Tag Archives: financial crisis

Running CERCLA around FIRREA

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Law360 quoted me in High Court Environmental Ruling Could Clear Air For Banks (behind a paywall). The article reads in part,

A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a federal environmental law does not preempt state statutes of repose has inspired banks and other targets of Wall Street enforcers to test the decision’s power to finally fend off lingering financial crisis-era cases on timeliness grounds.

The high court on June 9 found that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act could not extend the 10-year statute of repose in a North Carolina environmental cleanup suit in the in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger case. Although the decision pertained to a case outside of the financial realm, attorneys say it could limit the ability of federal financial regulators to bring claims on behalf of failed financial institutions under two of their favored tools: the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act.

That’s because the defendants in those cases, including banks but others as well, will now be able to argue that regulators like the National Credit Union Administration, the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. missed their chance to bring claims on behalf of institutions in receivership.

Given the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the regulators may be on shaky ground.

“The government is going to have a much more difficult time sustaining the arguments it’s been making after CTS,” said Jeffrey B. Wall, a partner with Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and a former assistant solicitor general.

In its CTS ruling, the Supreme Court found that CERCLA does not preempt state statutes of repose like the one in North Carolina, citing CERCLA’s exclusive use of the phrase “statute of limitations.”

Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are distinct enough terms in their usage that it’s proper to conclude that Congress didn’t intend to preempt statutes of repose when it crafted CERCLA, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy said in the majority opinion. The justice cited a 1982 congressional report on CERCLA that recommended repealing state statutes of limitations and statutes of repose but acknowledged that they were not equivalent.

According to a memo released June 10 by Sullivan & Cromwell, both FIRREA and HERA are susceptible to similar readings by courts.

Both statutes include extenders that allow government agencies suing on behalf of failed financial institutions to move beyond statutes of limitations on state law claims. However, much like CERCLA, both say nothing about extending statutes of repose, the memo said.

And that could make a major difference for a large number of defendants trying to fend off claims from the FDIC, NCUA and FHFA, Wall said.

*    *    *

The CTS ruling is likely to play out in cases brought by financial regulators in smaller cases over losses incurred by failed financial institutions using FIRREA and HERA. But FIRREA has also become a favored tool in the U.S. Department of Justice’s big game hunts against ratings agency Standard & Poor’s and Bank of America.

Because those cases are largely predicated on federal claims, the CTS case is unlikely to be a help for those institutions, according to Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss.

“I don’t read it as having an extension on the higher-profile FIRREA cases,” he said.

But even if CTS is limited to state law claims brought by financial regulators, that could have a major impact given the sheer number of cases the FDIC, NCUA and FHFA bring.

Reiss in CSM on Rental Policy

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The Christian Science Monitor quoted me in Census Outlines ‘Poverty Areas’: Which States Hit Hardest? It reads in part,

The number of US residents living in “poverty areas” has jumped significantly since 2000, according to a Census Bureau report released Monday.

According the 2000 Census, less than 1 in 5 people lived in poverty areas. But more recently, 1 in 4 residents have lived in these areas, according to census data collected from 2008 to 2012.

The Census Bureau defines a poverty area as any census tract with a poverty rate of 20 percent of more.

Sociologists and other analysts point to the Great Recession, in particular housing and job challenges, as well as slow and uneven growth since the recession.

“With the advent of the financial crisis and the bursting of the housing bubble, many people lost their homes and thus needed to rent or move in with relatives,” says Cheryl Carleton, an economics professor at Villanova University near Philadelphia. “[I]ndividuals need to move where they can afford to live … which is going to be in areas where public housing is available or housing prices and rental rates are low, which is more likely to be in a ‘poverty area.’ ” Professor Carleton made her comments via e-mail.

*     *     *

Law professor David Reiss suggests that changes to homeownership policies could help.
“Federal and state housing programs could do more to support a market for well-maintained rental units for low-income households,” e-mails Professor Reiss, who teaches at Brooklyn Law School. “Many low-income households have difficulty maintaining homeownership because of irregular incomes and low wealth.”

