Tag Archives: multifamily

Housing Goals and Housing Finance Reform

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The Federal Housing Finance Agency issued a proposed rule that would establish housing goals for Fannie and Freddie for the next three years. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 required that Fannie and Freddie’s regulator set annual housing goals to ensure that a certain proportion of the companies’ mortgage purchases serve low-income households and underserved areas. Among other things, the proposed rule would “establish a new housing subgoal for small multifamily properties affordable to low-income families,” a subject that happens to be near and dear to my heart.(54482)

This “duty to serve” is very controversial, at the heart of the debate over housing finance reform. Many Democrats oppose housing finance reform without it and many Republicans oppose reform with it. Indeed, it was one of the issues that stopped the Johnson-Crapo reform bill dead in its tracks.

While this proposed rule is not momentous by any stretch of the imagination, it is worth noting that the FHFA, for all intents and purposes, seems to be the only party in the Capital that is moving housing finance reform forward in any way.

Once again, we should note that doing nothing is not the same as leaving everything the same. As Congress fails to strike an agreement on reform and Fannie and Freddie continue to limp along in their conservatorships, regulators and market participants will, by default, be designing the housing finance system of the 21st century. That is not how it should be done.

Comments are due by October 28, 2014.

Top Ten Issues for Housing Finance Reform

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Laurie Goodman of the Urban Institute has posted A Realistic Assessment of Housing Finance Reform. This paper is quite helpful, given the incredible complexity of the topic. The paper includes a lot of background, but I assume that readers of this blog are familiar with that.  Rather, let me share her Top Ten Design Issues:

  1. What form will the private capital that absorbs the first loss take: A single guarantor (a utility), multiple guarantors, or multiple guarantors along with capital markets execution? How much capital will be required?
  2. Who will play what role in the system? Will the same entity be permitted to be an originator, aggregator, and guarantor?
  3. How will the system ensure that historically underserved borrowers and communities are well served? To what extent will the pricing be cross subsidized?
  4. Who will have access to the new government-backed system (loan limits)? How big should the credit box be, and how does that box relate to FHA?
  5. Will mortgage insurance be separate from the guarantor function? (It is separate under most proposals, but in reality both sets of institutions are guaranteeing credit risk. The separation is a relic of the present system, in which, by charter, the GSEs can’t take the first loss on any mortgage above 80 LTV. However, if you allow the mortgage insurers and the guarantors to be the same entity, capital requirements must be higher to adequately protect the government and, ultimately, the taxpayers.)
  6. How will small lenders access the system? (All proposals attempt to ensure access, some through an aggregator dedicated to smaller lenders—a role that the Home Loan Banks can play.)
  7. What countercyclical features should be included? If the insurance costs provided by the guarantors are “too high” should the regulatory authority be able to adjust capital levels down to bring down mortgage rates? Should the regulatory authority be able to step in as an insurance provider?
  8. Will multifamily finance be included? How will that system be designed? Will it be separate from the single-family business? (The multifamily features embedded in Johnson-Crapo had widespread bipartisan support, but the level of support for a stand-alone multifamily legislation is unclear.)
  9. The regulatory structure for any new system is inevitably complex. Who charters new guarantors? What are the approval standards? Who does the stress tests? How does the new regulator interact with existing regulators? What enforcement authority will it have concerning equal access goals? What is the extent of data collection and publication?
  10. What does the transition look like? How do we move from a duopoly to more guarantors? Will Fannie and Freddie turn back to private entities and operate as guarantors alongside the new entrants? How will the new entities be seeded? What is the “right” number of guarantors, and how do we achieve that? How quickly does the catastrophic insurance fund build? (16-17)

None of this is new, but it is nice to see it all in one place. These design issues need to thought about in the context of the politics of housing reform as well — what system is likely to maintain its long-term financial health and stay true to its mission, given the political realities of Washington, D.C.?

