NYC’s Abandoned Public Housing

The Community Service Society issued an important report, Strengthening New York City’s Public Housing. Public housing has a terrible reputation in much of the country, but the New York City Housing Authority traditionally had the reputation, notwithstanding its real flaws, as the best large public housing system in the nation. This report makes a strong case that many of its current flaws are the result of systemic disinvestment at the federal, state and local levels in recent years. The report concludes,

the analysis confirms the reality of the appalling living conditions in NYCHA apartments reported by residents and the media for several years. But the Authority’s reputation or its competence should not be at issue; it performed relatively well until its resource base fell apart in the period following 2001. Government defunding was and is the root cause of the accelerating deterioration over the last decade. The state and city were major contributors to that decline, often at levels equivalent to the federal disinvestment. They should be open to a major role in restoring NYCHA.

Moreover, existing institutional arrangements that make NYCHA opaque to public scrutiny need to be changed—those that mask the Authority’s financial condition and its failures to comply with local housing and building codes—because they cloak the real consequences of government defunding and, as a result, deprive residents, advocates, concerned elected officials, and the interested public of the information they could use as ammunition to press for needed resources. The NYCHA Board also needs to be freer to act as a leading advocate for the Authority. Its governance structure should be reconsidered to assure the Board the independent voice it needs to better make the case for itself and its residents. (27)

The de Blasio Administration has made affordable housing a centerpiece of its agenda, so there is reason to think that this report will get its attention. Let us hope so — there is a lot of solid infrastructure which just needs its deferred maintenance issues addressed. But the report also highlights various operational changes that can lead to real improvements in the lives of NYCHA residents.  These reforms could provide many low-income households with decent homes.

A Resilient NYC

NYU’s Furman Center released a report, The Price of Resilience: Can Multifamily Housing Afford to Adapt? It explains that storm-proofing New York City

poses several special challenges not shared by all coastal areas. First, New York City is largely built out, with much of its building stock long predating current flood-resistant design standards. Resilience in New York, then, primarily means retrofitting older buildings, not just strengthening building codes for new construction. Second, much of the official guidance about how to retrofit residential properties to reduce risk and lower insurance premiums is geared toward 1-4 family buildings, reflecting the national housing stock. In New York City, though, only one-third of the buildings thought to be vulnerable to flooding are1-4 family, detached homes. A much larger number of housing units vulnerable to future storms are located in roughly 4,500 multifamily buildings with five or more rental units. Finding ways to cost effectively retrofit these types of buildings to protect residents and reduce insurance premiums for owners needs to be central to New York City’s storm-preparedness efforts.

Finally, the extreme shortage of affordable housing in New York may make the direct and indirect costs of retrofitting particularly hard to bear. Based on current federal policy, increased flood risk requires for many buildings either investment in physical improvements or payment of higher insurance premiums. Without external funding or other relief, there is no clear avenue to enact these resilience improvements while maintaining affordability. Eliminating all units below the predicted flood level, for example, could result in the loss of thousands of indispensable housing units. Even if units are not lost, property owners may pass on the costs of retrofitting buildings to residents through a rent increase, reducing the supply of affordable units in New York City’s coastal areas. For buildings that are constrained in their ability to raise rents and raise funds for improvements, like many of the rent stabilized and subsidized buildings in the city, the financial burden of making costly retrofits might be overwhelming, leading to the conversion of those buildings to market rate (when permitted), unsustainable operating budgets that may require a bail-out, or a large number of buildings left unprepared for future storms. The costs of not retrofitting, however, may be even more burdensome: building owners may face skyrocketing flood insurance premiums if they do not retrofit their buildings.

While I am not so sure that storm-proofing will be what pushes New York City’s housing stock into the unaffordable column (I think the relentless increases in demand might just to the job for units that are not rent regulated), the Furman Center report reminds us that we have a lot to do to protect New York from the next big storm. The Bloomberg Administration did a lot in a short time to identify what the City can do to increase the City’s resiliency. Given the quality of his housing and economic development team, there is reason to hope that the de Blasio Administration will continue to tackle the threat of climate change in a productive way.

The Furman Center report provides three concrete recommendations to ensure that NYC’s large stock of multi-family housing in flood zones is protected from future storm events:

  1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should modify the guidelines for its National Flood Insurance Program for coverage of existing multifamily buildings;
  2. New York City should expand its Flood Resilience Zoning Text Amendment to cover buildings in the 500-year floodplain; and
  3. The city should revisit its existing rehabilitation programs to ensure that resilience measures can be readily funded; and it should require that buildings in the 100-year and 500-year floodplains that receive city assistance have adequate emergency and resilience plans.

