Low, Low, Low Mortgage Rates

photo by Martin Abegglen

TheStreet.com quoted me in Top 5 Lowest 15-Year Mortgage Rates. It opens,

U.S. mortgage rates have continued to decline in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, low Treasury rates and the stagnant economy, giving potential homeowners an opportunity to save money because of the dip.

The current market conditions give homeowners in the U.S. an opportunity to take advantage of the continuation of low mortgage rates since the Federal Reserve has not increased interest rates.

But, how do you snag the absolute lowest rates?

How to Get a Low Rate

Low mortgage rates can play a large factor in homeowners’ ability to save tens of thousands of dollars in interest. Even a 1% difference in the mortgage rate can save a homeowner $40,000 over 30 years for a mortgage valued at $200,000. Having a top notch credit score plays a critical factor in determining what interest rate lenders will offer consumers, but other issues such as the amount of your down payment also impact it.

A high credit score is the key to ensuring that borrowers receive a low mortgage rate. Here’s a quick rundown of what the numbers mean – a score of anything below 620 ranks as poor, 620 to 699 is fair, 700 to 749 is good and anything over 750 is excellent. Think carefully before canceling a credit card with a long, positive history, but decrease your debt. One of the biggest factors which impact your credit score is your credit utilization rate.

Many potential homeowners focus only on the interest rate or the monthly payment. The APR or annual percentage rate gives you a better idea of the true cost of borrowing money, which includes all the fees and points for the loan.

The origination fee or points is charged by a lender to process a loan. This fee shows up on your good faith estimate (GFE) as one item called the origination charge. However, the origination fee can be made up of a few different fees such as: processing fees, underwriting fees and an origination charge.

Homeowners who are able to afford a 20% down payment do not have to pay private mortgage insurance (PMI), which costs another 0.5% to 1.0% and can tack on more money each month. Having at least 20% in equity shows lenders that there is a lower chance of the individual defaulting on the loan.

Choosing Between 15-year and 30-year Mortgages

Obtaining a 15-year fixed rate mortgage instead of a traditional 30-year mortgage means homeowners can save thousands of dollars in interest. One drawback of a 15-year mortgage is that consumers will be locked into higher monthly compared to a traditional 30-year mortgage or a 5-year or 7-year adjustable rate mortgage, “which could put the squeeze on homeowners when times are tight,” said Bruce McClary, spokesperson for the National Foundation for Credit Counseling, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit organization.

Many households would not benefit from a 15-year mortgage because it “does more to limit their financial flexibility than to enhance it,” said Greg McBride, chief financial analyst of Bankrate, a North Palm Beach, Fla.-based financial content company.

“Locking into higher monthly payments makes the household budget tighter and for what?,” he said “So you can pay down a low, fixed rate loan? On an after tax, after-inflation basis you’re essentially borrowing for free.”

McBride suggests that this strategy does not bode well for homeowners, especially if they are not paying down their higher interest rate debts and maximizing their tax-advantaged retirement savings options such as IRAs and 401(k)s.

“Even then, you might be better off investing your money elsewhere than tying up more of your wealth in the most illiquid asset you have – your home,” he said. “Just 28% of American households have a sufficient emergency savings cushion, so why the hurry to pay off a low, fixed rate, tax deductible debt. Money in the bank will pay the bills, home equity will not.”

The current economic situation has pushed down rates with 15-year mortgages becoming “relatively more attractive” than even 5-year adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) over the last year, said David Reiss, a law professor at the Brooklyn Law School in New York. Last week Freddie Mac announced the average 15-year mortgage rate was 2.74% and the average for the 5-year ARM was 2.75%.

“These rates are virtually the same,” he said. “A year ago, the 15-year was relatively more expensive than the 5-year by about 0.16%. If you can swing the higher principal payments for the 15-year mortgage you will be getting about as good an interest rate as you could hope for.”

Reiss on FHA Mortgages for First Timers

MainStreet quoted me in FHA Loans Can Be A Good Option for First-Time Homebuyers. It opens,

FHA loans can be an attractive option for consumers purchasing their first home, because they require much smaller down payments.