Mortgage Market Trending in the Right Direction, but . . .

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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) released its OCC Mortgage Metrics Report, First Quarter 2014. the report is a “Disclosure of National Bank and Federal Savings Association Mortgage Loan Data,” and it “presents data on first-lien residential mortgages serviced by seven national banks and a federal savings association with the largest mortgage-servicing portfolios. The data represent 48 percent of all first-lien residential mortgages outstanding in the country and focus on credit performance, loss mitigation efforts, and foreclosures.” (8, footnote omitted) As a result, this data set is not representative of all mortgages, but it does cover nearly half the market.

The report found that

93.1 percent of mortgages serviced by the reporting servicers were current and performing, compared with 91.8 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 90.2 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were 30 to 59 days past due decreased 20.9 percent from the previous quarter to 2.1 percent of the portfolio, a 19.8 percent decrease from a year earlier and the lowest since the OCC began reporting mortgage performance data in the first quarter of 2008. The percentage of mortgages included in this report that were seriously delinquent—60 or more days past due or held by bankrupt borrowers whose payments were 30 or more days past due — decreased to 3.1 percent of the portfolio compared with 3.5 percent at the end of the previous quarter and 4.0 percent a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were seriously delinquent has decreased 22.4 percent from a year earlier and is at its lowest level since the end of June 2008.

At the end of the first quarter of 2014, the number of mortgages in the process of foreclosure fell to 432,832, a decrease of 52.3 percent from a year earlier. The percentage of mortgages that were in the process of foreclosure at the end of the first quarter of 2014 was 1.8 percent, the lowest level since September 2008. During the quarter, servicers initiated 90,852 new foreclosures — a decrease of 49.1 percent from a year earlier. Factors contributing to the decline include improved economic conditions, aggressive foreclosure prevention assistance, and the transfer of loans to servicers outside the reporting banks and thrift. The number of completed foreclosures decreased to 56,185, a decrease of 7.5 percent from the previous quarter and 33.9 percent from a year earlier. (4)

These trends are all very good of course, but it is worth remembering how far we have to go to get back to historical averages, particularly for prime mortgages.  Pre-Financial Crisis prime mortgages typically have done much better than these numbers, with delinquency rates in the very low single digits.

S&P: Future of Private-Label RMBS Uncertain

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S&P has posted an Executive Comment, Lifted By Improving Economic Conditions, The U.S. Leads The Global Securitization Rebound–But Headwinds Remain. It concludes,

After surviving its first severe test, the market for securitization is slowly emerging from a sharp downturn, demonstrating its viability to efficiently distribute risk and expand credit availability. In this light, with many regulatory and economic uncertainties still present, we’re forecasting continuing slow growth going into next year.

The question is if, and when, securitization will register large issuance numbers again, contribute to the funding diversity and liquidity positions of banks, and improve the efficient allocation of resources to foster global economic growth.

For the U.S.–far and away the largest and most mature securitization market in the world–it’s clear, given the interconnectivity of the economy, the securitization market, and housing finance, that a continued economic recovery is necessary before the securitization market can fully recover. Economic growth will also encourage regulators, policymakers, and investors to work on the eventual return of private housing finance. But we believe that mortgage financing remains a concern for general credit availability and a continuing housing market recovery. The future of non-agency RMBS will remain in question so long as the GSEs dominate housing finance while enjoying exemptions from the qualified mortgage and risk-retention rules. (7)

I do not think that there is anything particularly new in this analysis, but it does highlight an important issue, one that I have touched on before. The gridlock on housing finance reform in DC has many effects. The GSEs are not on solid footing. The private-label industry does not know what part of the mortgage market it can operate in, whether with Qualified Mortgage (QM) or Non-QM products. And most importantly, homeowners are  not getting credit at a price that a stable and mature market would offer.

The conventional wisdom is that housing finance reform is off the table until after the mid-term elections or even until after the next presidential election. That is bad news for American households, the housing industry and the financial markets. And without some strong leadership in DC, it looks like the conventional will be right.