Speaking of politics, her prognosis for reform in the near term is not too hopeful:

The current state of the GSEs can best be summed up in a single word: limbo. Despite the fact that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conservatorship in 2008, with the clear intent that they not emerge, there is little progress on a new system, with a large role for private capital, to take their place. Legislators have realized it is easy to agree on a set of principles for a new system but much harder to agree on the system’s design. It is unclear whether any legislation will emerge from Congress before the 2016 election; there is a good chance there will be none. (26)

She does allow that the FHFA can administratively move housing finance reform forward to some extent on its own, but she rightly notes that reform is really the responsibility of Congress. Like Goodman, I am not too hopeful that Congress will act in the near term. But it is crystal clear that there is a cost of doing nothing. In all likelihood, it will be the taxpayer will pay that cost, one way or another.

A Resilient NYC

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NYU’s Furman Center released a report, The Price of Resilience: Can Multifamily Housing Afford to Adapt? It explains that storm-proofing New York City

poses several special challenges not shared by all coastal areas. First, New York City is largely built out, with much of its building stock long predating current flood-resistant design standards. Resilience in New York, then, primarily means retrofitting older buildings, not just strengthening building codes for new construction. Second, much of the official guidance about how to retrofit residential properties to reduce risk and lower insurance premiums is geared toward 1-4 family buildings, reflecting the national housing stock. In New York City, though, only one-third of the buildings thought to be vulnerable to flooding are1-4 family, detached homes. A much larger number of housing units vulnerable to future storms are located in roughly 4,500 multifamily buildings with five or more rental units. Finding ways to cost effectively retrofit these types of buildings to protect residents and reduce insurance premiums for owners needs to be central to New York City’s storm-preparedness efforts.

Finally, the extreme shortage of affordable housing in New York may make the direct and indirect costs of retrofitting particularly hard to bear. Based on current federal policy, increased flood risk requires for many buildings either investment in physical improvements or payment of higher insurance premiums. Without external funding or other relief, there is no clear avenue to enact these resilience improvements while maintaining affordability. Eliminating all units below the predicted flood level, for example, could result in the loss of thousands of indispensable housing units. Even if units are not lost, property owners may pass on the costs of retrofitting buildings to residents through a rent increase, reducing the supply of affordable units in New York City’s coastal areas. For buildings that are constrained in their ability to raise rents and raise funds for improvements, like many of the rent stabilized and subsidized buildings in the city, the financial burden of making costly retrofits might be overwhelming, leading to the conversion of those buildings to market rate (when permitted), unsustainable operating budgets that may require a bail-out, or a large number of buildings left unprepared for future storms. The costs of not retrofitting, however, may be even more burdensome: building owners may face skyrocketing flood insurance premiums if they do not retrofit their buildings.

While I am not so sure that storm-proofing will be what pushes New York City’s housing stock into the unaffordable column (I think the relentless increases in demand might just to the job for units that are not rent regulated), the Furman Center report reminds us that we have a lot to do to protect New York from the next big storm. The Bloomberg Administration did a lot in a short time to identify what the City can do to increase the City’s resiliency. Given the quality of his housing and economic development team, there is reason to hope that the de Blasio Administration will continue to tackle the threat of climate change in a productive way.

The Furman Center report provides three concrete recommendations to ensure that NYC’s large stock of multi-family housing in flood zones is protected from future storm events:

  1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should modify the guidelines for its National Flood Insurance Program for coverage of existing multifamily buildings;
  2. New York City should expand its Flood Resilience Zoning Text Amendment to cover buildings in the 500-year floodplain; and
  3. The city should revisit its existing rehabilitation programs to ensure that resilience measures can be readily funded; and it should require that buildings in the 100-year and 500-year floodplains that receive city assistance have adequate emergency and resilience plans.

These all seem like reasonable policies that should be implemented asap.

Watt’s up with Fannie and Freddie

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There has been a lot of press coverage of FHFA Director Watt’s first public speech since taking on his job. Watt emphasized that

we must ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate in a safe and sound manner.  It means that we’ll work to preserve and conserve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets.  And it means that we’ll work to ensure a liquid and efficient national housing finance market.  Our job at FHFA is to balance these obligations . . ..

He also set forth three goals for his FHFA:

Strategic Goal 1: MAINTAIN, in a safe and sound manner, foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages to foster liquid, efficient, competitive and resilient national housing finance markets. 