First-time homebuyers often consider these Federal Housing Administration loans, because they do not require a large down payment or high FICO scores unlike traditional 30-year fixed mortgages. Given that young households tend not to have the savings for a substantial down payment, they can be an attractive option, David Reiss, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School.

Because FHA loans are mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration, this guarantee reduces the risk of “loss of principal for lenders, which is advantageous for borrowers,” said Joseph Cahoon, director of the Folsom Institute for Real Estate at Southern Methodist University’s Cox School of Business School in Dallas.

This results in some consumers being able to put down as little as 3.5% for a down payment towards the purchase of a new home. For many first-time Millennial homebuyers, the prospect of saving 20% for a standard down payment has been challenging during the past several years because of a combination of low growth in wages and high student loan debt.

“For those borrowers with good credit, FHA insured loans offer a good pathway to home ownership, he said.

*     *     *

“Homebuyers should compare all of their options before going with an FHA mortgage,” Reiss said.

Housing Finance Reform at a Glance

The Urban Institute has posted its November Housing Finance At A Glance.  This is a really valuable resource. The introduction provides a nice overview of recent developments in the area:

With a sweeping midterm election victory for the GOP, the path to legislative GSE reform got considerably narrower. Thus, the focus for reform turns to the FHFA and FHA, where we expect significant movement in the coming months. Over the past six months, the FHFA has asked for input on a variety of issues, and we have commented on them all: guarantee fees and loan level pricing adjustments, Private Mortgage Insurance Eligibility requirements (PMIERs), the single security, and affordable housing goals.
The FHFA has made a concerted effort to open the credit box, strengthening the provision by which lenders are relieved from much of their put-back risk and raising the maximum loan-to-value ratio for some GSE loans from 95 to 97. Both will help expand access without unduly increasing GSE risk. FHFA Director Mel Watt has indicated in recent speeches that work is underway to further clarify reps and warrants, with more guidance on the sunset provision, an independent resolution process for put-back disputes, and remedies short of a put-back for lesser mistakes.
As our new credit availability index indicates, these actions to open the credit box are very important. Our index shows that post-crisis loans have half the credit risk of loans made in the 2000-2003 period. The GSE channel is particularly tight, with about a third of the risk of the 2000-2003 period. This is corroborated by the data in our special feature, which shows that only 8.3 percent of recent Fannie loans (page 34) and 7.4 percent of recent Freddie loans (page 36) have FICOs under 700, compared to 35-37 percent in 1999-2004.
On the FHA side, there have also been initiatives to open the credit box, as outlined in the Blueprint for Access program. Since then, the FHA has released the initial critical draft chapters of their guidebook and a draft of the taxonomy of defects. Many hope to see lower mortgage insurance premiums to broaden access and lessen the risk of adverse selection as better credit flees to the less costly GSEs. Given that their actuary now projects that the FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund will not reach the statutory reserve requirements until 2016, however, such a move is far from certain.
Risk Sharing Developments
The GSEs continue to broaden their risk sharing activities, now turning to front-end risk sharing deals. Prior to this month, they had focused exclusively, and with much success, on laying off risk already on their books, known as back-end risk sharing. Fannie has laid off risk on 7.5 percent of their book of business and Freddie on 11.9 percent of theirs (page 21), both far exceeding the requirements of the Conservatorship Scorecard. The GSEs started including mortgages over 80 LTV in these transactions in May.
This month saw a very meaningful step in bringing private capital back into the mortgage market: the first front-end risk sharing deal, JPMorgan’s Madison Avenue Securities 2014-1 (page 21). JP Morgan warehoused loans made by JP Morgan Chase bank, then sold them in bulk into a newly issued Fannie Mae MBS, presumably for a very meaningful reduction in guarantee fees. JP Morgan retained the first 4.75 percent subordinated interest, and a 26.88 bps servicing strip that absorbs losses before the subordinated interest. The risk on the 4.75 percent subordinated interest was sold in the capital markets in the form of credit linked notes. Redwood Trust is also reported to be contemplating a front-end risk sharing transaction.
Front-end risk sharing bears important similarities to the private capital/catastrophic insurance structure contemplated by many GSE reform proposals. It is thus an administrative opportunity to experiment deliberately with a truly reduced government footprint in the conventional mortgage market. (3)
I am very excited by the possibility of putting private capital in a first loss position for residential mortgages and agree with UI that the stars are aligning, at least a little bit, for this to become a reality. Many interests will need to be balanced for this to move forward, but politicians of all stripes should be worried about leaving Fannie and Freddie in limbo for much longer.

