Tag Archives: FHFA

Federalizing Monoline Mortgage Insurance

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The Federal Insurance Office of the Department of Treasury issued a report required pursuant to Dodd-Frank, How To Modernize And Improve The System Of Insurance Regulation In The United States, which addresses among other things the state of the monoline mortgage insurance industry:

Recommendation: Federal standards and oversight for mortgage insurers should be developed and implemented.

Like financial guarantors, private mortgage insurers are monoline companies that experienced devastating losses during the financial crisis. A business predominantly focused on providing credit enhancement to mortgages guaranteed by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, mortgage insurers migrated from the core business of insuring conventional, well-underwritten mortgage loans to providing insurance on pools of Alt-A and subprime mortgages in the years leading up to the financial crisis. The dramatic decline in housing prices and the impact of the change in underwriting practices required mortgage insurers to draw down capital and reserves to pay claims resulting in the failure of three out of the eight mortgage insurers in the United States. Historically high levels of claim denials, including policy rescissions, helped put taxpayers at risk.

Regulatory oversight of mortgage insurance varies state by state. Though mortgage insurance coverage is provided nationally, only 16 states impose specific requirements on private mortgage insurers. Of these requirements, two govern the solvency regime and, therefore, are of particular significance: (1) a limit on total liability, net of reinsurance, for all policies of 25 times the sum of capital, surplus, and contingency reserves, (known as a 25:1 risk-to-capital ratio); and (2) a requirement of annual contributions to a contingency reserve equal to 50 percent of the mortgage insurer’s earned premium. In addition to the states, the GSEs (and through conservatorship, the Federal Housing Finance Agency) establish uniform standards and eligibility requirements that in some cases are more stringent than those required by state regulators. As the financial crisis unfolded, mortgage insurers no longer met state or contractual capital requirements. State regulators granted waivers in order to allow mortgage insurers to continue to write new business while the GSEs loosened other standards that were applicable to mortgage insurers.

The private mortgage insurance sector is interconnected with other aspects of the federal housing finance system and, therefore, is an issue of significant national interest. As the United States continues to recover from the financial crisis and works to reform aspects of the housing finance system, private mortgage insurance may be an important component of any reform package as an alternative way to place private capital in front of any government or taxpayer risk. Robust national solvency and business practice standards, with uniform implementation, for mortgage insurers would help foster greater confidence in the solvency and performance of housing finance. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to establish federal oversight of federally developed standards applicable to mortgage insurance. (31-32)

This critique of the monoline insurance industry seems accurate to me. The industry has a tendency to fail when it is needed most — during major financial crises. Having multiple states regulate monoline insurers allows this nationally (and globally) significant industry to engage in regulatory arbitrage — that is, finding the most pliable regulatory environment in which to operate. National regulation would solve that problem. As always, a single federal regulator is more prone to capture by the industry it regulates than a bunch of state regulators. We have, however, tried the alternative and it has not worked so well. I think a federal approach is worth a try.

The Road to Securitization

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Miguel Segoviano et al. of the IMF released a helpful Working Paper, Securitization:  Lessons Learned and the Road Ahead (also on SSRN). It opens,

Like most forms of financial innovation, there are cost and benefits associated with the securitization of cash flows. From a conceptual perspective, a sound and efficient market for securitization can be supportive of the financial system and broader economy in various ways such as lowering funding costs and improving the capital utilization of financial institutions—benefits which may be passed onto borrowers; helping issuers and investors diversify risk; and transforming pools of illiquid assets into tradable securities, thus stimulating the flow of credit—an issue of particular relevance for some European countries. However, these features need to be weighed against the potential costs, including the risk that securitization contributes to excessive credit growth in and outside of the formal banking system; principal-agent problems that amplify perverse incentives; the complexity and opaqueness of certain products which make efficient pricing problematic; and the heavy reliance of the industry on credit ratings. (3)

The authors identify lessons learned from the financial crisis as well as impediments to a renewed securitization market. They conclude with a set of policy recommendations.

I recommend this paper as a good overview. I particularly like that it looks beyond the United States market, although it does spend plenty of time looking at the history and structure of the U.S. market. The recommendations tend to be pretty reasonable, but not particularly innovative — implement Dodd-Frank-like requirements in non-U.S. jurisdictions; de-emphasize the role of NRSRO credit ratings; increase transparency and decrease needless complexity throughout the industry; modernize land record regimes, etc.

It is surely hard to get your hands around the global securitization industry, but it is important that we try to. Securitization is here to stay. We should manage its risks the best that we can.