Strategic Goal 2: REDUCE taxpayer risk through increasing the role of private capital in the mortgage market.

Strategic Goal 3: BUILD a new single-family securitization infrastructure for use by the Enterprises and adaptable for use by other participants in the secondary market in the future.

These goals are all totally reasonable for the FHFA to pursue. But it is also clear that Director Watt is taking the FHFA in a direction that is quite different than the one pursued by his predecessor, Acting Director DeMarco.  DeMarco had taken the position that the best way to protect taxpayers was to be pretty tough on everyone else. “Everyone else” included defaulting and underwater homeowners as well as originating lenders who had sold Fannie and Freddie tons of mortgages that did not comply with the reps and warranties that the parties had agreed to about the quality of those mortgages. DeMarco’s strategy was much criticized but also quite coherent.

Watt has made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with homeowners. He highlighted a pilot program in Detroit that will include “deeper loan modifications.”  He has also made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with lenders, relaxing rep and warranty standards for mortgages that Fannie and Freddie purchase from lenders. These may be very good policies to pursue, but it would be helpful if he set forth a clearer vision of how safety and soundness is best balanced with liquidity and efficiency. Federal housing finance policy typically goes off the rails when its goals get all mixed up. Director Watt should ensure that FHFA’s safety and soundness goals are clearly set forth and that other goals for Fannie and Freddie are designed to work in harmony with them.

State of the Union’s Rental Housing

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The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University released its report, America’s Rental Housing: Evolving Markets and Needs. The report notes that

Rental housing has always provided a broad choice of homes for people at all phases of life. The recent economic turmoil underscored the many advantages of renting and raised the barriers to homeownership, sparking a surge in demand that has buoyed rental markets across the country. But significant erosion in renter incomes over the past decade has pushed the number of households paying excessive shares of income for housing to record levels. Assistance efforts have failed to keep pace with this escalating need, undermining the nation’s longstanding goal of ensuring decent and affordable housing for all. (1)

The report provides an excellent overview of the current state of the rental housing stock and households. Of particular interest to readers of this blog is how the report addresses the federal government’s role in the housing finance system. The report notes that

During the downturn, most credit sources dried up as property performance deteriorated and the risk of delinquencies mounted. Much as in the owner-occupied market, though, lending activity continued through government-backed channels, with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) playing an important countercyclical role.

But as the health of the multifamily market improved, private lending revived. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, banks and thrifts greatly expanded their multifamily lending in 2012, nearly matching the volume for Fannie and Freddie. Given fundamentally sound market conditions, multifamily lending activity should continue to increase. The experience of the last several years, however, clearly testifies to the importance of a government presence in a market that provides homes for millions of Americans, particularly during periods of economic stress. (5)

 The report, to my mind, reflects a complacence about the federal role in housing finance:

Although some have called for winding down Fannie’s and Freddie’s multifamily activities and putting an end to federal backstops beyond FHA, most propose replacing the implicit guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with explicit guarantees for which the federal government would charge a fee. Proposals for a federal backstop differ, however, in whether they require a cap on the average per unit loan size or include an affordability requirement to ensure that credit is available to multifamily properties with lower rents or subsidies. While the details are clearly significant, what is most important is that reform efforts do not lose sight of the critical federal role in ensuring the availability of multifamily financing to help maintain rental affordability, as well as in supporting the market more broadly during economic downturns. (8)

The report gives very little attention to what the federal housing finance system should look like going forward, other than implying that change should be incremental:

To foster further increases in private participation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA—the regulator and conservator of the GSEs) has signaled its intent to set a ceiling on the amount of multifamily lending that the GSEs can back in 2013. While the caps are fairly high—$30 billion for Fannie Mae and $26 billion for Freddie Mac—FHFA intends to further reduce GSE lending volumes over the next several years either by lowering these limits or by such actions as restricting loan products, requiring stricter underwriting, or increasing loan pricing. With lending by depository institutions and life insurance companies increasing, the market may well be able to adjust to these restrictions. The bigger question, however, is how the financial reforms now under debate will redefine the government’s role in backstopping the multifamily market. Recent experience clearly demonstrates the importance of federal support for multifamily lending when financial crises drive private lenders out of the market. (27)

I would have preferred to see a positive vision from the Center for how the federal government should go about ensuring liquidity in the market during future crises and how it should support an increase in the affordable housing stock. Perhaps that is asking too much of such a broad report, although the fact that Fannie and Freddie are members of the Center’s Policy Advisory Board which provided funding for the report may have played a role as well. [I might add that I found it odd that the members of the Policy Advisory Board were not listed in the report.]

