Ghost of A Crisis Past

photo by Chandres

The Royal Bank of Scotland settled an investigation brought by New York Attorney General Schneiderman arising from mortgage-backed securities it issued in the run up to the financial crisis. RBS will pay a half a billion dollars. That’s a lot of money even in the context of the settlements that the federal government had wrangled from financial institutions in the aftermath to the financial crisis. The Settlement Agreement includes a Statement of Facts which RBS has acknowledged. Many settlement agreements do not include such a statement, leaving the dollar amount of the settlement to do all of the talking. We are lucky to see what facts exactly RBS is “acknowledging.”

The Statement of Facts found that assertions in the offering documents for the MBS were inaccurate and the securities have lost billions of dollars in collateral. These losses led to “shortfalls in principal and interest payments, as well as declines in the market value of their certificates.” (Appendix A at 2)

The Statement of Facts outlines just how RBS deviated from the statements it made in the offering documents:

RBS’s Representations to Investors

11. The Offering Documents for the Securitizations included, in varying forms, statements that the mortgage loans were “originated generally in accordance with” the originator’s underwriting guidelines, and that exceptions would be made on a “case-by-case basis…where compensating factors exist.” The Offering Documents further stated that such exceptions would be made “from time to time and in the ordinary course of business,” and disclosed that “[l]oans originated with exceptions may result in a higher number of delinquencies and loss severities than loans originated in strict compliance with the designated underwriting guidelines.”

12. The Offering Documents often contained statements, in varying forms, with respect to stated-income loans, that “the stated income is reasonable for the borrower’s employment and that the stated assets are consistent with the borrower’s income.”

13. The Offering Documents further contained statements, in varying forms, that each mortgage loan was originated “in compliance with applicable federal, state and local laws and regulations.”

14. The Offering Documents also included statements regarding the valuation of the mortgaged properties and the resulting loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios, such as the weighted-average LTV and maximum LTV at origination of the securitized loans.

15. In addition, the Offering Documents typically stated that loans acquired by RBS for securitization were “subject to due diligence,” often described as including a “thorough credit and compliance review with loan level testing,” and stated that “the depositor will not include any loan in a trust fund if anything has come to the depositor’s attention that would cause it to believe that the representations and warranties of the related seller regarding that loan will not be accurate and complete in all material respects….”

The Actual Quality of the Mortgage Loans in the Securitizations

16. At times, RBS’s credit and compliance diligence vendors identified a number of loans as diligence exceptions because, in their view, they did not comply with underwriting guidelines and lacked adequate compensating factors or did not comply with applicable laws and regulations. Loans were also identified as diligence exceptions because of missing documents or other curable issues, or because of additional criteria specified by RBS for the review. In some instances, RBS disagreed with the vendor’s view. Certain of these loans were included in the Securitizations.

17. Additionally, some valuation diligence reports reflected variances between the appraised value of the mortgaged properties and the values obtained through other measures, such as automated valuation models (“AVMs”), broker-price opinions (“BPOs”), and drive-by reviews. In some instances, the LTVs calculated using AVM or BPO valuations exceeded the maximum LTV stated in the Offering Documents, which was calculated using the lower of the appraised value or the purchase price. Certain of these loans were included in the Securitizations.

18. RBS often purchased and securitized loans that were not part of the diligence sample without additional loan-file review. The Offering Documents did not include a description of the diligence reports prepared by RBS’s vendors, and did not state the size of the diligence sample or the number of loans with diligence exceptions or valuation variances identified during their reviews.

19. At times, RBS agreed with originators to limit the number of loan files it could review during its due diligence. Although RBS typically reserved the right to request additional loan-level diligence or not complete the loan purchase, in practice it rarely did so. These agreements with originators were not disclosed in the Offering Documents.

20. Finally, RBS performed post-securitization reviews of certain loans that defaulted shortly after securitization. These reviews identified a number of loans that appeared to breach the representations and warranties contained in the Offering Documents. Based on these reviews, RBS in some instances requested that the loan seller or loan originator repurchase certain loans. (Appendix A at 4-5)

Some of these inaccuracies are just straight-out misrepresentations, so they would not have been caught at the time by regulators, even if regulators had been looking. And that’s why, ten years later, we are still seeing financial crisis lawsuits being resolved.