Insuring Mortgages Through the Business Cycle

Mark Zandi and Cristian deRitis of Moody’s, along with Jim Parrott of the Urban Institute, have posted Putting Mortgage Insurers on Solid Ground. They wrote this in response to the Private Mortgage Insurance Eligibility Requirements set forth by the FHFA. While generally approving of the requirements, they argue that

Several features of the rules as currently written, however, would likely
unnecessarily increase costs and cyclicality in the mortgage and housing markets.
With a few modest changes, these flaws can be remedied without sacrificing the
considerable benefits of the new standards. (1)

I would first start by reviewing their disclosure:  “Mark Zandi is a director of one mortgage insurance company, and Jim Parrott is an advisor to another. The authors do not believe that their analysis has been impacted by these relationships, however. Their work reflects the authors’ independent beliefs regarding the appropriate financial requirements for the industry.” While, I understand that the authors believe that their views are not impacted by their financial relationships with private mortgage insurers, readers will certainly want to take them into account when evaluating those views.

The authors argue that FHFA’s requirements are procyclical, that is they become more burdensome just as mortgage insurers are facing a distressed environment. This could contribute to a vicious cycle where mortgage credit tightens because of regulatory causes just when we might want credit to loosen up. This is certainly something we should look out for.

They also argue that the FHFA’s requirements will increase mortgage insurance premiums unnecessarily because they increase capital reserves too much. I find this argument less compelling. The Private Mortgage Insurance industry has typically done terribly in distressed environments from the Great Depression through the 2000s. Not only have there been failures but they have also reduced their underwriting of new insurance just when the market was most fragile.

But there are certain shaky assumptions built into this analysis. For instance, they argue that Private Mortgage Insurance companies will need to maintain their historical after-tax return on capital of 15%. But if the business model is shored up with higher capital reserves, investors should be satisfied with a lower return on capital because the companies are less likely to go bust. That is, instead of increasing premiums for homeowners, it is possible that higher capital requirements might just reduce profits.

The authors write that while “the increase in capital requirements is clearly warranted, there are certain features of the requirements as currently drafted that will increase mortgage insurance premiums unnecessarily, running counter to the aim of policymakers, including the FHFA, to encourage greater use of private capital in housing finance.” (2-4) Policymakers have lots of goals for private mortgage insurance, including having it not implode during down markets. An unthinking reliance on private capital is not what we should be after. Rather, we should seek to promote a thoughtful reliance on private capital, taking into account how we it can best help us maintain a healthy mortgage market throughout the business cycle.

Good Data for the FHFA

The Federal Housing Finance Agency released a White Paper on the FHFA Mortgage Analytics Platform.  By way of background, the White Paper states that

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) maintains a proprietary Mortgage Analytics Platform to support the Agency’s strategic plan. The objective of this white paper is to provide interested stakeholders with a detailed description of the platform, as it is one of the tools the FHFA uses in policy analysis. The distribution of this white paper is part of a larger effort to increase transparency on mortgage performance and the analytical tools used for policy analysis and evaluation within the FHFA.

The motivation to build the FHFA Mortgage Analytics Platform derived from the Agency’s need for an independent empirical view on multiple policy initiatives. Academic empirical studies may suffer from a lack of high quality data, while empirical work from inside the industry typically represents a specific view. The FHFA maintains several vendor platforms from which an independent view is possible, yet these platforms tend to be inflexible and opaque. The unique role of the FHFA as regulator and conservator necessitated platform flexibility and transparency to carry out its responsibilities.

The FHFA Mortgage Analytics Platform is maintained on a continuous basis; as such, the material herein represents the platform as of the publication date of this document. As resources permit, this document will be up dated to reflect enhancements to the platform. (2)

This platform is a very welcome development for exactly the reasons that the White Paper sets forth.  Academics have a very hard time accessing good data on the mortgage markets (its usually expensive, untimely, limited).  Industry interpretations of data typically have agendas.