These all seem like reasonable policies that should be implemented asap.

Rent Regulation and Housing Affordability

NYU’s Furman Center issued a fact brief, Profile of Rent-Stabilized Units and Tenants in New York City, that provides context for the deliberations of the Rent Guidelines Board as it considers a rent freeze for NYC apartments subject to rent stabilization.

Rent regulated (rent stabilized and rent controlled) apartments clearly serve households that have lower incomes than households in market rate apartments. Median household income (fifty percent are below and fifty percent are above this number) is $37,600 for rent regulated and $52,260 for market rate households.Thus, market rate households have median incomes that are nearly 40% higher than rent regulated ones.

The median rent is $1,155 for rent regulated and $1,510 for market rate households.Thus, median rents are about 30% higher for market rate tenants.

Despite these differences, the number of households that are rent burdened (where rent is greater than 30% of income) is similar for the two groups: 58% for rent regulated and about 56% for market rate households. (4, Table D)

The Furman Center brief provides a useful context in which to consider NYC’s rental housing stock as well as the households that live in it. Given the nature of NYC households, however, I would have wished for a more finely detailed presentation of household incomes and rents.

NYC’s distribution of income is skewed toward the extremes — more low-income and high-income households and therefore fewer middle-income ones than the rest of the nation. Given this, it would have been helpful to have seen the range and distribution of incomes and rents, perhaps by deciles. The Furman Center brief indicates that updated data will be available next year, so that may provide an opportunity to give a more granular sense of dynamics of the NYC rental market.

Mayor de Blasio’s housing plan outlines his commitment to preserving affordable housing. One element of that commitment is to preserve rent regulated housing. Understanding that market sector and the households it serves is essential to meeting that commitment.

Investors Unite for High GSE-Fees

Investors Unite, a “coalition of private investors . . . committed to the preservation of shareholder rights for those invested in” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sent a letter to FHFA Director Watt pushing for higher guarantee fees (g-fees). The technical issue of how high g-fees should be set actually contains important policy implications, as I had blogged about earlier.

Tim Pagliara, the Executive Director of Investors Unite, writes,

g-fees were historically determined by the GSEs and FHFA does not have a mandate as conservator to run the GSEs as not-for-profit entities. We urge you to adhere to a set of principles that takes into account the critical purpose of setting appropriate guarantee fees while respecting the rights of all economic stakeholders, including the GSE’s shareholders. Ideally, after undoing the 2012 sweep, when setting guarantees fees, FHFA should also take into full consideration that:

1. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have profit-making purposes onto which public mandates are layered, and they should charge guarantee fees that earn an appropriate market-based return on the capital employed, whether taxpayer capital or private capital. This is an absolutely critical factor “other than expected losses, unexpected losses and G&A fees” that should be considered when determining g-fees.

2. Increasing guarantee fees will provide more cash flow with which the GSEs can build capital and be restored to “safe and solvent condition.” Maximizing returns is not only consistent with, but arguably required by, the conservatorship.

3. FHFA as conservator has legal duties to the direct economic stakeholders – including all shareholders – that must be respected alongside the interests of other parties.

4. Earning an appropriate return on capital is entirely consistent with the conservatorship and affordable housing mandates. There is no conflict here between the GSEs building capital and setting aside funds for affordable housing. Indeed, it is only when the GSEs have earned their way back to a “safe and solvent condition” that they can sustainably meet their public affordable-housing mandates. After the GSEs have adequate capital, the suspension of those mandates can be reversed, i.e. the affordable housing support can be turned back on.

5. Keeping guarantee fees low to support the housing market in general, including homeowners and homebuyers that are well off and do not need help, is not as important as charging higher guarantee fees (a) to build a capital base to protect against future credit losses, and (b) to redistribute a portion of earnings to targeted constituencies that  particularly need financial support.

6. Guarantee fee rates should be tied to sound underwriting standards. If FHFA directs the GSEs to relax underwriting standards, it is essential that guarantee fees be adjusted upwards to account for the greater credit risk assumed in doing so.