I do not want to end on a negative note about such a helpful report. I would note that it takes seriously some controversial ideas about increasing the supply of affordable housing.  The report advocates for the reduction of regulatory constraints on affordable rental housing construction. I interpret this as a version of the Glaeser and Gyourko critique of the impact of restrictive local land use regimes on housing affordability. As progressives like NYC’s new Mayor know, restrictive zoning and affordable housing construction are at cross purposes from each other.

GSEs Are Giants of Multifamily Sector Too

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In discussions about the future of Fannie and Freddie, we tend to emphasize their outsized role in the single-family sector.  We often forget that they have an even bigger footprint in multifamily.  A recent Kroll BondRatings report, FHFA Slowdown May Spur Multifamily Resurgence in Conduit CMBS, shows just how big it is. Chart 1 shows Multifamily Loans as a Percentage of the New Issuance Market by Year. Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie had a 15 to 47 percent market share at points during the eight years from 2000 through 2007.  It jumped to 85 to as high as 100% (!!!) at points during the following five years.Kroll notes that the private sector (CMBS Conduits) has begun to increase market share dramatically, although this is measured from a very small base.

Kroll concludes that

it is evident that private lending sources will experience continued growth in multifamily lending as the GSEs reduce their commitment to the space. Conduits are well positioned to participate in this growth, provided the spread environment doesn’t impede conduit lenders’ ability to offer attractive financing rates. Multifamily fundamentals will also inevitably play a role in overall financing volumes, and while it isn’t clear the sector’s outsized performance will continue, housing and demographic trends suggest the sector will remain relatively strong over the next couple of years. While the question of whether and when conduits will surpass GSE originations remains to be seen, we anticipate that the percentage of multifamily product in CMBS will trend upward throughout next year. When 2015 rolls around we may even see the proportion of multifamily in CMBS approach or exceed levels last seen in the mid 2000’s, when it represented, on average, 18% of the CMBS universe, with some recent deals in the conduit universe starting to trend closer to 20%. (4)

What is clear to me is that we should not forget about the relatively small multifamily housing finance sector as we think about the appropriate role for Fannie and Freddie in the single-family sector. They are completely different sectors. The one is akin to a wholesale business and the other is akin to a retail business, each with very different underwriting.

We should be open to very different policy outcomes for the two sectors. The policy reasons that might support a large government role in the single-family sector do not necessarily carry over to the multifamily sector. As I have noted elsewhere (and here) in the context of the multifamily sector, a market failure or liquidity crisis is the typical rationale that justifies government intervention in a particular market. It is incumbent on those who argue for a very active role for the government in the multifamily sector to clearly explain the market failure that government policy intends to address.

Reiss on Fannie and Freddie Multifamily Contraction

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GlobeSt.com interviewed me (and others) about Federal Housing Finance Agency Acting Director Edward J. DeMarco plans to reduce Fannie and Freddie’s multifamily finance volume by 10% from last year’s levels:

Also consider this, says David Reiss, a professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School who has published papers on the GSEs: “We are living through a very abnormal time when the federal government dominates the market for single family and multifamily mortgages.”

This is neither necessary nor optimal, he tells GlobeSt.com. “It is not necessary because there have been long stretches in the past when the government had a much smaller role in those markets. And other credit markets operate well with no or a much smaller government footprint.”

This is not to say that there is no role for the federal government in the multifamily mortgage market, Reiss continues — just that it is far too large at this point in time. “If the reduction in the GSE footprint is telegraphed over a reasonable time horizon to the other market participants, this change should be taken in stride by the multifamily market,” he predicts.