Subprime Scriveners

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Milan Markovic has posted Subprime Scriveners to SSRN. The abstract reads,

Although mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and other financial products that nearly caused the collapse of the global financial system could not have been issued without attorneys, the legal profession’s role in the financial crisis has received relatively little scrutiny.

This Article focuses on lawyers’ preparation of MBS offering documents that misrepresented the lending practices of mortgage loan originators. While attorneys may not have known that many MBS would become toxic, they lacked incentives to inquire into the shoddy lending practices of prominent originators such as Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) when they and their clients were reaping considerable profits from MBS offerings.

The subprime era illustrates that attorneys are unreliable gatekeepers of the financial markets because they will not necessarily acquire sufficient information to assess the legality of the transactions they are facilitating. The Article concludes by proposing that the Securities and Exchange Commission impose heightened investigative duties on attorneys who work on public offerings of securities.

The article addresses an important aspect of an important subject – which professionals could and should be held responsible for the rampant misrepresentation found throughout the MBS industry in the early 2000s. The prevailing wisdom is that no one can be held responsible, because no one did anything that made him or her personally culpable.  Markovic argues that lawyers can and should be held responsible for the misrepresentations found in MBS offering documents.  While I buy his argument that lawyers have been unreliable gatekeepers, I am not sure that I fully agree with diagnosis of the problem.

Markovic writes,

The large financial institutions that issued MBS presumably understood the implications of incorporating questionable representations from loan originators into MBS offering documents. They also would have been able to consult with their in-house counsel about the risks of securitizing poor quality mortgages. It is not self-evident that ethical rules should compel attorneys to investigate what sophisticated clients advised by in-house counsel do not believe needs investigating. (45)

In fact, sophisticated parties often use reps and warranties to allocate risk. For instance, a provision could require that an originating lender buy back mortgages that failed to comply with reps and warranties. This is not a situation where any of the parties would expect anyone to investigate the “representations from the loan originators.”  Rather, the parties assumed (rightly or wrongly) that the originator would stand behind the representation if and when it was proved to be false. And, indeed, solvent originators have had to do so.

As I do not fully agree with Markovic’s diagnosis of the problem, that leads me to have concerns with his proposed solution as well. But the article raises important questions that we have not yet answered even though the events leading to the financial crisis are nearly a decade behind us.

Fannie and Freddie’s Debt to Treasury

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Larry Wall of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta has posted one of his Notes from the Vault, Have the Government-Sponsored Enterprises Fully Repaid the Treasury? It opens,

Have U.S. taxpayers been fully compensated for their bailout of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? The Treasury is reported to have argued that “the value of Treasury’s commitment to the GSEs was “incalculably large,'” with the implication that it could never be repaid. Richard Epstein, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution [and who discloses that he consults “with several hedge funds with positions in Fannie and Freddie”], responded that “the level of the Treasury commitment was not ‘incalculably large’: it was $188 billion, all of which will shortly be repaid.” The significance of Epstein’s argument is that if Treasury has been fully compensated for its bailout of Fannie and Freddie, a case can be made that the future profits of the two GSEs should go to their private shareholders.

As an accounting matter, one could argue that Epstein is correct; the dividends equal the amount of Treasury funds provided to the GSEs. And as a legal matter, the issue may ultimately be resolved by the federal courts. However, as an economic matter, the value of the government’s contribution clearly exceeds $188 billion once the risk borne by taxpayers is taken into account.