It is not clear that these types of problems can be kept from infiltrating the capital market once greed overcomes fear over the course of the business cycle. That’s why it is important for individual actors to suffer consequences when they allow greed to take the driver’s seat. We still have not figured out how to effectively address tho individual actions that result in systemic harm.

Manafort’s Mystery Mortgage

photo by Kevin Dooley

NBC News quoted me in Manafort Got $3.5M Mystery Mortgage, Paid No Tax. It opens,

Former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort took out a $3.5 million mortgage through a shell company just after leaving the campaign, but the mortgage document that explains how he would pay it back was never filed — and Manafort’s company never paid $36,000 in taxes that would be due on the loan.

In addition, despite telling NBC News previously that all his real estate transactions are transparent and include his name and signature, Manafort’s name and signature do not appear on any of the loan documents that are publicly available. A Manafort spokesperson said the $3.5 million loan was repaid in December, but also said paperwork showing the repayment was not filed until he was asked about the loan by NBC News.

News of the missing documents comes as New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is taking a “preliminary look” at Manafort’s real estate transactions, according to a source familiar with the matter.

On August 19, 2016, Manafort left the Trump campaign amid media reports about his previous work for a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine, including allegations he received millions of dollars in payments.

That same day, Manafort created a holding company called Summerbreeze LLC. Several weeks later, a document called a UCC filed with the state of New York shows that Summerbreeze took out a $3.5 million loan on Manafort’s home in the tony beach enclave of Bridgehampton.

Manafort’s name does not appear on the UCC filing, but Summerbreeze LLC gives his Florida address as a contact, and lists his Bridgehampton home as collateral.

A review of New York state and Suffolk County records shows the loan was made by S C 3, a subsidiary of Spruce Capital, which was co-founded by Joshua Crane, who has partnered with Donald Trump on real estate deals. Spruce is also partially funded by Ukrainian-American real-estate magnate Alexander Rovt, who tried to donate $10,000 to Trump’s presidential campaign on Election Day but had all but the legal maximum of $2,700 returned.

The mortgage notice for the loan, however, was never entered into government records by the lender. A mortgage notice normally names the lender, and gives the interest rate, the frequency with which payments must be made, and the length of the mortgage.

Real estate experts contacted by NBC News called the omission “highly unusual,” though not illegal.

David Reiss, a professor at Brooklyn Law School who specializes in real estate law, said, “It would be totally ill-advised to not record the loan on the property that is being secured. … Recording the mortgage on the property protects the lender.” Without it, there’s no public record that the borrower owes money.

Reiss on Airbnb

MainStreet.com quoted me in Housing Activists Claim Airbnb Cuts Into Affordable Apartment Inventory in Manhattan. The story opens

Popular and trendy neighborhoods in Manhattan accounted for 30% of units booked as private rentals on AirBnB.com, according to information subpoenaed by New York Attorney General (AG) Eric T. Schneiderman that Airbnb fought against releasing.

Those neighborhoods include the Lower East Side, Chinatown, Chelsea, Hells Kitchen, Greenwich Village and SoHo. “Removing rental units from the marketplace by operating them as illegal hotels damages the availability of housing,” said Roxanne Earley, a blogger with the Association for Neighborhood & Housing Development (ANHD).

Another tidbit from the AG’s report based on subpoenaed records is that commercial users of the home-sharing website collected $168 million in rent last year, controlled one in five AirBnb units and one in three bookings. “Although Airbnb is marketing itself as a company that helps the majority of its hosts make some extra money to keep their homes, the reality is that a multi-billion dollar business is helping a small portion of commercial users rake in a disproportionate amount of profit,” Earley told MainStreet.

“The markup on short-term rentals is much higher than that of long-term residential use of apartments and this has resulted in landlords breaking the law and using their units, sometimes whole buildings as illegal hotels,” said Earley.

And that’s eating into affordable housing units that city residents could be living in. “Commercial users earn an incredible markup on short term rentals and take units that may otherwise be affordable off of the market for long term occupancy,” Earley said.

