Tag Archives: Freddie Mac

Transferring Risk from Fannie & Freddie

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency has posted its FHFA Progress Report on the Implementation of FHFA’s Strategic Plan for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As its name suggests, it provides a progress report on a range of topics, but I was particularly interested in its section on credit risk transfers for single-family credit guarantees:

The 2014 Conservatorship Strategic Plan’s goal of reducing taxpayer risk builds on the Enterprises’ previous risk transfer efforts. Under the 2013 Conservatorship Scorecard, FHFA expressed the expectation that each Enterprise would conduct risk transfer transactions involving single-family loans with an unpaid principal balance (UPB) of at least $30 billion. The 2014 Conservatorship Scorecard tripled the required risk transfer amount, with the expectation that each Enterprise would transfer a substantial portion of the credit risk on $90 billion in UPB of new mortgage-backed securitizations. FHFA also expected each Enterprise to execute a minimum of two different types of credit risk transfer transactions. FHFA required the Enterprises to conduct all activities undertaken in fulfillment of these objectives in a manner consistent with safety and soundness. During 2014, the two Enterprises executed credit risk transfers on single-family mortgages with a UPB of over $340 billion, which is well above the required amounts. (14)

Risk transfer is an important tool to reduce the risks that taxpayers will be on the hook for future bailouts. The mechanism for these risk transfer deals are not well understood because they are pretty new. The Progress Report describes how they work in relatively clear terms:

The primary way that the Enterprises have executed single-family credit risk transfers to date has been through debt-issuance programs. Freddie Mac transactions are called Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) notes, and Fannie Mae transactions are called Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS). Following the release of historical credit performance data in 2012, each Enterprise has issued either STACR or CAS notes that transfer a portion of the credit risk from large reference pools of single-family mortgages to private investors. These reference pools are comprised of loans that the Enterprises had previously securitized to sell the interest rate risk of the loans to private investors. The STACR and CAS transactions take the next step of transferring a portion of the credit risk for these loans to investors as well. Each subsequent credit risk transfer transaction is intended to provide credit protection to the issuing Enterprise on the mortgages in the relevant reference pool. (14)

The Progress Report provides more detail for those who are interested. For the rest of us, we may just want to think through the policy implications. How much credit risk can Fannie and Freddie offload? Is it sufficient to make a real dent in the overall risk that the two companies pose to taxpayers? It would be helpful if the FHFA answered those questions in future reports.

Monday’s Adjudication Roundup

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Wells Fargo Smackdown

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Circuit Judge Elliott of Missouri Circuit Court issued a Judgment in Holm v. Wells Fargo et al. (No. 08CN-CV00944 Jan. 26, 2015) that awarded nearly three million dollars in punitive damages. This is just one of a number of searing judicial opinions that I’ve discussed on the blog. The Court found that

Wells Fargo and its agents expended immeasurable, if not incomprehensible, time and effort to avert reinstatement. The result of Wells Fargo’s egregious conduct was to impose approximately six and one-half years of uncertainty, lost optimism, emotional distress, and paralysis of Plaintiffs’ family.

The evidence established that Wells Fargo’s intentional choice to foreclose arose from its own financial incentives. Dr. Kurt Krueger testified that Wells Fargo had financial incentives to seek reimbursement of its fees at a foreclosure sale. This economic motivation collided with the well-being of David and Crystal Holm, and was clearly contrary to the interests of Freddie Mac. In other words, in this case, a powerful financial company exerted its will over a financially distressed family in Clinton County, Missouri. The result is predictable. Plaintiffs were severely damaged; Wells Fargo took its money and moved on, with complete disregard to the human damage left in its wake.

Defendant Wells Fargo is an experienced servicer of home loans. Wells Fargo knew that its decision to foreclose after reinstatement was accepted would inflict a devastating injury on the Holm family. Wells Fargo’s actions were knowing, intentional, and injurious. (7)

It is not certain that this judgment will be held up on appeal. If it is, it is still worth asking whether the occasional verdict of this magnitude is sufficient to change the behavior of servicers. There have been many efforts to change the incentives that servicers have, but cases such as these make one wonder if there is some deeper problem that has not yet been identified and addressed. One cannot imagine how Wells Fargo employees could have let this go on for so long in this case. But they did.

Friday’s Government Reports Round-Up

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Friday’s Weekly REFin ReCap

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Reiss On:

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Tuesday’s Regulatory & Legislative Round-Up

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GSE Nationalization and Necessity

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Nestor Davidson has posted Nationalization and Necessity: Takings and a Doctrine of Economic Emergency to SSRN. This essay will be of interest to those following the Fannie/Freddie shareholder litigation. The abstract reads,

Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently, shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the obligation to pay just compensation should be recognized as a natural extension of the doctrine of emergency in takings. Public officials must be able to respond quickly to serious economic threats, no less than when facing the kinds of imminent physical or public health crises — such as wildfires and contagion — that have been a staple of traditional takings jurisprudence. Far from an affront to the rule of law, this reflection of necessity through an extension of emergency doctrine would reaffirm the flexibility inherent in property law in times of crisis.

Davidson looks at the various companies that were nationalized during the financial crisis, including Fannie and Freddie, and concludes,

It does no violence to norms of ownership—or the rule of law—to acknowledge that overriding necessity in times of crisis can be as relevant to economic emergency as it has always been to more prosaic threats. The doctrine of economic emergency that this Essay has proposed accords with the deepest traditions of our system of property, and rightly should be so recognized. (215)

 

Davidson reaches a very different conclusion than does Richard Epstein, who argues that just compensation is warranted for shareholders in the two companies. I have no doubt that the judges deciding these cases will have to struggle with very same issues that Davidson sets forth in this article, so it is worth a read for those who are closely following these cases.