A sampling of the Platform’s elements include:

  • Performing Unpaid Principal Balance
  • Scheduled Paid Principal Balance
  • Unscheduled Paid Principal
  • Dollars of New 90 Day Delinquencies
  • Non-Performing Balances
  • Property Value of Non-Performing Loans (30-31)

Let us hope that the Platform offers a transparent and flexible tool to track this very dynamic market.

Reiss on Mortgage Insurance Proposal

Law360 quoted me in FHFA Capital Rules Will Squeeze Older Mortgage Insurers (behind a paywall). It opens,

The Federal Housing Finance Agency on Thursday released proposals that would impose higher capital requirements on private mortgage insurers doing business with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but experts say insurers with bubble-era mortgages in their portfolios may find it tough to meet the new mandates.

The new standards will force mortgage insurers to determine the amount of cash and other liquid assets they retain to cover potential payouts using more of a risk-based formula than they have up to this point, meaning that the riskier the mortgage, the more capital will be required.

Because of that, mortgage insurers that were in business during the housing bubble era and have older loans on their books will be hit harder than insurers that have only post-financial crisis loans on their books, said Paul Hastings LLP partner Kevin Petrasic.

“The older vintage mortgages have more challenging issues than the newer mortgages,” he said.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are barred from backing mortgages where the borrower has contributed less than a 20 percent down payment without getting private mortgage insurance to make up the difference. The insurance on those mortgages absorbs any losses before Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do in the case of default, in essence putting private money before taxpayer money.

During the financial crisis, private mortgage insurers paid out billions of dollars on bad mortgages even as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took on over $180 billion in federal bailout money in the fall of 2008, when they were put under the FHFA’s conservatorship.

However, the financial crisis also saw many of the larger mortgage insurers fail under the weight of the huge number of claims they had to cover, contributing to Fannie and Freddie’s collapses.

“The history of the mortgage insurance industry is a history of good profits during good times and catastrophic losses in bad times,” said Brooklyn Law School professor David Reiss. “It seems like what the FHFA is doing is saying we don’t want the taxpayer on the hook during the next period of catastrophic losses.”

That is exactly what the FHFA says it intends with its new regulations, part of a so-called strategic plan to strengthen Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and to bring more private money into the mortgage market.

Watt’s up with Fannie and Freddie

There has been a lot of press coverage of FHFA Director Watt’s first public speech since taking on his job. Watt emphasized that

we must ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate in a safe and sound manner.  It means that we’ll work to preserve and conserve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s assets.  And it means that we’ll work to ensure a liquid and efficient national housing finance market.  Our job at FHFA is to balance these obligations . . ..

He also set forth three goals for his FHFA:

Strategic Goal 1: MAINTAIN, in a safe and sound manner, foreclosure prevention activities and credit availability for new and refinanced mortgages to foster liquid, efficient, competitive and resilient national housing finance markets. 

Strategic Goal 2: REDUCE taxpayer risk through increasing the role of private capital in the mortgage market.

Strategic Goal 3: BUILD a new single-family securitization infrastructure for use by the Enterprises and adaptable for use by other participants in the secondary market in the future.

These goals are all totally reasonable for the FHFA to pursue. But it is also clear that Director Watt is taking the FHFA in a direction that is quite different than the one pursued by his predecessor, Acting Director DeMarco.  DeMarco had taken the position that the best way to protect taxpayers was to be pretty tough on everyone else. “Everyone else” included defaulting and underwater homeowners as well as originating lenders who had sold Fannie and Freddie tons of mortgages that did not comply with the reps and warranties that the parties had agreed to about the quality of those mortgages. DeMarco’s strategy was much criticized but also quite coherent.

Watt has made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with homeowners. He highlighted a pilot program in Detroit that will include “deeper loan modifications.”  He has also made it clear that he is going to be more flexible with lenders, relaxing rep and warranty standards for mortgages that Fannie and Freddie purchase from lenders. These may be very good policies to pursue, but it would be helpful if he set forth a clearer vision of how safety and soundness is best balanced with liquidity and efficiency. Federal housing finance policy typically goes off the rails when its goals get all mixed up. Director Watt should ensure that FHFA’s safety and soundness goals are clearly set forth and that other goals for Fannie and Freddie are designed to work in harmony with them.