U.S. Dismissive of Frannie Suits

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency filed its motion to dismiss all the claims in Perry Capital v. Lew, D.D.C., No. 13-cv-01025, 1/17/14. I blogged about this case (and similar cases) when they were filed last summer. It is quite interesting to read the government’s side of the story now. Today’s post focuses on the federal government’s alternative narrative. Where the private investors describe an opportunistic and abusive government in their complaints, the FHFA’s brief describes the government as a white knight who rode in to save the day at the depth of the financial crisis:

The national crisis having eased, Plaintiffs now ask the Court to re-write the agreements that FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, and Treasury executed to stabilize the Enterprises and the national economy, pursuant to express congressional authority. Plaintiffs want to cherry-pick those aspects of the agreements that they like—namely, the unprecedented financial support from Treasury at a time when the Enterprises required billions of dollars in capital—and discard the parts they do not like—namely, the Third Amended PSPAs—now that over one hundred billion dollars of federal taxpayer capital infusions and commitments have allowed the Enterprises to remain in business and produce positive earnings, rather than being placed into mandatory receivership and then liquidation. Plaintiffs’ attempt to reward themselves, at the expense of federal taxpayers who risked and continue to risk billions of dollars to save the Enterprises from receivership and liquidation, directly contravenes the relevant statutory authorities as implemented by the unambiguous language of the PSPAs.

Plaintiffs’ charges of common law and APA violations have it exactly backwards: FHFA, on behalf of the Enterprises, has acted at all times consistent with the Enterprises’ contractual obligations and FHFA’s powers as Conservator and statutory successor to all rights of the Enterprises and their stockholders. The shareholder-Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are attempting through these cases to convince this Court, during the conservatorships, to give shareholders financial value that they are not owed under the terms of their stock certificates or statutes, and to ignore the rights of the Enterprises’ senior preferred stockholder, the U.S. Treasury. By doing so, Plaintiffs seek not only to undermine the purposes of conservatorship, but also the very statutory mission of the Enterprises in which they chose to invest. (4-5)

While I think that the investors raise some serious legal issues for the court to decide, the federal government’s narrative of the financial crisis jibes a whole lot more with my own than does the investors’. I argued last summer that the side that wins control of the narrative will have an advantage in the battle over the legal issues. I would say that the federal government has won this first round.

State of the Union’s Rental Housing

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The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University released its report, America’s Rental Housing: Evolving Markets and Needs. The report notes that

Rental housing has always provided a broad choice of homes for people at all phases of life. The recent economic turmoil underscored the many advantages of renting and raised the barriers to homeownership, sparking a surge in demand that has buoyed rental markets across the country. But significant erosion in renter incomes over the past decade has pushed the number of households paying excessive shares of income for housing to record levels. Assistance efforts have failed to keep pace with this escalating need, undermining the nation’s longstanding goal of ensuring decent and affordable housing for all. (1)

The report provides an excellent overview of the current state of the rental housing stock and households. Of particular interest to readers of this blog is how the report addresses the federal government’s role in the housing finance system. The report notes that

During the downturn, most credit sources dried up as property performance deteriorated and the risk of delinquencies mounted. Much as in the owner-occupied market, though, lending activity continued through government-backed channels, with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) playing an important countercyclical role.

But as the health of the multifamily market improved, private lending revived. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, banks and thrifts greatly expanded their multifamily lending in 2012, nearly matching the volume for Fannie and Freddie. Given fundamentally sound market conditions, multifamily lending activity should continue to increase. The experience of the last several years, however, clearly testifies to the importance of a government presence in a market that provides homes for millions of Americans, particularly during periods of economic stress. (5)

 The report, to my mind, reflects a complacence about the federal role in housing finance:

Although some have called for winding down Fannie’s and Freddie’s multifamily activities and putting an end to federal backstops beyond FHA, most propose replacing the implicit guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with explicit guarantees for which the federal government would charge a fee. Proposals for a federal backstop differ, however, in whether they require a cap on the average per unit loan size or include an affordability requirement to ensure that credit is available to multifamily properties with lower rents or subsidies. While the details are clearly significant, what is most important is that reform efforts do not lose sight of the critical federal role in ensuring the availability of multifamily financing to help maintain rental affordability, as well as in supporting the market more broadly during economic downturns. (8)

The report gives very little attention to what the federal housing finance system should look like going forward, other than implying that change should be incremental:

To foster further increases in private participation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA—the regulator and conservator of the GSEs) has signaled its intent to set a ceiling on the amount of multifamily lending that the GSEs can back in 2013. While the caps are fairly high—$30 billion for Fannie Mae and $26 billion for Freddie Mac—FHFA intends to further reduce GSE lending volumes over the next several years either by lowering these limits or by such actions as restricting loan products, requiring stricter underwriting, or increasing loan pricing. With lending by depository institutions and life insurance companies increasing, the market may well be able to adjust to these restrictions. The bigger question, however, is how the financial reforms now under debate will redefine the government’s role in backstopping the multifamily market. Recent experience clearly demonstrates the importance of federal support for multifamily lending when financial crises drive private lenders out of the market. (27)

I would have preferred to see a positive vision from the Center for how the federal government should go about ensuring liquidity in the market during future crises and how it should support an increase in the affordable housing stock. Perhaps that is asking too much of such a broad report, although the fact that Fannie and Freddie are members of the Center’s Policy Advisory Board which provided funding for the report may have played a role as well. [I might add that I found it odd that the members of the Policy Advisory Board were not listed in the report.]