Ultimately, g-fees profits should be allowed to stay within the housing market and should be set at levels that help ensure safety and soundness of the GSEs, that protect long-term health of the housing market, and that respect the rights of all economic stakeholders-including the GSE’s shareholders. (1-2, emphasis added)

This letter goes to the heart of the g-fee debate and the GSE litigation, as far as I am concerned.  The g-fee level will determine whether Fannie and Freddie shares have any value at all. A low g-fee means no profits and no value. A high g-fee means profits and shareholder value. I agree with Pagliara that g-fees should reflect “sound underwriting.” The FHFA should therefore clearly outline the goals that the g-fee is intended to achieve. I may disagree with Pagliara as to what those goals should be, but sound underwriting is key to any vision of a sustainable housing finance market.

Promoting Affordable Housing, and the Winner Is . . .

I had blogged about a competition to generate ideas to lower the cost of affordable housing, the Minnesota Challenge to Lower the Cost of Affordable Housing.  I was pretty excited about this challenge and was happy to see that a winner has been chosen:  the University of Minnesota’s Center for Urban and Regional Affairs (CURA).

CURA’s winning proposal is here.  Basically, they

propose a three-stage program for addressing the state and local regulatory cost driver. First, we will identify and summarize best practices at the state and local levels for reducing regulatory and permitting barriers to affordable housing. There is a significant national database of initiatives that can provide examples for possible implementation here, as well as the Affordable Housing Toolkit established by ULI Minnesota. Second, we will conduct an analysis of where a more complete adoption of best practices is likely to have the largest effect on the production of affordable housing, particularly those suburban cities with the largest future affordable housing goals. Finally, we will take advantage of the fact that the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities is currently drafting a Regional Housing Policy plan, which is a vehicle that could implement regulatory reforms and create incentives for local governments to adopt practices and policies to reduce development costs. (1)
These are all valuable things to do, but I have to say that I am disappointed that this is as good as it gets when it comes to innovation regarding reducing the cost of affordable housing construction. Perhaps the takeaway lesson is that building affordable housing is expensive and that we can only cut costs a bit at the margins. I am hoping, however, that I am wrong about that and that some innovative ideas are still out there. Are there big ideas about inclusionary zoning?  About modular construction? About public/private partnerships? We’ll have to wait and see.

Affordable Housing Preservation in NYC

Leaders of Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A have released a white paper, Mayor de Blasio’s Housing Plan:  The Most Important Housing Plan in NYC History? Just to get the suspense out of the way, they pretty much feel that it is. But they do push the Mayor to pay more attention to the preservation aspect of his Housing Plan. They write,

Based upon our experience, representing the low-income tenants we serve, we have observed that rent decontrol is often brought about by predatory actions from landlords to push protected tenants out of their apartments in order to reach decontrol status. In 2013, over 30,000 New York City families were displaced from their homes. Without access to free legal services, many of these families had to represent themselves in Housing Court and were unable to fight the predatory and often illegal actions that made them lose their homes. The most recent reports from the Task Force to Expand Access to Civil Legal Services commissioned by the Chief Judge of the State of New York stated that 99% of tenants are unrepresented in eviction cases in New York City. The need for legal services is very real, and without increasing the very limited resources available for such services the fight for preserving affordable housing will almost certainly not be successful.

Brooklyn A’s attorneys are constantly witnessing how this perfect storm of rising housing values and limited supply of affordable housing can impact low-income communities. In many neighborhoods landlords are more incentivized than ever to try and push out rent protected tenants by any means necessary, so that they can void the rent protections and bring in new tenants willing to pay the inflated market price. We are currently representing tenants from a building whose main waterline, boiler and gas meters were destroyed in the middle of the night, only a short time after the tenants refused offers by their landlords to get bought out of their apartments. In another recent case the landlord shut off all heat, hot water, and sewage in the building to provoke a vacate order to force the rent-stabilized tenants out. The tenants had to live in emergency Red Cross shelters for a period of time because they lost their home; including one who had lived at the building for thirty years. Unfortunately, these are just a couple of examples of increasingly common practices by landlords to violate and then deregulate those apartments. (2, footnotes omitted)

During earlier run ups in real estate prices, landlords seeking to make a quick profit were known to send in thugs with baseball bats and pit bulls to frighten tenants, particularly elderly tenants, so that they would move and make the apartments available for tenants who would paid higher rents. The predatory equity that has been documented in NYC in the last decade has used less obviously threatening behaviors such as “repairs” that lead to long term loss of utilities and frivolous filings in housing court. But the goal is the same — get rid of tenants paying low rent-regulated rents.  Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A is right to focus on the role that legal services attorneys can play in protecting existing affordable housing in a cost-effective way.