achieving “maximum secondary market liquidity,” so it is particularly interested “in views on how to preserve TBA eligibility and ensure that legacy MBS [mortgage-backed securities] and PCs [participation certificates] are fully fungible with the Single Security.” (8)

I must say that I am a little skeptical about the reasons for this move to a Single Security. It is unclear to me that this is an urgent need for the FHFA, the two companies, originating lenders or borrowers. While I have no doubt that it could slightly increase liquidity and slightly decrease the cost of credit, I do not see this move as having a dramatic effect on either.

I would say, though, that this move is consistent with an agenda to move toward a new model of government-supported housing finance, one that could contemplate an end to Fannie and Freddie as we know them and the beginning of a more utility-like securitizer like those proposed in the Johnson-Crapo and Corker-Warner bills. Perhaps the regulator will lead the way to housing finance reform when Congress and the Executive have failed to do so . . ..

Input is due by October 13, 2014.

 

Good Data Makes Good Mortgages

The CFPB issued a proposed rule about increasing the quality of information that lenders report about mortgage applications. The press release regarding the proposed rule states that these changes will ease the reporting burden on lenders, and that may very well be true. But the contested part of these rules relate to the type of information to be collected:

  • Improving market information: In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress directed the Bureau to update HMDA regulations by having lenders report specific new information that could help identify potential discriminatory lending practices and other issues in the marketplace. This new information includes, for example: the property value; term of the loan; total points and fees; the duration of any teaser or introductory interest rates; and the applicant’s or borrower’s age and credit score.
  • Monitoring access to credit: The Bureau is proposing that financial institutions provide more information about underwriting and pricing, such as an applicant’s debt-to-income ratio, the interest rate of the loan, and the total discount points charged for the loan. This information would help regulators determine how the Ability-to-Repay rule is impacting the market, and would also help the Bureau monitor developments in specific markets such as multi-family housing, affordable housing, and manufactured housing. The proposed rule would also require that covered lenders report, with some exceptions, all loans related to dwellings, including reverse mortgages and open-end lines of credit.

Lenders are not going to like this, because this new information may be used against them in a variety of ways — in Fair Housing lawsuits, by the CFPB in enforcement actions, by members of Congress seeking to increase credit access to various constituencies.

I like this because regulators and academic researchers have been hamstrung by limited and stale data on the fast-moving mortgage market. The mortgage market is often driven by the short-term profit-seeking of private actors and by special interests pushing their agendas with the Executive and Legislative Branches.  Good data can inform good decision-making that can ensure that the housing finance system is vibrant and provides sustainable credit for households over the long term.

Comments on the proposed rule are due by October 22, 2014.

 

Reiss on Supreme Court Mortgage Case

Law360 quoted me in Supreme Court Takes Up Mortgage Rescission Timing Case (behind a paywall). It reads in part,

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to weigh in on whether federal law requires borrowers to notify creditors in writing of their intention to rescind their mortgages or file a lawsuit making a similar claim within three years.

The petitioners in the case, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski of Eagan, Minn., are seeking to overturn a September ruling in the Eighth Circuit that they were required to sue Countrywide Home Loans Inc. to have their mortgage financing rescinded within three years of the transaction closing. The Jesinoskis argue that the Truth In Lending Act only requires that they provide notice of rescission in writing within those three years.

But the case goes beyond a ruling in the Eighth Circuit. A Supreme Court ruling would resolve a circuit split that has seen the Third, Fourth and Eleventh circuits rule that borrowers have three years from closing to notify lenders in writing within three years of their intention to cancel their mortgages, while the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth circuits have found that a lawsuit must be filed within that three-year period, according to the Jesinoskis’ December petition for certiorari.

“The resulting rule does violence to the statutory text, manufactures legal obstacle for homeowners seeking to vindicate their rights under a law that was enacted to protect them, and risks flooding the federal courts with thousands of needless lawsuits to accomplish rescissions that Congress intended to be completed privately and without litigation,” the petition said.

TILA provides two different rescission rights to borrowers who apply for and receive a mortgage refinancing. The more common process allows such borrowers to rescind their mortgage within three days of closing and before any money is disbursed.

The law also provides a more expanded rescission right in situations where borrowers do not receive mandated disclosures. There, the law provides three years from the closing date to provide such notice, but with proof that the documents were not provided.

Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, such expanded rescission claims were rare, said Reed Smith LLP partner Robert Jaworski.

“A lot more people were in trouble on their mortgages and couldn’t make payments and were subject to foreclosure. That caused a lot of these claims to be made, much more than previously,” he said.

And that has made the need for resolving the circuit split that much more important.

“It’s kind of ambiguous. It’s not stated as a statute of limitations,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.