In this Notes from the Vault I examine the value of the taxpayers’ contribution to Fannie and Freddie from an economic perspective. My analysis of these contributions is divided into three parts: (1) the GSEs’ profitability prior to the 2008 conservatorship agreement (bailout), (2) the value of the taxpayer promise at the time of the bailout, and (3) support of new investments since they were placed in conservatorship. (1)

The article goes on to explain each of these three parts of the taxpayers’ contribution and concludes,

The claim that the taxpayers and Treasury have been fully repaid for their support of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is based on an accounting calculation that does not withstand economic analysis. The claim that Treasury’s commitment has been fully repaid attributes no dividend payments to Treasury starting in 2012, attributes no value to the government guarantee to absorb whatever losses arose in the pre-conservatorship book of business, and arguably reflects Treasury setting too low of a dividend rate on its senior preferred stock. Moreover, the profits that are being used to pay the dividends did not arise from the contributions of private shareholders but rather entirely reflect risks borne by the Treasury and taxpayers. Thus, the Treasury claim that the value of the aid was “incalculable” is an exaggeration; the value surely can be fixed within reasonable bounds. However, the implication of this claim, that the GSEs cannot repay the economic value on behalf of their common shareholders, is nevertheless accurate. (2)

This article offers a useful corrective to the story one hears from those representing Fannie and Freddie’s shareholders. They have constructed a simple narrative of the bailout of the two companies that ignores the way that the two companies’ fortunes have been intrinsically tied to the federal government’s support of them. That simple narrative just nets out the monies that Treasury fronted Fannie and Freddie with the payments that the two companies made back to Treasury.  After netting the two, they say, “Case closed!” Wall has demonstrated that there are a lot more factors at play than just those two.

I would also highlight something that Wall did not: the federal government actually determines the level of profits that Fannie and Freddie can make by setting the fees the two companies charge for guaranteeing mortgages. So, the federal government could wipe away future profits by lowering the guaranty fees. And wiping away those profits would make those outstanding shares worthless.

So the question remains: what is the endgame for the investors who have brought these lawsuits?

Reiss on Marketplace: Cash Cows to Slaughter

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I was interviewed on Marketplace for its story, Fannie and Freddie: Cash Cows Avoid The Slaughter? (sound file) The text of the story reads

We are making money – the tax payer, that is – on Fannie and Freddie Mac.

When Freddie Mac hands the treasury a $10.4 billion dividend next month, tax payers will have received more money in interest than was put in. (Technically the two institutions still owe the principal on the loan that bailed them out, but the interest they’re paying will shortly exceed that amount).

But.

There always is a but with these things.

Making money for the tax payer isn’t good if you ask those who want reform.

Back during the financial crisis, conservatives and liberals disagreed over whether Freddie and Fannie were a victim of or a cause of the housing collapse, but they agreed that the institutions needed reform. The profits are throwing a wrinkle into this debate.

“As long as Fannie and Freddie continue to pay substantial amounts of money to the government, they are looked at by some people in Congress as a great source of revenue that reduces the deficit,” explains Peter Wallison with the American Enterprise Institute. His concern – shared by reformers on both sides of the political spectrum – is that if Fannie and Freddie become cash cows, congress won’t want to touch them.

David Reiss, professor of law at the Brooklyn Law School, agrees. He says the financial crisis wasn’t a one time problem.

“We should think of it as that we dodged a bullet. There’s fundamental problems with the Fannie and Freddie business model which rests on this notion of privatizing profits and socializing losses.”

Freddie and Fannie buy mortgages from lenders, and then bundle them into “mortgage backed securities” that can be sold to investors. It’s useful because it converted illiquid mortgage loans into liquid securities. In plain English, it means a bank or investor who made a mortgage loan to someone didn’t have to wait around for 30 years to be paid back. They could sell their stake in the mortgage to Fannie or Freddie, move along, and go invest in other things. This helped more people get mortgages.

One concern was that Fannie and Freddie were simply too big and too concentrated. Another concern was that the federal government implicitly guaranteed investments in Freddie and Fannie, and that encouraged people to make home loans that were too risky.

Even without the complication of profits, the debate over how to reform Fannie and Freddie is at a stand still.

House Republicans don’t want the government involved at all, they want an efficient market. The Senate wants the government to be involved a little bit, essentially to promote housing.

“What I see,” says David Reiss, “is nothing really happening, and us being a holding pattern for a long time.”

It’s possible that reform-minded politicians will compromise before they lose their chance. Also possible they won’t.