I do not want to end on a negative note about such a helpful report. I would note that it takes seriously some controversial ideas about increasing the supply of affordable housing.  The report advocates for the reduction of regulatory constraints on affordable rental housing construction. I interpret this as a version of the Glaeser and Gyourko critique of the impact of restrictive local land use regimes on housing affordability. As progressives like NYC’s new Mayor know, restrictive zoning and affordable housing construction are at cross purposes from each other.

Reiss in Reuters on Mortgage Investing

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Reuters quoted me in Mortgage Bonds Reward Yield-Sensitive Investors, which addresses the future of Fannie and Freddie. It reads in part,

Investors who buy mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hold those bonds until they mature will get their full investment back; there is no “principal risk.”

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Washington has spent years debating what to do with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the future, and quick change is unlikely.

Even if Fannie and Freddie are privatized, older bonds would be safe, suggests David Reiss, a law professor of real estate finance at Brooklyn Law School.

“The government would not change the rules of the game for securities purchased with the guarantee. Pre-privatization (securities) would retain the guarantees, and future securities would have a different type of guarantee,” he said.

Individual Liability for RMBS Misrepresentations

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Judge Cote (SDNY) issued an Opinion and Order in Federal Housing Finance Agency v. HSBC North America Holdings Inc, et al., 11-cv-06201 (Dec. 10, 2013).  The opinion relates to the potential liability of individuals who signed various documents containing alleged misrepresentations that were filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These misrepresentations, if true, may violate the Securities Act of 1933. Individuals who signed off on the alleged misrepresentations could be liable as “control persons” or other key individuals under the Act. The alleged misrepresentations were contained in offering materials for RMBS purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The issue in the case is a pretty technical one: “the motion requires the Court to decide whether the SEC radically altered Section 11 liability for individuals who sign registration statements in the context of the shelf registration process when the SEC promulgated Rule 430B in 2005.” (5) Less technically, the motion requires that the Court decide the scope of potential liability for individuals for misrepresentations made in documents that they DID NOT sign that were supplemental to documents that they DID sign. The Court found that individuals could be held liable for such misrepresentations as had been the case before Rule430B had been promulgated.

I am not a securities law expert, so I assume that Judge Cote is right in stating that the defendants were arguing for a radical change to  the Securities Act of 1933 liability regime. I am also on the record in support of liability for individuals who are responsible for material aspects of the financial crisis. But I have also expressed concern about incredibly broad liability provisions. As a non-expert in this area, I was surprised that individuals could be held liable for misrepresentations that were made after they signed off on the preliminary documentation for securitizations.

Reiss on Watt Confirmation

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Law360 interviewed me about the Senate confirmation of Mel Watt as the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency in Fannie, Freddie’s Footprint Could Grow Under New FHFA Head. The article reads in part,

The U.S. mortgage industry is in for a sea change as Rep. Mel Watt, D-N.C., takes the helm of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, experts say, predicting Watt will seek to expand Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, veering sharply from his predecessor’s plans but lining up more closely with President Barack Obama’s.

The confirmation came Tuesday in a 57-41 vote after months of delay ended by Senate Democrats’ implementation of the so-called “nuclear option” eliminating the filibuster of presidential nominees. Senate Republicans had expressed concern about the choice of a politician like Watt — as opposed to an academic or economist — to head the agency.

Members of the real estate finance community are also divided about whether Watt’s confirmation will have a positive or negative impact on the industry, but most agree that a major change is ahead.

“I think Watt, as director, could end up having a very big impact both in terms of reversing some changes that have been implemented, and also taking the agency in a very different direction,” said David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Since 2009, interim FHFA head Ed DeMarco has made an effort to shrink the footprint of the regulator and its government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie and Freddie, in the U.S. residential mortgage market.

DeMarco faced pushback in these efforts from industry groups and lawmakers, causing him to backpedal a bit in November when the FHFA announced that it would hold off on reducing the size of mortgages that Fannie and Freddie can guarantee for at least the first half of next year.

Obama also did not share DeMarco’s ideology, but experts believe Watt’s plans for the GSEs are much more in line with those of the president. He appears cautious about allowing Fannie and Freddie to back away from the market entirely and may in fact favor policies that will increase the GSEs’ role in the mortgage market.

“My guess is that Watt will further enmesh Fannie and Freddie in the operations of the mortgage markets, whereas DeMarco was actually shrinking their footprint,” Reiss said.

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The difference between the short-term and long-term impacts of Watt’s expected actions will be significant, experts say.

DeMarco’s moves made short-term waves, but supporters believed the aim was long-term equilibrium and an eventual balance of public and private capital in the mortgage market. Watt may have more potential for positive short-term results, but there will still be a question as to whether this will translate into a stable market for the next generation, Reiss said.

“Often when people are talking about government intervention, they want help for problems now, but they’re also setting up the rules of the game for once the crisis has passed,” he said.