The existence of rent regulation is unique to cities like New York and San Francisco and further complicates the Airbnb factor. Administered by a court or public authority, rent regulation limits the changes in price that can be attached to renting a home, which balances the negotiating power of landlord to tenant.

“If rent regulated apartments become profit-centers, tenants may also be incentivized to hang on to their apartments longer than they would otherwise, negatively impacting the availability of affordable housing for those who would use it purely for their own personal residence,” said David Reiss, professor at Brooklyn Law School.

 

Casting Light on the Shadow Docket

New York Attorney General Schneiderman’s lawsuit against various HSBC entities, New York v. HSBC Bank USA et al., No. 2013-1660 (May 31, 2013), alleges that HSBC entities have sent hundreds or thousands of NY households into legal limbo because they did not comply with procedural requirements applicable to foreclosure.  The complaint outlines these procedural requirements as follows (warning:  technical details to follow):

13. At lease 90 days prior to filing a foreclosure action, the lender must send a homeowner a notice that (i) states the homeowner is at risk of losing the home, (ii) sets forth the amount owed and (iii) provides a list of approved housing counseling agencies that may provide free or low-cost counseling.  [RPAPL section 1304(1).]  The intent of RPAPL, section 1304(1) is to prevent the necessity of a foreclosure action the first place.

easy installment loans

14. It the matter is not resolved within 90 days, the lender may file a foreclosure action.  [RPAPL section 1304(1).]

15. In order to help homeowners avoid losing their home whenever possible, New York State law, CPLR section 3408(a), provides for the court to schedule a mandatory settlement conference for the homeowner and lender.

16. The express purpose of the settlement conference is “to determin[e] whether the parties can reach a mutually agreeable resolution to help the [homeowner] avoid losing his or her home, and evaluat[e] the potential for a resolution in which payment schedules or amounts may be modified or other workout options may be agreed to, and for whatever other purposes the court deems appropriate.” [CPLR section 3408(a).]

17. The lender or its counsel must appear a the mandatory settlement conference. If counsel appears, the lawyer must have authority to dispose of the case. CPLR section 3408(c) (emphasis added). The parties are required to negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution, including a loan modification, that will enable the homeowner to stay in his or her home on more affordable terms.

18. Recognizing that the success of a settlement conference will be enhanced if it is heldf as soon as possible before the arrears, interest, fees and penalties owed by the homeowner mount, CPLR section 3408(a) mandates that the court must hold a settlement conference within sixty days after the date that the lender files proof of service.

19.  However, proof of service is filed with the County Clerk and not the Uniform Court System, which is responsible for scheduling the mandatory settlement conference.  Because the Unified Court System is not aware that a foreclosure action has been commenced until a Request for Judicial Intervention (“RJI”) has been filed, New York Court rules regarding residential foreclosures and mandatory settlement conferences, 22 NYCR section 202.12-a(b)(1), expressly require that the lender file an RJI with the proof of service.

20. Filing the RJI with the proof of service furthers the New York State policy of preventing the loss of homes to foreclosures in two important respects.

21. First, without filing the RJI with the proof of service, the Unified Court System cannot comply with its legal obligation to hold the mandatory settlement conference within sixty days after the date when proof of service is filed.

22. Second, the court sends the RJI, or the homeowner’s name, address and telephone number to an approved housing agency “for the purpose of that agency making the homeowner aware of housing counseling and foreclosure prevention services and options available to them . . .” CPLR section 3408(d). The obvious intent of this requirement is to provide homeowners with the tools and resources that can help them avoid losing their homes. (3-5)

These cases are what is now known as the “shadow docket” because they are in a litigation limbo. it seems that HSBC will have a hard time arguing with the AG’s identification of hundreds of such cases in the four of NY’s 62 counties that it investigated. But it is unclear whether courts will be willing to impose the penalties requested by the AG, including “waiving all accrued interest charges, fees and penalties that accrued, or will accrue, beginning 60 days after the filing of proof of service on the homeowner.” (11) While the failure to hold the settlement conference most certainly has harmed some homeowners, it has also most certainly not harmed others who were not in the position to pay anything at all on a mortgage after losing a job or facing some other serious crisis. There may be a disconnect between the wrong exposed and the remedy requested.